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LIBYA - BILLY CARTER

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-19NEW YORK TIMES
24 JULY 1980

ESSAY

The
Hostage
Profiteer

By William Safire

WASHINGTON, July 23 — Why do you suppose Zbigniew Brzezinski lied when he insisted to me last Sunday that he had not discussed Libya with Billy Carter? Why did he claim that the only reason the President's brother came to him after a Justice Department interrogation was because Zbig was "a family friend"?

And why did Presidential Counsel Lloyd Cutler tell reporters that Billy Carter just "showed up" at his office, assuring us that "nothing sinister" could be attached to the person who arranged for him to just "show up"?

No matter of national security caused these deliberate deceptions. The sole reason for this week's dissembling in the White House was to cover up Jimmy Carter's dirtiest little secret: that he had entrusted a diplomatic mission to his besotted, bigoted brother — and that Billy Carter immediately took advantage of his official hostage-crisis credentials to set up a multimillion-dollar oil deal.

Follow the hostage profiteering:

On Nov. 27, 1979, Mr. Brzezinski met at 11:30 A.M. with the President, Vice President, C.I.A. Director Turner and Hamilton Jordan. The White House admits the National Security Adviser then went to a meeting about the Iranian crisis and other matters that Billy Carter had been asked to arrange with Ali el-Houdari, Dictator Qaddafi's representative in the U.S.

On Dec. 10, two weeks after the Brzezinski-Billy Carter-Houdari meeting, Qaddafi told Youssef Ibrahim of The New York Times in Libya that he had received "assurances" from the U.S.: "We have received these assurances in the last few days through unofficial but reliable channels from President Carter," said Qaddafi. "We interpret them as meaning a more neutral American posture in the conflict between the Arabs and Israel."

In the midst of this dealing with an Arab leader who considers Yasir Arafat too moderate, Billy Carter — who had not until then been able to shake substantial money out of the Libyans — presented his bill: a 55-cents-a-barrel commission on Libyan-American oil sales that could earn him \$20 million, and a half-million-dollar loan.

arrears to the Internal Revenue Service. In the lax Atlanta office of I.R.S., agents had turned stringent after criticism of an earlier "sweetheart audit" of Carter Warehouses.

Within one month — in January of this year — Mr. Houdari, the same Libyan friend of Billy who relayed the Brzezinski "assurances" to Qaddafi, signed the first check after seeing results from Billy Carter's obviously valuable services. More important, the President's brother was encouraged to become the middleman in oil sales, an idea first advanced by Robert Vesco.

The Carter-Houdari deal was probably this: Billy was to deliver Brzezinski's assurances of a second-term tilt toward the Arabs, along with a pipeline into the Oval Office — in return for Qaddafi's message to Ayatollah Khomeini on the hostages to show President Carter what an effective diplomat his little brother could be, along with the whopping oil commissions and a small advance to tide him over.

Two months later, in March, electronic intercepts alert Mr. Brzezinski to the likelihood that First Brother would soon be cashing in on the hostage initiative with his oil deal. He takes this to Jimmy Carter, who tells his National Security Adviser to call Billy Carter to warn him (a possible violation of the Communications Intelligence Act). At that point, the President must have realized he had created a double agent: While his brother was ostensibly helping with the hostages, he was able to use this activity to get commissions directed his way by a foreign power.

When Mr. Brzezinski was finally forced into the open this week, Counsel Cutler shrewdly tried to focus the question of the President's guilty knowledge on the payments of \$220,000, part of the advance against future oil commissions. That detail is insignificant compared to the President's knowledge of his brother's multimillion-dollar oil deal.

The President and his closest advisers — fully aware that the Department of Justice was lazily trying to get Billy Carter to register — did nothing then to cause him to make full disclosure or to disclose the whole sordid story themselves.

At Philip Heymann's criminal division, where every week is Brotherhood Week, nobody involved in this scandal has been put under oath. A Senate select committee, with special counsel, would put an end to the see-no-evil favoritism; the majority leader, Robert Byrd, is putting up partisan resistance.

Diplomatic urgency rather than national security is now being peddled by the White House as justification for this year's cover-up. Nobody's buying; we all knew that Jimmy Carter profited in the polls from the seizure of Americans as hostages, but few suspected that his money-grubbing

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE **B-15**

WASHINGTON POST
23 JULY 1980

JACK ANDERSON

Georgians Lured by Libya's Oilbucks

Some of the good ol' boys around Jimmy Carter have demonstrated an overpowering attraction toward Libya's Muammar Qaddafi, the darling of world terrorists. This is developing into a major scandal which has already produced some incriminating conversations, secretly recorded and erased ~~as in~~ Watergate.

The real lure, of course, is Qaddafi's abundant petrodollars, which he has handed out to terrorist gangs and President Carter's brother Billy alike. The fiery Qaddafi has been characterized by the Central Intelligence Agency as "the world's most unabashed proponent of revolutionary violence."

Billy Carter made his first excursion to Libya in September 1978. He took along an entourage of Georgians who were eager, I was told, to relieve Qaddafi of some petrobucks. So I flew to Libya to find out what the president's brother had been up to.

It didn't take long to discover what Qaddafi wanted out of the Carter administration. He was furious over Washington's refusal to deliver some airliners and transport planes which he had purchased from the United States.

Qaddafi positively fumed when he spoke to me about it. "The United States is behaving as a thief," he bristled. "They didn't give us planes. They didn't give us even our money back."

I saw classified diplomatic dispatches and spoke to confidential sources. Afterward, I reported that

the Libyans hoped to use the president's brother to get their planes released" and that Billy Carter talked to the Libyans about lifting the freeze. Billy Carter has now admitted accepting a \$220,000 advance on a \$500,000 "loan," which the Libyans granted him for no more than a handshake. He also accepted expensive gifts and two all-expense-paid trips to Libya, and he could collect enormous commissions for representing Libya on commercial deals.

Two months after Billy Carter returned from Libya, his brother in the White House released two Boeing 727 airliners to the Libyans. This was opposed, according to State Department sources, by then-secretary of state Cyrus R. Vance.

About the time Billy Carter was wheeling and dealing in Libya, fugitive financier Robert Vesco was also trying to secure the release of the controversial planes.

He told Senate Judiciary Committee investigators this month that the Libyan government credited him with the release of the two 727's and paid him "a substantial sum of money." He also let the investigators listen to part of a startling conversation he had secretly recorded.

A Texas lobbyist, James Day, had contacted Vesco allegedly in behalf of Democratic National Chairman John White and White House staff chief Hamilton Jordan. Here are excerpts:

Vesco: "Yeah but at the time you told me [that] Hamilton Jordan, you

and White met in Texas. Was that the starting point of Carter's knowledge of White's contacts with me?"

Day: "Yes."
Vesco: "OK, but how did it swing from that into Libya, that's what I'm trying to get at."

Day: "OK. OK. OK."
(inaudible) "... if you remember, I went back and delivered a message."

Vesco: "What was to be done?"

Day: "That as a gesture on their good faith that they should deliver those planes."

Vesco: "Right, OK."

Day: "So this was what he [White] reported to Ham Jordan and Carter."

Vesco: "Now does White have the power to tell Carter to signal to withhold or not act upon Vance's recommendation to stop the sale [of the planes]."

Day: "Yes."

Day acknowledged that he had discussed the subject with Vesco in Nassau and that the tape was probably accurate. But both Day and White denied there was any substance to the statements. "When you are dealing with people," explained Day, "sometimes you tell them what they want to hear."

Vesco also told Senate investigators that half of the incriminating tape was mysteriously erased but that the master copy was intact.

Footnote: Sens. Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz.) and Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) are conducting an investigation of the Vesco-Libyan-Carter connections.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE **A-1**WASHINGTON POST
23 JULY 1980

Billy Carter Used By Brzezinski as Libya Go-Between

By Robert G. Kaiser
and Edward Walsh

Washington Post Staff Writers

The White House revealed yesterday that Zbigniew Brzezinski, the president's national security adviser, used Billy Carter last year as an intermediary to arrange a meeting with the Libyan charge d'affaires in Washington.

That meeting, between Brzezinski, Billy Carter and Ali Houderi, took place last Nov. 27, 23 days after the American hostages were seized in Tehran.

White House press secretary Jody Powell said yesterday that Brzezinski asked the Libyan for his government's help in winning the hostages' release from Iran. Soon afterward, Powell said, Houderi informed Brzezinski that the Libyan leader, Muammar Qaddafi, had sent a message to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini asking for the hostages' release.

Senior White House officials acknowledged last night that the revelation that Brzezinski had used Billy Carter as a go-between "built up Billy in Libyan eyes," as one of them put it, and thus could have contributed to the Libyans' view that Billy Carter could be a valuable agent in the United States.

Billy Carter revealed in a registration with the Justice Department last week that he received \$220,000 from the Libyan government in January and April of this year as payments on what he described as a \$500,000 loan. The money came in two checks, conveyed to Carter through an intermediary by Houderi, the Libyan diplomat.

One senior official at the White House acknowledged last night that the revelation of Brzezinski's role in using Carter as an emissary is likely to open a new series of questions.

The first question may be why did Brzezinski turn to Billy Carter instead of other possible intermediaries, when he had known since early 1979 that the Justice Department was investigating Billy Carter's relations with the Libyans?

News of Brzezinski's role was released yesterday in a formal White House statement intended to calm the political tempest that is brewing on Capitol Hill over the Billy Carter affair. The statement reiterated, with new detail, past White House insistence that it had not been involved in any improper way with the Justice Department's investigation of Billy Carter.

The White House also released a statement by President Carter rebuking his brother. "I do not believe it is appropriate for a close relative of the president to undertake any assignment on behalf of a foreign government. Facts relating to the existence of any such relationship should be fully and publicly disclosed."

Calls for full disclosure were also heard yesterday on Capitol Hill. House and Senate Republicans both laid plans for investigations of the Billy Carter affair that they obviously hoped would prove politically damaging to his older brother, the president.

The revelation that Brzezinski and Billy Carter met with Houderi last November was the first official indication that any such contact had taken place. The White House statement yesterday said Brzezinski had initiated this meeting by calling on Billy Carter for help.

Other White House officials elaborated, saying that Brzezinski felt that using Billy Carter would be a good way to get around the diplomatic iceberg then blocking Libyan-American relations.

"Our relations were very cool then," one official said, and Brzezinski felt that using Carter would demonstrate to the Libyans that he wanted to make a serious proposition.

Five days after the Brzezinski-Carter-Houderi meeting, mobs in Tripoli burned the American Embassy there. It was sometime after that incident that Qaddafi asked Khomeini to release the hostages.

The explanation that Brzezinski initiated this meeting by calling Billy Carter was disputed yesterday by a government official who was intimately involved in the early diplomatic efforts to free the American hostages.

This source, who had heard of Brzezinski's dealings with Billy Carter and the Libyan charge many months before yesterday's announcement, told The Washington Post that it was Billy Carter who asked Brzezinski to meet, and not the other way around. At least that was the version of the encounter that reached this high official, he said.

White House officials said "Zbig was very explicit" that he, not Billy Carter, initiated the meeting.

Earlier yesterday in an interview with The Washington Post, Billy Carter described Brzezinski as one of the few people in his brother's White House with whom he has maintained an ongoing relationship. He said he seeks out Brzezinski whenever he visits the White House.

"I know very few people in the White House," he said. "He is one of the few I do, and I like him very much."

The Washington Post also was told by sources close to Brzezinski yesterday that he has long taken a personal interest in improving Libyan-American relations.

In the statement released yesterday, the White House for the first time revealed a reason for Billy Carter's desire to meet with Brzezinski last June 11, the same day he first talked with Justice Department officials about the \$220,000 he had received from Libya.

According to the statement, Billy Carter asked Brzezinski "whether there was any national security reason why he could not disclose" details of the earlier Brzezinski-Carter-Houderi meeting to Justice Department investigators. Brzezinski informed Billy Carter that there was not, the statement said.

The White House said that five minutes after the June 11 meeting began, Brzezinski asked White House counsel Lloyd Cutler to join it, after Billy raised the subject of the Justice Department investigation.

Cutler then advised Billy that he should have a lawyer, and suggested several law firms to him. From that list, Carter selected Stephen J. Pollak.

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and Henry S. Ruth Jr.; Cutler then introduced Billy Carter to them over the telephone.

After June 11, when Billy Carter retained Pollak and Ruth, the two lawyers stayed in touch with Cutler at the White House. Late in June they told Cutler that Carter was "reluctant to make a statement and full disclosure, and it was doubtful that he would," in words used yesterday by Powell.

Cutler passed this information to the president on June 30, and on July 1 the president telephoned his brother and urged him to file the registration statement and make a full disclosure of his dealings with the Libyan government.

According to the White House statement, Cutler next heard from Pollak and Ruth on Friday, July 11, when they told him the registration statement was about to be filed.

According to Powell, this was the first time that anyone in the White House was informed of the details of Billy Carter's financial arrangements with Libya, specifically the "\$220,000 loan. Powell said Cutler did not inform President Carter of these details until Monday, July 14. The president spent that weekend on Sapelo Island, Ga.

The White House statement also revealed for the first time that the president has known since March that his brother was attempting to act as a middle man by seeking a larger allocation of Libyan crude oil for an American oil company.

Brzezinski also played a role in this episode. According to the statement, "Last March Brzezinski noted an intelligence report" describing Billy Carter's efforts on behalf of Charter Oil Co. of Jacksonville, Fla. The statement said Brzezinski then called Billy Carter "to advise him that he should not engage in any activity that could cause embarrassment to the administration. Brzezinski subsequently informed the president of this conversation."

Powell said yesterday that the president "would have preferred" that there be no such relationship between his brother and an American oil company seeking favors from a foreign government. But Powell would not put this in the same category as what the president described as Billy's inappropriate relationship with the Libyan government.

Powell said the president did not urge Billy Carter to sever his relations with Charter Oil because "he is not in a position to make decisions for his brother."

The Washington Post reported yesterday that at about the same time that Brzezinski saw that intelligence report about Billy Carter and Charter Oil, U.S. intelligence had learned that the Libyans were then trying to gain influence with the Carter administration "across the board." No names were mentioned in those reports.

According to one source, other intelligence reports subsequently gave the Justice Department its first hints, and later confirmation, that Billy Carter had received money from Libya.

Powell noted that speculation yesterday, but said that if there were such intelligence reports, "they were not seen in the White House." He speculated that officials handling such sensitive intelligence might have passed it directly to the Justice Department, deliberately bypassing the White House to avoid the appearance of any conflict of interest.

Powell was questioned last night about the propriety of choosing Billy Carter as an intermediary to deal with Libya last November.

Powell said the president's "principal, overriding consideration was to obtain the release of our people," and "in that effort, we dealt with all sorts of people." Referring to Billy Carter, Powell added: "Some were considerably more unlikely than this one."

Powell said the mere hope that Billy Carter's connection with Libya "just might" help procure the release of the hostages meant that "we should have done it."

Powell said he knew of no other occasion on which Brzezinski used Billy Carter as an intermediary or helper in dealing with Libya.

Powell's appearance at the White House briefing room yesterday was one manifestation of the administration's anxiety over the possible political repercussions of this latest Billy Carter affair.

Powell cut short a vacation in his home town of Vienna, Ga., to spend much of yesterday in meetings with senior officials, where the White House statements were drafted. Later he spent more than an hour briefing reporters and answering their questions.

Powell acknowledged that there were some questions about this episode that the White House could not answer. For one, why did Billy Carter decide on June 10 to go to the Justice Department to discuss, for the first time the details of his financial arrangements with Libya? Another unanswered question, Powell acknowledged, was why Billy Carter arranged his meeting with Brzezinski even before he had been to the Justice Department.

(Both meetings were arranged on June 10 and took place on June 11.)

Powell speculated that Billy Carter may have anticipated Justice Department questions about any and all contacts he might have had with the White House involving Libya, and therefore he might be forced to disclose the November Brzezinski-Carter-Houderi meeting.

Powell said he did not know whether President Carter suspected this spring that his brother was receiving money from Libya. But Powell acknowledged that the Justice Department's efforts to get Billy Carter to register as an agent suggested to White House officials that money had probably changed hands.

But no one at the White House had specific information about Libyan payments to Billy Carter until July 11, Powell insisted.

In the second half of an interrupted briefing last night, Powell was asked about an NBC News report that Billy Carter still owes \$50,000 to \$100,000 to the family warehouse operation, of which the president owns 62 percent. A reporter questioned whether some of the money Libya paid Billy Carter might end up in the president's bank account as repayment of that debt.

Powell said he wasn't sure Billy Carter was still a partner in the warehouse, and he couldn't give a specific answer to the query.

In the statement rebuking his brother, President Carter yesterday disclosed his telephone call to Billy Carter on July 1, and said, "I note from the registration that he is not presently engaged in any activities on behalf of Libya and has no activities on its behalf under consideration."

In his ABC interview yesterday, Billy Carter agreed that he had no current relationship with Libya. "In the future, I don't know," he added.

During his briefing yesterday, Powell contributed to speculation about why the Libyans originally befriended Billy Carter, noting that in many cultures the existence of a close blood tie to an important person is assumed to make the blood relation important as well.

Meanwhile, Republicans in the House and Senate moved with evident glee yesterday to make an issue of

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Billy Carter's relations with Libya. Six of the seven Republican members of the Senate Judiciary Committee met and agreed to seek a full-scale committee inquiry. The full panel is to meet and consider their request this morning.

Sens. Bob Dole (R-Kan.) and Jesse A. Helms (R-N.C.) both made statements demanding full inquiries. Dole charged that the Justice Department had failed to follow up on charges that Billy Carter was acting as a middleman for convicted swindler Robert Vesco in his dealings with the Charter Oil Co.

A spokesman for Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.), the committee chairman, said Kennedy, President Carter's presidential rival, will refrain from participating in the committee deliberations on the matter. The committee Democrats are expected to caucus just before the scheduled meeting today.

In the House, 76 members, nearly all Republicans, invoked a rarely used House procedure to introduce a "resolution of inquiry" demanding that President Carter produce key documents relating to the Billy Carter episode within seven days.

In effect, the resolution, fostered by Rep. Robert E. Bauman (R-Md.), would demand records of any meetings or conversations inside the White House relating to Billy Carter and Libya. The resolution will be referred to committee, but after seven legislative days any member can demand a House vote on it. This appears to assure a House vote before Congress recesses for the Democratic National Convention.

Staff writers Walter Pincus, Ward Sinclair, Richard L. Lyons, George Lardner Jr., Morton Mintz and Charles R. Babcock contributed to this report.

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ON PAGE **A-16**

NEW YORK TIMES
23 JULY 1980

The Statement On Billy Carter

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 22 — Following is the text of a statement issued by the White House press office today as in connection with contacts among Billy Carter, White House aides and other Government officials concerning Mr. Carter's ties to Libyan officials:

The White House has of course been aware of press reports running back over many months that the Department of Justice was conducting an investigation into the question of whether Billy Carter was legally obliged to make a filing under the Foreign Agents Registration Act with respect to activities on behalf of the Government of Libya.

At no time, however, has there been any contact in either direction between the White House and the Department of Justice concerning the conduct of this investigation, except for the F.B.I. interviews with Mr. Phillip Wise and the call to him mentioned below.

On June 10, 1980, Billy Carter requested a meeting with the President's National Security Adviser, Dr. Brzezinski, and the meeting was held on June 11. When Dr. Brzezinski heard the subject of the meeting, he asked the White House counsel, Lloyd Cutler, to join the discussion.

Billy Carter said he had been interviewed that morning by Justice Department investigators and asked to describe any discussions with White House officials relating to Libya. He inquired whether there was any national security reason why he could not disclose a prior meeting (which occurred on November 27, 1979) with Dr. Brzezinski, and a Libyan official, which Billy Carter arranged at Dr. Brzezinski's request to explore the possibility of seeking Libyan Government support in urging the release of the American hostages in Iran. This was three weeks after the seizure of the hostages, and the United States was exploring every possible avenue of contact with the Iranian leaders. Billy Carter was asked to arrange the meeting on short notice because of the cool official relations then existing between the United States and Libya.

No Objection Over Security

Dr. Brzezinski and Mr. Cutler advised Billy Carter that there was no national security objection to informing the Department of Justice investigators about this meeting, and Mr. Cutler added that Billy Carter had a legal obligation to respond fully to the Department's questions.

In the course of the meeting, Mr. Cutler learned that Billy Carter had attended the interview without the participation or advice of legal counsel. Mr. Cutler urged Billy Carter that he should promptly obtain counsel to advise him of his rights and duties and represent him before the Department. At Billy Carter's request to suggest a qualified counsel in Washington, Mr. Cutler recommended several lawyers including Steven J. Pollak, Esq., and Henry Ruth, Esq., of the firm of Shea & Gardner. At Billy Carter's request, Mr. Cutler introduced him to Mr. Pollak over the telephone.

Thereafter, at Mr. Cutler's request, Mr. Pollak and Mr. Ruth informed Mr. Cutler that Dr. Brzezinski's meeting with a Libyan official and Billy Carter concerning the hostages had been reported to the Justice Department. They also informed him that Billy Carter was considering the prompt filing of a registration statement reporting his activities. Mr. Cutler reported this information to the President. On July 1 the President telephoned Billy Carter and urged him to file the registration statement and make a full disclosure.

Until July 11 Mr. Cutler received no information about the particulars of Billy Carter's activities or about the financial aspects of this relationship. On July 11 Mr. Pollak and Mr. Ruth informed Mr. Cutler that the Department was about to file a civil complaint, and that the parties were in negotiation about the simultaneous filing of a registration statement and a consent judgment.

Papers Given to Cutler

On July 14 they advised Mr. Cutler that the complaint, registration statement and consent judgment had been filed. In these conversations they informed Mr. Cutler of a few of the particulars of the reported activities and financial transactions, and, after the Court filing, delivered to him copies of the filed papers.

During the course of the Department's investigation on March 14 and June 4, 1980, the F.B.I. interviewed Mr. Phillip Wise, Appointments Secretary to the President, to inquire about calls from Billy Carter to Mr. Wise concerning Libya in 1978 and January 1979. On July 1, 1980, Mr. Wise also received a telephone inquiry from a Department lawyer about such a conversation. Mr. Wise responded that he has no record or independent recollection of any such call or conversation.

In 1978, before travelling to Libya, Mr. Henry R. Coleman, an associate of Billy Carter's, had telephone conversations with Karl F. Inderfurth and William E. Quandt, then on the N.S.C. staff, for a general briefing about U.S. policy toward Libya. Billy Carter participated briefly in one of these conversations. After leaving the N.S.C. staff, Quandt and Inderfurth were questioned about these conversations by Department of Justice investigators.

Last March Dr. Brzezinski noted an intelligence report that Billy Carter was attempting to assist an oil company in obtaining an increased allocation of Libyan oil, and telephoned Billy Carter to advise him that he should not engage in any activity that could cause embarrassment to the Administration.

Dr. Brzezinski subsequently informed the President of this conversation. Neither the President nor Dr. Brzezinski had any other information, at any time before the news accounts of the filing of the court papers on July 14, concerning the financial transactions between Billy Carter and the Government of Libya.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-16

NEW YORK TIMES
23 JULY 1980

Libyan Links to Billy Carter Reported Part of Wide Plan

By PHILIP TAUBMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 22 — Libya's ties with Billy Carter are part of an extensive, covert Libyan plan to gain political influence in the United States through labor unions, black organizations, oil companies and politically important individuals, according to American intelligence reports.

The plan, according to senior intelligence officials, calls for the Libyan Government to befriend organizations and individuals to enlist their help in promoting Libyan interests here, and in some cases, to make secret payments to them.

The Libyans' objectives, according to these officials, include gaining possession of military and civilian aircraft that they have purchased but not received because of a State Department ban on such exports to the anti-Israeli regime of Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, which has supported terrorist groups in the Middle East. They said concerted efforts by Libya to obtain release of the aircraft could be traced back at least four years.

The Libyan Government also would apparently like to see a general improvement in relations with the United States, which has had no Ambassador in Tripoli for two years, and no official representative there since last May.

Oil Exports as Leverage

To achieve these goals, the officials said, the Libyans were prepared to use their oil and oil income to gain friends among special interest groups in the United States, officials said.

In the case of the oil companies, the officials said, Libya hopes to use oil exports as a form of leverage, increasing allocations to American companies in exchange for political help with its problems here.

"They are looking for help anywhere they can get it or buy it," said one intelligence official. "Billy Carter is just part of a major campaign to win friends and influence people."

The intelligence officials said the Libyan effort differed sharply from traditional efforts of foreign governments to gain a sympathetic hearing in the United States. The covert nature of the Libyan effort, and its contemplated use of secret payments, makes it potentially illegal as well as unusually brazen, they said.

They said, however, that there was no hard evidence of covert payments having been made to date, nor proof of any other illegal activity. They also noted that the Government has made no concerted effort to track Libyan ties here.

Billy Carter has acknowledged receiving \$220,000 from Libya, but has characterized it as a loan extended without formal documents. The Justice Department has characterized it as payment for "propaganda" work and service as a commercial intermediary. Discovery of the payment led the President's brother to register as an agent of the Libyan Government under a law that requires such registration when an American represents the interests of a foreign government.

Among other targets of the Libyan effort, the officials said, were the Charter Oil Company and Operation PUSH, a Chicago-based self-help organization headed by the Rev. Jesse L. Jackson, the civil rights leader. There is no indication that they received payments or favors from the Libyan Government, however.

Park L. Beeler, vice president of Charter Oil, said that Libya at no time had asked for political or other favors in return for oil allocations, which have decreased recently as Libya has lowered production and cut allocations across the board. Mr. Jackson could not be reached, and a spokesman for Operation PUSH said any comment on the matter would have to come from him.

A partial outline of the Libyan plan was contained in intelligence reports that were widely circulated within the intelligence community and high levels of the executive branch in March, the officials said.

They said the report, based on intelligence gathered in the field, did not name the President's brother as a recipient of Libyan payments, but did describe an individual with important political ties who was in financial difficulty and in communication with the Charter Oil Co.

Billy Carter, who has acknowledged financial difficulty and who has said Charter Oil agreed to pay him a commission for helping it obtain Libyan oil, presumably would fit that description.

The existence of the report, and its wide circulation within the government, has raised speculation that officials with access to the report in the White House might have connected the description to the President's brother.

Early Warning Suspected

The sequence of events involving Mr. Carter's eventual registration as a foreign agent last week has led some Justice Department officials to suspect that the President's brother was warned, in advance of official notification, that the department had discovered the \$220,000 payment.

The White House disclosed today that Zbigniew Brzezinski, the President's national security adviser, received an intelligence report in March that Billy Carter was involved in a Libyan oil transaction. According to a White House statement, Mr. Brzezinski advised the President's brother "that he should not engage in any activity that could cause embarrassment to the Administration."

According to the statement, Mr. Brzezinski "subsequently" informed the President. But neither Mr. Brzezinski nor the President, the statement said, had any other information about financial transactions between Billy Carter and Libya until July 14, when the President's brother registered as a foreign agent.

The intelligence reports also indicate that Libyan officials believed they could get support from labor unions. Intelligence officials declined to identify unions that were targeted, but said some whose members handle Middle Eastern goods and trade were involved.

Several years ago Libya made an apparent effort to gain sympathy from Senator Frank Church, the Idaho Democrat who is chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, by trying to arrange a deal to purchase \$30 million worth of wheat from Idaho farmers.

Independent oil companies other than Charter also were considered as targets of the plan for manipulating allocations in return for favors, the officials said, but such major concerns as Exxon and Mobil apparently were not included.

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ON PAGE A-1

NEW YORK TIMES
23 JULY 1980

BRZEZINSKI SOUGHT BILLY CARTER'S HELP ON HOSTAGE PARLEY

BOTH MET A LIBYAN DIPLOMAT

President Criticizes Brother's Ties and Recounts Advice to Him to Make Full Disclosure

By STEVEN R. WEISMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 22 — The White House disclosed today that Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's national security adviser, had asked Billy Carter to set up a meeting with a representative of Libya last November to ask for Libyan assistance in freeing the American hostages in Iran.

In March of this year, the White House said further, Mr. Brzezinski learned from "an intelligence report" that the President's brother was attempting to assist an oil company in obtaining oil from Libya. He then "telephoned Billy Carter to advise him that he should not engage in any activity that could cause embarrassment to the Administration," the White House said in a two-page statement issued late this afternoon.

Investigation of Activities

The contacts between Billy Carter and Mr. Brzezinski took place at the same time the Justice Department was pursuing an investigation of whether Billy Carter had violated a Federal law by acting as an unregistered foreign agent for Libya.

The White House asserted today that, at a previously disclosed meeting between Billy Carter and Mr. Brzezinski last June 11, Billy Carter had asked if he could disclose to Federal investigators their in November meeting with the Libyan representative on Iran.

The June 11 meeting with Mr. Brzezinski took place the same day Billy Carter acknowledged to the Justice Department for the first time that he had received money from the Libyan Government. However, the White House again said today that Mr. Carter did not mention the payments to Mr. Brzezinski or to Lloyd N. Cutler, the White House counsel, with whom he also met.

The President's Statement

In a separate, two-paragraph statement today, President Carter for the first time directly criticized his brother for his activities in connection with Libya. He said:

"I do not believe it is appropriate for a close relative of the President to undertake any assignment on behalf of a foreign government. Facts relating to the existence of any such relationship should be fully and publicly disclosed."

"When my counsel informed me that according to my brother's attorneys he was considering whether to register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act and report his activities, I urged him to register and make a full disclosure. I note from the registration that he is not presently engaged in any activities on behalf of Libya and has no activities on its behalf under consideration."

Loans to President's Brother

The White House said today that the President and his brother spoke together July 1, but that it was not until July 14 that the President learned that his brother had, in fact, received \$220,000 from the Government of Libya. Billy Carter has characterized the payment as a loan; the Justice Department has said it represented compensation for "propaganda" work and service as a commercial intermediary.

The payments to Billy Carter were made at a time when the Libyan Government was pursuing wide-ranging efforts to secure political influence in the United States, senior intelligence officials said today. [Page A16.]

The White House statements today constituted the Administration's first lengthy, formal comment on the disclosures of recent days about Billy Carter's meetings or discussions with Presidential aides about Libya.

Billy Carter's registration as a paid agent of the Libyan Government, combined with subsequent questions about his contacts with the White House about Libya, have caused political embarrassment to the Carter Administration, and several Republican members of Congress have called for a Congressional investigation.

Until today, President Carter and Mr. Brzezinski maintained that Billy Carter's relations with Libyan officials, which date to September 1978, were his own affair and entirely separate from the White House or the State Department.

The Carter Administration's relations

with the Libyan Government have been strained because because of Libya's avowed support of anti-Israeli terrorist activities and because of the sacking of the American Embassy in Tripoli last December. There has been no American Ambassador in Tripoli for two years, and no formal representative since May.

Last September, the Justice Department said it was conducting an investigation of a possible bribery plot aimed at securing Carter Administration approval military aircraft sold to Libya but held in the United States because of the troubled relations.

Invitation by Brzezinski

Two months later, the White House disclosed today, Mr. Brzezinski called Billy Carter "to explore the possibility of seeking Libyan Government support in urging the release of the American hostages in Iran."

The meeting took place at the White House on Nov. 27, 1979, with Mr. Brzezinski, Mr. Carter and Ali el-Houdari, identified as the chief representative of the Libyan Government in the United States. The United States Embassy in Teheran had been seized the previous Nov. 4.

At a briefing today, Jody Powell, the White House spokesman, defended Mr. Brzezinski's calling Billy Carter at a time when the White House was publicly maintaining its independence from him, in part because of the Libya ties.

"At that time," Mr. Powell said, "we were engaged in exploring every possible avenue to obtain assistance in getting our people released."

'Cool' Relations With Libya

Mr. Brzezinski sought the aid of Billy Carter because of what Mr. Powell said was "the rather cool nature of the relationship" between the United States and Libya at that time. It was also reported that Mr. El-Houdari was close personally to Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, the Libyan leader.

At Mr. Brzezinski's request, Mr. Powell said, Mr. el-Houdari asked Mr. Qaddafi to help. Mr. Qaddafi "indeed sent a message" to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini "urging the release of the American hostages," Mr. Powell said.

Asked if the President had been informed of the November meeting, Mr. Powell said: "I assume that he was, either before or after."

The other contact between Mr. Brzezinski and the President's brother occurred last March, shortly after the national security adviser learned of "an intelligence report that Billy Carter was attempting to assist an oil company in obtaining an increased allocation of Libyan oil," the statement said. In disclosing his dealings with Libya last week, Billy Carter said that the Charter Oil Company had agreed to pay him a commission of up to 50 cents a barrel if he helped it obtain more Libyan oil.

No References to Payments

Mr. Powell would not disclose the nature of this intelligence report, but he said it contained no references to Billy Carter's receiving any payments from the Libyan Government. The report, he said, thus did not negate the assertion by Mr. Brzezinski and others at the White House that they had not learned of the

CONTINUED

payments until the period of July 11-14 this year.

Mr. Powell said Mr. Brzezinski recalled informing President Carter after he had given his advice to Billy Carter in March, but acknowledged it was possible he could have informed the President beforehand.

Many of Mr. Powell's comments today were directed at emphasizing that the White House had no knowledge of the Libyan payments to Billy Carter until the period of July 11-14, and that therefore no one at the White House could have informed Billy Carter earlier that the Justice Department had learned of the payments on June 2.

Within eight days of the Justice Department's discovery of the payments, and before he was formally notified of the finding, Billy Carter instructed a lawyer to call the Justice Department and arrange a meeting to check on the status of the investigation. The call led some Justice Department aides to suspect that someone had warned the President's brother about the discovery.

Today Mr. Powell said he had not interviewed "every soul" at the White House, but that, "to the best extent we have been able to determine," Billy Carter had not been informed about the Justice Department's finding by anyone in the White House.

Account by Billy Carter

Billy Carter said in an interview this evening that the White House statement was generally accurate. Responding to criticism by President Carter of his ties with Libya, he said, "I don't want to get into an argument with the White House.

I've been very careful not to say what I think about the President."

A conceivable way Billy Carter could have found out about the Justice Department's discovery, Mr. Powell acknowledged, was that Philip Wise, President Carter's appointments secretary, was interviewed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation on March 14 and June 4.

But Mr. Powell said neither Mr. Wise, nor his secretary, nor anyone in the White House counsel's office — all of whom knew of the F.B.I. interview — informed Billy Carter of its occurrence. Mr. Wise, a Carter family friend from Plains, Ga., declined to comment on the matter today.

The White House said that Mr. Cutler, the White House counsel, learned of the Libyan payments to Mr. Carter on July 11, not from the Justice Department, but from Billy Carter's lawyers, Steven J. Pollak and Henry Ruth of the Washington firm of Shea & Gardner.

In this evening's interview, Billy Carter discussed his role in the meeting on the Iran hostages, adding some details not disclosed by the White House.

He said that he was unsure that Mr. Brzezinski had the "authority" to involve him in matter, so before he arranged a meeting with the Libyans, he called Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance to get his approval. He said Mr. Vance had no objection.

The President's brother said he drove to Washington from Georgia for the meeting, and sat in on only the initial phase of discussions. He said a second meeting between Mr. Brzezinski and the Libyan diplomat was arranged, but that he did not attend it.

THE WASHINGTON POST
22 July 1980

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ON PAGE A1

Intelligence Confirmed Billy Got Libyan Money

White House Drafting Statement

By George Lardner Jr., Staff Writer

Washington Post Staff Writer

U.S. intelligence sources reported early this spring that the Libyan government was trying to acquire influence with the Carter administration across the board, government officials said yesterday.

Those reports did not come with any names attached to them, but according to one source, it was also from U.S. intelligence operatives that the Justice Department subsequently picked up "hints" and then confirmation that Billy Carter had been receiving money from the Libyans.

The confirmation came on June 2 when the Justice Department learned that the president's brother had been paid \$220,000 by the Libyan government. The payments—\$20,000 in January and \$200,000 in April—were publicly disclosed last week when Billy Carter was forced to register as a foreign agent.

Both Justice Department and FBI officials refused to comment yesterday on how they learned that the payments had been made. It was learned last night, however, that the White House is preparing a detailed statement on the Billy Carter imbroglio for public release, perhaps as early as

today. It will reportedly include the White House version of all its dealings with Billy Carter, including his meetings June 11 with National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and White House counsel Lloyd Cutler.

Carter arranged for the meeting with Brzezinski the day before, on June 10, while Justice Department investigators were still working under tight secrecy on their inquiry into Carter's dealings with the Libyans.

Several sources pointed out that FBI counterintelligence agents undoubtedly maintained "extensive coverage" of Libyan activities in this country, especially since the expulsion of a number of Libyan diplomats in April and early May for an alleged campaign of intimidation against opponents of Col. Muammar Qaddafi.

In a speech in early April, Qaddafi publicly called for the assassination of opponents of his revolution who were living abroad.

According to one knowledgeable U.S. official, FBI counterintelligence reports are not routinely circulated among U.S. intelligence agencies, but are instead sent only to appropriate officials at the Justice Department and sometimes the National Security Council and the State Department.

Some government officials have reportedly voiced suspicions that someone warned Billy Carter early last month of the Justice Department's progress in the case.

In any event, on June 10, Carter sought a meeting for the next day with Justice Department lawyers to check on the status of his case, something he had not done before during the course of the 18-month inquiry.

National Security Council spokesman Alfred Friendly Jr. said Carter also called on June 10 to ask for a meeting with Brzezinski at the White House. Friendly said Carter did not say why he wanted to see Brzezinski.

On June 11, Carter went to the Justice Department first and acknowledged receiving the \$220,000 which he has since publicly described as installments on a promised \$500,000 loan from the Libyans. Then he went to the White House to see Brzezinski, who sent him to Cutler. Cutler has said he learned that Carter was under Justice Department "interrogation" and recommended that he hire Washington attorney Stephen Pollak to represent him.

Carter could not be reached for comment yesterday on what prompted him to check on the status of his case or confer with Brzezinski.

For their part, the Libyans have supported Carter's claims that they simply loaned him the money and that no wrongdoing was involved.

At a July 15 press conference in Nicosia, Libyan Foreign Minister Ali Turyaki said that his government established relations with the president's brother to maintain contact with the American people and to tell the United States that its Middle East policies are "erroneous."

"We are trying to inform the American people of the erroneous politics of their government towards the Middle East, and the contact with Billy Carter enters into this context," Turyaki said, according to a dispatch by Agence France-Presse.

He added that Libya maintains contacts with a good many Americans to inform the American people of the real situation in the Middle East.

The payments to Carter in January and April both followed visits to Tripoli by his business associate, Henry R. (Randy) Coleman of Plains, Ga.

As Justice Department spokesman said yesterday that Coleman has been notified that he too will have to register as a foreign agent and that he has agreed to do so within a few days. Officials doubted, however, that he

will be required to be any more explicit about his activities than Carter has been.

His trips at the expense of the Libyans, a 13-day visit in late December and early January and a three-week stay in March, were simply listed in Carter's statement as having been undertaken "in response to invitation."

Despite the \$220,000 payments, no loan agreement between Carter and the Libyans has been executed.

The questions raised by Carter's dealings with the Libyans have given rise to a round of calls by Senate Republicans for a congressional investigation. Sen. Bob Dole (R-Kan.) has charged that the arrangement seems to be "a clear case of influence peddling" and called on President Carter to "go public with the entire story."

Responding to a request from Dole, Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.), chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, said through a spokesman that the committee will consider the matter at a meeting scheduled for Wednesday.

Dole, a member of the committee, wants it to require Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti to turn over "all relevant documents and information concerning Mr. Carter's failure to properly register as an agent for the Libyan government." In a separate letter to Civiletti, Dole said a prompt response would "serve to avoid the possibility of extensive Judiciary Committee hearings."

Dole has raised the question of whether the White House played any role in the decision not to prosecute the president's brother. Justice Department officials, however, have insisted that this decision was made "at a fairly low level" and without any serious dissension.

Billy Carter has always contended that he should not have had to register under the foreign agent act and did so only reluctantly.

At the Judiciary Committee meeting Wednesday, Sen. Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz.) is also expected to seek approval of a resolution giving his subcommittee on judicial machinery jurisdiction over a proposed investigation into alleged connections between fugitive financier Robert Vesco and the Carter administration, some of them reportedly involving Libya.

The initial intelligence reports concerning Libyan plans to gain influence across the board came around March and apparently received routine circulation within the U.S. intelligence community, officials said. They said that it was "not that unusual for foreign embassies to be doing that."

Justice Department officials said the first word that Billy Carter was getting payments came to them in late May and was nailed down to their satisfaction on June 2.

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SAUDI ARABIA

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THE WASHINGTON POST
22 July 1980

Group Working Among Saudi Students in U.S.

Royal Family Target of Leftist Drive

By David Leigh

Washington Post Staff Writer

A shadowy international group claiming links with dissidents in Saudi Arabia is stepping up a propaganda campaign among the 13,000 Saudi students in the United States.

The CIA is concerned about the new group, and has notified the FBI of its interest, FBI sources say. The group is a novel element in U.S. official forebodings about the stability of the Saudi regime, and it has already led to pessimistic guesses that the monarchy may collapse within two to five years.

When Iranian students started to campaign against the now-deposed shah of Iran, their activities were ignored for a long time. But the Saudi pamphleteers already find themselves in an anxious limelight.

Calling themselves Sout al-Taliah—"Voice of the Vanguard"—the group was founded in 1973, its supporters say, but has been dormant for years. Now, from bases in San Francisco and Denver, it is distributing literature across the United States, in Arabic and in glossy English-language booklets.

One of Sout al-Taliah's spokesmen, who would identify himself only as "Tariq," said in a telephone interview from Denver last week, "Both the CIA and the FBI should not be concerned with our activities."

"We feel some pressure. We think it should stop. If not, the American establishment will become involved with the Saudi intelligence as they did with Savak [the secret police] of the shah."

Sout al-Taliah claims to be part of a network of left-wing nationalists, with a collective leadership based abroad and financial support from Saudi students in the United States.

The Saudi students are "all getting about \$1,000 a month and can afford to support us," according to Tariq, the only member of the Denver group, he says, who can speak English.

The group deflects questions about its precise strength, identity and backers, although members deny any relationship with the Palestinians, the Libyans or the Iranians.

They use the language of nationalism and human rights rather than that of Islamic fundamentalism, attacking compulsory mosque attendance and calling for a democratic presidential system to replace the

ruling royal family.

In their English-language booklet, "Pillars of the Saudi Regime" published this month without any identification other than a San Francisco Post Office box number, the group attacks the Saudi prohibitions on dress and conduct. Restrictions have been tightened since last November's uprising at the Grand Mosque in Mecca by traditionalist dissidents.

"Practically everything is prohibited in Saudi Arabia," group says, citing bans on bicycles, trousers, radios and moustaches: "If you shave your beard and grow your moustache, you incur the wrath of the regime."

The regime's religious organization

imposes on-the-spot fines for such conduct, Sout al-Taliah says, and is more backward than 14th century Europe.

While members of the Saudi ruling family have complained bitterly about U.S. press coverage in recent months, this newly active, although nervously anonymous group, says the opposite. Sout al-Taliah claims the U.S. government is so concerned about Saudi sensitivity that it tries to hush up the facts.

The group maintains that the Saudi royal family, under 67-year-old King Khalid, is autocratic, backward and "wallowing in corruption."

Saudi spokesmen in Washington declined comment on the group.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
22 July 1980

CIA Redfaced Over Its Gaffe on Saudis

By David Leigh

Washington Post Staff Writer

An air of intense embarrassment still hangs over the entire affair. The deputy director of the CIA, Frank Carlucci, even apologized to Saudi Arabia's ruling circles for it afterward.

It began simply enough, with that venerable and almost routine Washington maneuver, the leak. But this was a leak that went wrong.

Earlier this year, the CIA warned the White House that Saudi Arabia's ruling regime might collapse within two years.

When it leaked, the agency privately briefed two journalists—another longstanding Washington habit. No one quite knows why the agency did it on this occasion.

One person who was not well-served by this turn of events was President Carter's national security affairs adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, who was to depart within days on a delicate trip to Saudi Arabia. The Arab kingdom is one of the main pro-western states in the Middle East and the largest producer of oil imported by the United States (20.1 percent of U.S. oil imports in December 1979).

The agency realized it had made a gaffe. It started twisting arms to keep the lid on the story and confine it to the extensive Washington grapevine, where it could do no harm.

It almost succeeded in killing the story with high-level telephone calls. But it could not prevent the Saudis from being miffed.

So instead of gaining a reputation for being smart spies, the agency ended up offending everyone.

In the close-meshed world of Washington—bureaucrats, politicians and journalists, this episode cannot be detailed without a certain indistinctness. Neither the CIA nor anyone else involved will discuss it on the record.

But it began in January, barely two months after the attack on the Grand Mosque in Mecca by traditionalist Saudi dissidents, an event that sent shock waves through the ruling family of 67-year-old King Khalid.

As Brzezinski prepared to visit Saudi Arabia, by way of Pakistan, to discuss the prospect of military bases in the region, the story of the CIA warning began to surface on Capitol Hill.

For all its secrecy, the CIA gives selected U.S. journalists "background briefings" at its Langley headquarters. The briefings occur on request or when someone in the CIA thinks it might serve the agency's purposes, and the articles that result generally attribute the information to "intelligence sources."

In the case of the Saudi report, the agency decided to brief Roberta Hornig of The Washington Star and Jane Whitmore of Newsweek.

They apparently were told of the report suggesting that the Saudi regime might collapse within two years. As one source quoted the report, Crown Prince Fahd, next in line to the throne, "would have to go." The man to watch was Prince Abdallah, the conservative commander of the national guard.

Official sources, who do not wish to be identified, say the two journalists were briefed by a CIA analyst. The reporters say they cannot discuss CIA briefings.

The day after the briefing, Brzezinski lunched with Newsweek editors. He was to leave for Saudi Arabia within a few days.

What happened then remains obscure. Newsweek printed a paragraph attributed to an administration official, who said that the White House had received numerous pessimistic "alert" memos from Langley in recent weeks.

The official sarcastically pointed out that with so many predictions, "some of them are bound to be right," and added that "there are few crises lately they haven't predicted one way or another."

Early on the day after Brzezinski's lunch with Newsweek editors, the CIA launched its efforts to kill the story of its Saudi warning.

Both the Star and Newsweek reporters were beseeched by the agency not to write the story. They were threatened that if they did, they would not get any more briefings. References were made to the "national interest."

According to intelligence sources, the CIA claimed to have suddenly realized that it was not supposed to brief reporters on "countries which are actively involved in U.S. foreign policy."

Did someone in Brzezinski's office point out that his trip would not ex-

actly be helped by such stories?

No one is saying. And the CIA's efforts to suppress the story almost worked—the Star did not run it.

And not until after Brzezinski's return did Newsweek print two guarded lines on the subject in a five-page analysis of Saudi Arabia's uncertain prospects.

"One secret U.S. report," the magazine said, "warned recently that the regime's survival could not be assured beyond the next two years."

There was no reference to the CIA's apparent flood of gloomy "alert" memos in the wake of the Iran debacle. But this glancing reference to Saudi Arabia was enough to make senior CIA people fear anew about Saudi blood pressure.

After Khalid's illness in February, reports quoting French intelligence sources said the royal family could be overthrown within the next few years.

On May 3, the Saudi minister of industry and electricity, Dr. Ghazi Algo-

saibi, encapsulated Saudi complaints about the U.S. media when he told the National Association of Arab-Americans that the fate of the regime did not depend on "the pronouncements of third-rate bureaucrats, reading fourth-rate intelligence reports from fifth-rate spies."

Carlucci apologized. "He conveyed to us," said one source, "that it had been an unfortunate briefing, and the briefer had since been moved."

The hapless Langley analyst is not alone in his thinking. Many Middle East experts expect traumatic changes in Saudi Arabia within five years.

One former U.S. diplomat who returned from Saudi Arabia this spring said that corruption, internal unrest and strains within the ruling family combine to make the regime highly fragile.

"If we're talking about guarantees," he said, "then the survival of the Saudi regime can't be absolutely guaranteed for more than six months."

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LEASHING/UNLEASHING CIA

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WATERBURY REPUBLICAN (CT)
7 July 1980

Don't cripple CIA

The House Intelligence Committee has demonstrated again that intelligence is what is most sorely lacking. The committee just sent a bill to Congress that would require the CIA to inform the House and Senate Intelligence committees of the undercover operations.

The CIA might as well place all its undercover operations in the Congressional Record. Congress holds a secret like a sieve holds water.

This type of legislation is less an attempt to control the CIA than to totally obliterate the agency's effectiveness.

Do we want an intelligence ser-

vice? Do we want an effective one?

Disasters in Iran and elsewhere show the need for good reliable intelligence. But the same people who forced the CIA into its present weak position, now want to cripple the agency. Instead of learning from the errors of the past, they are compounding them.

If only the Kremlin had an intelligence committee like this overseeing the KGB, we would not need the CIA. They would be too weak to seek world domination.

A majority of right thinking congressmen should take this bill and bury it deep. It should be killed once and for all.

DOVER FOSTER'S DEMOCRAT(NH)

7 July 1980

Central unintelligence

A few months back, presidential candidate and former Central Intelligence Agency Director George Bush was leading a charge to have the shackles taken off the CIA. His contention was that many of our problems had their roots in the inability of the CIA — under post-Watergate restrictions — to perform its job of providing the government with proper information.

Now comes this story out of Afghanistan.

A journalist and former Marine named Calen Geer walked into that country and managed to walk out with a collection of Soviet military hardware the CIA had been unable to prove the Soviets were using. Among the beauties Geer carried out were: a nerve-gas filter (confirming, it would seem, the reports of gas warfare), sticks of incendiary material far more lethal and gruesome than napalm, a hand-held missile launcher, and hollow-tipped bullets from a new Soviet assault rifle. The bullets, incidentally, are designed to blow large holes in victims and are strictly forbidden by the Geneva Conventions.

To us, the point is not the good work of an enterprising reporter. The point is that our vaunted CIA did not know about some of the items and could not confirm others, yet an amateur could prove the whole bunch in 11 days.

We repeat Bush's point. How can the United States lead the free world with a blindfold on?

Soviet intelligence services operate under no Watergate restrictions. The work of the CIA may not be all that savory, but in this imperfect world it may make the difference between the survival of America and communist world domination.

If the Soviet Politburo were writing the script for the downfall of the U.S., they would include an awful lot of items that are presently high on the list of liberal causes, including pulling the fangs of the CIA. But, of course, to say any such thing is to be branded a witch-hunter, kook and radical conservative by red-blooded American liberals. And if the Kremlin were writing the script for liberals, wouldn't they also include an item that said, 'If anyone points out that what you are doing is aiding the communist conspiracy, call him a witch-hunter, kook and radical conservative.'?

HUNTSVILLE TIMES (AL)
5 July 1980

Simply Unneeded

A proposal by six senators to introduce this summer legislation to unleash the CIA, FBI and the rest of the federal intelligence network to spy on Americans deserves quick rejection.

Sen. Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo.), stalwart Ronald Reagan supporter, as are the other sponsors of the legislation, is out front in this assault on the freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.

These protectors of the federal intelligence network are working even against the wishes of the agencies themselves. The sponsors propose, for one thing, to allow federal intelligence agencies to write their own rules — only in consultation with Congress — on opening the mail or electronically surveilling and burglarizing Americans as well as foreigners they judge to be appropriate targets, all without court warrant.

Since the revelations of wrongdoing by the unsupervised agencies cast such aspersions on their investigative credentials, it is indeed surprising that this bill

has surfaced. There is shock, too, that the motivations represented in this proposed legislation still survive in a Congress whose own investigators found violations of the rights of Americans in civic, church and community groups innocent of any crime beyond exercising their freedom of expression.

The list of victims is long, literally in the hundreds, but think only of the FBI's cruel scandal-mongering against the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. and actress Jean Seberg.

Both the CIA and the FBI say they don't want the power the six senators have proposed to give them. And the entire suggestion reeks of political hay-making for Reagan. The Justice Department says such a legislated charter "would weaken the intelligence community by casting its practices into further legal doubt."

The project should be abandoned before it goes any further. The charters needed by the two agencies can be formulated fairly and with the necessary protections. This throwback legislation needs to be thrown

MADISON TIMES
28 June 1980

Nelson explains CIA oversight bill

By SEN. GAYLORD NELSON

ON JUNE 3, 1980, the U.S. Senate passed, by a vote of 89-1, S. 2284, the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980. I voted in favor of this legislation, which was endorsed by the American Civil Liberties Union and the Center for National Security Studies, because I believe that, if enacted into law, it will constitute a useful first step toward a rational policy concerning our intelligence agencies.

In 1975, Americans were appalled by the Final Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (the "Church Committee"). That report revealed activities on the part of U.S. intelligence agencies which the committee considered "unworthy of a democracy and occasionally reminiscent of . . . totalitarian regimes."

However, since 1975, all attempts to write a comprehensive legislative "charter" for the intelligence agencies have failed. The reasons for this are obvious. Some members of Congress believe there should be virtually no restraints on the CIA and other intelligence agencies and that existing restraints established by executive order have hampered the effectiveness of intelligence activities,

while others maintain that the CIA is insufficiently constrained by existing law and that more stringent controls are needed.

THIS YEAR, after months of hearings on charter legislation before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, both proponents and opponents of such legislation concluded that it would be impossible to pass charter legislation this year.

The Senate Select Committee then decided to unanimously report S. 2284, a bill with much more limited objectives. At the outset, it is important to note that this bill does not achieve the measure of control that I believe Congress can and must achieve over the

remains to be done. However, it ought to be remembered that the choice we faced was not between this legislation and a more extensive bill, but rather between this bill and no bill at all.

And, in its own right, S. 2284 is a balanced and intelligent piece of legislation. It would repeal the "Hughes-Ryan" Amendment of 1974, which requires that covert CIA activities be reported to as many as eight congressional committees.

IT WOULD REPLACE Hughes-Ryan with the following legal requirements: First, S. 2284 would require that the two permanent congressional committees on intelligence matters be kept "fully and currently informed" of all intelligence activities. Second, the two committees would have to be informed of "any significant anticipated activity." Third, the intelligence committees would have to be provided with any information they requested from any intelligence agencies.

Under extraordinary circumstances affecting the "vital interests of the United States," prior notice of intelligence activities could be limited to congressional leaders, with the full intelligence committees to be informed later.

The CIA and the other intelligence agencies are now subject to most of these requirements. However, these procedures were established by previous presidential executive orders, and executive orders can be revoked by future presidents. The American Civil Liberties Union and the Center for National Security Studies, who have justifiably concerned themselves with CIA abuses in the past, considered it important to write these necessary safeguards into the statute books, and I agree with them.

QUESTIONS WERE RAISED during debate on the bill concerning a provision in its preamble that would seem to direct the intelligence agencies to comply with the bill's reporting provisions only "to the extent consistent with due regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified information and information relating to intelligence sources and methods."

Though the bill's managers stated clearly that this provision constituted "a routine disclaimer" and was not intended to create a loophole affecting the bill's substantive reporting requirements, it does present at least potential dangers. However, the problems this provision may cause did not seem to me to outweigh the bill's substantial benefits.

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IRAN

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WASHINGTON STAR (RED LINE)
24 JULY 1980

U.S. Hostages Went Through Mock Execution

By Henry S. Bradsher
Washington Star Staff Writer

Shortly after the capture of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran on Nov. 4, the Islamic students holding Americans there staged a mock execution as part of a warning to their prisoners against causing any trouble or trying to escape, State Department officials said today.

The officials emphasized, however, that all reports since then indicate that the captors, who are still holding 49 Americans, have treated most of them fairly mildly. Three other Americans are trapped in the Iranian foreign ministry.

"Although the situation itself is impossible, the whole thing illegal, in many ways they've been model captors," one official said about the militant students. He cited cases of showing consideration for many prisoners' personal needs.

But some hostages might still be held in basement, prison-like rooms because of accusations that they were CIA agents, other officials noted. There is no precise information available on the treatment or even the location of all 49 hostages.

The first report of the mock execution came from Richard Queen, who was released from the embassy July 11, because of medical problems. He was later diagnosed as having multiple sclerosis. The 28-year-old consular officer is now vacationing with his parents in Maine.

In debriefings here, after Queen returned to the United States last Friday, he recounted the mock execution to officials. It occurred within the first few weeks of the hostage situation, Queen said. During that period, the captors

were threatening the hostages with punishment or even death if the hostages defied them in any way. Most or all of the hostages were kept handcuffed or tied up most of the time.

It was an unsettled period, with both captors and hostages nervous and uncertain about what would happen, according to reports pieced together at the State Department. Later, the situation became more relaxed and apparently most of the hostages were given freedom of movement within their assigned rooms.

One day in the unsettled period, according to officials' descriptions of what Queen reported, he and some other hostages who had been held in a windowless basement of an embassy building were led out into a courtyard. They were lined up against a wall facing armed students. The students clicked their rifles, but nothing happened.

After that apparent attempt to frighten the hostages, they were led back to their makeshift cells. There have been no reports of physical harm to the hostages from their captors.

Queen reported that, on the contrary, as the captors became more relaxed about the unusual situation for which they had seemed initially unprepared, they showed more consideration for their prisoners. Queen said there was no change in

their treatment as a result of the unsuccessful U.S. rescue attempt April 25.

Some students went to his apartment to get extra clothing for him, Queen said, and some other hostages were also given similar help.

One of the woman hostages, who was released just before Thanksgiving, reported that when she had problems with her contact lenses the students sent the lenses to Tehran's best optician for polishing and also got for her a new supply of lens fluid.

In recounting these and similar stories, State Department officials have been wary of appearing to present a rosy picture of the situation. They emphasized that they are continuing to search for ways to obtain the hostages' release from an abnormal, illegal, very trying and still potentially dangerous situation.

Middle East newspapers have published reports in the last two days suggesting that the hostages will be released in a few weeks at the end of the Moslem month of fasting, Ramadan.

A State Department spokesman said today there was no indication that anything would happen then. Another official noted there had been similar rumors of the hostages' release on the occasion of some other Moslem holy days during the first few months of their captivity.

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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
23 July 1980

An ex-spy defends those CIA broadcasts to Iran

By Anonymous

The recent acknowledgment by unidentified Washington "officials" that a clandestine radio station ("Free Voice of Iran") was being backed by the CIA has again put the agency in the stocks. The broadcasts allegedly used terms like "fascist" and "racist" for Ayatollah Khomeini; supported exiled leader Shahpur Bakhtiar, called for the "liberation" of Iran, and appealed to Iranians to prepare for armed action.

Before examining these points, there is a fundamental one which bears periodic repetition because it is so consistently ignored: The CIA does not conduct such operations without approval (if not instigation) from the highest levels of the executive branch, and without careful review by various legislative committees.

No less fundamental is our need to face up to the world as it really is, as opposed to the world as we would like it to be. As Americans, our problem is that we try to impose our domestic rules and values internationally. This is fair enough when it comes to controlling activities by foreigners here, like South Korea's rent-a-congressman operation, but does not always make sense when dealing with other cultures on their grounds. When it comes to promoting long-term US interests overseas, our rules (violence aside) should be at least as flexible as those of the local environment.

Well, who needs clandestine propaganda? What is the rationale for unattributed outlets? There are several reasons:

- In countries where the United States stands branded as an enemy, resistance to any message from an official American station is very strong — when indeed its very call sign does not impose a grave risk on the listener. To reach these audiences an unofficial medium is necessary.

- There are some messages which the United States wishes to put across but which it cannot do openly for a variety of reasons: because they would offend friends, be perceived as transcending permissible levels of meddling, might imply deeper commitments than the US was willing to make.

- Finally, the restrictions that the very fact of official sponsorship puts on a medium can inhibit language and terminology to the point that it no longer has any impact. An audience accustomed to heady levels of vituperation in its own media may yawn at more measured presentations.

None of the above justifies a massive resort to such means, nor does it absolve sponsors

from responsibility for unexpected results of their efforts. Long ago Radio Free Europe, for example, was blamed for giving Hungarians the impression that the US would come to their aid if they rose up against the Soviet Union. That blame was not entirely unwarranted, but it must be recalled that the US had, after all, adopted a policy some years earlier of "rolling back communism" and had never explicitly rescinded it. The problem was that Radio Free Europe was so clearly under official US sponsorship that its "unofficial" status was no longer believable.

Clandestine radio broadcasting needs a base abroad, a pool of high-quality talent drawn from recent émigrés, and an ostensible sponsor (individual or group) which may or may not be aware of the true source of support. All of these factors make precise control extremely difficult, and as a result the broadcasting product does on occasion deviate from the ideal.

Let us now return to the "Free Voice of Iran" and the probable reasons why it came into existence.

First, we may accept the thesis that Iran today is being governed by individuals whose hostility toward the US has reached unusual extremes.

Second, it is probably not in the interests of the US that these individuals continue to run the affairs of Iran.

Third, the Iranians themselves (or the effects of internecine strife at the top levels) will probably dispose of the incumbent leaders before too much longer, and we will be confronted with new faces.

Fourth, it is palpably in the interests of the US that this new group of leaders (a) reflect Iranian not Soviet or other foreign interests, (b) reorient some of Iran's hate-America energies into more productive channels, and (c) establish a more stable, law-abiding society.

In order to accomplish these aims, it can be assumed that the US wanted to support those Iranians who opposed the current leadership; the problem was to do so without admitting it. Hence the unattributed radio.

Now as to those particular aspects which were so upsetting to some in the American press:

- The Ayatollah was termed a "fascist" and a "racist." His penchant for xenophobic demagoguery, backed by officially encouraged mob action, does rather take one back to the brown shirts of the 1920s and the jackboots of the 1930s, but one is not supposed to say so in polite international society. True, but in terms of the broadcasts' ostensible sponsorship such terminology would be part of the normal give and take of Iranian politics; any-

thing softer would have been suspect.

- The broadcasts supported the exiled Shahpur Bakhtiar. Is this bad from the standpoint of US interests? It becomes so only when official US sponsorship is revealed. (Needless to say, that is also bad for Shahpur Bakhtiar, whether or not he was previously aware of clandestine US support for the radio.) The point is, an ostensible sponsor or cause was needed, and Shahpur Bakhtiar seems to have been a logical choice.

- The broadcasts called for the "liberation" of Iran. Well, yes, that is the usual terminology used by "outs" when trying to unseat "ins" in parts of the world where exile is the price of political defeat.

- The broadcasts reportedly "even appealed to Iranians to prepare for armed action." If read swiftly, that might sound like a call to arms; another interpretation is that it was merely a warning to the citizenry to take prudent steps to avoid becoming noncombatant casualties.

Until leaked in Washington, and then publicized and virtuously decried in the American press, "Free Voice of Iran" appears to have been a needed counterbalance to what, even then, was a one-sided presentation. The station has now become, instead, a source of national embarrassment.

Who is most to blame for this? The CIA, for running the operation? The White House, for authorizing it? The Congress, for approving it? Or officials who no longer seem to have the right of silence on matters affecting national security, and a press that does not exercise restraint in the national interest?

The author, requesting anonymity, describes himself as a retired CIA officer who was not involved with "Free Voice of Iran" but has observed similar activities where he served in the past.

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WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
22 JULY 1980

Queen to Meet With Families Of 52 U.S. Hostages Still in Iran

By Henry S. Bradsher

Washington Star Staff Writer

Former hostage Richard Queen today meets with families of some of the 52 Americans still in the hands of Iranian captors who he said had treated him pretty well after initially keeping him confined in a windowless basement.

"There was no brainwashing, and the militants who seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran on Nov. 4 didn't really pressure us to sign confessions," Queen said yesterday.

The bearded young consular officer emphasized at a State Department press conference that he spoke only from his personal experience and had had little contact with other hostages. But his own experience offered some hope for families of the others that they are also holding up well after 8½ months of captivity.

Families from the Washington area were to meet Queen at the State Department under the auspices of the families' own organization, Family Liaison Action Group. One vocal critic of the department's activities on the hostage problem, Elisa Keough, was expected to fly from Vermont at her own expense.

The department announced yesterday that it was renewing efforts to obtain information on another American reported held in Iran, Mrs. Cynthia Dwyer, a free-lance journalist from Buffalo, N.Y.

The Swiss ambassador to Iran, Eric Lang, confirmed May 9 that Dwyer had been arrested as an alleged CIA agent. This was based on information from the Iranian foreign ministry.

But the State Department said yesterday that the Swiss have reported being told by the Iranian prosecutor's office that there is no record of Dwyer's being held. The Swiss have been asked to seek an urgent check on her, a spokesman said.

Queen was released July 11 on order of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini because of a medical problem. It has been diagnosed as multiple sclerosis, a nerve disorder, but Queen's appearance and movements were not noticeably affected during his public appearances yesterday.

The Georgetown University Hospital, where he has been under examination since returning to the United States last Friday, planned to

make an announcement on his condition later today. Queen is expected to leave tomorrow for a vacation with his parents in Maine.

An applauding, sometimes cheering crowd of State Department personnel welcomed Queen in the diplomatic lobby of the Foggy Bottom building yesterday. On the way to microphones with Secretary of State Edmund S. Muskie escorting him, Queen stopped to receive hugs and kisses from two former embassy secretaries in Tehran, Terry Tedford and Joan Walsh. They also has been taken hostage Nov. 4 but were released just before Thanksgiving among 13 women and blacks.

"I wish I'd brought the other 52 (hostages) with me," Queen told the crowd, "but I'm sure they'll be back home soon." He added to reporters later, "Sometimes I feel a little guilty that I'm here now" while the rest remain prisoners.

Administration officials are not so sure the others will be home soon. The selection of a conservative Islamic fundamentalist as speaker of the national assembly, which has been given the authority by Khomeini to decide the hostages' fate, was not considered an encouraging sign of a quick settlement.

Describing to reporters his own experiences, Queen said he fled the embassy from his consular office's back door during the Nov. 4 seizure. But "I was captured because I turned down the wrong street. I ambled slowly." Six other Americans reached safety with Canadian diplomats and were spirited out of the country.

For the first three or four months he was held in a windowless basement that was so grim even the captors complained of being there, Queen said. Then he was moved upstairs to share a room with Joseph Hall and Charles Jones.

Except for meals and being es-

corted to bathrooms, the captors left them alone, Queen said. Jones wanted to play poker 14 to 16 hours a day. "It was a good thing it was just for pennies, because Charlie played pretty good," Queen said.

"I have the feeling that some wild poker games are taking place now" in the embassy, Queen said.

In the early months of captivity, the captors offered them statements to sign, but they did "practically nothing" to apply pressure, he said. Some individual captors tried to turn some hostages against the U.S. government, but there was no effort to brainwash them.

Some reports from Tehran have said that a few hostages accused of being CIA agents in the embassy have continued to receive harsh treatment. Queen said his own interrogation ended after he took his captors on a tour of his consular section and explained its functions. "They weren't impressed," he added.

Queen described the captors as anti-Communist Islamic students. "They're individuals with different viewpoints," he said. "We had some really fine people," the bulk of them were neither good nor bad, "and there were a few real SOB's."

The way hostages were treated depended on captor attitudes, he said. "Some had childish moods, acting peevish sometimes," but he and a few others were lucky to have the students go get clothes from their apartments. Some captors were conscientious, but the whole setup was disorganized and things were constantly being misplaced, Queen said.

Treatment did not change as a result of the unsuccessful U.S. rescue mission in April, which he knew little about, Queen said. Some hostages reportedly were moved from the embassy to other parts of Iran after that attempt, but Queen had no evidence of it.

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ON PAGE A 13

THE WASHINGTON POST
22 July 1980

Philip Geyelin

A Policy As Patient As the Queens'

"As adults, we are not fools. And as adults we are not hysterical."

The words were almost lost, as Harold Queen walked briskly past the waiting television crews outside the hospital. He and his wife, Jeanne, had just been told that their recently released hostage son, Richard, is suffering from multiple sclerosis. They were saying that they understood what that meant—that the disease is sometimes fatal, often prolonged, of mysterious origins, unpredictable in its course and without a known cure.

But they were saying also that they were not going to give way to panic, or leap to conclusions, or be plunged into despair. They were offering, in short, a badly needed model of patience and fortitude as the hostage crisis drags through its ninth month. Its own causes and cure, you will have noted, have much in common with MS. But its treatment in the developing campaign debate and in the comments of the Carter administration critics has almost nothing in common with the quiet courage of the Queens.

"If we had leadership worthy of the name," Barry Goldwater roared from the Republican convention platform the other night, "no country in this world would have ever taken hostages from us." The Carter administration, Henry Kissinger thundered from the same podium, has "vacillated between threats and conciliation on the hostages. We are making the world safe for anti-American radicalism."

Perhaps so—though it's small comfort to the hostages' relatives. Perhaps also, the release of Richard Queen proves that—see!—Ayatollah Khomeini is firmly in command. He may even have a streak of compassion in him, the argument goes. In any event, this proves he can be dealt with in rational terms. And that, it is said, effectively destroys the self-serving administration alibi that Iran is torn by a continuing power struggle—that there is no element, no responsible force with which the United States can deal effectively.

Again, perhaps so. But the administration's painful policy of patience, nonetheless, is powerfully reinforced by the intelligence reports and the judgment of down-the-line professionals far removed from any concern for the president's political fortunes. Here, in brief, is how they see it:

The release of Queen, they unhappily conclude, says almost nothing about the prospects for the remaining 52 hostages. Iranian Red Cross doctors have been examining the hostages as often as once a week, almost certainly for precisely the reason that Queen was released: while the various forces at work on the Iranian political scene are at odds on how to deal with the hostage problem, almost nobody involved wants a hostage to take seriously ill, or die, while in their hands.

Not even the radical militants want that. Indeed, some analysts are convinced the anxiety of the hostages' captors on this score adds an extra dimension of complexity to the hostage problem. Even if the political leaders could be brought to an agreement for the hostages' release, they suspect, the militants might literally be scared to do it.

"They would think they'd be signing their own death warrant even if they returned the hostages unharmed," says one intelligence officer. "They're probably convinced that the CIA would track them down and kill them in reprisal."

The guessing here is that doctors reported they had a problem they couldn't handle in Iran—that Queen's illness could become an embarrassment, or worse, and that he should be returned. The militants agreed. And because this in no way prejudiced the basic hostage issue, Khomeini also agreed, which is a far cry from a calculated gesture of conciliation or even a firm command.

What, then, is Khomeini's role? The analysts see him as a power-balancer governing by going with the flow. And the flow is turbulent. President Bani-Sadr is thought to be more than ready to get rid of the hostage issue. But he is also thought to be on the way out.

On the ascendancy, say the experts, are the "clerical fascists," the radicals among the clergy whose interest is less in Khomeini's holy Islamic crusade than it is in recovering the power (to collect taxes) and the land that was taken from them by the shah. In the wings are prominent exiled leaders spoiling, and planning, for a *coup d'etat*.

In the factional infighting, the hostages, almost by accident, have become a critical pawn. To be soft on the hostage issue is to be dangerously vulnerable, politically. "The hostages will only cease to be an instrument in the power struggle," says one authority, "when the struggle is unambiguously resolved."

That is not a cheerful diagnosis. But neither was Richard Queen's.

THE PALEIGH NEWS AND OBSERVER (NC)
5 July 1980

CIA propaganda damaging

The anti-Khomeini radio broadcasts into Iran by the "unconventional broadcasting" section of the Central Intelligence Agency, as reported by The New York Times, come across as a dumb stunt.

The Iranians, who accuse the American hostages of being spies, have a near phobia that the United States will engineer a coup, as it did to re-install Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi on the Peacock Throne in

1953. However far-fetched the Iranians' claims may seem in the United States, the broadcasts by the CIA can serve only to heighten the fears and suspicions of the Iranian government and to intensify the danger to the hostages. The CIA, after all, has a long history of dissimulation on its activities abroad.

Moreover, to the extent the broadcasts might succeed in creating instability in Iran, it would invite the Soviets to proceed with whatever designs they may have on the country.

Yet the broadcasts, identified as "The Free Voice of Iran," included commentary aimed at undermining the Khomeini government and appeals to the army not to fight against rebels. The Times reported Khomeini was described as a "racist and fascist." Iranians were urged to "take guns into your hands" in preparation for action.

These broadcasts apparently were not cooked up solely by the CIA. Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's national security adviser, developed the CIA connection in Egypt, where the broadcasts originated last December. Afterwards, Brzezinski was described as dissatisfied with Voice of American broadcasts to Iran.

The United States has a legitimate interest in broadcasting factual information into Iran to set the record straight. But the CIA's black propaganda can only undermine U.S. credibility. More importantly, the United States must have a firm and clearcut policy toward Iran. And for the CIA to foment rebellion when the president has promised that the United States will not meddle in Iran's internal affairs increases the uncertainty in an already dangerously uncertain situation.

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AGEE

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HUMAN EVENTS
26 JULY 1980

PBS Propaganda Goes Too Far

By M. STANTON EVANS

Any lingering doubts about the need to abolish the Public Broadcasting Service have now been laid conclusively to rest.

PBS pretty well sealed the verdict a few weeks back when it broadcast a three-part series called "On Company Business"—a blast at the Central Intelligence Agency as seen by renegade agent Philip Agee and others of his ilk. The purpose of the series, as the producers put it when the project was announced, was to tell "the story of 30 years of CIA subversion, murder, bribery and torture as told by an insider"—meaning Agee.

Viewers were not informed that Agee in recent years has been actively working the other side of the street—in behalf of America's enemies. Agee himself makes no bones about his sympathies in the matter, though innocents watching PBS were not brought in on the secret. In a 1975 interview, for example, he was quoted as saying his allegiance was with the Communists in their struggle with the evil "capitalists."

"The CIA," he said, "is plainly on the wrong side, that is, the capitalistic side. I approve KGB [Soviet intelligence] activities, Communist activities in general; when they are to the advantage of the oppressed. In fact, the KGB is not doing enough in this regard, because the USSR depends on the people to free themselves. Between the overdone activities the CIA initiates and the more modest activities of the KGB there is no comparison."

In other words, the Communists are good guys—although a bit too "modest" in their efforts. The bad guys are the capitalistic Americans. These sympathies were underscored by an article Agee did for *Esquire*, in which he expressed his admiration for Communist Cuba, acknowledged he had done a lot of "research" in that Socialist paradise, and otherwise spewed out Marxist boilerplate.

In this revealing article, Agee said "I aspire to be a Communist and a revolutionary." Although saying he wasn't versed in Marxist doctrine and that his Communist aspirations did not require a foreign model, he had obviously absorbed enough of the creed to denounce America in class struggle terms for alleged "social and economic injustice" committed in the interests of the evil corporations.

In further explanation of his views, Agee added: "I came to reject gradualist reform as the path to a better society." And: "I had come by now to acknowledge socialist revolution as the historical process that would lead to a higher form of social and economic organization. Not only had I comprehended what I was *against*, but also what I was *for*."

What Agee is "for" and "against" is further exemplified in the pattern of his expose activities, which focus exclusively on the supposed evils of the CIA while having nothing critical to say about the Soviet intelligence network or its stooges in the Cuban DGI.

Much of the background on Agee and the slanted nature of the PBS presentation are spelled out in a recent newsletter from Accuracy in Media. This watchdog organization wants to know why PBS would air a three-hour onslaught against our intelligence service from the standpoint of a Soviet apologist—without even identifying him as such. On the past record, AIM probably won't get much satisfaction.

PBS has indulged in similar shenanigans before, such as a dithering

tribute to sports in Communist Cuba and a sanitized look at life in the ghastly police state of North Korea. When responsible parties at the network were taken to task for these blatant offerings, they showed little willingness to concede their error or mend their ways.

The usual defense provided for such programming is that it is covered by "freedom of the press," but that is an evasion. Presumably, any private news outlet could pump forth similar slanted offerings and, while people would vehemently protest, there would be no question about the journalistic right to such expressions.

PBS, however, is not a private outlet. It is heavily funded by the government and would not survive for very long without such funding. Which means that U.S. taxpayers are being compelled to foot the bill for the blatant pro-Soviet propaganda of Agee and others like him. As one such taxpayer, I consider this to be an outrageous violation of my constitutional rights.

The case for having a public broadcast system is weak-to-nonexistent anyway, since there is no good reason in a free society to have government involved in such activity. When the system is used to disseminate the unabashed propaganda of America's enemies, it is long since time to shut it down.

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WASHINGTON POST
24 JULY 1980

Stay Halts Return Of Agee Passport

United Press International
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, acting at the government's request, yesterday stayed a court order restoring the passport of former CIA agent Philip Agee.

Burger's action further postpones the opportunity for the controversial former agent to retrieve his passport, which was lifted by the State Department last December for national security reasons.

Agee, a longtime critic of the CIA's covert operations, has published the names of hundreds of CIA agents around the world, an apparent breach of the secrecy agreement he signed with the intelligence agency.

The Justice Department had asked Burger to delay the reinstatement of Agee's passport until the entire Supreme Court considers the case.

On June 27, a federal appeals court panel ruled that Agee's right to travel was constitutionally protected and that Cyrus R. Vance, while secretary of state, did not have legal authority to revoke Agee's passport.

REUTER

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WASHINGTON, JULY 21, REUTER - AN APPEALS COURT HAS DELAYED UNTIL WEDNESDAY IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS ORDER REQUIRING THE GOVERNMENT TO RESTORE THE PASSPORT OF EXILED FORMER CIA AGENT PHILIP AGEES; THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT SAID TODAY.

THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS LAST MONTH RULED THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT OVERSTEPPED ITS AUTHORITY IN REVOKING MR AGEES'S PASSPORT LAST DECEMBER AND ORDERED THAT IT BE RESTORED.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAS CLAIMED THAT INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL BY MR AGEES, AN OUTSPOKEN CRITIC OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, CAUSES SERIOUS DAMAGE TO U.S. FOREIGN POLICY.

THE APPEALS COURT DELAYED IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS ORDER TO ENABLE THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT TO APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT. THE DEPARTMENT HAS ALREADY ASKED THE HIGH COURT TO REVIEW THE CASE.

MR AGEES, WHO NOW LIVES IN WEST GERMANY, HAS CLAIMED THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT DEPRIVED HIM OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO TRAVEL.

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ON PAGE A-13

WASHINGTON POST
19 JULY 1980

Agee Fight Goes To Highest Court

Associated Press

The Justice Department asked the Supreme Court yesterday to overturn a court order restoring a passport to ex-CIA agent Philip Agee, who the government says is damaging national security.

Having lost its case in both trial court and appeals court, the government urged the Supreme Court to rule that the president, acting through the secretary of state, has authority to revoke the passport of an American citizen whose international travel activities have caused and will continue to cause serious damage to national security and foreign policy.

The Justice Department said international travel was essential to Agee's activities because it allowed him to collect information, recruit help, attract extremist groups and gain media attention.

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LEAKS

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-1BOSTON GLOBE
20 July 1980

Press seen as 'enemy' in White House

By Curtis Wilkie
Globe Staff

CAMDEN, Maine — Former State Department spokesman Hodding Carter 3d says that some of the measures taken by President Jimmy Carter to control foreign policy leaks were offensive and demoralizing, and he blames Zbigniew Brzezinski for convincing the President that the State Department was the source.

Carter, who left the Administration this month, was critical of Brzezinski's National Security Council operation and said it was responsible for the "most substantive leaks."

In an interview Friday at his summer home in Camden, overlooking Penobscot Bay, Carter also said the Administration had a misconception about the way reporters work in this country.

The White House, he said, "sees the press as the enemy."

"There are some people there, who are major leakers themselves, who think the only way reporters get a story is through a leak. They think reporters are clods and animals, and that you simply feed them," said Carter, who is no relation to the President and who has spent much of his life as a journalist.

He left the government two weeks ago — not long after the resignation of his friend and boss, Cyrus Vance, as Secretary of State — and retreated to the quiet of Maine after 3½ years at the heart of the action in Washington.

However, he was pitched back into the maelstrom last week by a series of news stories involving leaks and bureaucratic strife. As he sat on a large rock rising out of the back lawn of a "castle" he purchased with part of the proceeds of the sale of the Mississippi newspaper his father founded and he once ran, Carter reflected on the infighting of the nation's foreign policy apparatus.

Carter's remarks came after reports that he had refused to sign an affidavit declaring that he was not responsible for leaks that led to a news story about a debate within the Administration over increased military aid to Morocco.

The article appeared in the Washington Post last October. It reportedly angered the President so much that he sought affidavits from such high-ranking officials as Vance, Brzezinski and CIA Director Stansfield Turner in which they professed their innocence.

Carter said he was approached by FBI agents. "I talked to them quite willingly. I told them it was not a story in which I was involved."

Shortly before he left the State Department — he announced his intention to resign shortly after Vance quit — Carter said he was presented with an affidavit to sign. "I was led to believe that it came from the highest levels of the White House. I refused to sign a presumptive statement that says I'm a good boy."

Asked if he had been offended by the affidavit, Carter said: "Of course I found it offensive. But I found it sillier than offensive. It was also counter-productive."

He said the President had depressed many members of the State Department hierarchy in an earlier attempt to stop leaks.

Vance and 16 other State Department officials were summoned to the White House in February 1979 for a dressing down after a report by CBS that US officials believed the Iranian government of Shapur Bakhtiar would soon fall.

The President, who was enraged over the story, according to accounts of the incident, threatened to fire any officials who had leaks coming out of their divisions at the State Department, even if the officials themselves were not directly responsible.

Carter, who was assistant secretary of state at the time, said he was "heartsick" after the meeting.

"I was mad. I felt it was a bum rap. I felt that the procedure amounted to a kangaroo court. It was a humiliation to Vance and destructive to the loyalty of those who had to sit there and be told: 'You are untrustworthy. You are my problem.'"

The Bakhtiar government fell within days of the meeting.

Carter is married to Patricia Derian, an assistant secretary of state in charge of human rights. She was also singled out in a Washington Post story last week as a prime suspect for leaks. "We start with Patt Derian and then we add to the list," an investigator of leaks was quoted as saying.

"Patt is articulate, and she opposes policy openly," Carter said. "Some of the idiots who work in government are not used to people speaking up. In a town which shoots from ambush, they can't believe anybody will look them in the eye and disagree."

It has been reported that there are 15 criminal investigations of leaks of military or diplomatic information, and that another 10 investigations were closed last year, Carter said he had not been aware of any of them until the FBI discussed the story of the Moroccan aid with him.

CONTINUED

As for his wife, Carter said she was "demonstrably" clear of guilt because not a single case had been proved against her.

Carter acknowledged that the State Department "leaks — and leaks like a sieve," but said that other government agencies, including the NSC, the White House, the CIA and the Defense Department, also leaked stories "for self-serving reasons and for policy reasons."

"I think that one sad thing that happened was that the President, over time, became convinced by Brzezinski — who is doing it for a reason — that it's the State Department" that is responsible for most of the leaks.

"The most substantive leaks come from the White House," where Brzezinski's NSC staff works, Carter said.

Carter was especially critical of the relationship between Brzezinski and Richard Burt, a reporter who covers national security issues for the New York Times.

"You don't have to read anything less juvenile than Richard Burt to see Zbigniew Brzezinski's lips move while Burt writes," Carter said. "Burt is notorious for being an open wound on the National Security Council. They turn on the arterial flow and he transmits it to the New York Times."

If the leaks do not come directly from Brzezinski, Carter said, "it's from his aides. I have no idea if the President is aware of it, but everybody else in town (Washington) surely knows."

In an article in the Times last week, Burt wrote that a spirit of cooperation was prevailing between

Brzezinski and the new Secretary of State, Edmund S. Muskie. One of the reasons cited by the reporter's sources for the "relative absence of rancor" was the departure of some of Brzezinski's "fiercest critics" at the State Department, such as Carter and Leslie H. Gelb, former director of politico-military affairs.

The Times story followed by a week an account in the Washington Post in which sources close to Muskie — widely believed to be Washington lawyer and longtime Muskie associate Berl Bernhard — complained of Brzezinski's attempts to upstage the former Maine senator.

During the President's European trip last month, Brzezinski appeared on television repeatedly and the White House distributed texts of his interviews.

"Because the President allows him to do it, and because Brzezinski loves to do it, you have a highly visible national security adviser," Carter said.

After the Post article critical of Brzezinski appeared, Carter said, Burt "went over (to the NSC) and got his tap turned on."

Burt, reached for comment in Washington yesterday, said that Muskie had told a New York Times group prior to the publication of his article that the situation vis-a-vis the NSC was "working harmoniously."

The Times reporter said he felt Hodding Carter's comments were "unfair" because he had talked to State Department officials, as well as the NSC staff, before writing the story.

Burt also pointed out that it was one of his stories about a possible site for an electronic listening post in Norway to verify Soviet compliance with the strategic arms limitation treaty that triggered one of the government investigations into leaks.

Hodding Carter's attack on Brzezinski in the in-

terview with The Globe represents one of the sharpest and most open criticisms in the history of disputes between the State Department and the NSC.

The conflict between the State Department, which lies in Foggy Bottom, and the White House's NSC will continue, Carter said, "until the President brings one to heel."

Several times during his Administration, the President has ordered the State Department and the NSC to stop sniping at each other. It has created truces, but Carter said that eventually "somebody from across town would throw a knife into us."

He said the State Department was repeatedly branded for being "soft on the Russians," which he called "reprehensible" conduct by "guys on that (NSC) staff, starting at or near the top."

He also called it "standard idiot behavior in a bureaucracy with overlapping turf."

Carter said that Vance often differed with Brzezinski on approaches to foreign policy, but would accept the President's decision even if he lost.

"It is a fact that Brzezinski does not easily take no for an answer, or accept it when a decision goes against him," Carter said. "Vance would often think an issue was decided and then look over his shoulder and see Brzezinski nibbling away."

During his years as State Department spokesman, Carter was popular among the diplomatic press corps. Asked if he had ever leaked a story himself, the 45-year-old Carter grinned and answered cryptically: "I think I felt an intense loyalty to the Secretary of State and the President, to policies as I understood them."

Carter became well known to the nation as the Administration's chief spokesman on the Iranian crisis in the first months after the hostages were seized. He said he agreed with the President's handling of that issue.

However, he said the President's remark in which he called Muskie a more effective Secretary of State than Vance — whom the President described as "bogged down in details" — was "a sad and unfortunate misuse of words."

"What he said could only hurt the man who bent over backwards to keep from hurting him."

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ON PAGE A-2

NEW YORK TIMES
21 JULY 1980

Hodding Carter Says U.S. Aides See Press as Enemy

BOSTON, July 20 (Reuters) — Hodding Carter 3d, the former State Department spokesman, said in an interview published today that the Carter Administration "sees the press as the enemy."

Mr. Carter, in an interview with The Boston Globe, said that this climate of suspicion had caused members of the Presidential circle to be mistaken about the way the press works in the United States.

"There are some people there who are major leakers themselves who think the only way reporters get a story is through a leak," Mr. Carter said. "They think that reporters are clods and animals and that you simply feed them."

In October, President Carter became angered by leaked stories concerning a debate within the Administration over increased military aid to Morocco. Signed affidavits were sought from several high-ranking Government officials, including Stansfield Turner, the Director of Central

Intelligence, and then Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance, who swore they had not been responsible for the leaks.

Carter Refused to Sign Affidavit

But Hodding Carter, who resigned last month, refused to sign an affidavit, calling it "a presumptive statement that says 'I'm a good boy.'"

Mr. Carter said that some of the recent news leaks that enraged President Carter were coming from within the White House. He said that Zbigniew Brzezinski, the President's national security adviser, had convinced President Carter that the State Department had been the source of news leaks. But in fact, Mr. Carter said, Mr. Brzezinski himself and the National Security Council were responsible for the leaks. He was particularly critical of the National Security Council and Richard Burt, a reporter for The New York Times.

"You don't have to read anything less juvenile than Richard Burt to see Zbigniew Brzezinski's lips move while Burt

writes," Mr. Carter told The Globe. "Burt is notorious for being an open wound on the National Security Council. They turn on the arterial flow and he transmits it to The New York Times."

In New York, a spokesman for The Times said there would be no comment on the story.

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CIA ESTIMATES/STUDIES

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CHICAGO TRIBUNE

23 July 1980

Soviet GNP slowed to 2.1% in '78-79: CIA

WASHINGTON (UPI)—The Soviet Union's economy grew only 2.1 per cent in 1978-1979, leaving ordinary citizens unhappy about consumer shortages as defense spending forged ahead, the CIA reported Monday.

"The Soviet economy slowed to a crawl in 1978-1979," according to a 25-page report, "The Soviet Economy in 1978-1979 and Prospects for 1980."

"THE AVERAGE annual Gross National Product growth rate of 2.1 per cent was the lowest for any two-year period since World War II," it said.

The Soviet Union's GNP is equivalent to about \$1.3 trillion, compared with \$2.55 trillion for the United States in 1980.

The CIA report said the Soviet consumer is increasingly cynical and frustrated at shortages of such basic supplies as meat, refrigerators, automo-

biles, and housing.

"While consumer frustrations do not pose a threat to the stability of the regime, there are substantial economic social costs at stake," the report said.

"REDUCED PRODUCTIVITY, excessive labor turnover, alcoholism, and absenteeism as well as increased corruption and private (often illegal) economic activity are all manifestations of unfulfilled consumer demand which will continue to rise unchecked through at least 1980."

Meanwhile, the study said, the Soviet leadership continues to press massive military programs.

"During the past few years, estimated Soviet defense spending grew more rapidly than GNP. As a result, in 1979 the defense effort consumed 12 to 14 per cent of Soviet GNP," according to the report.

NEWSDAY
22 July 1980

That U.S.-Soviet Defense

Budget 'Gap'

By Arthur Macy Cox

The Republican Party has adopted a platform plank on defense which says, "The scope and magnitude of the growth of Soviet military power threatens American interests at every level. . . we will build toward a sustained defense expenditure sufficient to close the gap with the Soviets and ultimately reach the position of military superiority that the American people demand."

Richard Nixon in his new book, "The Real War" gives his view of the origin of the defense spending "gap": "In 1976 the CIA estimates of Russian military spending for 1970-1975 were doubled overnight as errors were discovered and corrected. . . . When the first concrete steps toward arms control were taken American presidents were being supplied by the CIA with figures on Russian military spending that were only half of what the agency later decided spending had been. Thanks, in part, to this intelligence blunder we will find ourselves looking down the nuclear barrel in the mid-1980's."

But the CIA's estimates indicated no spending gap. Nixon, the Republican Party and millions of other Americans are victims of a fundamental misunderstanding of the facts. Actually, the USSR and its allies still spend significantly less for defense than does the United States and its allies.

Congress recently authorized the largest U.S. defense budget in history because most members of Congress have come to believe that the Soviets had doubled their defense spending during the decade of the '70s. Throughout the United States there is a broad view that the Soviets have made a dramatic increase in their defense programs. But the facts are

Arthur Macy Cox, who served as a CIA official for 10 years, is a writer specializing in Soviet affairs. He is policy consultant to the American Committee on East-West Accord.

very different. At no time has the Soviet defense budget been increased by more than 3 per cent a year.

In 1976, the CIA made what appeared to be an astounding discovery about Soviet defense spending. Television, radio and press throughout the country headlined the story. "CIA Doubles Estimate of Soviet Defense Spending." But the media was very poorly briefed. Nobody at the CIA thought the Soviets had suddenly increased their defense spending by 100 per cent. But the impression was allowed to stand and has not subsequently been clarified.

A recent Air Force study prepared by the U.S. Strategic Institute said: "Estimates prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency, as well as by U.S. academic economists, have been in error by as much as 100 per cent. The CIA estimates were accepted without question until 1976, when they were acknowledged to be grossly in error and doubled. Economists have not yet recovered from the shock of that experience."

The CIA has an admittedly difficult job estimating what the Soviets spend on defense because so much Soviet information is secret. The figure which the Soviets publish in their annual budget doesn't come close to approximating actual Soviet defense totals. The CIA tries to estimate the dollar cost of the Soviet military by determining what it would cost the United States to duplicate the Soviet defense establishment. This methodology is obviously subject to considerable error because there are such vast differences in what defense items actually cost in the U.S. and USSR.

For example, the most glaring difference is in military manpower. The Soviets have about 4.4 million military personnel compared to a U.S. figure of 2.1 million. The CIA makes an estimate of the dollar cost of the 4.4 million Soviet force multiplied by U.S. military pay and allowance rates. This results in a gross distortion because U.S. military personnel are volunteers with relatively high levels of pay and allowances. The Soviet forces, on the other hand, are drafted and paid about one-fifth the U.S. rate.

When this method of costing Soviet defense began in the early 1970s, the CIA concluded that the Soviets were spending between 6 and 8 per cent of their gross

national produce (GNP) for defense. At the time, the U.S. was expending about the same percentage of its GNP. Today, the U.S. figure is closer to 5 per cent. However, it is often forgotten that the U.S. continues to have a GNP which is about double that of the Soviets.

During the period from 1973 to 1976, as CIA analysts refined their methodology and obtained better intelligence they made an important breakthrough. In costing Soviet defense production they had been crediting the Soviets with efficiency which was close to that of the United States. What they discovered was that Soviet defense production, in fact, was not very efficient. Thus, the Soviet defense effort was absorbing a greater share of their GNP than previously believed.

Here is what the published 1976 CIA report said: "The new estimate of the share of defense in the Soviet GNP is almost twice as high as the 6-8 per cent previously estimated. This does not mean that the impact of defense programs on the Soviet economy has increased—only that our appreciation of this impact has changed. *It also implies that Soviet defense industries*

are far less efficient than formerly believed." [Emphasis added.]

The CIA increased its estimate of defense spending as a percentage of the USSR's GNP from 6-8 to 11-13, but there had been no near doubling of the rate of actual spending. There was merely an increase in the CIA's estimate of the share of GNP expended for defense because Soviet defense industries are so inefficient.

Thus, these findings, rather than causing jubilation, were made to seem threatening; the truth was never adequately explained to the Congress and the public. Instead, for the past four years, a misperception that there has been a great surge in Soviet defense spending has gone uncorrected. That this idea continues its widespread hold would appear to be rank irresponsibility on the part of the Carter administration.

In fact, there have been no dramatic increases in Soviet defense spending during the entire decade. Here is what a CIA paper published this January said for the 1970-79 period: "Estimated in constant dollars, Soviet defense activities increased at an average annual rate of 3 per cent." In other words the Soviets have indeed been increasing their defense budget each year since 1970 at about the same rate as the United States and most of its NATO partners have raised their military spending during each of the past four years.

From the standpoint of weighing the essential defense burden of the U.S. and the USSR there are several factors that should be given much greater emphasis when the executive branch is presenting the facts to Congress.

The first is the great difference between the defense contribution made by the European allies of the U.S. and the Warsaw Pact allies of the Soviet Union. In 1978, the European NATO members expended \$75 billion for defense, and France, a non-NATO ally, spent \$16 billion—a total of \$91 billion. The Warsaw Pact members, other than the USSR, expended \$23 billion, or one-fourth of the defense spending of our European allies.

Perhaps even more important in considering the relative defense burdens is the cost shouldered by the USSR in defending against China. The U.S. Defense

Department says: "at least 22 per cent of the increase in the Soviet defense budget during these 13 years (1964-1977) has been attributed to the buildup in the Far East The high construction costs in Siberia suggest that the intelligence estimates may understate the cost of the Soviet buildup in the Far East substantially." In addition, according to the Defense Department, the Soviets "station as much as 25 per cent of their ground forces and tactical air power on their border with China."

The Soviet burden of defense against China comes more sharply into focus when note is made of the fact that the Soviets have 44 divisions facing China and 31 divisions facing NATO. Of the 31 divisions in Central Europe, four are standing guard in Hungary and five have remained in Czechoslovakia since the invasion of that country in 1968. As a result, there are about twice as many Soviet divisions committed to the China front as to the West German front.

Furthermore, the U.S. does not have to match the Soviet forces facing China. Those forces are at the end of a long and tenuous line of communications that can be severed, in time of war, by missile strikes. These are not forces that can be readily transferred to combat in a European war.

On the other hand, if it is argued that the U.S. defense budget should provide forces to counter the Soviet threat to China, then the Chinese defense budget should be included on our side of the ledger—a total of \$35 billion.

The combined U.S.-NATO defense budgets are greater than the combined Soviet-Warsaw Pact defense budgets, and if the China factor is included, the Soviet proportion of its defense budget used against the U.S. and its allies is less than 75 per cent of that of the NATO powers.

These are facts which Congress should have before it when weighing budget appropriation decisions this summer. The USSR has an ample defense budget, but it still does not equal its potential adversaries. The perception of Soviet military superiority is an illusion based, in large part, on a misunderstanding of the facts.

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BALTIMORE SUN
21 JULY 1980

CIA reports Soviet edgy on GNP lag

Study finds cynicism over shortages, defense burden

By Charles W. Corddry
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—The Soviet economy has slowed to a crawl, turning in its worst performance last year since the Second World War, and failed promises of a better life have produced public frustration and cynicism.

President Leonid I. Brezhnev himself protests shortages of basic items such as soap, diapers, bread and milk, threatening punishment for those to blame, but goes steadily on with a defense buildup that outstrips economic growth.

This, in part, is the predicament described in a new Central Intelligence Agency compendium of facts, statistics and opinions titled, "The Soviet Economy in 1978-79 and Prospects for 1980."

The Russian gross national product increased 0.7 percent in 1979, compared with a growth of 3.5 percent the year before. The economy "slowed to a crawl" over the two years chiefly because of crop failures (due to harsh weather), a decline in productivity and a leveling of oil production as energy demand increased, the study indicated.

The lot of the Soviet citizen improved little. Per capita consumption went up less than 2 percent a year in the period and per capita meat production, "a key indicator of consumer welfare," dropped 1 percent in 1979. The consumer outlook this year is "particularly gloomy, especially the food situation."

A severe housing shortage persists and such high-priority items as refrigerators and automobiles remain scarce.

Defense is a wholly different matter, "not affected by the slowdown in the rate of economic growth," the report said.

Major weapons programs, with powerful political and bureaucratic backing, drove up military outlays while the output of capital and consumer goods dropped. The defense sector had ample money and siphoned off much of the best scientific, technical and managerial talent as well as high-quality materials.

The CIA said that defense spending in the last few years has grown faster than the economy and took 12 percent to 14 percent of the gross national product in 1979. On present trends, the figure could reach 15 percent by 1985.

For purposes of comparison, the United States gross national product increased 2.3 percent (on top of inflation) in 1979, defense spending increased about 3 percent and the outlay amounted to 5 percent of GNP. Having declined from 8 percent of GNP a decade ago, defense spending has been a fairly steady burden on the American economy over the last several years.

In the Soviet Union, the economy grew

0.7 percent last year, defense spending increased 4 percent to 5 percent and, as the CIA figures on share of GNP indicate, defense will be an increasing burden.

Though the CIA study did not discuss the point, intelligence analysts are known to conjecture on whether economic stringencies in the 1980s will force an eventual curtailment of Soviet arms production and a diversion to consumer goods and domestic industry.

They further speculate on whether that prospect could lead to more aggressive adventures in the early 1980s while Moscow is in a strong military position.

The public mood in Russia, the CIA said, is one of "pessimism and cynicism as food shortages become more widespread, especially in cities where supplies have been relatively good until recently."

Consumers discount propaganda that increased Soviet aid to less-developed countries accounts for shortages at home, and blame government "mismanagement."

The agency study said consumer frustrations did not threaten the stability of the Kremlin regime. What they did do was cause reduced productivity, alcoholism,

absenteeism and corruption.

The Soviet Union was able to import a record 31 million tons of grain last year, avoiding the distress slaughtering of livestock that the major domestic crop failure otherwise would have caused.

This year's prospect is quite different: America's grain embargo, because of the Afghanistan invasion, will withhold 19 million tons from the Soviet Union in 1980 and, the study said, Moscow can only partly offset the loss.

When Mr. Brezhnev said U.S. actions would not affect "plans for providing bread," Soviet consumers' skepticism was such that they formed long lines at food stores in Moscow and elsewhere and reportedly began to hoard flour.

Reciting in detail Moscow's problems with oil, coal, electricity, steel, machinery, chemicals, transportation and labor, the CIA said "deeply troubled" leaders had reacted with "reforms" that essentially were more of the same—central allocation of resources, administrative price fixing and other measures that historically have discouraged innovations and encouraged waste.

The measures "will do little to perk up the Soviet economy," the study said.

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MISCELLANEOUS

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THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
22 July 1980

Freedom of Information Act

Unlocking Uncle Sam's secrets

By Stewart McBride

Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

San Francisco

Archaeologists make a business of digging in ancient rubbish heaps for stone tools, arrowheads, or odd bits of pottery that open windows on old cultures.

In the same way, contemporary historians are sifting through government records hunting for a phone message, interoffice memo, or doodle that might illuminate that modern subterranean culture called "the bureaucracy."

While the ancients had neither knack nor interest in hiding from the prying eyes of posterity, federal agencies have both. The government is notorious for covering its tracks — and documents — with rubber stamps marked "CLASSIFIED." Until recently, scholars trying to unearth records of the post-World War II period from agency files have found themselves vainly clawing at this "buried history."

Now they have a sophisticated new tool to dig with — the 1966 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) with the strengthening amendments of 1974 and 1976. With it, researchers have already dug up important information on some Central Intelligence Agency activities such as: spying on Martin Luther King Jr. and other United States citizens; experiments with mind-control drugs in the '50s and '60s that killed at least two Americans (Project MK-Ultra); Project Resistance, in conjunction with the Federal Bureau of Investigation's controversial COINTELPRO program to infiltrate, discredit, and disrupt the antiwar and other radical movements; covert actions in Chile; the agency's relations with journalists, academics, and local police departments; and its attempt to keep the story of the Glomar Explorer (the attempt to salvage a sunken Soviet submarine) out of the press.

The Freedom of Information Act has also helped to uncover the dangers of Agent Orange to the health of Vietnam war veterans, and the hazards of low-level radiation to communities near nuclear testing sites.

Publishing houses and university presses alike are cranking out volume after volume based on government documents declassified through the FOIA. Among the most notable books are Allen Weinstein's "Perjury: The Hiss-Chambers Case," Peter Wyden's "Bay of Pigs: the Untold Story," and William Shawcross's "Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia."

A few months ago, a Columbia history professor, Sigmund Diamond, published an account in The Nation magazine of the FBI's presence on the Yale campus in the '40s. The article, which has caused quite a stir in New Haven and throughout academia, centered on FBI records to which Diamond gained access through the FOIA.

"Most of the bits of information we turn up under the act don't make headlines," says Barton Bernstein, a Stanford history professor who has gotten hundreds of government documents declassified. Over the last several years Bernstein has used the information to publish articles reinterpreting the Korean war, the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban missile crisis, and the decision to drop the atomic bomb. Last year, he made public that at least 11, and perhaps more than 20, American POWs in Hiroshima were killed when the A-bomb was detonated — a fact the government had kept secret for decades.

"In isolation, the documents are not usually dramatic, but they do help fill in the web of history and have strength in their collectivity," Bernstein says. "For anyone working in the history of foreign and domestic policy in the postwar period, the act is essential."

At the moment, scholars like Bernstein are seriously concerned that their new research tool is about to be blunted.

With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Iran's taking of US hostages, and Cold War II looming on the horizon, congressional support for the Freedom of Information Act is eroding. The act has come under specific attack from the CIA, which claims it cannot properly function as an intelligence service under disclosure laws applied to the rest of government. In an attempt to strengthen the CIA — whose wings were severely trimmed after Watergate — the Carter administration has been pushing for a new CIA charter which, among other things, would grant the agency broad exemptions from disclosure requirements of the FOIA.

Last February, Frank C. Carlucci, deputy director of the CIA, told Congress: "The Freedom of Information Act has emerged as the focal point of the often-heard allegation that the CIA cannot keep a secret. It is virtually impossible for most of our agents and sources (in foreign countries) to understand the law itself, much less why an organization such as the Central Intelligence Agency should be subject to the act."

When asked by the Monitor how the CIA's sources and methods had been endangered by the act, the agency's general counsel, Daniel Silver, responded: "Classified information has been disclosed through the FOIA as a result of our own mistakes, and I am convinced that FOIA litigation has harmed the agency in rather subtle ways. We have not released headline secrets, but have painted a picture that would have been better left unsaid."

Scholars championing the fight against CIA exemptions are quick to point out that the agency has made an about-face since 1978, when John Blake, the career CIA officer in charge of FOIA requests, told the Senate Judiciary Committee that with respect to the act: "We have been able to make the necessary adjustments. I am pleased to report that, in fact, I think that the agency is better off for it."

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Because of election-year campaigning and an already overloaded legislative calendar, it is unlikely Congress will act this session on CIA charter legislation. Meanwhile, the academic community continues to mobilize its troops. Earlier this year, the Organization of American Historians (OAH), the American Historical Association, Historians for Freedom of Information, and some 150 other organizations and individuals, ranging from Common Cause to the National Indian Youth Council, sent letters to Congress protesting CIA exemptions that would, they said, "damage serious historical and journalistic research and the conduct of informed debate."

William Appleman Williams, a diplomatic historian at Oregon State University and the new president of the OAH, said the CIA exemptions from disclosure would "close down serious scholarship in recent contemporary history."

In May, Lloyd Garson, a history professor at Rutgers, told the House Government Operations Subcommittee on Government Information and Individual Rights: "The post-Vietnam backlash against declassification and against FOIA can only remind the historian of days when kings banished prophets who displeased them, and sent messengers bearing bad news to oblivion."

While it is unlikely the Freedom of Information Act will be banished to oblivion, historians — looking at the past, as good historians should — draw little comfort from Congress's record on this matter.

"It took Congress 170 years — that is, 85 Congresses or six full professorial careers — to pass [FOIA] legislation against the bureaucratic tendencies to withhold records," says William Preston, chairman of the history department at John Jay College. "That is not a tradition of access. It's the youngest and perhaps most precarious right that has been established."

Precarious though it may be, the basic structure of the FOIA is breathtaking and revolutionary. It says, essentially, that any person is entitled to see any government agency record unless the government proves it comes within one of nine specified exemptions such as national security or privacy. Beyond that, the act gets rather complicated and raises a host of questions that have kept the legal profession hopping since the act's passage.

What is an agency? It is not Congress or the courts; it is an executive department or military department. It includes independent regulatory bodies such as the Federal Communications Commission and the National Labor Relations Board and government-controlled and financed corporations like the Tennessee Valley Authority. The act excludes the president's immediate staff whose sole function is to advise the president, but it includes those in the White House and executive offices who perform other ministerial duties.

The Supreme Court recently ruled that the press was not entitled to see notes made by Henry Kissinger while he was assistant to the President for national-security affairs, though when he switched hats and took on the additional task of secretary of state he became covered by the FOIA.

What is a record? A record is defined as anything that contains information, usually in writing. Though FOIA users normally request documents, computer tapes and printouts are also fair game. A recent request for the weapon used in the assassination of President Kennedy was denied on the grounds that it was not a "record." You can get a description of the gun, but not the gun.

Who can make a request? The statute applies to "any person," which includes any US citizen or, for that matter, any foreign citizen or spy. Under the act, you do not have to show a need for the document. In fact, why you want the document is generally of no concern to the agency or the courts.

Need is relevant in some cases, however. If you are able to show that your request is in the public interest, you may (1) persuade an agency to release information even if it is covered by an exemption, (2) get a fee waiver of the charges for search and copying fees, or (3) obtain attorney's fees provided for in the act or obtain free counsel from public-interest groups like the American Civil Liberties Union, Center for National Security Studies, or Ralph Nader's Public Citizen organization.

In theory, the burden of proof falls upon the government to prove that records withheld from historians fall within one of the nine FOIA exemptions. In practice, scholars say, the government agencies always have the upper hand.

"It doesn't seem to me yet to be a fair fight," Professor Preston says. "When you stack up the entrenched bureaucratic habits, the mania for classification, the growth of secrecy, the passion for exemption, the sheer bulk of the records, the fees and delays, and the courts' reluctance to challenge and review agency discretion, when the historian is up against all of that he begins to look like Custer at the Battle of Little Big Horn."

While it is unlikely the Freedom of Information Act will be banished to oblivion, historians — looking at the past, as good historians should — draw little comfort from Congress's record on this matter.

The most common complaints among historians are:

Destruction of documents. In the name of "administrative housekeeping," agencies destroy records that may be historically significant. Recently, the American Friends Service Committee, along with Historians for Freedom of Information, The Nation magazine, and some 40 other plaintiffs won a federal injunction to stop the FBI's destruction of its field files. Judge Harold H. Greene, of US District Court in Washington, D.C., gave the FBI and the National Archives until January 1981 to devise a system of evaluating the historical value of records before disposing of them. The judge ruled that the Archives had failed for the last 30 years to carry out its legal responsibility because it had approved FBI requests to destroy records without ever sampling those files. One National Archives official explains, "We never had the clout to go in and tell the director of the FBI, 'Show us your records!'" Judge Greene's decision gives us that clout.

Overclassification. Within the government are some 40,000 officials with the power to classify information, says Preston, who estimates that disclosure of most of the 1 billion classified federal documents would pose no danger to national security. Historians say the general rule of thumb among bureaucrats passing judgment on FOIA requests seems to be: "While there is some risk in making the information available, there is no risk in denying the request." Says Stanford's Bernstein: "There's no incentive for agency people to declassify because there are no penalties for erring on the side of security and excessive caution. Scholars have very little influence, and the agencies know universities are not likely to file suit on their behalves."

Mutilation. Before government agencies release documents, they are "sanitized." Sensitive material is deleted, often to the extent that scholars have received entire pages censored, save a few harmless conjunctions. "What do you do when you get a mutilated record that looks like a J. Edgar Hoover inkblot test?" Dr. Preston asks.

CONTINUED

Discovery and identification. Scholars are caught in the Catch-22 of having to know a document exists before they can request it. If you don't do a good job of defining the document, the agency is apt to respond: "Sorry, we don't have it as you've described." Furthermore, files are not always labeled as researchers might expect. For example, numerous requests to the FBI for civil rights material delivered nothing because the material had been filed under "National Security." To complicate matters, some agencies, like the FBI, have files of "blind memos" (identifying neither the sender nor the recipient) and "Do Not File" files.

"Woe betide the FOI requester who attempts to fish in the CIA's waters if he or she doesn't know precisely the name, rank, and serial number of the quarry they seek, especially if that quarry might lead to something the agency prefers to keep from public view," says William Corson, who spent 26 years as a career marine in a wide variety of operations and staff intelligence assignments at the Department of Defense. He is the author of a recent book, "Armies of Ignorance: The Rise of the American Intelligence Empire."

Delays. The agencies say that FOIA requests are time-consuming and costly. The CIA's Carlucci estimates his agency receives daily an average of 18 information requests (FOIA, Privacy Act, and Executive Order 12065) which cost about \$900 each to process. The CIA's backlog in February was over 2,700 unanswered requests, "and increasing." Denials and delays by agencies, historians agree, are more likely the result of "administrative lethargy" and the "chaos of inefficiency" than "lurking malevolence." The agencies' heavy caseloads mean "quick successes are rare," says Bernstein. "Despite statutory requirements that agencies respond promptly, I have cases that have gone on three years and more."

Falsification. Once a document has been declassified, the scholar is faced with the problem of evaluating the accuracy of the information. Numerous US citizens, most recently civil rights leader Roy Wilkins, have found falsely incriminating reports in their files at the FBI. Historians are also aware that the declassification of documents is often politically motivated by agency officials who wish to discredit or embarrass their predecessor by "leaking" damaging information through an FOIA request. A number of scholars speculate that William Shawcross was given access to such rich classified documents for his book on the secret bombing of Cambodia because Zbigniew Brzezinski, assistant to the President for national security affairs, and others in the Carter administration wanted to make Henry Kissinger look bad.

At the moment, scholars are not unanimous in support of the Freedom of Information Act. Recently, American historians using the act have come under attack from other members of their profession for writing of "instant history." "Why do you need access to the material so soon?" the critics ask. "Why not just wait until it finds its way to the National Archives? Ought historians to be testifying before Congress and getting tangled in the thicket of politics?" they ask.

Academics defending the act offer the counterargument: Historians need it to check the accuracy of the "official histories" being written by agency insiders or favored scholars. The act ensures "equality of access": Once a researcher gets a set of documents declassified, the information is available to all of his peers. And finally, through the FOIA, historians are able to act as watchdogs on agencies that may be destroying documents of use to future historians. "Trusting the agencies not to destroy historically important material is putting the safety of these irreplaceable documents in the hands of people who simply are not qualified to make historical judgments," says Columbia Prof. Harold Fruchtbau, secretary of Historians for Freedom of Information. "Unless historians get involved now, future generations may look back on us and say those early historians didn't do their job to preserve the national heritage."

Many historians like Preston and Fruchtbau not only want to preserve the FOIA, but to extend it. Some are now pressing state legislatures to adopt legislation granting access to the records of state government. Others call for criminal sanctions against federal administrators who willfully delay and frustrate disclosure. Preston suggested at the recent Organization of American Historians meeting in San Francisco that any agency planning to destroy records be required to submit an "information impact statement" assessing "the effect on the public and on historians trying to understand past government policies."

In the final analysis, even with the FOIA, the task of digging out the nation's "buried history" from federal agencies continues to try the patience of the most sedulous scholars. Says Professor Bernstein: "When André Gide was asked, 'Who was France's greatest poet?' he said, 'Victor Hugo, alas.' If I were asked for the best way of getting documents from the government, I guess I'd have to say, 'The Freedom of Information Act, alas.' It's the best we have."

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ON PAGE A-3NEW YORK TIMES
21 JULY 1980

Aides Disagree on Level of U.S. Arms Aid to Afghans

By DREW MIDDLETON

Questions have arisen about the amount of arms aid — if any — that the United States is providing to the insurgents in Afghanistan as the Soviet Union's war there progresses through the indiscriminate bombing of undefended villages to new levels of intensity.

An American officer who has followed the fighting closely since it began said that the insurgents were receiving "nothing from the United States, China or Pakistan." His statement was supported by officers from America's allies interviewed by telephone.

Sources in the Pentagon, however, say that the United States is providing arms to the insurgents on a limited basis. This seems to mean enough arms to keep the insurgents fighting in the field, but not enough to provoke Soviet retaliation against Pakistan, across whose frontier with Afghanistan American weapons would move.

A certain amount of arms traffic has been reported from the frontier. But American sources describe the arms as weapons that have been shipped out of Afghan provinces in the northeast and sent southward to be reintroduced into the areas east and southeast of Kabul.

A spokesman for the Central Intelligence Agency said he could not comment on American arms aid.

White House officials said on Feb. 15 that the United States had begun an operation to supply the insurgents with light infantry weapons, presumably rifles, light machine guns and grenades. The C.I.A., the White House source said, had been assigned to carry out the covert mission.

The arms, the officials said, would be shipped through Pakistan. Earlier, Egypt announced it would train insurgents and send them back to the battle with weapons.

Rebel leaders, normally not reticent

when it comes to discussing the fighting, have not mentioned the receipt of weapons from the United States or anywhere else. They have been quoted repeatedly as saying that they steal nearly all the weapons they require from the Russians. Sources who have seen some of the fighting report that the Afghans have a considerable number of Soviet infantry weapons but that the balance of these have been stolen not from Soviet troops but from the Afghan Army. Other weapons have come from Afghan troops deserting to the rebels.

Various Reasons for Secrecy

There are reasons for secrecy if American arms are being provided, and among them are the following:

¶ The weapons would have to go to those rebel groups that would use them and this must be done secretly to avoid splits between the insurgents, who are already riven by tribal ambitions and jealousies.

¶ The arms would have to move from Pakistan to Afghanistan and the Pakistani Government is anxious to avoid any action that might provoke the Russians.

¶ Open arms assistance in quantity could be used by the Russians as support for their claims that they are protecting the Afghan Government from outside interference.

¶ If the rebels are receiving arms, recent reports on the fighting indicate that the supply is not sufficient nor are the correct weapons for the present tactical situation being provided.

The people of the villages sustain the active, armed resistance in the countryside. Soviet tactics are to harry insurgent bands in the field with infantry and light armored personnel carriers, to bomb the villages that provide food, ammunition and shelter for the insurgents. Both fighter-attack aircraft and helicopter gunships are used against these targets.

The weapons the insurgents need most in this situation are those that will combat Soviet air power. Arms specialists say that the best weapon available is the Soviet-made SAM-7 antiaircraft missile. This has a range of about 6.25 miles and weighs only about 25 pounds. It takes only a few hours of instruction to become proficient in its use.

The Soviet Union has provided a number of Middle East arsenals with these weapons in the past and NATO sources suggest that Egypt could provide up to 150 launchers, each with three or four missiles, without seriously weakening its own defenses.

PUBLISHER'S WEEKLY
18 July 1980

Cynthia Helms
AN AMBASSADOR'S
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As insight, background, and commentary, Cynthia Helms's book makes an essential contribution to our understanding of Iran today. The story of her life during her husband's (former CIA Director Richard Helms) four-year tenure as U.S. Ambassador in Tehran, it presents an unforgettable picture of a nation gripped by fear and edging toward chaos, of the Shah before his downfall, and of turmoils across the country that have yet to be resolved. Photographs.
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ON PAGE B-1

WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
24 JULY 1980

Today's News In the Region

Survey Raps Carter's Foreign Policy



REP. MARJORIE HOLT
Polled constituents

Three-fourths of the 15,000 constituents who responded to a survey by Rep. Marjorie Holt, R-Md., say they disapprove of President Carter's handling of foreign affairs, Holt's office said yesterday. In a newsletter mailed to 4th Congressional District constituents, the conservative Republican noted that 75 percent of the survey respondents disapproved of Carter's handling of foreign policy, while only 14 percent approved. Ten percent were undecided. Responses to the 13-question survey also showed overwhelming support for the Russian grain embargo, which 89 percent approved; the boycott of the Moscow Olympics, 77 percent; more freedom for the Central Intelligence Agency, 70 percent, and continued construction of U.S. nuclear power plants, 70 percent. Some 56 percent of respondents favored registering women for the draft.

Three-fourths of the 15,000 constituents who responded to a survey by Rep. Marjorie Holt, R-Md., say they disapprove of President Carter's handling of foreign affairs, Holt's office said yesterday. In a newsletter mailed to 4th Congressional District constituents, the conservative Republican noted that 75 percent of

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE **E-23**WASHINGTON POST
24 JULY 1980**JACK ANDERSON**

Flesh Peddling in Moscow

There's an unpublicized but important event that's not on the schedule of the Moscow Olympics: the entrapment of Western visitors by Russian prostitutes working for the Soviet secret police. And in this the Russians are after as many gold medals as they can hook.

Indeed, U.S. intelligence experts glumly predict that some West Europeans, or even Americans, with access to sensitive intelligence information, have already been caught in the lush toils of comely KGB agents they have met in the festive Olympic atmosphere. The danger comes when the unwary victim, blackmailed by the threat of embarrassing publicity or a one-way ticket to the Gulag Archipelago, agrees to spy for the Kremlin when he returns home.

Intelligence sources told my associate Dale Van Atta that it's a safe assumption that any Russian woman who makes sexual overtures to a foreigner — or who responds to such overtures — is working for the secret police.

The reason is as obvious as the Soviets' perennial housing shortage. As one source explained: "The girl can't take the John back to her apartment because of the relatives living with her. And the hotels are constantly watched. So any girl who does this successfully must have the protection of the police — or the KGB." If she has her own apartment — a rarity in Russia — she is certainly working for the KGB, he said.

A typical example of the Soviet badger game was the case of a vacationing American engineer who did top-secret research for an Air Force contractor. The compliant chipper startled him by screaming rape, and the cops came bursting in. The engineer spilled everything in the six-day interrogation that followed.

Another case involved the administrative aide of a U.S. senator. A toothsome young lady named Natasha was seated "by chance" at his table in a Moscow hotel, and a pickup followed. Natasha dragged him from store to store to buy presents for her, and casually got him to sell her dollars for rubles at the black market rate.

The Senate aide grew suspicious — partly because of her stunned reaction when he snapped her picture without warning — and told American Embassy officials about his affair. He was hastily sent home, where CIA debriefers assured him that he'd have been nabbed on currency exchange violations. He has been advised not to travel in Communist-bloc countries, where the secret police could snare him for the KGB.

The KGB flesh peddlers cater to all sexual preferences, the experts noted. They have homosexual men and women on their payroll, as well as gigolos who prey on susceptible foreign women.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 15

AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY
21 July 1980

Washington Roundup

Diverging Views

Defense Intelligence Agency and the White House are in dispute over the Sept. 22, 1979, "event" in the South Atlantic that may or may not have been a nuclear explosion. The Pentagon interpretation of signals from a Vela satellite indicates some nation—South Africa or Israel—has committed the near perfect secret test—a nuclear explosion off the coast of Antarctica so cunningly timed that it was shielded by weather and circumstance from all but one satellite. A panel convened by the White House found, however, that a meteoroid impact on the satellite probably blasted ejecta loose. The pieces then floated past the sensors, glinting in the sun, and caused false signals. The possibility of such an impact occurring is once every 10 years, a White House official said. He admitted later he based the judgment on the fact that Vela satellites have been in orbit about 10 years. The Administration report will be available for a review of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty next month.

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ON PAGE A-5

NEW YORK TIMES
21 JULY 1980

Fickle History Tantalizes Adviser on Soviet

By PHILIP TAUBMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 20 — Marshall D. Shulman, the Carter Administration's leading expert on the Soviet Union, came here three years ago hoping to help reduce tension and moderate strategic arms competition. Now he is preparing to return later this year to the teaching post he left at Columbia University, somewhat battered by his time here and deeply pessimistic about the future of American-Soviet relations.

"Sometimes I get the feeling I'm sitting on a hilltop watching two trains racing toward each other on the same track," he said in a recent interview. "I don't think either of us has been acting very sensibly. This period of tension promises to continue for a long time."

For Mr. Shulman, 64-year-old Special Adviser to the Secretary of State, that prospect represents a personal and policy defeat.

His expectations were frustrated by the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and the collapse of support for the second treaty limiting nuclear arms. Instead of being a leading actor in a historic improvement in relations between the two superpowers, Mr. Shulman was relegated to a secondary role where he concentrated on trying to limit the damage.

Influence Has Declined

In the end, Mr. Shulman, like his mentor, former Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance, saw his moderate views fall out of fashion. Mr. Shulman, according to a State Department friend, experienced "success in modest ways, but failure in the great sweep of things."

Mr. Shulman does not contest that assessment. "I couldn't characterize it any better than that," he said.

The ups and downs of Mr. Shulman's three-year sojourn were marked by bureaucratic infighting and an uneasy rela-

tionship with Zbigniew Brzezinski, the President's national security adviser.

The two men, longtime colleagues at Harvard and Columbia, disagreed on how best to deal with the Soviet Union, with Mr. Brzezinski generally pushing for a more confrontational American posture.

Embarrassing Moment in Vienna

Friends of both men said there was "bad blood" between the two and their staffs. These strains produced moments that Mr. Shulman would clearly prefer to forget. Symbolic of Mr. Shulman's fading influence within the Administration, for instance, was his experience last year at the summit meeting in Vienna between President Carter and Leonid I. Brezhnev. Mr. Shulman, in theory the Administration's senior adviser on Soviet affairs, was not invited to official meetings. His friends said the snub, which greatly embarrassed Mr. Shulman, was engineered by Mr. Brzezinski's staff. White House officials denied the charge.

Mr. Shulman declined to blame anyone. "I'm not interested in playing bureaucratic games," he said. He added, "Temperamentally, I don't have a taste for low-grade combat. Vienna was a White House show, and I didn't expect to be active in discussions."

He also avoided direct criticism of Mr. Brzezinski. "Zbig and I are not rivals and never have been," he said. "I'm not ambitious for anything. I'm not seeking power, fame or anything like that, and my role has not been that of a front man on Soviet policy."

Disappointed and Weary Inside

These disavowals, according to Mr. Shulman's friends, are somewhat misleading. "Marshall does not like to show emotion or engage in public disputes, but underneath that calm, quiet exterior there is a very weary, disappointed man," said one.

Mr. Shulman came here in September 1977 at the invitation of Mr. Vance, taking a leave from his post as director of the Russian Institute at Columbia.

President Carter appointed him co-chairman of a new interagency committee to coordinate policies toward the Soviet Union, apparently removing that function from the National Security Council. Mr. Shulman seemed to have the mandate to shape Soviet policy.

Mr. Shulman arrived in the wake of the Soviet Union's rejection of Carter Administration proposals for negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms and President Carter's letter of support to a leading dissident, the physicist Andrei D. Sakharov. Both initiatives had strained relations between Washington and Moscow.

Relations Appeared to Improve

Mr. Shulman successfully urged the Administration to pressure the Russian leadership on human rights issues in less public ways. The arms limitation talks

got back on track as the Administration, with help from Mr. Shulman, modified its bargaining position. By early 1978, relations appeared to be improving.

In retrospect, officials said, that was the high-water mark for Mr. Vance and Mr. Shulman. Their influence faded as Moscow increased aid to pro-Soviet forces in the Horn of Africa and Angola during 1978. The announcement of normalization of relations between Washington and Peking in December 1978, an action pressed by Mr. Brzezinski, was viewed as a defeat for the State Department, which wanted normalization delayed until completion of the arms limitation treaty.

By the time the dispute over the Soviet brigade in Cuba developed last fall, Mr. Shulman's influence had faded sharply. State Department officials said he helped guide the Administration out of that crisis but that his views about Soviet intentions around the world were viewed as naive and unrealistic in the White House.

The interagency coordinating committee under Mr. Shulman never seized the initiative in shaping policy toward Moscow, officials said. Mr. Shulman's supporters said the importance of the committee had been overplayed to begin with, but others said Mr. Shulman's failure to engage in backstage maneuvering restricted the committee to a secondary role.

The Final Blow: Afghanistan

The final blow to Mr. Shulman's position was the Soviet action in Afghanistan. "It seemed to be a repudiation of all Marshall's talk about conciliation with Moscow," said a friend. "The invasion looked like living proof that Brzezinski was right about Russian intentions."

Mr. Shulman's critics said the intervention revealed the dangers inherent in his approach to dealing with the Soviet Union and his emphasis on trying to find areas of common interest.

Mr. Shulman says he approves of the sanctions imposed by President Carter,

but he also cautions against overreaction. "The most serious thing that could happen to us would be if we fall into Soviet-style anti-Sovietism," he said. "You don't have to have act like the Soviets to deal with them."

For Mr. Shulman, a sensible approach to the Soviet Union means never overlooking chances to stabilize the strategic nuclear competition.

"Regardless of the repugnant aspects of the Soviet system, and much of it is repugnant," he said, "we each have an interest in not letting our competitive relationship get to the point of nuclear war."

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ON PAGE 13

NEWSWEEK
28 July 1980

PERISCOPE

The Kremlin Picks Reagan

The Kremlin expects Ronald Reagan to win in November, according to U.S. intelligence reports. The reports say that Georgi Arbatov, the top Soviet Americanologist, is spreading the word on Reagan in talks with Western European Communist officials. Arbatov's message: Soviet leaders are ready and willing to do business with Reagan and anticipate no particular problems, since they have dealt effectively with past Republican administrations.

Ford as Elder Statesman

Despite his public protestations last week that he does not see himself as an elder statesman, Gerald Ford now seems eager to take on roles befitting a former President. Ford told NEWSWEEK that he is willing to serve as chairman of a proposed new Federal government-reorganization commission, just as Herbert Hoover did in the 1940s. He also said that he would be available to take charge of investigations of major agencies, such as the CIA—jobs, as Ford puts it, “where my background and experience are relevant.”

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE C-1WASHINGTON POST
19 July 1980

Two in Vietnam Spy Case Lose Appeal, But May Be Given New Trial Anyway

By Ed Bruske

Washington Post Staff Writer

A federal appeals court upheld yesterday the espionage convictions of a former U.S. Information Agency officer and a Vietnamese expatriate who were found guilty two years ago of funneling classified U.S. documents to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

The ruling was made with a condition, however, that could result in a new trial for the two.

The 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Richmond rejected contentions by Ronald Humphrey and David Truong that government evidence gathered by warrantless wiretaps and used against them should not have been admitted in their celebrated case.

But the Richmond appeals court also ruled that District Judge Albert V. Bryan Jr., of Alexandria, should have an opportunity to review some materials submitted by the prosecution late in the trial.

If Bryan rules that defense lawyers should have been able to see the materials before they were used, he could order a new trial, the court said.

Both Humphrey and Truong face 15-year prison sentences in the case. They have been free on bond since the summer of 1978, pending their appeals.

Neither Humphrey nor Truong could be reached for comment yesterday. Their lawyers, who said they had not read the appellate court's 67-page opinion, declined to comment.

The trial was the only one of its kind to result from the war in Vietnam and lasted for three dramatic weeks in Alexandria's federal courthouse.

It pitted one man's love for a woman he had met in war and another man's love for his homeland against federal government efforts to crack down on leaks of classified documents.

It questioned the president's right to order wiretaps and clandestine television taping without a warrant, and starred a Vietnam-born informant paid by the CIA and FBI.

When the verdict was delivered, jurors wept along with the defendants' families.

Humphrey admitted passing classified documents from his U.S. Informa-

tion Agency office to Truong, a lobbyist on Capitol Hill who had been a leader of the antiwar movement here.

Truong, whose father once campaigned as a peace candidate for the presidency of Vietnam, admitted giving the materials to a courier for delivery to Vietnam representatives in Paris.

But both defendants steadily maintained they were never spies, that they had, for different reasons, tried only to improve relations between the United States and Vietnam.

Based on information supplied by the courier, a paid informant working for the CIA and FBI, they were arrested in January 1978.

Humphrey testified that he worked with Truong to secure the release from Vietnam of a young woman and her children—a woman who had saved his life there, Humphrey said, and with whom he had fallen in love.

The woman, whom Humphrey called Kim, later became his common-law wife. He testified that they first met in 1969 when he was assigned to Vietnam, and that she had saved his life by warning him of a Vietcong attack.

But Kim became trapped there in 1975 while attempting to bring her five children out of the country.

"I had one preoccupation and that was to get them out of Vietnam. I knew I owed my life to Kim," Humphrey told the jury and a packed courtroom in Alexandria. "I felt that whatever I was doing in life wouldn't be fulfilled unless I got that family."

He said that his love for Kim caused him to lose his judgment, and that he began giving classified documents to Truong. Kim arrived in this country two months before Humphrey was arrested.

Truong had grown up the son of Vietnam's leading Rotarian, who was jailed briefly under the Diem regime and who later was defeated in a bid for the country's presidency by Nguyen Van Thieu.

At the age of 19, Truong was sent to Stanford University in California and became active in the antiwar movement. In 1968, columnist Drew Pearson said of him: "Of the several million youngsters in this country urging peace in Vietnam, probably the most effective is David Truong."

It was through Pearson that Truong made many contacts on Capitol Hill.

Truong stayed in this country after the Saigon government fell in 1975 and was active in several organizations urging reconciliation between the U.S. and Vietnamese governments.

The FBI said that Truong began giving classified documents to double agent Dung Krall in 1977. Krall testified that she delivered the materials to Vietnamese representatives in Paris.

Based on information supplied by Krall, President Carter authorized the opening of packages from Truong without a warrant. The Justice Department authorized a warrantless tap on Truong's phone and a concealed television camera was installed in Humphrey's office.

Humphrey and Truong argued consistently that the materials they were funneling to Vietnam were insignificant, that much of it was already public knowledge, and did not deserve to be classified.

Some of it was found to be press clippings, and a portion of one document was labeled as "gossip." But government attorneys argued that the classified cables revealed intelligence sources and threatened U.S. security.

In upholding the conviction, the appeals court said yesterday, "The needs of the executive are so compelling in the area of foreign intelligence, unlike the area of domestic security, that a uniform warrant requirement would unduly frustrate the president in carrying out his foreign affairs responsibilities."

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ON PAGE B-3

WASHINGTON STAR
19 JULY 1980

Appeals Court Upholds Virginia Spy Convictions

From News Services

RICHMOND, Va. — A federal appeals court yesterday upheld the espionage convictions of a Vietnamese citizen and a federal government employee found guilty of transmitting government information to Communist Vietnam.

But the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals made its decision conditional on an order that U.S. District Judge Albert Bryan Jr. review in more depth documents submitted at the end of the espionage trial of David Truong and Ronald Humphrey. The trial was held in Alexandria.

"They (the materials) were not given the careful scrutiny the district court felt was necessary to make a confident decision," the appeals court said. "If the district court concludes that denial of it (the material) was not harmless error, it should vacate the judgments of conviction in order that the defendants may obtain a new trial."

The case began in 1976 when Truong, a Vietnamese citizen studying in the United States, asked Dung Krall, a Vietnamese-American and the wife of a U.S. naval officer, to carry packages of diplomatic cables and other classified papers to Vietnamese officials in Paris.

Truong obtained the documents from Ronald Humphrey, an employee of the U.S. Information Agency. Humphrey said his motive was to improve relations between the North Vietnamese government and the United States so that he could be reunited with a woman whom he loved who was a prisoner of the North Vietnamese government.

Unknown to Truong, Dung Krall was a confidential informant employed by the CIA and the FBI. She

kept both agencies informed of Truong's activities and presented the packages Truong gave her to intelligence officials, who inspected them and allowed them to be passed on to the Vietnamese.

In a 67-page opinion, the appeals court brushed aside arguments by Truong and Humphrey that their convictions should be overturned because they were based on searches and surveillance conducted by the CIA and the FBI without warrants.

The appeals court agreed with the lower court that warrants were unnecessary for most of the investigation conducted in 1976 and 1977 against the two men because the surveillance and searches had been authorized by the executive branch.

The appeals court wrote, "The needs of the executive are so compelling in the area of foreign intelligence, unlike the area of domestic security, that a uniform warrant requirement would unduly frustrate the president in carrying out his foreign affairs responsibilities."

Truong and Humphrey were arrested in January 1978. They were convicted by a federal trial jury in May 1978 on six counts of espionage, conspiracy, theft of government documents and failure to register as foreign agents and sentenced to 15 years each in prison.

Justice Department officials and defense attorneys both regarded the case as a significant test of the government's power to conduct electronic surveillance, which was authorized in the case by former Attorney General Griffin B. Bell.

The telephone in Truong's apartment was tapped and monitored for 268 days beginning May 11, 1977, according to his appeal.

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LEAKS

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Angry Carter Said to Have Asked Aides to Swear They Kept Secrets

By PHILIP TAUBMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 18 — President Carter, angered over disclosures to the press about Administration foreign policy deliberations, authorized investigators earlier this year to obtain signed affidavits from Cabinet members and other senior officials affirming that they were not responsible for the disclosures, according to officials close to the case.

It was the first time, the officials said, that a President had sought sworn statements of innocence from his most senior aides as part of an investigation into unauthorized disclosures of secret national security information.

Those who signed statements, according to the officials, included Cyrus R. Vance, then Secretary of State; Adm. Stansfield Turner, Director of Central Intelligence; Zbigniew Brzezinski, the national security adviser, and Deputy Secretary of Defense W. Graham Claytor.

25 Inquiries This Year

Justice Department officials said today that the investigation was one of 15 current criminal inquiries into publication of secret military or diplomatic information. Ten other such investigations were closed in the last year, according to Robert L. Keuch, deputy assistant attorney general in the criminal division.

One of these was concluded with the withdrawal of some security clearances, the dismissal of one official, and several voluntary resignations, officials said. Sources said the case had dealt with a State Department problem.

Officials said that two of the 25 investigations had been ordered by the President. They refused to disclose how many others had been initiated at the request of the White House.

Investigations of unauthorized disclosures are conducted under provisions of the Espionage Act, which forbids the dissemination of classified information.

The inquiry that led to the request for affidavits stemmed from an account in The Washington Post last October that reported on divisions within the Administration over supplying military equipment to Morocco.

Several dozen officials who attended a

Cabinet-level meeting about Morocco last Oct. 18, or who received working papers on the issue, were asked to sign affidavits. The request reportedly infuriated some of the officials, according to aides.

The only official to refuse the request was Hodding Carter 3d, who resigned recently as State Department spokesman. "It was like being told that you weren't trusted," he said in an interview today. "I said, 'If you don't trust me, fire me, but don't ask me to sign some kind of paper saying I'm a good guy.'"

Officials said that Steven Cohen, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights, agreed to sign a statement on the condition that it include his reservations about the use of sworn affidavits.

Other senior officials, sources said, signed prepared statements stating that they had not been responsible for disclosures to the Washington Post reporter, William Branigin.

Circulated by Lawyer

In the State Department, the prepared statement was circulated late this spring by William J. Lake, a lawyer in the Office of Legal Adviser. Middle-level officials approached by Mr. Lake said he told them that statements had been signed by Mr. Vance, Deputy Secretary Warren M. Christopher, and David D. Newsome, Under Secretary for Political Affairs.

The investigation into the disclosures began shortly after the Post report was published, according to officials. It began with a routine inquiry by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which conducts interviews in such cases at the request of the Justice Department.

Agents questioned several dozen senior Administration officials, officials said, working from a list supplied by the White House. The list included officials who had attended the meeting of the Cabinet-level Policy Review Committee on Morocco.

The White House counsel, Lloyd N. Cutler, was consulted from time to time on the investigation, White House aides said. When it became clear that the inquiry would probably not lead to any prosecutions, Mr. Cutler apparently took under consideration the question of asking for sworn statements.

Mr. Cutler would not comment today on his involvement in the investigation, but sources close to the case said that he eventually recommended asking for affidavits and that Mr. Carter approved.

Earlier, in June 1979, the White House started an investigation into a report in The New York Times about the use of an electronic listening post in Norway to help verify Soviet compliance with provisions of the strategic arms limitation treaty.

According to one account, Mr. Carter threatened to dismiss officials if unauthorized disclosures were found to be coming from their areas. This warning came after a CBS News report on Feb. 5, 1979, that American officials believed the Iranian Government head by Prime Minister Shahpur Bakhtiar would fall.

Ray Jenkins, a White House spokesman, said today that Mr. Carter had made no such threat but had made clear that he held officials responsible for disclosures coming from their departments.

Generally, Justice Department officials consider such investigations to be an ineffective use of manpower and money because they rarely result in prosecutions, or even the collection of solid evidence. "These investigations are a tool for intimidating people, not prosecuting them," one official said.

Still, according to veteran Washington officials, every President in memory has occasionally become alarmed by unauthorized disclosures of national security information and taken steps to stop them.

President Nixon was angered by press reports of secret United States military initiatives in Southeast Asia, including the disclosure of the secret bombing of Cambodia in 1969. In an attempt to determine the source of those disclosures, the White House authorized wiretapping of Administration officials and journalists.

The publication of the Pentagon Papers in 1971 fueled White House concern about national security leaks and led to the formation of the "plumbers" unit in the White House.

Drip, Drip

PERHAPS the press pays a bit more attention to these things than the rest of you, but you will forgive us for observing that a hallmark of any administration is the way it defines the secrets it really means to keep, the measures it takes to keep those secrets secret, and the further measures it takes when it discovers, as it invariably does, that its precautions have been at least selectively breached. Certainly nothing better characterized, or more hurt, the Nixon administration than its approach to the various sorts of secrets it generated. It hardly seems stretching things to suggest that in 1976 Jimmy Carter ran principally on—against—Richard Nixon's record on secrets. So it is entirely understandable that people should be curious to see how Jimmy Carter handles secrets on his own.

What does the Carter record show so far? There have been no serious allegations that Mr. Carter has, for either personal or political gain, abused the label of national security and the procedures of secret-keeping available to a president in order to cover up the kind of abuses of power that, when uncovered, finished President Nixon. In that important respect, his claim to "open" government is respectable. At the same time, Mr. Carter has been sorely vexed by foreign-policy leaks. As indicated yesterday by reporter Scott Armstrong, the list is short on bombshells but medium-to-long on sensitive nuts-and-bolts items—for instance, what kind of arms should be sold to Morocco?—that no government would wish to discuss publicly, least of all while the question was still undecided. As always, these leaks have come, by the administration's reckoning, from disgruntled insiders.

To plug leaks, there have evidently been no plumb-ers, no wiretaps and, on another level, there has been little significant (and ultimately self-defeating) narrowing of the circle of those brought into the policy-making process. But there have been a number of FBI investigations; predictably, they appear to have gotten nowhere. And Mr. Carter has gotten mad enough to threaten to fire State Department officials from whose "area" the leak came—though his precise words in this matter are uncertain. Frankly, we have no complaint about all this: if, as we believe, it's up to the press to dig out secrets, it's up to the government to keep them. Presidents tend to see a necessity, where journalists often see at best a mere convenience, in maintaining confidentiality in internal decision-making and in certain dealings with foreign governments. That is where the war is fought and, we would say, Jimmy Carter has fought fair.

Something else cries out to be said, however, about the report that, with respect to the Morocco story last October, "I didn't leak it" affidavits were either solicited from his top national security aides by Mr. Carter or volunteered by them. There may be no way for an administration to chase leaks without bruising the sensibilities of people down in the ranks, as the president has done. But to nourish an atmosphere in which the confidence of one's elite advisers is somehow called into question? Only a few months earlier, in his "malaise" period, Mr. Carter had brought about a set of circumstances in which his whole Cabinet was allowed or encouraged to say it would resign. There's a pattern here. It is a strange way to earn the full trust and loyalty of one's closest advisers.

Carter Given Oaths on 'Leaks'

By Scott Armstrong
Washington Post Staff Writer

Leaks to the press from high government officials last year so infuriated Jimmy Carter that the secretary of state, the director of the CIA and the president's national security adviser felt obligated to sign affidavits saying they were not the leakers. The Washington Post has learned.

Carter's wrath stemmed from a Washington Post account last October that described an internal administration split over whether to provide new types of military equipment to Morocco.

Signing sworn statements that they had not leaked the story were former secretary of state Cyrus R. Vance, CIA Director Stansfield Turner, national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, Deputy Secretary of Defense W. Graham Clayton, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and Undersecretary of State David Newsom, along with dozens of other high-ranking aides. All were interrogated by the FBI.

There were conflicting accounts as to whether Carter ordered his chief aides to sign the affidavits or whether they signed them voluntarily to mollify the president and encourage the other officials to sign them as well.

Either way, the taking of sworn statements from such high-level officials is unprecedented in any presidency, according to State and Defense department sources. Carter's vigorous pursuit of this and other leaks is an attempt to silence internal critics of his foreign affairs policies while demonstrating his grave concern over both the criticism and the substance of the leaks, sources said.

The investigation of the nine-month-old leak is still continuing. It is being handled by a special FBI team and is one of at least nine inquiries over the past 18 months into leaks describing deep policy divisions within the administration.

Two of the leak probes were initiated by the president.

The FBI has complained to the Justice Department about such investigations, departmental sources indicate, because agents do not believe such investigations ever lead to prosecutions. Instead, they are used to silence critics either by intimidating them or by identifying and firing them, the agents feel.

From the investigators' point of view, the White House is at fault for first encouraging the image of an open administration and then complaining bitterly as information about policy alternatives leaked out.

No sources of leaks have been yet identified by the two investigations initiated by the president. The Post was told. However, at least three State Department officials,

including one deputy assistant secretary of state, have been forced to resign after leak probes, sources said.

The White House refused to comment yesterday on the leak investigations.

The October story in The Post detailed the positions taken by each of the departments at a Cabinet-level Policy Review Committee (PRC) meeting two days earlier, on Oct. 16. The meeting had been attended by Vance, Brzezinski, Turner, Clayton, Christopher and Newsom as well as several of their aides.

Written by William Branigin, the article described a split over whether to provide new types of military equipment to Moroccan King Hassan II in his battle against guerrillas attempting to gain control of the Western Sahara. Several days later the president decided to provide the new arms.

One source said that "the president went off the ceiling" when he saw the article.

"Please see I get the results of the PRC before The Washington Post," the president reportedly said to Brzezinski. Although the minutes of the meeting had been prepared and were awaiting his approval, the president had not yet seen them, said one source familiar with the investigation.

"He got so mad that they [Brzezinski, Vance, and Turner] decided they had to do something they had never done before," said one source who said he felt PRC members came up with the idea of the affidavits to mollify the president.

Several other administration officials said, however, that the sworn affidavits were the president's idea.

"It was not so much the substance of the story," said one State Department source. "It was the detail about the conversations that took place in the meeting that got to the president. They were of greater concern than the substance. The story itself was trivial."

Other administration sources insisted that the president has been most disturbed by leaks that show in which direction he is leaning on foreign policy decisions, particularly when he takes a position perceived as being in conflict with a previously stated policy. Most such situations have involved placing ostensible national security concerns and strategic interests over articulated commitments to human rights and arms sales limits.

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"The president is particularly sensitive about stories that portray him as bending his espoused principles to help our right-wing dictators," one source said, alleging that there have been investigations of leaks of information about Carter's support for the deposed shah of Iran and former Nicaraguan president Anastasio Somoza.

At the State Department, Vance, Christopher, Newsom, Near East bureau head Harold Saunders and 15 other individuals signed the affidavits. At the Defense Department Claytor and five others also signed.

One former deputy assistant secretary for human rights, Steve Cohen, protested in writing that the procedure was improper, and then signed the affidavit.

Hodding Carter, the former State Department spokesman, was the only official who refused to sign, according to sources in the administration. According to one source, Carter, never really a suspect in the investigation, denied being the source for the story but refused to sign the affidavit on principle.

The majority of a dozen officials interviewed by The Post, none of whom would speak for the record, said they did not believe there was a deliberately formalized policy of intimidating internal critics of administration policy. One White House official defended the president's "maturity" about leaks.

"I have never seen him get angry about [leaking], himself, Jody [Powell, the president's press secretary] and Zbig get furious, but never the president. But I do see in him a deep sense of disappointment when something surfaces. He feels if people have to leak things then they ought to resign. It is a question of loyalty. It is personally disloyal to leak."

Most officials did acknowledge, however, that the conducting of even a few full-scale FBI probes of leaks has the effect of intimidating internal dissent.

"When someone from the seventh floor [where the State Department's top officials are housed] is implicated, the investigation is immediately closed," said one source. "But when it is someone in the bureaus, it is pursued until every lower grade officer connected with the issue understands that public disagreement will not be tolerated."

Several sources noted that the state department bureaus concerned with human rights and arms sales policies are most often blamed by the White House and State Department for leaks critical of the president for policy inconsistencies.

"We start with Patt Derian [director of the human rights bureau] and then we add to the list," said one investigator when asked how he got his suspects.

The other investigation initiated by Carter attempted to find the source of a story concerning the use of an electronic listening post in Norway to help verify Soviet compliance with provisions of the strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT I) and the proposed SALT II.

Published on June 29, 1979, The New York Times story by Richard Burt said the site in Norway was being considered as a replacement for listening posts in Iran and U2 flights over Turkey for verification of the types and quantity of warheads launched in Soviet missile tests.

At the time, reports said Turner had requested an investigation because the article disclosed the existence of the Norwegian base. Several administration sources said last week, however, that the existence of the tracking station and its functions had been widely known for some time in Norway and most certainly to Soviet intelligence agencies.

The source said that the damage from the point of view of the Carter administration was that the bottom of the article stated that "these systems would only be able to pick up a small fraction of the missile telemetry obtained previously at the Iranian sites."

"The president's strong reaction came over the fact that this was another tool for critics of SALT II to use to defeat the program," said one administration source.

A Defense Department source disputed that, however, saying, "Some people here still think the Soviets did not know what that site was about. In any event, it was highly classified."

According to a State Department source, the greatest current concern over leaks has to do with ones coming out of the Defense Department.

"The amount of leaking now is at an all-time high," said one State Department official. "On security subjects, leaks seem to have a political motivation [to convince the public of the need for a stronger defense]. The pressure has been on the Defense Department because in the last four or five months there has been a great deal of information coming out of there. Brown is as much concerned about backgrounders [briefings for reporters] as he is about leaks."

"That is completely false and preposterous," said Defense Department

spokesman Thomas B. Ross yesterday.

One high-ranking State Department official said that Vance as well as Carter was deeply bothered by leaks from the State Department.

But Vance was also convinced that most leaks came not from within his department but from Brzezinski's National Security Council, that source said. Ever the gentleman, Vance would never confront Brzezinski directly, the source said.

Instead, Vance would call Brzezinski and say he thought Jerrold L. Schecter, Brzezinski's press secretary, had made "inappropriate comments" in a background briefing. Brzezinski "knew what the boss was talking about," the source said. "He knew that Vance thought he had done it."

Brzezinski, on the other hand, was said by several sources to have called Vance regularly to complain that leaks had come from the State Department.

"Zbig is fast to call about a story with a leak in it," said one State Department official familiar with such calls. "Some in his building think he is often trying to preempt suspicion from falling on himself or his staff."

According to several sources, Brzezinski's complaints to the president about State Department leaking led to a dramatic Feb. 6, 1979, meeting in the Cabinet room of the White House.

According to one administration source, the president authorized Brzezinski to draw up a list of suspected leakers from the State Department after a CBS television report on U.S. policy toward Iran.

On the evening of Feb. 5, the CBS senior State Department correspondent, Marvin Kalb, broadcast that "U.S. officials believe that the [former Iranian Prime Minister Shahpour] Bakhtiar government will fall, probably in the next day or so."

Within minutes after the broadcast, Powell called CBS to say that the president, Vance and Brzezinski did not believe that the Bakhtiar government would fall.

The next day presidential appointments secretary Phillip Wise called the State Department with a list of 16 people the president wished to see with Vance that afternoon. The list included roughly half the department's ranking brass at the level of assistant

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secretary or above, plus the head of the Iran desk at the State Department, Henry Precht.

At the meeting, Carter praised Vance at length. After saying Vance was the best secretary of state in recent times, Carter then launched into an increasingly intense and angry monologue about the problem of leaks—particularly those on U.S. policy toward Iran that had occurred over the preceding three months.

There were bound to be differences among foreign policy advisers, Carter said, according to four people who attended the meeting. He was bound to have to reject some of the advice he received. But he could no longer let those whose advice had been rejected carry on their battle in the press, Carter reportedly said.

Accounts of what else the president said differ slightly, but all sources agree he said the following:

"This leaking has got to stop, and what I am going to do is this. If there are any leaks out of your area, whatever the area may be, I am going to fire you. Whether or not that's fair, and I can see where some of you might not think it fair, this has just got to stop. So, leaks from your area, regardless of who is at fault, and you're fired!"

Carter then left the room, taking no questions.

At the State Department that day, nearly every person attending the meeting sought out Vance for assurance. Vance told them that while he too was concerned with leaks and the divisiveness they created, the president was wrong to single out the department. Several aides asked if the message was a personal one and whether they should leave the department. Vance assured each of his personal confidence.

According to several State Department officials, the majority of those present at the meeting felt Vance had been publicly humiliated by the president, despite Carter's lavish praise of him.

"Whatever personal loyalty the president had with each of the people in that room that day was severed permanently," one State Department source said.

Reactions to the meeting varied. Political appointees serving at the president's pleasure seemed to feel personally attacked, sources said. Some thought that Precht, an advocate of a much different Iran policy than the one the president had been following for the previous six months, had been singled out. Career employees of the State Department tended to think that the department was the target of an institutional attack, another source said.

Later that day or the next day, Vance spoke with both the president and the vice president about the meeting, sources said. He reportedly expressed concern that his staff was being unfairly singled out for deeds that were occurring regularly everywhere in government, including in the National Security Council staff.

The next day the president met with Brzezinski and several of his senior staff members. This time, however, he did not threaten. Rather, he cajoled them to smooth their relations with their State Department counterparts.

Most leaks do not result in compromising the national security but in official discomfort, according to one source. The discomfort can range from presidential outrage at having policy alternatives prematurely narrowed to official embarrassment abroad, as in a recent instance in Italy.

That matter involved a Defense Department employee who told an Italian journalist how inept a particular Italian intelligence official was. When an article ran with attribution to American intelligence sources, an American intelligence official was expelled by the Italian government in the ensuing flap.

Under the Carter administration, the State Department has referred between a half-dozen and a dozen cases each year to the Justice Department for further investigation and possible prosecution. Virtually none of those referrals are ever prosecuted, however, because the Justice Department insists that the referring agency be willing to declassify the leaked information for use in a trial.

Sources were unable to estimate the number of referrals during previous administrations, but generally believed it was no higher. One source, however, noted that during the period that Henry A. Kissinger was secretary of state there were far more internal investigations to determine the sources of leaks.

While Kissinger was foreign policy adviser to President Nixon, he helped select 17 aides for wire-tapping.

No electronic surveillance has been used to determine the sources of news leaks under the Carter administration, according to sources, although the FBI agents conducting the two investigations authorized by the president were said to be reporting "out of the normal chain of command."

Since prosecutions in leak cases are rare, leakers are more frequently punished by disciplinary actions ranging from an entry in their personnel file for unwitting mistakes to forced resignation for serious leaks.

A deputy assistant secretary of state was forced to resign from the department last year for a variety of reasons after having inadvertently leaked precise information on the number and type of Soviet helicopters in Afghanistan during a background briefing. Because of the detail given, the Soviets may have been able to deduce how the information was collected, according to administration officials.

Another junior officer was forced to resign for having gotten "carried away" and giving a well-known journalist classified documents, including an easily traced study on which the junior officer was working. It was a case of a bureaucratic flasher, said one administration leak-chaser. "Leakers are often... without axes to grind and without any foreign policy goals. They just have a psychological need to do it."

Another State Department official observed that the psychological need is often to be sure the truth comes out of a bureaucracy laden with falsehoods.

Staff writer Timothy S. Robinson contributed to this report.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
PARADE MAGAZINE
13 July 1980

Walter Scott's personality parade

Q- Were Stansfield Turner, director of the CIA, and William Webster, director of the FBI, ever roommates at Oxford? — Gene Mitchell, St. Louis, Mo.
A- No, they were classmates at Amherst College in Massachusetts, 1941-1942, after which Turner transferred to the U.S. Naval Academy, where he became a classmate of Jimmy Carter.

Sports Latest Style In Transportation

Third in a series

By Angus Phillips

Washington Post Staff Writer

Phil Stewart, the managing editor of Running Times, says nothing in the world "satisfies me more than running past a traffic jam. I feel it's a triumph of my body over technology."

Evidently more and more people are enjoying the same kind of satisfaction. The rising price of fuel, gasoline shortages and an increasing interest in physical fitness appear to be combining to create a growing phenomenon in Washington and other large cities: sports as transportation.

The Post's recent survey of Washington area residents' inclinations on sports, recreation and exercise indicated a trend toward mobility for fun.

Such sports as bicycling, walking, running, and boating led the lists of things people did in their leisure time.

About 47 percent of the 1,563 respondents to the poll said they bicycled frequently or sometimes; 40 percent ran or jogged. And when respondents were asked what their main sports were, jogging, swimming and walking headed the list, with bicycling a notch behind tennis.

All these sports but tennis are potential transportation sports, but obviously some are more reasonable than others. Just how reasonable became evident during last year's transit strike in New York, during which an estimated 250,000 commuters got to work by bicycle and hundreds of thousands of others walked or ran.

The guru of the run-to-work movement is a New Yorker. Fred Lebow, 48, gave up his job in the textile business four years ago to devote his full-time efforts to running.

As volunteer president of the New York Road Runners Club, Lebow last winter decided to prove how beneficial and easy running as transportation could be. He swore off all other means of transportation for a month.

He ran to work at the Road Runners Club and to all engagements. He kept records that showed he attended six breakfast meetings, 13 luncheons, eight dinners, two concerts, two parties, 18 business meetings and made 27 trips between home and office, all in his running clothes. He covered 238 miles and figures he saved about \$200.

He said he felt great when it was over, and had a handle on what the problems associated with running as a principal means of transportation are.

"You can't go to formal restaurants," he said, "and I was occasionally harassed by motorists and fat people. It was difficult to find places to change; laundry costs went up; I did so much running to get around that I had to cut down on my regular workouts, which I enjoy."

Generally, Lebow said, his worst problem was with unacceptably bright running clothes. "We must enlist the help of the fashion industry in developing a line of clothing appropriate for running to work and a proper carry-all bag for commuting," he said.

"And," Lebow added, "we must educate the public that while a fit body does perspire, it doesn't smell."

Runners generally agree that the biggest obstacle to using their sport as a means of transportation is the lack of showers and changing facilities in work places. But Stewart said as the number of people who run to or from work or on lunch hours increases, the problems are easing some.

In a story in the August 1979 Running Times, Ed Ayres wrote that "at least 300 major U.S. corporations are now providing shower facilities. The number of smaller companies offering facilities is unknown, but it is definitely growing."

Bicyclists have the same problems but the growth in bicycling continues at a rapid pace.

More new bicycles have been sold in the last eight years in America than new cars—88.3 million to 83.1 million—according to Phil Burke of the Bicycle Manufacturers Association of America.

And an increasing number of these bicycles are being ridden to work, in Washington via bike lanes along Rock

Creek, down Rhode Island Avenue and MacArthur Boulevard, along the Potomac from Mount Vernon and through Arlington and Alexandria.

Leslie Baldwin of the Washington Area Bicyclists Association said her organization estimates some 30,000 Washington area residents occasionally ride bicycles to work. She believes the number of regular bike commuters has quadrupled in the last four years and she is working to keep the trend going.

Baldwin has started a bicycle commuting course that will be offered through the city's Open University this summer.

"We've found that distances between two and 10 miles are ideal, and that bicycling is at least as fast as Metro and that you save money," she said.

Washington, with its wide boulevards and flat landscape, is considered ideal for biking, running and walking.

The physical benefits of a sporting commute are hard to measure. Says Baldwin, "It's purely personal. In my case, bicycling to work is the only exercise I get. If I cut it out I'd really be losing something."

The man who may have worked out the most satisfying way to commute is Bob Sinclair, who 10 years ago joined an interesting get-to-work arrangement—a canoe pool.

Sinclair tied in with some fellow CIA employees who found it quicker and pleasanter to canoe across the Potomac than to drive over one of the crowded bridges to Virginia.

Now Sinclair, the only remaining regular in the canoe pool is settled into a daily multidimensional sports commuting adventure.

When he leaves his house in Bethesda weekday mornings, he mounts a bicycle and rides four miles to the river. He locks the bike and boards his canoe for the paddle to Virginia.

In the tangled wilderness on the western shore he tosses his day pack on his shoulder and sets off on a half-mile hike up the riverbank to his office.

This three-pronged commuting saga saves no time. "Actually, this way takes a little less than an hour," he said. "By car it's a half-hour. The saving is in emotional wear and tear."

"A month ago I was coming home late and almost collided with a beaver. The play of light in the woods this morning was gorgeous. I like to look at the wildflowers."

"Going to work by canoe is so much a part of my life it's hard to think of doing it any other way, or of taking it out of my life. People ask me, 'Are you still canoeing in?' as if there's some reason to stop."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 17.CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
16 July 1980

Reporter probes two superspies

A Wilderness of Mirrors, by David C. Martin.
New York: Harper & Row. \$12.50.

By Victor Burg

Spying breeds further spying. Disclosures of spying breed further disclosures. A secret covertly revealed becomes a new secret. As one learns of the methods of the Central Intelligence Agency in Berlin in the '60s, one may transpose that knowledge to events in Chile in the '70s. As the side of any triangle may form the side of any other triangle, knowledge about the history and tactics of espionage increases geometrically. Learn a few proofs and you find that there is a vast amount more to know.

"A Wilderness of Mirrors" is a brief history of some of the CIA's adventures in counterespionage, in the manipulation of double agents. It covers the years since the agency was chartered in 1947, and does so by centering on two high-level agents and on a few vignettes of cases in which the CIA and these agents had an avowedly significant part.

The agents are Bill Harvey, "the Pear," and James Angleton, "the Cadaver," so called because of their physical appearances. "Harvey was Big Ten. Angleton was Ivy League," David C. Martin sums up. "Harvey collected firearms. Angleton crafted fishing lures. Harvey was a cop; Angleton a spy. Each was a prototype of the two strains — FBI refugees and OSS veterans — coming together to form the postwar espionage establishment at the CIA."

Harvey's insistent suspicions about Kim Philby ultimately proved correct and led to Philby's disgrace. His tenacity in cold-war Berlin led to the construction of an elaborate tunnel and wiretap of the Eastern sector's espionage headquarters. However, his bravado — he was introduced to JFK as "our" 007 — in Cuba, coupled with the impossibility of penetration into its secrets, finally led to his dismissal.

Angleton, the chief of counterespionage at the CIA, was instrumental in the handling of key defectors. His theoretical cunning was

unmatched for some time but finally became so convoluted as to be counterproductive, as Martin portrays him.

Both men failed in the eyes of the company they had helped form because, ironically, of their talents. Harvey did so because he was not able to do everything that his past made him and his superiors believe he could do.

Angleton's value diminished because of his unprovable contention that there was a "mole" in the highest reaches of the agency. The ultimate extension of his cunning and his lures, this premise finally exhausted his theorems and turned them against himself.

"A Wilderness of Mirrors" raises more questions than it answers. "This book," its author write, "begins and ends in mystery, with precious few solutions in between." The presentation of espionage as history contains enormous difficulties. For instance, at least a couple of remarkable novelists — Graham Greene and John le Carré — have brilliantly plumbed spying's secrets with no need to document their speculations. They have been able to bring us closer to the heart of spycraft than authors like Mr. Martin, who must rely upon the verifiable but elusive facts.

As well, there is a larger, social history that lurks behind the workings of any government agency. There has been considerable differences in what the American public expected from the CIA during each of the last three decades, and there is ongoing debate over what is to be expected in the future. These changing expectations are alluded to in this book, but only alluded to.

And finally, it is difficult to be sure what measure of truth can be revealed in such a book. In the reading of "A Wilderness of Mirrors," one learns to be wary of what one hears. One learns that the truths a spy may make evident (and it is spies whose testimony provides the substance of this history) may be real but partial truths, deep enough only to convince a hearer of a further validity which may not be forthcoming. Thus the book itself teaches one to wish for more from it. Ironically, for the concerned citizen and the fan of spycraft narratives alike, this may be its best achievement, an accomplishment of merit and no small worth.

Victor Kantor Burg is a free-lance reviewer.

ARTICLES APPEARED
ON PAGE 17CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
16 July 1980

Co-agent faults CIA in Mideast

Ropes of Sand: America's Failure in the Middle East, by Wilbur Crane Eveland. New York: W. W. Norton & Co. \$14.95.

By John K. Cooley

Reading this book by a retired CIA operative in the Mideast is like watching a film about something I lived through — but with significant parts speeded up, slowed down, or stopped for close scrutiny.

It offers a stinging indictment of the Central Intelligence Agency's covert operations in Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Iran, and elsewhere, written by an author who took part in many and initiated some of them.

Though I never met Eveland in many years of reporting from the Mideast, he describes scenes and mentions people that are familiar to me, among them the late Sam Pope Brewer of the New York Times; Abu Said Abu Rich, the Palestinian stringer and informant for Time magazine in Beirut; Miles Copeland, Eveland's ex-CIA associate and friend of former Egyptian President Nasser; and elder Lebanese statesman Camille Chamoun.

Eveland's thesis grew out of his experience as an Arabic-speaking military attaché in Baghdad, then as a senior CIA operative (with State Department cover) in Damascus and Beirut in the 1950s, and finally as a consultant to oil and construction companies in the Mideast. It is stark and simple: Today's troubles — from energy dependence and the Palestinian problem to Soviet adventurism and Israel's unwillingness to quit widening its borders — took root 30 years ago, when CIA spymaster Allen Dulles's obsession with secret political operations aggravated the Mideast and helped make it the tinderbox it is today.

Instead of leaving diplomacy to the diplomats, Dulles chose to meddle, while neglecting the CIA's real job of gathering information. Eveland charges: This left the United States totally unprepared for the 1956 Suez war, the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy (and with it Britain's power in the Mideast) in 1958, the 1958 Lebanese civil war, and the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973 (though Eveland accuses members of the Johnson administration of helping Tel Aviv plan the earlier conflict, unbeknownst to either the US secretary of state or Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban).

Important disclosures in the book that surprised the CIA's prepublication censorship include:

- Confirmation that a US Joint Chiefs of Staff directive in existence since the early

1950s calls for US military destruction of Iran's oil fields if they appear to be falling into the hands of advancing Soviet armies.

- Affirmation (strengthening charges made by authors James Ennes and Anthony Pearson) that former Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan ordered a deliberate attack on the US intelligence ship Liberty during the June 1967 war off Sinai. The attack, billed at the time as a mistake, killed 34 US Navy personnel. Eveland says the raid was ordered because the ship intercepted communications showing that Israel intended to exceed a plan, discussed with President Johnson's advisers, to overthrow Nasser; the radio transmissions indicated the Israelis also planned to occupy the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Syria's Golan Heights, as well as Sinai.

(Eveland maintains the US has covered up the Liberty affair, and Israel's failure to try those responsible or pay full reparations for the "mistake," so as to keep Israel from exposing close collaboration between its Mossad intelligence agency and former CIA counterintelligence chief James Angleton. Israel says Eveland, has been the CIA's best intelligence source on the Soviet Union for years, a relationship that has given Tel Aviv leverage on successive US administrations.)

- The assertion that British intelligence in the 1950s was obstinately devoted to Nasser's overthrow. (The CIA eventually seconded this cause, after first backing Nasser and helping him to build an image as the Arab world's leader.) Early Arab-Israeli peace feelers between Nasser and Israel's dovish Prime Minister Moshe Sharett were discouraged or even sabotaged by the British.

- Eveland's acknowledgment that he knew both Kim Philby, the Briton who worked as a master spy for the Soviets and finally fled from Beirut to Moscow in 1963, and Philby's second wife, Eleanor (formerly Mrs. Sam Pope Brewer). He managed to communicate with Philby after his flight. He surmises that Philby's penetration of the CIA, as well as Britain's Secret Intelligence Service, was worse than yet reported and that Philby may still have been masterminding Soviet espionage and "disinformation" operations in the Mideast until recently.

"If we use reasoned judgment," Eveland argues, "and take lessons from the history of our past failures, our adversities can be turned to an advantage." The US "must demonstrate to the third world nations," he continues, "that we are concerned foremost with the people of the Middle East and that we do not regard that area as merely a source of oil or a platform for military bases."

Resolution of the Palestinian conflict would put the US in a better position to deal with problems of energy, Soviet expansion, and growing Muslim hostility. Eveland reasons. In response to America's "immutable"

30-year commitment to Israel's survival, "making peace with its Arab neighbors could be Israel's greatest contribution as an American ally . . ." he writes. "We don't have another thirty years to find the answer. The world's stake in the Middle East is nothing less than peace itself."

John K. Cooley, a Monitor correspondent now based in Washington, reported from northern Africa and the Middle East from 1953 to 1978.

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ON PAGE 2

THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
14 July 1980

Snepp Agrees to Delete CIA Agent's Name

Former CIA agent turned author Frank Snepp has cleared the first hurdle to agency clearance of a novel about the assassination of President Kennedy.

Snepp, who submitted the novel "Convergence of Interests" for CIA pre-publication review under protest, ended the deliberations last week by agreeing to delete the name of an agency officer, Snepp said yesterday.

Negotiations over the review had threatened to reach an impasse earlier this month when John Peyton, the CIA's review board chief, informed Snepp that the agency would insist on the deletion of a person's name mentioned several times in the manuscript.

Use of the name of the former CIA operative, Snepp said he was told, would harm foreign intelligence contacts and agency activities concerning the Soviet Union.

The CIA withdrew its demand last week after learning that the CIA operative in question had been identified in an agency-cleared book by David Phillips, published several years ago.

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ON PAGE A11

THE WASHINGTON POST
14 July 1980

An Identity Crisis

CIA to Snapp: Delete Name Of (Known) Agent in Novel

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

The CIA insists it is no "big deal," but its reviewers stubbed their toes this month on a piece of fiction.

They demanded the deletion from a novel of the name of an operative whose cover had already been "blown" by the CIA itself.

The situation was disclosed yesterday by former CIA officer Frank Snapp who had submitted the manuscript of a new book to the agency for prepublication review that the CIA demands of its alumni.

The CIA's censors found no legal problems with the book—a fictional account of President Kennedy's assassination in 1963—except for one thing. On July 3, they informed Snapp that the name of a CIA officer, whose real identity Snapp had chosen to use along with a number of others, "must be deleted."

"As you may be aware," CIA Assistant General Counsel John F. Peyton Jr. wrote Snapp in the July 3 letter, "you have used the correct name of an agency officer whose association with the agency remains classified."

Snapp was astounded. A CIA critic, he had been sensitized by a Supreme Court decision in February ordering him to relinquish \$140,000 in profits from his first book for failing to submit it to CIA review. This time, he said, he had been especially careful to tell no tales out of school. The name of the man in question, he said, had been plucked out of another book on the Kennedy assassination, "Legend: The Secret World of Lee Harvey Oswald," by Edward Jay Epstein.

What's more, Snapp said, the man had also been named in several other books, including one that had been cleared by the CIA. Snapp refused, for the sake of good form, to identify that tome, but he said it was written by David A. Phillips, former CIA station chief in Mexico City and currently chairman of the pro-CIA Association of Former Intelligence Officers. He wrote "The Night Watch," an account of his years with the agency that the CIA cleared several years ago.

Belatedly apprised of all this, Peyton told Snapp's lawyer Mark Lynch in a July 8 telephone call that the CIA was withdrawing its demand. But Peyton, Snapp said, told Lynch that "the name was still so sensitive they were going to ask me to delete it voluntarily."

"That gives you an idea of how good the clearance process is," Snapp protested. "They'd allowed one of their 'good old boys' [Phillips] to release a name and now they were trying to get me to help squeeze the toothpaste back in the tube."

At a meeting with Snapp and Lynch Friday, Peyton emphasized the request in person. "He said the name in question had to do with certain operations directed at the Soviet Union and with very important liaison operations with foreign intelligence services that the CIA considers crucial," Snapp said yesterday.

Snapp agreed to use a pseudonym, although not without a certain sense of satisfaction. "In all my writings and speaking engagements," he told Peyton in a letter mailed Saturday, "I have gone to great lengths to avoid exposing a secret, a name or an intelligence source whose confidentiality is crucial to the effective functioning of our intelligence services. Although your own review staff has shown itself to be somewhat less diligent, I will not violate my own moral responsibility."

CIA spokesman Herbert Hetu confirmed yesterday afternoon that the name of the CIA man in question, although he has "retired under cover," has been publicized before. He said he did not know what representations Peyton might have made in seeking anonymity now. "We just don't want to call attention to his name again needlessly," Hetu declared. "It wasn't a big deal."

ARTICLE APPEARED
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SOVIET UNION

A CIA Spy in the Kremlin

It was a dark exercise in espionage and counterespionage, a story as startling as anything out of "Smiley's People"—or "The Spy Who Came in From the Cold." But the story was real—and so were its victims. NEWSWEEK learned last week that for a number of years during the early 1970s, the CIA had a top-grade spy in the Soviet Foreign Ministry in Moscow. The agent's code name was "Trianon." For a time he supplied the CIA with a reliable and accurate flow of diplomatic secrets. Then, Trianon's reports began to smack of disinformation, a run of subtle and not-so-subtle lies designed to mislead and discredit—touching, among others, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet Union's ambassador in Washington, and Jimmy Carter's first round of SALT negotiations with Moscow. NEWSWEEK's David Martin reports from Washington:

The Trianon file opened in the early 1970s. Trianon was then a Soviet diplomat posted overseas. After the Central Intelligence Agency recruited him, he returned to Moscow and a well-placed job in the Soviet Foreign Ministry. From that vantage, he passed intelligence on Soviet diplomatic intrigues to the CIA in Washington. The CIA considered him one of the most valuable operatives on the payroll of The Company, a worthy replacement for Col. Oleg Penkovsky, who had supplied the CIA with 5,000 pages of top-secret documents in the mid-1960s. "Trianon's information was carefully assessed by a group of agency analysts and

judged to be sound and of high quality," said one intelligence expert in Washington. "CIA experts had full confidence in this guy's stuff."

Then, during the Presidency of Gerald Ford, the quality of Trianon's production began to slip. His information ceased to tally with that of other CIA sources. Senior Administration officials began to fear that he had been discovered and "turned" by the KGB. "When a first-rate source turns in fourth-rate stuff consistently," explains one expert, "you begin to suspect something." The KGB apparently had begun using Trianon as a channel of "disinformation"—deliberately falsified data—perhaps without his knowledge. Suspensions heightened in the early months of the Carter Administration. But as long as Trianon kept selling, the CIA kept buying.

Private Conversation: In April 1977, Trianon filed a startling report that further undermined his credibility: a copy, supposedly verbatim, of a cable to the Politburo by Dobrynin. The document recounted a private breakfast conversation in Washington between Dobrynin and former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger—

and it attributed to Kissinger some highly unseemly diplomatic meddling. According to Dobrynin's purported cable, Kissinger had requested the meeting and had used it to attack Jimmy Carter's first major plans for SALT II.

One month earlier, Kissinger's successor, Cyrus Vance, had gone to Moscow with Carter's proposal calling for deep cuts in the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union. The package repre-

Martha Peterson

Tass from Sovfoto



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sented a significant break with a previous generation of strategic-arms understandings negotiated by Kissinger. According to the Dobrynin cable, Kissinger said he did not blame the Russians for rejecting the Carter Administration's initiative. The new proposal was bad, he reportedly told Dobrynin; the Carter Administration had clearly misread the Soviet leadership in its attitudes toward arms control; the President was a prisoner of his own ideological illusions. Kissinger was also represented as having criticized national-security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski as dogmatically anti-Soviet. Finally, he was said to have concluded the chat by asking Dobrynin to pass along his best wishes to Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev.

Cable: Kissinger strongly denied the Trianon allegations last week. He also accused the Administration of leaking the story to discredit him on the eve of this week's Republican National Convention. A Kissinger spokesman in Washington told NEWSWEEK that the April 1977 breakfast had taken place and that Kissinger and Dobrynin did discuss SALT. But it was the Soviet ambassador who had requested the meeting, using it to complain about the new SALT proposals, the aide said. Kissinger offered neither solace nor advice.

Almost no one inside the CIA took the allegations against Kissinger seriously. Several years earlier a Polish defector who had worked with the KGB in the 1950s had claimed that Kissinger had been recruited as a Soviet agent after World War II; but the same defector also called himself the last of the Romanov dynasty of Russia—so the CIA groaned and dismissed him. The most plausible explanation for the alleged Dobrynin cable—which has mysteriously disappeared from the CIA's files—seemed to be that the KGB was out to discredit Kissinger even at the expense of besmirching Dobrynin. Why? "To divide the Americans," speculated one source. "The tough thing for the Russians is a strong, bipartisan consensus in the United States."

Whatever the Russians' purpose, the Trianon file closed abruptly three months after the Kissinger-Dobrynin breakfast. On July 15, 1977, KGB agents arrested a CIA operative named Martha Peterson at one of Trianon's "dead drops," a prearranged place for leaving messages, in Moscow. The Soviet press reported that she had been carrying two poison ampoules. (Sources in Washington said the poison had been requested by Trianon for his own use if the KGB unmasked him.) The Soviets interrogated Peterson and released her. Trianon dropped from sight. The CIA subsequently heard that Trianon had committed suicide but no one could be sure whether that report was one more exercise in KGB disinformation. So the CIA may never find out the real fate of its onetime master spy.

LYNCHBURG NEWS (VA)
28 June 1980

Former Employee Insists CIA Work Is Romanticized

By J. MICHAEL HEAD
Staff Writer

If you listen to Davis Powell long enough, you'll probably begin believing that working in the CIA is dull. Just some boring office work, perfunctory governmental functions, and an occasional revealing tidbit of information — that's the CIA, if you believe Powell.

BUT THAT'S what he wants you to believe, and has wanted inquiring people to believe, since he retired to a picturesque Lynch Station home in 1975, after 30 years with the controversial organization.

"Most of it's deadly dull," Powell yawned, nestling comfortably onto a couch in a remodeled portion of the family's home, Oak Grove.

"What you're talking about is romanticized...the spy novels and movies," he continued, dispelling the stylized myth of the elusive, erudite agent "007."

"For every one of those, there are 49 others in offices, at desks, sorting information and writing reports," Powell said.

"TAKE THE Bulgarian wheat crop, that's interesting, isn't it?" he suggests, explaining some of the nebulous nuances of his former job.

"We find out something about the Bulgarian wheat crop this year and try to determine what effect it will have on something else.

"It's like a crossword puzzle—trying to figure out what will work with this piece of a word," he said.

Powell, 58, was involved in such crossword puzzle solutions for 30 years, beginning in the confusion and secrecy of World War II's Office of Strategic Services.

The clandestine operations of the OSS leader, "Wild Bill" Donovan and his original crew have been recounted with various degrees of embellishment, since the CIA's image became clouded during the Nixon years.

POWELL'S FLUENCY in French and a University of North Carolina degree in psychology and sociology prompted his recruitment into the highly classified organization when he was stuck in basic training at Virginia's Camp Lee.

"They told us about it one day and said we had to decide in 24 hours," Powell recalled, saying his introduction to the intelligence community was cloaked in mystery.

"The guy did not even know what the letters stood for," Powell laughed.

"The story goes that after Donovan organized the OSS in the early war, they realized he had no one that spoke English and everyone had names with four syllables," he explained.

"THEY TOLD him he had to have some Americans and they got 22 fellows. Powell was one, and we were called the

"Jack Armstrong All-American Boys."

Working with the English Secret Service and French and German operatives, Powell spent the war years in the European theater, mostly on friendly soil.

"My one claim to fame was we got caught behind enemy lines," the athletically trim, gray-haired Powell reluctantly admitted.

"Actually, the line moved and we were behind it and didn't know it," he said.



"It was at the Battle of the Bulge...we were trying to send a German agent through the line from a farm house."

"IT WAS COLD...we couldn't build any fires," he said, rejecting flatly an attempt to enliven the story by including a sympathetic German maiden.

Six of them escaped without incident, Powell said, and for whatever reason, he didn't work in operations during the rest of his career.

As an administrative and personnel officer, Powell spent the next 27 years in embassies from Vienna and Paris, to the oriental splendor of Shanghai and Saigon.

Both Asian capitals fell to the Communists while he was there, but he accepts no blame for either.

CONTINUE

HE MET HIS WIFE Temple during a brief sojourn at UNC for graduate work, and they raised four children amidst the pomp and circumstance of CIA-related diplomacy in foreign capitals.

They retired in 1975 to Temple's Tyree family home near Altavista and began remodeling Oak Grove's rustic 200-year-old house, while remodeling their lifestyle for the area's friendly pace.

"At that time, the agency was going through some bad times, and I didn't advertise too much about what I did for a living," Powell recalled.

Regardless of criticism of the agency, Powell said he never had been completely open about his profession.

explaining the precarious uncertainty that necessarily was part of his life.

"THIS REALLY is a unique experience for me," he admitted in discussing his career, recalling the "not-quite" references to his job in the past, and precautionary habits of survival.

"I would never throw anything in a trash can...didn't discuss my work at all," Powell said, jokingly adding how he "went clean" on retirement.

"That was cleared by them and I can basically talk of things within its confines," he said, lapsing into his most animated tones at mention of other former CIA members who have not played by the rules.

"They're an abomination," Powell said of CIA exposures by Phillip Agee, among others.

"WE SIGNED when we came on and when we left to not disclose confidential documents," he said, although confessing that hindsight observation has shrouded the agency's image somewhat.

"Sure, there were excesses, and looking back, they should not have been done...but at the time when we began, it was wartime and we needed things that had to be done," he said.

"We've just gone through a soul-searching, conscience-cleaning time, but I think we'll eventually look back and see that the organization was a worthwhile thing.

"Some of the things that we've done, would not be done today, but we were doing what had been agreed to...had been approved, most of them, all the way to the White House," Powell said.

"BUT WE NEED, especially in this day and time, some advanced warning...some intelligence gathering system," Powell said.

The excesses of the CIA are more than matched, Powell added, by industrial and commercial spy systems that infiltrate competitors' organizations, looking for secrets.

"You need to know what to expect...what they've got that you'll have to have, and when is the deadline," he said.

Powell's deadlines now involve fund drives and church or school related matters, rather than identifying Bulgaria's wheat potential.

HE TEACHES vocational classes at Altavista High School, is active in local theater productions and is a senior leader in his church, when not corresponding with former "Jack Armstrong boys" scattered throughout the world.

He understates the change in his life after retirement "sending the kids to school, eating three meals a day, and going to PTA meetings at night."

Just a run-of-the-mill existence, if you listen to Davis Powell. Just the type life that would be perfect cover for...oh, forget it, he's not a spy.

Right? ...

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WASHINGTON STAR
16 July 1980

White House Panel Cites Natural Cause In Blast Off S. Africa

By John J. Fialka

Washington Star Staff Writer

A panel of outside experts assembled by the White House has concluded that the satellite that recorded the mysterious explosion near South Africa may have been struck by a small meteoroid that mimicked the signs of a nuclear explosion.

The panel's conclusions, an administration official admitted, did not convince experts at the Defense Intelligence Agency, which launched the Vela satellites during the 1960s. They have prepared a second report, which is classified but concludes that the Sept. 22 event was a nuclear explosion.

In the White House panel's report, which will be issued to an international panel as the Carter administration's view of the incident, the panel explained away a variety of indications that a nuclear explosion occurred during the early morning of Sept. 22, 1979.

Calling the other indications "ambiguous," the panel focused on the peculiar "double-hump" signature received by the special light sensors on the U.S. Vela satellite as it orbited over South Africa and the South Atlantic.

While panel members thought originally that the signature was that of an atomic bomb, an administration official explained during a background briefing for reporters yesterday, they later discovered that there was a body of natural phenomena, some of which come close to duplicating the twin peaks or double light pulses that are given off by an exploding nuclear weapon.

Closer examination of the light signals received by the Vela, he explained, showed that there were discrepancies in the size of the light pulses received by the two sensors aboard the satellite. The discrepancies were large enough to lead the panel to conclude that something much closer to the satellite, something that may have been closer to the lens of one of its sensor instruments than to the other, caused the discrepancy.

The "best candidate" among the events that could cause such a pulse, the official said, would be an impact from a small meteoroid, ranging from the size of a small pebble to a speck of dust.

If such a meteoroid, moving at speeds up to 8 miles a second, had hit the Vela satellite, it might have resulted in a shower of smaller particles, including pieces of paint and metal skin from the Vela that rebounded away from the satellite. The light reflected from the impact and the rebound, the official explained, could have caused the peculiar "double humped" signal thought to be peculiar to a nuclear blast.

Asked about the report by the Defense Intelligence Agency, the conclusions of which were leaked to the press in advance of the White House panel's findings, Defense spokesman Tom Ross said that the DIA experts and the White House experts were working from the same evidence but drawing different conclusions.

"They're not going to be able to resolve it, and the decision was to put it on the table and let the public know what the state of the play was," said Ross.

State Department officials will present the panel's findings to the international conference to review the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which meets in Geneva next month to assess the status of the global efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons.

In explaining its report, the administration official said that many members of the panel seemed to be driven to their conclusion by two major negative findings: there has been no tell-tale radioactive debris found from the blast, despite massive U.S. efforts at collection; and there apparently has been no intelligence data that would pinpoint a clandestine weapons test.

The panel did reveal, however, that it has a variety of other data that suggests that there might have been some kind of large explosive pulse recorded in the early hours of Sept. 22.

Airborne sound waves were received at a "distant recording site in the northern hemisphere" and weak underwater sound waves picked up at two undisclosed monitoring sites at about the same time as the blast. The White House panel concluded that the atmospheric sound wave was probably unrelated, but added that the Navy's Research Laboratory is still examining the underwater signals and has only a "very preliminary analysis" of them.

A third possible indicator was an electrical disturbance detected in the ionosphere that was moving over the South Atlantic at about the same time. The panel concluded that this could have resulted from a tropical storm in the area.

The official admitted that the panel's findings do not rule out the possibility of a nuclear explosion, but only state that there is a more likely cause for the signal.

White House Panel Doubts Light Flash Was Nuclear Blast

By Edward Walsh

Washington Post Staff Writer

A mysterious flash of light detected by a space satellite over the South Atlantic last Sept. 22 was "probably not" caused by a nuclear explosion as initially believed, a panel of scientists appointed by the White House reported yesterday.

In a conclusion that still left many questions unanswered and was at odds with the findings of other in the government, the scientists said it is more likely that the flash detected by the satellite was light reflected from debris from the satellite after it was struck by a small meteoroid.

The scientists said they cannot be sure exactly what caused the signal detected by the Vela satellite. But whatever the cause, they said that their eight-month investigation found "sufficient internal inconsistency to cast serious doubt whether that signal originated from a nuclear explosion or in fact from any light source not in the proximity of the Vela satellite."

The conclusion of the panel, which was headed by Dr. Jack Ruina of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, is not likely to end the internal

government division over whether a nuclear device was or was not exploded over the South Atlantic last Sept. 22.

On Monday, Pentagon sources said that the Defense Intelligence Agency had reached precisely the opposite conclusion as yesterday's report from the White House panel—that the flash probably was from a clandestine nuclear explosion.

A White House official who made the panel's report public yesterday said the dispute within the government will probably continue. "A lot of people remain convinced that this was a nuclear explosion," he said.

The initial belief of most government experts was that the flash picked up by the satellite was a nuclear explosion. There was speculation that South Africa, the closest country to the site of the activity, had conducted a nuclear test, and later there were stories that Israel had exploded an atomic bomb in the region.

South Africa and Israel, however, denied conducting any nuclear tests and government officials were puzzled by the absence of other evidence of a nuclear explosion—the detection of fallout, for example.

As a result, the White House convened the panel of nine scientists to investigate.

The scientists said their conclusion that the signal detected by the satellite was probably not caused by a nuclear explosion was based on three major findings:

- The signal strongly resembled signals detected by satellites from nuclear explosions, but also differed from those other signals "in a very significant way." That difference suggested that the origin of the signal was close to the satellite and not near the surface of the earth where nuclear tests are conducted.

- The satellite's detection devices, known as "bhangmeters," have recorded hundreds of thousands of signals of nonnuclear origins. In a few cases, signals triggered by unknown causes known to scientists as "zoo events" have had some of the characteristics of signals set off by nuclear explosions.

- A search for other evidence of a nuclear explosion has turned up only "ambiguous" data. "At this date, there is no persuasive evidence to corroborate the occurrence of a nuclear explosion on Sept. 22," the panel said.

The scientists said they examined a number of alternative explanations for the flash detected by the satellite and discarded most of them. They said the possibility that the satellite was struck by a meteoroid, an event they said could be expected to occur about once in a decade, "appears to be the best candidate for a nonnuclear origin of the signal."

White House officials said investigations of the signal will continue and that if the source was a nuclear explosion it may be possible to pinpoint its location near the coast of Antarctica rather than in the large expanse of the South Atlantic studied so far.

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NEW YORK TIMES
15 JULY 1980

Panel Doubts Flash Sighted Off Africa Was Atomic

By RICHARD BURT
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 14 — A panel of scientific experts appointed by the White House has concluded that a mysterious flash detected by an American satellite last September was not caused by a nuclear explosion. Government officials said today.

The panel was established by President Carter's science adviser, Frank Press, after a Vela intelligence satellite, passing over the South Atlantic on Sept. 22, recorded an intense burst of light that

resembled a nuclear blast. Officials said that, in a report to be released tomorrow, the experts assert that the satellite was probably struck by a tiny meteor, causing a light burst recorded by the spacecraft's instruments resembling one that would be caused by a nuclear explosion on the earth.

This finding, the officials acknowledged, contradicts the conclusions of a recent Defense Intelligence Agency report that is said to maintain that the flash was caused by a covert nuclear test off the coast of South Africa.

White House science aides contended, however, that their report, prepared by scientific specialists, represented the most extensive Government investigation of the Sept. 22 event.

Officials said that the Pentagon's conclusions showed that after 10 months the question whether South Africa or some other nation had detonated a nuclear bomb remained unanswered.

The question has stirred a lively debate because officials have been unable to find any corroborative evidence, such as traces of nuclear fallout, to indicate that an explosion did occur. Despite this, intelligence experts are said to believe that a test was indeed conducted because the Vela satellite has had a near-perfect record in picking up other nuclear blasts.

The Pentagon report, officials added, is also said to assert that the satellite was functioning properly last September and that the flash detected by the two "bangmeters" aboard the spacecraft resembled the typical pattern of a nuclear blast.

In the Pentagon's view, the nuclear explosion last September was relatively small, between one and three kilotons, or about a thousand times less powerful than most American nuclear weapons. One kiloton is equivalent in destructive

power to 100 tons of TNT. In drawing this conclusion, Pentagon aides acknowledged, the Defense Intelligence Agency did not explore other possible explanations for the light flash.

The White House team is said to have unanimously ruled out the possibility of a nuclear test, despite what was described as the initial inclination of some of its members to believe that South Africa had detonated a low-yield weapon. Its conclusion was based in part, officials said, on the fact that seismic and acoustical equipment could not confirm the satellite's findings.

In addition, the White House team, led by Jack Ruina, a physicist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, is said

to have found a possible natural cause for the flash. After extensive statistical checks, officials said, the experts found that the two bangmeters aboard the satellite did not pick up precisely the same light flash.

This means, White House aides said, that the flash probably occurred near the satellite in space rather than close to the earth's surface. Thus, some members of Mr. Ruina's team are said to believe that a small meteor struck the Vela satellite and broke into fragments, not much larger than specks of dust.

One fragment, possibly reflecting sunlight, is then thought to have created an optical signal similar to that created by a nuclear test 20,000 miles away.

DIA Concludes Mystery Flash Probable A-Test

Associated Press

A Defense Intelligence Agency report has concluded that a mysterious flash over the South Atlantic last September probably was caused by a clandestine nuclear explosion, Pentagon sources said yesterday.

The report, said to be hedged with uncertainties, disagrees with the opinion of a White House-sponsored panel of nongovernment experts who leaned to the view that the flash stemmed from natural causes.

The issue arose last Sept. 22 when a Vela nuclear-test detection satellite registered what was described as an "optical flash." U.S. intelligence sources said at the time they believed South Africa might have exploded a nuclear device in the atmosphere over a remote part of the South Atlantic.

South Africa denied conducting any nuclear test. The intelligence report at the time also fueled speculation that Israel might have set off an explosion.

Pentagon sources, who asked to remain anonymous, said the Defense Intelligence Agency was basing its conclusion principally on readings from Vela satellite instruments.

Senior defense officials outside the intelligence community tend to agree with the White House panel assessment that the satellite signals resulted from natural phenomena.

In an official reply to questions about the DIA report, the Pentagon said "the experts disagree in this matter, so no clear conclusion exists."

Last April, a senior defense scientist said experts had studied 20 to 30 kinds of sensors without producing any evidence of nuclear explosion except the flash.

The result of nearly a year of debate is that the flash is likely to remain a mystery.

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Capital Briefs

★ On July 2, Louis Wolf, who, along with CIA defector Philip Agee, puts out the viciously anti-CIA Covert Action Information Bulletin, held a press conference in Jamaica during which he claimed 14 diplomats attached to the U.S. Embassy in Kingston were intelligence agents. Wolf identified N. Richard Kinsman, the first secretary of the embassy, as a key CIA agent, and made public his home address, unlisted telephone number and the license plate and description of his car. Two days later—after the list of names was rebroadcast on the government-owned Jamaican broadcasting network and printed in the government-owned Jamaica Daily News—armed gunmen using automatic weapons attacked Kinsman's home. Miraculously, he escaped death.

Another watchman to watch

The Central Intelligence Agency, long since officially declawed and all but disavowed by the government it presumes to serve, is still the target of irrational hostility in this country. In fact, the Ayatollah Khomeini himself, crying "Satanic CIA plot" every time his policies run into opposition from the Iranian people, is no harder on the United States' foreign intelligence-gathering network than certain of its home-grown enemies.

The example of the moment is Louis Wolf, a one-man crusade who boasts of having broken the cover of some 2,000 CIA agents around the world. He does it through books and through a regularly published information bulletin. He does it in the name of First Amendment rights and the wrongness of American intervention in the internal affairs of foreign countries.

When his work appears to get results, as it did when, after he was named as a CIA agent in the Wolf newsletter, N. Richard Kinsman had his house in Jamaica shot up, there's a ready explanation. According to Wolf, the CIA staged the attack to give its agents martyr status.

Undercover maneuvering, however strictly limited to collecting information, invites questionable behavior. Whatever is done in secret is, by definition, hard to police from the outside. Unaccountability is a great corrupter. Unaccountability also inspires paranoia about what other people are up to.

Thus there are legitimate reasons for worrying about any nation's intelligence apparatus. The unfortunate thing is that, in this country, these legitimate concerns so easily become entangled with the facile anti-Americanism of

certain social critics given to measuring what our government does by utopian standards and to evaluating what other governments do by what they profess to intend.

This seems to be the case with Mr. Wolf, who pursues CIA agents with the zeal of a Louis Pasteur trying to track down disease germs. The situation in Jamaica, which he feared the CIA was trying to "destabilize," includes such elements as the Labor party's charges that the government of Prime Minister Michael Manley is collaborating with Cuba to arm and train an extra-legal military force.

Happily, the intelligence-gathering function still has a few friends in the United States. There are even a few people who believe that those who carry out that function should have what protection is possible in their dangerous tasks.

There is even an Intelligence Identities Protection Act under consideration in Congress. Its purpose is to rein in the anti-CIA ardors of a Louis Wolf by penalizing the unauthorized revelation of names and addresses of agents engaged in secret work on behalf of the United States government. It's about time.

Happily, Mr. Kinsman and his family were unharmed by the attack on their house in Jamaica. And if the episode draws attention to the needless peril they were exposed to by Mr. Wolf, it may not be altogether negative in its impact. For that matter, if it draws attention to what seems to be going on between the governments of Cuba and Jamaica, complete with the implications for the United States, that might not be a bad thing either.

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NEW YORK TIMES
14 JULY 1980

Getting at the Spy Hunters

Philip Agee and Louis Wolf call themselves journalists, but the only thing they have done for journalism is to create and corner a most ghoulish part of the market. They are in the business of identifying American undercover intelligence agents and publishing their names in books and bulletins. Their purpose is to destroy the nation's covert intelligence operations. Endangering the lives of the secret agents may not be their main purpose, but that is one result of their labor, a result about which they express indifference.

Because of that indifference, it is fair to tax this enterprise with some responsibility for the assassination in 1975 of Richard Welch, the C.I.A. station chief in Athens. The armed attack 10 days ago on the home of an American embassy official in Jamaica followed soon after Mr. Wolf described that official as the C.I.A.'s station chief in Kingston. Mr. Wolf suggests without proof that the agency itself might have committed the violence, but the important thing is that he doesn't care. As he told Philip Taubman of The Times, he has no qualms about the fate of individuals. "C.I.A. covert activities are inseparable from C.I.A. people," he said.

This attitude, like the project itself, mocks the First Amendment guarantee of free speech and American respect for dissent. It invites retribution against responsible as well as reckless critics of intelligence operations. It sorely tempts society to curb these individuals in ways that curtail the liberties of all. One such excessive response was the State Department's lawless revocation of Mr. Agee's passport, an action already struck down by the U.S. Court of Appeals in Washington.

We cannot match our outrage with a satisfying

solution. It should be easier to deal with Mr. Agee, a former C.I.A. agent, than with Mr. Wolf, a private citizen educated by Mr. Agee in methods of detecting agents and their covers. Present and former Government employees can be punished for misusing information they acquired in official jobs; perhaps the law can even presume that a misused secret was one derived from Government employment.

But it is not a crime, nor should it be, for a private citizen to gather and to publish information from public sources, however offensive to the Government and society. A law that would punish Mr. Wolf for publishing secret names in his Covert Action Information Bulletin could also punish a newspaper that identified an agent in the valid and necessary reporting of events or in the course of a legitimate study of the C.I.A.

The United States needs spies abroad; every country employs them. Congress is reaffirming the need for intelligence and counterintelligence even as it strives to write a legislative charter to curb the past abuses of the C.I.A. Anyone is free to disagree with that commitment to spying and to agitate against it. But the Agee-Wolf publications exceed the bounds of dissent.

Threatening the safety of individuals ought to be distinguishable from challenging a national policy. So Congress is right to try to draw the distinction in law. But we are not yet persuaded that it can be done without jeopardizing the most precious liberties of speech and press. This is not the first attempt to use the defense of civil liberties as a shield, even for the most contemptible scoundrels. Let us look at laws that might get at them, but let us not in the process compound the damage they do.

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NEW YORK TIMES
12 JULY 1980

Jamaican Campaign Going On Amid Rising Violence

By JO THOMAS

Special to The New York Times

KINGSTON, Jamaica — The daily count of dead and wounded in the violence in the Kingston slums has become a statistic as commonplace as the weather report. Recently a youth was stabbed to death and set afire by killers who fought off horrified passers-by, a child was shot in school, a police station was attacked with guns and bottles.

The violence has been growing since a parliamentary election was announced last February, and more than 250 have died since then. Its origins, other than poverty, are not clear. Some killings seem political; some drug-related, some simply criminal or familial.

"We're really quite bewildered at what to do about it," Faith Saunders, general secretary of the Jamaica Teachers Association, said.

The opposition Jamaica Labor Party, which has been campaigning under the slogan "Deliverance is near" and has been blanketing the walls of Kingston, the capital, with graffiti, has accused the governing People's National Party of stirring up violence so a state of emergency can be declared before the election. The opposition contends that the state of emergency declared to curb violence before the 1976 election, in which Prime Minister Michael N. Manley was returned overwhelmingly, was actually an effort to curtail their campaign.

Manley Bars Emergency Action

Mr. Manley has answered by pointing out that it was he who called the election in the first place, a year before it was required by statute. He insists he has no intention of declaring a state of emergency.

The continuing plague of violence has brought charges from each party that the other is planning to use foreign help to forestall a fair election. The campaign is likely to be a test not only of democracy in Jamaica but also of the restraint of both the United States and Cuba, whose names are constantly being dragged in.

"There is a growing fear of a military solution," Edward P. G. Seaga, leader of the opposition, said in an interview. He added that he was apprehensive that the Manley Government would call for help from Cuba or Cuban-trained Jamaicans; he qualified this by saying that though he thought it unlikely that the Government would need outside help to keep order, he thought the likelihood had increased.

Mr. Manley, also in an interview, deplored the violence. "It's a very bad thing, a very regrettable thing," he said, "but it's certainly, I'm afraid, not a new thing." He added that it was "very easy to exaggerate, to create the impression of a country that is almost in flames."

"The country isn't in flames," he said.

Earlier in the morning, although the Prime Minister did not know it at the time of the interview, the home of a United States official was machine-gunned. The attack came within 48 hours after the American, N. Richard Kinsman, had been described as the chief of station of the Central Intelligence Agency; he was unhurt.

His name and home address, with the identification of 14 other embassy officials, were given out at a new conference by Louis Wolf, co-editor of Covert Action Information Newsletter, a Washington, D. C., publication. Mr. Wolf accused the United States of trying to undermine the Manley Government, which favors democratic socialism and friendly relations with Cuba.

When Mr. Manley learned of the episode, he deplored the attack. Earlier in the day, asked about Mr. Wolf's allegations, he replied: "I am not going to make any charges against anybody if I can't prove them, and I can't prove anything against anybody. But anybody who has lived through Jamaica in the last year knows that there is a calculated and deliberate destabilization program at work. And I am not saying that the C.I.A. is involved in destabilization."

Mr. Manley and his party have been particularly critical of the newspaper The Daily Gleaner, which has consistently supported the opposition and raised alarms about the Government and the Cubans. Mr. Manley characterized its articles as "a massive, orchestrated, unending attack very often not related to fair comment at all." Members of the opposition, for their part, ridicule and discount the news on the Government-underwritten Jamaican Broadcasting Corporation, which has frequently mentioned suspicions about C.I.A. activities.

The criticism of the C.I.A. and the gunning of Mr. Kinsman's home were preceded by far more vehement and frequent denunciations of Cuban diplomats. The accusations have centered on the Ambassador, Ulises Estrada, but began before he arrived a year ago. Kingston was Mr. Estrada's first diplomatic post after a military career in Africa and a high-level Communist Party assignment in Havana in the department that, among other duties, has close contact with guerrilla movements in Latin America.

Although Jamaican Governments have had cordial relations with Cuba for years, Jamaicans generally fear Communism. Mr. Seaga raised questions about Mr. Estrada's background before he arrived and accused Cuba of sending agents disguised as teachers and doctors into Jamaica.

In September Mr. Estrada held a news conference at which he deplored the allegations by the opposition and accused The Gleaner of lying and of not playing fair because as a diplomat, he could not respond without being accused of meddling in internal affairs. The Ambassador was then accused of trying to threaten Jamaica and The Gleaner, and Mr. Seaga demanded that he be declared persona non grata; the Prime Minister refused.

The controversy heated up again in May when the authorities confiscated a shipment of 200,000 shotgun shells from Miami to a concern managed here by Rupert Hart, a Cuban. Documents indicated that the shipment was destined for Jamaica although Dudley Thompson, Minister of National Security, said it was in transit to Cuba.

33 Accused in Suspected Plot

Amid these controversies, 33 men were apprehended June 22 on suspicion that they were plotting to seize the Prime Minister, the armory and the army Chief of Staff and force the Government to resign. The alleged conspirators came from two groups no one had even mentioned in the heat of the campaign: the Jamaica United Front Party and the Jamaica Defense Force, which, unlike other Caribbean armies, has been both stable and apolitical.

Mr. Seaga, who was in the United States at the time, described the alleged conspiracy as "a comic opera coup" and raised the possibility that Mr. Manley had stage-managed it to create an atmosphere of crisis. However, the reputation of Brig. Robert Neish, the Chief of Staff and a key figure in the investigation, is so high that Jamaicans of both parties say they are unwilling to dismiss out of hand the possibility that there was a conspiracy.

In the meantime, as both parties concede, the fundamental issue of the campaign is the economy, which is managing somehow to keep going although deeply in debt and in need of foreign credits and investment. Mr. Seaga's party has accused the Government of ruining the country with its experiments in socialism and a mixed economy. Mr. Manley has accused Mr. Seaga of conducting a ceaseless scare campaign, both here and abroad, to undermine investor confidence, insuring a lack of investment that can be laid to the Government and helping Mr. Seaga to win the election.

In the long run, no matter who wins, the economy seems likely to improve. Jamaica has some of the world's largest bauxite reserves and both parties anticipate large investments and expansion in the bauxite and alumina industry.

LONDON SUNDAY TELEGRAPH

6 July 1980

Jamaica shots at man named as CIA agent

By RICHARD BEESTON in Washington

THE home of Mr Richard Kinsman, an American diplomat in Kingston, Jamaica, has been attacked with automatic gunfire and a fire bomb two days after he was named in a Washington newsletter as a CIA agent.

During a Washington news conference on Wednesday Mr Louis Wolf, co-editor of *Covert Action Information Bulletin*, accused the Central Intelligence Agency of trying to undermine socialist Jamaica.

He named Mr Kinsman and 14 other members of the Embassy staff as working for the CIA and provided home addresses, unlisted telephone numbers and licence plate numbers of diplomats' cars.

Jamaican police say that three gunmen opened fire on Mr Kinsman's house, where he was alone at the time, and some bullets went through the window of his daughter's bedroom. No one was injured and Mr Michael Manley, the Jamaican Prime Minister, has deplored the attack.

Jamaica is in the middle of a violent election campaign in which more than 240 people have been killed. Members of the two main parties have accused each other of seeking foreign military assistance.

The opposition leader, Mr Edward Seaga, has accused the Manley Government of collaborating with Cuba to train men with unrest over the political and import weapons for an illegal paramilitary force.

The list of names of the

alleged CIA agents was broadcast by the Jamaica Broadcasting Corporation and appeared in the Government owned *Jamaica Daily News* the day before the attack. Mr Wolf described the Kingston station as "one of the largest CIA establishments in Latin America." Jamaica is a former British colony in the Caribbean.

After the list was made public, members of the workers' party of Jamaica asked Mr Manley to expel Mr Kinsman, who is first secretary at the embassy.

Mr Cord Meyer, former CIA station chief in London in the 1970s, writing yesterday in the *Washington Star*, said that if Mr Seaga wins the election this autumn he will demand the withdrawal of the 500 Cuban officials invited in by Mr Manley.

He would "remove the covert infrastructure of Cuban agents that has infiltrated the island" and "knowing that Castro is pulling out all the stops in his attempt to support Manley and discredit Seaga."

Norman Kirkham writes: Prospects that Mr Manley will call a state of emergency in Jamaica before the general election are growing after continuing outbreaks of violence and allegations last week of an attempted army coup.

Opinion polls have indicated that Mr Seaga will sweep home with a resounding victory in the election. His support has grown over the political violence and because of Jamaica's severe economic plight.

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IRAN

Approved For Release 2009/06/12 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000501400001-4

Iran Declares Televised Trials Of Coup Suspects to Start Today

From News Services

TEHRAN, July 16—Trials of several hundred suspects in an alleged military plot to overthrow the Iranian government will begin Thursday, President Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr announced today after a meeting with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

Ayatollah Mohammad Behesti, head of the majority Islamic Republican Party and Supreme Court chairman, described the process as a forthcoming "execution of a group of conspirators" and said the proceedings would be televised.

He also attacked the National Front—a coalition of nationalist forces, and one of the few tolerated political organizations—saying that "some of its members have been arrested."

The Moslem fundamentalist leader did not call for the banning of the National Front, but said he was determined to crush all opposition, adding: "The revolution has always tried to preserve democratic liberties but this does not mean we shall remain inactive in the face of plots and crimes."

Other Iranian officials said a Catholic missionary school with about 800 students in Tehran was closed because its priests allegedly spied for Israel. According to Tehran radio, the Catholic teachers denied spying but were ordered not to leave the country.

The official Iranian news agency Pars quoted the officials as saying all "missionary" schools would be closed as a result of the incident.

Iran's oil installations were under heavy guard against saboteurs as a result of the 48-hour security quarantine called because of the alleged plot.

The arrested leaders have admitted they planned to bomb vital refineries and pipelines, the state radio said, warning the danger still existed.

"There is a big possibility that the remnants of the ominous triangular plot of America, Israel and Iraq are still at large and will threaten the oil industry," the radio said.

The country's borders and air space, closed early today are due to reopen early Thursday morning.

Iranian Plotters Said to Have Ties With Groups in U.S. and Europe

By RICHARD BURT

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 16 — Carter Administration officials say they believe that Iranian military officers who tried to stage a coup last week had links with Iranian opposition groups active in Western Europe and the United States.

The officials said that the Administration had only scanty information on the episode, in which several hundred people were reported arrested, but that the evidence available suggested that those taken into custody were affiliated with Shahpur Bakhtiar, the last Iranian Prime Minister appointed by Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlavi. Iranian officials have also linked the plot to Mr. Bakhtiar, charging that its aim was to bring him back to power from his exile in Paris.

Other American aides said they thought there was little doubt that some kind of military action had been planned to end the rule of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and they predicted that the Islamic Government in Teheran was likely to face similar threats in the future. However, most American specialists in Iranian affairs assert that the Iranian Government appears unlikely to be overthrown, at least in the near future.

Officials said the failure of the coup demonstrated that the Iranian Government had maintained an effective security service. They also expressed the view that President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr would not have publicized the affair if the Teheran Government felt itself seriously threatened.

The Iranian President went on television last Thursday to say that a plot by air force officers to take over by bombing the home of Ayatollah Khomeini and other targets had been crushed.

On Friday it was officially reported that 17 armored division officers had been arrested in the southern city of Ahwaz and put on trial, and various Iranian officials charged that the United States, Israel and Iraq were behind the conspiracy. Some also accused the Soviet Union of involvement.

Iran today sealed its borders for 48 hours in what was described as an attempt to capture conspirators still at large, and President Bani-Sadr said trials of plotters under arrest would begin shortly. Ayatollah Mohammed Beheshti, Iran's chief justice and the leader of the Islamic Republican Party, the dominant group in Parliament, said that some would receive the death penalty.

Some Carter Administration officials are known to have contacts with Iranians loyal to Mr. Bakhtiar and with other opponents of the existing Government in Teheran, but officials here strongly denied any involvement in or prior knowledge of last week's events.

Estimates from Teheran of the number of people arrested in the affair have varied, but American aides said that as many as 600 might have been jailed. Many of these people, they said, were probably not directly involved in the plot.

Washington's belief that Teheran is likely to face further plots is largely based on the view of Government specialists that the situation in Iran is growing steadily more chaotic. Economic stagnation, rising unemployment and the country's enforcement of a strict Islamic code have fostered increased public disaffection, they asserted.

Intelligence aides said it appeared that disaffection with the existing Government was highest in the country's armed forces, which have suffered from a series of purges over the last year.

These sources also said that Mr. Bakhtiar and other Iranian exile leaders had had some success in exploiting the demoralization within the military. The informants said that Bakhtiar aides had established a clandestine radio in Iraq by which anti-Khomeini messages were regularly broadcast into Iran.

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ON PAGE 17 (PART 1).

LOS ANGELES TIMES

15 July 1980

Iran Firing Squads Execute 26; Ex-Army Chief, Religious Leaders, Student Slain

From Times Wire Services

Iranian executioners shot at least 26 people late Sunday and Monday, including a former army chief of staff, two leaders of the Bahai religious sect and an anti-government student activist, the official news media reported Monday.

Stepping up their campaign for hostage trials, the Muslim militants holding the U.S. Embassy published a purported interview with one of their American captives in which he admitted to being a CIA officer and named two of his contacts—both high-level Iranians.

The militants identified the hostage as Thomas Ahern, a 48-year-old State Department employee and native of Fond du Lac, Wis., whom they have previously accused of espionage.

19 Executed for Vices

At least 19 of the Iranians executed—in Tabriz, Tehran and Hamadan—were accused of drug trafficking, prostitution, adultery or other vices, which have become capital offenses under the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's strict Muslim regime.

Others shot in Tehran included Lt. Gen. Houshang Hatam, who served as acting army chief of staff in the final months of the now-deposed Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi's regime, and Kiomars Rajabi, a former officer of the shah's imperial guard.

Hatam had been accused of "killing struggling people," apparently during the anti-shah revolution, and Rajabian of killing "a brave son of the nation," Tehran radio said.

In Tabriz, two leaders of the local Bahai community were executed, Tehran radio said. The broadcast said Faramarz Samandari and Yadollah Astani were put to death for "running the Bahais' centers in Tabriz, working for Savak (the secret police under the shah), cooperating with international Zionism, giving financial aid to Israel and spreading prostitution."

Bahai is a modern offshoot of Islam, and many Bahai believers in Iran were close to the deposed shah's regime. A Bahai spokesman in the United States estimated membership in Iran at 500,000.

Dozens of Iranian Bahais have been executed or imprisoned since the victory of the Khomeini revolution 17 months ago. The Iranian Bahais' supporters abroad contend they are being persecuted on religious grounds.

The Iranian media said another two men were executed in the northern city of Rasht, one a student who allegedly fomented unrest at the university there and "killed the people," and the other for "beating up and intimidating people." Another execution, of a policeman, was reported in the central city of Esfahan.

The militants holding the U.S. Embassy published an interview in the Tehran newspaper Azadegan in which they quoted an American hostage as saying he had been working in Iran as an agent of the Central Intelligence Agency. The militants later told a Tehran reporter that the hostage questioned was Ahern.

As quoted in Azadegan, he told the interviewer that he had four Iranian contacts who provided information about Iranian revolutionary politics, "information about the biography of individuals . . . information about Kurdistan and . . . brief reports about the leadership and the morale in the armed forces."

Iranian Contacts Named

He purportedly named two of his Iranian contacts—Amir Entezam, a former ambassador to the Scandinavian countries who has been under arrest in Iran since October for allegedly cooperating with the CIA, and Khosrow Qashqai, who was elected to Parliament but has been barred from taking his seat because of allegations by parliamentary hard-liners that he was an agent of the shah's secret police.

The American, as quoted in Azadegan, also implicated Adm. Ahmed Madani, saying Qashqai had discussed with Madani the possibility of publishing a newspaper together.

U.S. Hostage Said to Confess To CIA Role, Contacts in Iran

By Jay Ross

Washington Post Foreign Service

TEHRAN, July 14—A Tehran newspaper today published what it said were excerpts from the interrogation of one of the American Embassy hostages in which he admitted to being a CIA agent and named two of his contacts.

The newspaper, Azadegan, did not name the American, but a reporter on its staff and one of the militant Moslem students occupying the U.S. Embassy later identified the hostage as Thomas Ahern, who is listed as the embassy's narcotics officer. The paper said the questioner was one of the captors.

The purported interrogation was contained in a document that the militants had submitted to parliament, which has been charged by Iranian leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini with deciding the fate of the hostages. The militants holding them advocate putting them on trial as spies.

If the published statements are accurate, it would mark the first time that one of the hostages has confessed to being an officer of the Central Intelligence Agency. The militants in the past have accused Ahern and several other hostages of being CIA agents, but had not previously issued transcripts of any interrogations in which such an affiliation was admitted.

Ahern was accused by the militants shortly after the embassy takeover of holding a false passport.

The militants reportedly provided the purported interrogation and other documents to the parliament when it convened in late May. The date of the interrogation was not given.

Publication of the alleged confession came on one of the bloodiest days of wholesale executions since the revolution that brought Iran's Islamic Republic to power 17 months ago.

At least 28 persons were executed by firing squads in the last 24 hours in scattered locations throughout the country, according to the government-controlled news media.

Most of those executed were charged with narcotics offenses, but they also included two leading members of Iran's Bahai religious minority, a former deputy military chief of staff and an antigovernment student activist, according to the official news media.

The militants in the past have denied interrogating the hostages, but today's published account seemed to indicate that the militants had indeed done so. The State Department has said it regards any alleged hostage confessions of espionage activities in Iran as having been obtained under duress and therefore invalid.

There was no way to independently confirm the authenticity of the purported interrogation of Ahern. The newspaper that printed it usually reflects the views of the Islamic militants who have taken a hard line on the hostage issue. Publication of Ahern's alleged statements tended to bolster the militants' opposition to the seating of key moderates in the newly elected parliament.

In the interrogation Ahern allegedly admitted contacts with tribal leader Khosrow Qashqai, long an opponent of the shah, and former deputy prime minister Abbas Amir Entezam, who is currently in jail awaiting trial on charges of having had links with American officials here.

The parliament voted overwhelmingly yesterday to deny Qashqai credentials to sit in the legislature despite his election in March.

Ahern reportedly said Qashqai was not paid for his information about the security and political situation among his tribesmen in central Iran.

The published excerpt of Ahern's questioning mainly concerned the CIA's sources of information in Iran and their code names. Ahern reportedly said Qashqai had the code name "SD Rotter," while Entezam was known as "SD Pepper."

Asked whether Qashqai knew he was dealing with a CIA agent during his contacts with the U.S. official, the hostage replied, according to the newspaper, "I believe he knew that I am the representative of the CIA."

The paper said he added: "About the reason for his readiness to contact us, I do not remember that we had any discussion about it. There is no specific reference in the dossier about what his precise expectations from his contacts with me or other agents before me were."

The paper quoted the hostage as saying that Qashqai "used to give reports about one of the minorities in the country . . . about the security situation of one of the tribes . . . and about their relations with the local officials and central government."

In another development, opposing political groups exchanged charges of responsibility for an abortive military coup reported by the government last week. The Islamic Republican Party led by Ayatollah Mohammed Beheshti traded the accusations with the National Front, a moderate grouping that has been severely weakened by the dominant role of the Islamic Republicans and has seen several of its elected parliamentarians disqualified.

The most prominent person executed today was Lt. Gen. Houshang Hatem, deputy chief of staff of the armed forces under the shah, on charges of having ordered troops to

fire on crowds demonstrating against the monarch during the rebellion.

A former officer in the disbanded imperial guard was also shot for killing a conscript soldier during the uprising. Both political executions occurred in Evin Prison in Tehran. Three policemen were also shot for similar offenses in Isfahan in central Iran.

Seven convicted drug offenders were killed by a firing squad on a street in a former red light district of the capital shortly after dawn. It was the second time in a week that the area was a scene of public executions, long a tradition in Iran but banished by the shah in the mid-1960s.

The open air executions were further evidence of the harsh turn that Iran's revolutionary justice has taken in recent weeks.

The largest number of overnight executions occurred in the northern city of Tabriz, where 14 persons were killed for sex and drug offenses and other alleged crimes.

Two of the 14 were Bahais, a sect regarded by Iranian Moslems as an offshoot of Islam and therefore heretical. According to the official radio, they were accused of "running the Bahais' centers in Tabriz, working for SAVAK (the shah's secret police), cooperating with international Zionism,

26 Are Executed By Firing Squads In Iranian Cities

General and 2 Members of Bahai Sect Among Dead

By Reuters

TEHERAN, Iran, July 14 — Firing squads in several Iranian cities reportedly executed 26 people during the night, including a general and two members of the Bahai religious sect.

The general was convicted of killing people during the final days of Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlavi's rule; the Bahai members were convicted of espionage. Most of the others were put to death for narcotics and sex offenses. For the second time in less than a week seven people convicted of drug trafficking were shot on a Teheran street.

The developments, part of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's drive to enforce Islamic principles, came as the militants occupying the United States Embassy continued their efforts to win support for spy trials for the American hostages.

'Interrogation' of American

The Teheran newspaper Azadegan published what it described as an excerpt from the interrogation of an unidentified American hostage who was said to have admitted being an officer of the Central Intelligence Agency. The hostage was said to have named two high-level Iranian contacts. A spokesman for the militants said in a telephone interview that the hostage was Thomas Ahern, who had previously been accused by his captors of being a C.I.A. agent.

A spokesman for the newspaper said the text of the questioning, which was conducted by a militant, was among documents made available to Parliament relating to elected members whose credentials were being challenged on grounds such as links to the C.I.A.

The American was said to have identified one of his Iranian contacts as Khosroh Qashqai, a Member of Parliament barred from taking his seat. Parliament voted overwhelmingly yesterday to reject the credentials of Mr. Qashqai after he refused to testify at a hearing into charges that he had been an agent of the deposed Shah's secret police.

Another Member of Parliament who refused to attend a credentials hearing,

Adm. Ahmad Madani, was mentioned in the published transcript. It quoted the hostage as saying Mr. Qashqai and the admiral had discussed the possibility of publishing a newspaper together. The admiral, whose aides have been accused of maintaining close ties to the United States, came in second to President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr in the Iranian presidential election last January.

The hostage, one of at least six Americans accused by the militants of being spies, was also said to have named someone called Entezam as one of his Iranian contacts. This was presumably Abbas Amir Entezam, who was Deputy Prime Minister last year before being appointed Ambassador to the Scandinavian countries. Mr. Entezam, who was later summoned home and arrested, is still in jail.

The Iranian Parliament, which Ayatollah Khomeini gave the task of deciding the fate of the American hostages, is still in its organizational stage and is not expected to discuss the captives until late July at the earliest. Leading members have reported strong sentiment for trying the hostages.

The two members of the Bahai sect who were put to death, identified as Dr. Faramarz Samandari and Yadollah Astani, lived in the northwestern city of Tabriz. According to the Teheran radio, the charges against them included "running the Bahais' centers in Tabriz." They were also accused of working for the Shah's secret police, aiding Israel and spreading prostitution.

The Bahai faith, a religion that was founded during the 19th century in Persia and includes Mohammed as one of its prophets, is anathema to the Shiite Moslems in power in Iran. The Islamic authorities are said to regard the Bahais as members of a political rather than a religious movement. Dozens of adherents are said to have been imprisoned since Ayatollah Khomeini's supporters came to power. The execution last May of a woman who served as Education Minister under the Shah, Farrokhrou Parsa, was believed linked in part to a belief that she was a member of the sect.

Twelve other Tabriz residents were executed during the night, and other executions were reported in the cities of Hamadan, Rasht and Isfahan.

The army officer, Lieut. Gen. Hushang Hatam, who served as Deputy Chief of Staff during the final stages of the Shah's rule, was put to death in Teheran's Evin Prison, where he had been convicted. Also shot there was Kiomars Rajabian, a former officer of the Shah's Imperial Guard, who was convicted of killing what the Teheran radio described as "a brave son of the nation."

The seven shot on a Teheran street, like the seven others put to death last week, were taken to a former red light district for the executions. The area was selected, an official said last week, because it is frequented by narcotics violators.

Pars, the official press agency, reported that 36 prisoners sentenced by the Islamic revolutionary court in Sanandaj in Kurdistan had been granted amnesty to mark the start of the holy month of Ramadan. It gave no details of the prisoners' offenses or sentences.

In another development, a special security office set up to deal with a plot that the Government reported foiling last week said fugitive conspirators might try to attack the places where some of the American hostages were confined.

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
15 July 1980

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Iran militants say a hostage admits spying

Associated Press

The Moslem militants holding the U.S. Embassy in Tehran have published a purported interview with one of the U.S. hostages in which he admitted to being a CIA officer and named two of his contacts — both high-level Iranians.

The militants identified the hostage as Thomas Ahern, a 48-year-old State Department employee and native of Fond du Lac, Wis., whom they have accused previously of espionage. The militants want the hostages tried as spies.

Monday was the 254th day the 52 hostages have been in captivity. Their fate is to be decided by the Iranian parliament, the Majlis, but the decision may be months away. Leaders have said the chamber of deputies, or lower house of the Majlis, overwhelmingly supports putting the Americans on trial as spies.

Also yesterday and late Sunday night, at least 26 persons were put to death, including a former army chief of staff, two leaders of the Bahai religious sect and an anti-government student activist, the official news media reported.

In the interview in the Tehran newspaper Azadagan, the militants quoted Ahern, the U.S. hostage, as saying that he had been working in Iran as an agent of the CIA.

As quoted in Azadagan, Ahern told the interviewer that he had four Iranian contacts who provided information about Iranian revolutionary politics, "information about the biography of individuals... information about Kurdistan and... brief reports about the leadership and the morale in the armed forces."

Ahern supposedly named two of his Iranian contacts — Amir Entezam, a former ambassador to the Scandinavian nations who has been under arrest in Iran since October for allegedly cooperating with the CIA, and Khosrow Qashgai, who was elected to the Majlis but has been barred from taking his seat because of allegations by parliamentary hard-liners that he was an agent of SAVAK, the secret police of deposed Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi.

Ahern, as quoted in Azadagan, also implicated Rear Adm. Ahmad Madani, saying that Qashgai had discussed with Madani the possibility of publishing a newspaper together. The militant who conducted the interview implied through his questioning that the newspaper was to have U.S. support.

Like Qashgai, Madani has taken a relatively moderate position on the hostage issue and has been under political attack from the hard-line Moslem clergy.

Over the months the militants have named more than a half-dozen of the U.S. hostages as alleged CIA operatives.

In the most recent executions, at least 19 of the condemned Iranians — in Tabriz, Tehran and Hamadan — were accused of drug trafficking, prostitution, adultery or other vices that have become capital offenses under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's strict Moslem regime.

Others shot in Tehran included Lt. Gen. Houshang Hatam, who served as acting army chief of staff in the final months of the Pahlavi regime, and Kiomars Rajabian, a former officer of Pahlavi's imperial guard.

Hatam had been accused of "killing struggling people," apparently during the anti-Pahlavi revolution, and Rajabian of killing "a brave son of the nation," Tehran Radio said.

In Tabriz, two men executed were leaders of the local Bahai community. Bahai is a modern offshoot of Islam, and many of the estimated 50,000 Bahai believers in Iran were close to Pahlavi's regime.

Tehran Radio said the two executed men, Dr. Faramarz Samandari and Yadollah Astani, were put to death for "running the Bahais' centers in Tabriz, working for SAVAK (the former shah's secret police), cooperating with international Zionism, giving financial aid to Israel and spreading prostitution."

Dozens of Iranian Bahais have been executed or imprisoned since the victory of the Khomeini revolution 17 months ago. The Iranian

Bahais' supporters abroad contend that they are being persecuted on religious grounds.

The Iranian news media said two men were executed in the northern city of Rasht, one a student who allegedly fomented unrest at the university there and "killed the people," and the other for "beating up and intimidating people." Another execution, of a police officer, was reported to have taken place in the central city of Isfahan.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
12 July 1980

Iranians Exact Price for Tracing Hostage Site in Provincial City

By Jay Ross

Washington Post Foreign Service

ISFAHAN, Iran, July 11—At least one — and possibly many more — of the American hostages who have been spread around Iran is living under guard at 70 Kamal Esmail Avenue here in Isfahan, the architectural showpiece city of a 16th century Persian monarch.

The house, formerly owned by an informer for SAVAK, the dreaded security police under the deposed shah, is situated in one of the best parts of this central Iranian city. It is well guarded, featuring a sandbagged sentinel post atop the entrance gate, numerous self-appointed vigilantes, and the omnipresent anti-American banners of Iran's Islamic revolution.

The price for discovering yesterday that the house, mostly hidden by an imposing 60-foot-long wall, is a hostage site was considerable. For this reporter and Doyle McManus of the Los Angeles Times, it cost 4½ hours of detention by Revolutionary Guards, a search of our hotel rooms and being ordered to leave the city by 8 a.m. today.

The site is not hard to spot since it has a prominent sign saying it is the headquarters of "Students Following the Line of the Imam," Iranian leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The U.S. Embassy in Tehran, which the militant students took over last Nov. 4, has similar signs.

Several sources have said in recent weeks that they thought some of the hostages had been moved to the Isfahan house after the militants at the embassy decided to split up their captives following the abortive American rescue attempt in late April.

The militants have said they have scattered the hostages around the country, leaving considerable questions about how many of the 49 remaining captives from the embassy are in the capital. Three other American officials are at the Iranian Foreign Ministry.

The reception outside the gate yesterday for two reporters and a translator was unfriendly, as a Revolutionary

Guard in the sandbagged position pointed his rifle at us. But it did not take long to gain confirmation that there was a hostage inside.

Three students came out to talk—or more accurately to discourage talk.

"We will not tell you anything," said a tall student in a blue shirt. Then, when asked whether the estimate of six hostages at the site was accurate, he said, "there are between one and 50."

Soon we got further, unwelcome confirmation.

It was impossible to get a closer look at the embassy. The students took offense at our copying down revolutionary slogans from the wall, and ordered us to the nearby revolution-ordered us to the nearby Revolutionary Guards headquarters, where our

While he was intensively questioning me for 2½ hours, one of the security agents at the Guards' office said repeatedly that there were hostages down the street at 70 Kamal Esmail Avenue.

The Revolutionary Guards office had formerly been the local headquarters of SAVAK, and the surrounding buildings for about a quarter of a mile had been given to SAVAK's informants to reward their services, the interrogator said.

It seemed highly unlikely to me that the security agent was seeking to mislead me about the hostages by planting false information. The desul-

tory questioning was apparently aimed at trapping us in inconsistencies in our separate interviews.

One telling point was frequent reference to alleged involvement of Western reporters with the Central Intelligence Agency. The interrogator cited acknowledgement of such employment by CIA officials and asked, "how can you expect us to believe" that American journalists "do not work for the CIA?"

The interrogation was carried out by five security agents, one openly holding a pistol in a holster on his side. Unlike a SAVAK interrogation experienced under the shah's regime, however, there was no feeling of potential violence, only uncertainty of release and inability to contact anyone outside the headquarters.

The impression was of an independent authority acting on its own beyond control of the central government.

Several other foreign correspondents have been held longer or expelled, and many have been refused entry since the revolution, which used to be a favorite response of the shah's government to unfriendly reporting.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-4NEW YORK TIMES
12 JULY 1980

A Deep Silence Envelops Hostage Held Since May

By DUDLEY CLENDINEN

The release of Richard I. Queen leaves 53 Americans hostage in Iran, but only 52 of them are from the American Embassy. The 53d is in limbo, whereabouts, charges and condition unknown.

She is Cynthia B. Dwyer of Buffalo, who was taken from the Hilton Hotel in Teheran by revolutionary guards on the night of May 5. Three days later the Iranian Government informed the Swiss Embassy, which represents American interests, that Mrs. Dwyer had been arrested and accused of being a Central Intelligence Agency operative. That was the last word on her.

"We have heard nothing from her or about her since she was arrested," her husband, Professor John F. Dwyer, said yesterday. His wife left for Iran in mid-April, carrying credentials as a freelance journalist.

"There's very little we can do about it," Professor Dwyer, chairman of the English Department at Buffalo State College, said yesterday from his home in Williamsville, outside Buffalo. "We are relying on the Swiss, and they have been unable to make any contact at all," he said.

Militant Moslems seized the American Embassy in Teheran on Nov. 4 and the United States severed diplomatic relations earlier this year.

In Washington George Havens, a press spokesman for the Iranian working group in the State Department, said: "I under-

stand the Swiss Ambassador has even spoken to the Foreign Minister about it. They merely said they would take the requests under advisement. They just haven't come back on it."

"We made several interventions at very high levels," Pierre-Yves Simonin, an official at the Swiss Embassy in Washington, said yesterday. The most recent request, he said, was made at the beginning of July.

United States intelligence officials said in Washington that they had received no reports on Mrs. Dwyer. They insisted that she had no connection with American intelligence activities.

Striving for Regular Routine

Dr. Dwyer, as the father of three — Ben, 14 years old, Dan, 11, and Susannah, 8 — does what he can to keep the family rhythm going. "We make sure to keep to the regular routine all the time," he said. The children missed no school and now they are taking swimming lessons.

Two weeks ago, exactly a year after the family had made its first trip to Washington, D.C., as tourists, Dr. Dwyer took the children back, this time to a building they had not seen before: the State Department. The children walked the long halls and met some of the staff of the Iranian working group. "Just for their sake," Dr. Dwyer said, "I wanted to get them into the process, just to see that something was being done."

As a teacher, as a sympathizer, as was his wife, with the revolution in Iran, he tries to deal rationally with what he calls "the helplessness."

She Wanted to See It for Herself

His wife, he said, grew interested in Iran from friendships made with Iranian students and decided to see for herself, hoping to write for publication when she returned. "She certainly is not a spy," he said. "I think it's a lot of circumstances. I think she was there at the wrong time."

"It's the classic postrevolutionary situation in which the Government or the people who really can speak have yet to emerge," he Dr. Dwyer went on. "The stability that you need to get an answer is not yet there."

He is sure that his wife, in the silence of her imprisonment somewhere in Iran, still clings to her basic sympathy for the Iranian people and their revolution. "I would be surprised if her attitude toward the revolution in general has changed," he said. "I don't mean that she likes her detention or her jailors, but it's not all of a piece. It's not all of a piece."

For his part, he said, "we have to be patient, and obviously persistent, and we have learned to be both."



Cynthia B. Dwyer

LOS ANGELES TIMES
12 July 1980

HOSTAGE TRAIL ENDS WITH INTERROGATION

'You Are Spying,' U.S. Journalists Told

By DOYLE McMANUS

Times Staff Writer

ESFAHAN, Iran—The chief inquisitor's eyes bore in on mine. He smiled a thin, triumphant smile.

"You are spying for the CIA," he said with an air of finality.

No, I said; I am a journalist, and there is a difference between journalists and spies.

The inquisitor laughed. "Do you think we are naive?" he asked. "Even the CIA says it uses journalists as spies."

Not me, I said. And I began to worry. Even if I could prove to these 25-year-old revolutionary guards that I was a journalist, to them that meant that I was the same as a spy.

(In April, speaking at a meeting of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, CIA Director Stansfield Turner said the agency will consider using journalists for intelligence purposes when the desired results cannot be obtained any other way.)

(Responding to objections by the editors, Turner said, "What you are saying is that if you accept an assignment from me to get some information that can be very vital to our country, that you have lost your freedom. I don't understand that.")



(Turner, who attended a private luncheon in Los Angeles on Friday at the 20th Century-Fox Film Corp. studios, declined to comment on the incident in Esfahan.)

With another reporter, Jay Ross of the Washington Post, I had come to investigate reports that some of the hostages from the U.S. Embassy in Tehran had been moved to a house here. They had; but the militant students were not pleased that we had discovered them, and they handed us over to the revolutionary guards.

"Why should it interest you where the hostages are, or how many are there?" demanded the chief inquisitor, a thin young man with an uneven stubble of beard. "This is not news. This is not journalism. This is taking secrets."

It is a journalist's job to gather information, I said lamely. "It is a spy's job," he corrected.

Another militant joined in. "Did you study at a journalism school?" he asked.

No, I said truthfully. History.

"Then you cannot be a journalist," he said.

I supplied almost two hours' worth of such self-incriminating answers. Then I was locked inside a tiny room with a filthy mattress and stacks of popular music tapes, which are outlawed and confiscated in this Islamic republic.

It was Ross's turn to be interrogated.

Two hours later, my inquisitor returned, asked some more questions, then left, saying that telephone calls would be made to Tehran.

A half-hour later, a key turned in the door. "You are free," the inquisitor said.

THE PITTSBURGH PRESS

8 July 1980

Family, U.S. Question 'Hostage Letter' To Press

By LEE HOTZ

His shocked relatives call it unbelievable.

The U.S. Department of State says it may be the opening of a public relations campaign orchestrated by Iranian student militants afraid they may be losing their spot in the international limelight.

Postmarked "Teheran," it arrived here in yesterday's mail, a handwritten letter to The Pittsburgh Press purportedly from one of the American Embassy employees held hostage in Iran.

The letter claims that its author is an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency, denounces the government of the deposed shah as one of "terror and corruption" and asks Pittsburgh area residents to look at "this Iranian crisis on a more real and logical basis."

"Please join a just cause in the fight to have the shah returned to Iran," it reads.

Ostensibly signing the letter was Jerry J. Miele, 41, a career State Department communications employee from Mount Pleasant, Westmoreland County, who has been held hostage in Iran for 248 days.

A spokesman for the State Department's Iran Working Group, which was organized months ago to monitor the hostage crisis, said yesterday, "It sounds word for word like the militants."

"It may well have been written by an Iranian or by Miele under duress. You don't know what those guys are going through over there and we don't either," he added.

Although many of the 53 hostages have written to their families, the letter received by The Press is apparently the first addressed to an American newspaper, the spokesman said, and the first to echo so strongly the political beliefs of their captors.

It arrived on the heels of a statement from a leading member of the Iranian Parliament who was quoted as saying that the hostages must face a Nurem-

berg-like trial "as a bunch of spies."

"My name is Jerry J. Miele and I am an American Embassy hostage in Iran," the hand-printed letter begins.

"My permanent abode is in nearby Mt. Pleasant, Pa. I arrived in Iran to work in the U.S. Embassy o/a 25 March 1979. My position in the Embassy was as telecommunications officer.

"I am an employee of the CIA's Communications Division."

The letter describes briefly the operations of the embassy communications center and then goes on to make a plea for the shah's return to Iran.

Written in block letters with a ball-point pen and covering two-and-a-half sheets of plain white typing paper, it contains a number of spelling mistakes and grammatical errors.

"I believe it is well understood throughout the world that the reign of the shah was one of terror and corruption totalling (sic) lacking in human rights and of course the shah was the U.S. imposed leader thus enabling the U.S. to exploit Iran..."

"They (the militants) want the shah back for trail (sic) to show the world his type of rule and government should not be allowed in power, ever."

A spokesman for the Central Intelligence Agency in Washington, D.C., said yesterday that, following long-established policy, the agency would neither confirm nor deny that Miele was a CIA employee.

"He is in communications, that much is true," said Miele's sister, Mrs. Catherine Shutt. "But he's in the State Department."

"I am just so shocked by this. I'm just floored. He didn't write the letter. I'd bet my life on it. They must think he's a spy or something," she said.

"It's the militants who are writing it." The letter itself is dated June 20. The envelope, apparently official embassy

stationery, is postmarked June 23, Teheran.

Errors in the text lead relatives and State Department officials to doubt that Miele wrote the letter himself, although the signature, which seems to be written in a different hand, may be genuine.

"Jerry doesn't have bad grammar," his sister said.

State Department officials have requested the original of the letter for analysis and to verify the signature.

Relatives said they received a letter over the weekend from Miele which, from statements the letter contained and the way in which it was written, they believe was not completely his own work.

"There were two types of pen," Mrs. Shutt explained.

"Previous correspondence between the hostages and their families has been basically innocent stuff," the Iran Working Group spokesman said.

"Usually they're full of questions about what's going on at home. They're 'muffled' about their surroundings. This letter comes as something of a surprise," he said.

State Department officials, disturbed at the letter's reference to the CIA, called it a publicity ploy designed perhaps to bolster the militants' position in domestic Iranian politics.

"It's a very old trick," one official said. "You force someone to sign his name to a piece of propaganda. This sort of thing was done during World War II, Korea and in Vietnam."

Miele's family last saw him on television in November when, blindfolded and disheveled from his days in captivity, he was put on display in a group of hostages.

Although the students incorrectly identified him during the broadcast, his

CONTINUED

relatives said that with his blondish hair and moustache, they had no trouble picking him out of the group.

Miele grew up in the Mount Pleasant area and attended school there. In his 18 years at various State Department outposts around the world he was able to visit home only once or twice a year.

"When he talked about the country where he was working, he talked like a tourist," said his brother-in-law, Joseph Shuffy, who called Miele "a very quiet sort of fellow, a very nice guy."


"It should be common knowledge that shah (sic) ruled Iran was (sic) with a

U.S. trained military and the CIA secret police, SAVAK," the letter reads.

"The rule of the shah was not the type of government that the people in the US (sic) are led to believe our government wishes in countries throughout the world."

"The Iranian students are not only advocating a just and freer life for Iran but for the world. They simply want to run, govern and live their lives as they want it — not like a superpower wants them to do it...and they will."

"He wouldn't write that," his sister said. "Oh God, no way. I'm sure he didn't."



CONTINUED

Text Of Letter Sent To Press From Hostage

Here is the text of the letter allegedly sent by Jerry J. Miele to The Press:

June 20, 1980

Jerry J. Miele

U.S. Embassy

Tehran, Iran

The Pittsburgh Press

34 Boulevard of the Allies

Pittsburgh, PA

Dear Editor,

My name is Jerry J. Miele and I am an American Embassy hostage in Iran. My permanent abode is in nearby Mt. Pleasant, PA. I arrived in Iran to work in the U.S. Embassy o/a 25 March 1979. My position in the Embassy was as Telecommunications officer. I am an employee of the CIA's Communications Division. The Tele Communications Unit (TCU) in the Embassy was a radio station in itself, thus it was independent of any outside source of communications for the mission's messages to and from the embassy. TCU would then distribute the unprocessed incoming messages to the Communications & Records (C&R), messages addressed to the Embassy, Maag and Dao, CIA Tehran would pick up their processed messages direct from TCU. For outgoing messages, the process was reversed. C&R would give TCU the processed Embassy Dao and Maag messages to TCU in the form of a teletype (TTY) tape for transmission. CIA Tehran would deliver their messages direct to TCU for processing into a TTY tape and transmission. The above info gives you an idea of the basic function of the TCU unit.

The main purpose of this letter is to try to get the residents of the Pittsburgh area to look at this Iranian Crisis on a more real and logical basis. To also look at this crisis more towards Iran's Islamic students point of view & the return of the Shah to Iran and their reasons for wanting his return. I believe it is well understood throughout the world that the reign of the Shah was one of terror and corruption totalling (sic) lacking in human rights and of course the Shah was the U.S. imposed leader thus enabling the U.S. to exploit Iran. It also gave the U.S. military another foothold in the Middle East.

It should be common knowledge that Shah ruled Iran was (sic) with a U.S. trained military and the CIA trained Secret Police Savak. The rule of the Shah was not the type of government that the people in the US are led to believe our government wishes in countries throughout the world. Would a government by the people let a tragedy like Black Friday occur when many Iranians advocating freedom died for a better life without outside interference. Since the revolution, Iranians are once again proud to be Iranian.

The Iranian students are not only advocating a just and freer life for Iran but for the world. They simply want to run govern (sic) and live their lives as they want it...not like a SuperPower wants them to do it...and they will.

They want the Shah back for trail (sic) to show the world his type of rule and government should not be allowed in power, ever.

President Carter cannot be truthful when he advocates human rights and then sanction (sic) the safe haven of the Shah at the same time.

Please join a just cause in the fight to have the Shah returned to Iran.

Sincerely,

Jerry J. Miele

ATLANTA JOURNAL
7 July 1980

Destructive Meddling

THROUGHOUT the Iranian hostage crisis, Ayatollah Khomeini and his government officials and the militants holding the Americans at the embassy have demanded that the United States apologize for its policies and cease its interference in the internal affairs of Iran. The United States has refused to respond.

One thing justified the American position: the apparent fact that U.S. policy had indeed changed — that whatever wrongs might have been committed in past support of the shah, we were now embarked on a human-rights based foreign policy which eschewed manipulation of other nations' politics and rejected direct involvement in their business.

Now, however, we learn that the United States has not discarded all its old ways. The New York Times reports that the CIA has been operating clandestine radio broadcasts into Iran which have urged the overthrow of the ayatollah. The broadcasts, beamed from Egypt, have called Khomeini a "racist and fascist," supported ousted Prime Minister Shapour Bakhtiar and called for Iranians to "take guns into your hands," the Times reported.

This is a devastating revelation, one which negates all the cautious and supposedly responsible approaches the administration has taken in response to the hostage crisis. It plays directly into the hands of the ayatollah and his most anti-American supporters by demonstrating that when they say the United States is meddling in Iranian affairs, they are right.

To be sure, it would be better for American interests if the shaky government of the ayatollah were to collapse and a regime more friendly to the West were to take power — although with the communist parties being the next strongest in Iran after the religious groups,

there is no assurance that that would be the result of an overthrow of Khomeini. But the heart of the human rights policy — which we have supported — is that we recognize the right of people in other nations to choose their own government,

not have it imposed on them by coups orchestrated or abetted by the CIA.

The operation of these inflammatory radio broadcasts destroys the credibility of U.S. claims that we are changing our ways and surely sets back whatever progress we might have made in winning the trust of Third World countries. In addition, it probably means the already-slim hopes for a resolution of the hos-

tage situation have become dimmer than ever.

The decision to conduct this kind of campaign is a shocking disappointment to those who believed there might be a new American foreign policy — and its consequences may be far-reaching and damaging to our relations with the rest of the world.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 12

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
21 July 1980

Washington Whispers

U.S. intelligence officials were trying to confirm reports from Teheran that the Iranian government, anticipating the Shah's death in Cairo, was sending assassins to Egypt to kill members of his family and close associates if a public funeral were held.

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OLYMPICS

Approved For Release 2009/06/12 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000501400001-4

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ON PAGE 3

BOSTON GLOBE
14 July 1980

Soviets charge CIA trying to upset Olympics

United Press International

MOSCOW — A Soviet newspaper charged the CIA yesterday with using cloak-and-dagger spy tricks, including false-bottomed suitcases and underwear with secret pockets, to disrupt the Moscow Olympics with political subversion.

But the Sovetskaya Rossia newspaper said the Kremlin was confident that any attempt by the CIA and other anti-Soviet organizations in the West to broadcast a political message at the games could be deflected.

"A number of US publishing houses are fulfilling orders for subversive anti-Soviet literature which is to be smuggled to Moscow," the newspaper said.

"Special firms have been set up to manufacture double-bottom suitcases, underwear with secret pockets, boxes of sweets and cans of coffee stuffed with leaflets and pamphlets (written) on tissue paper," it said.

The newspaper singled out as troublemakers "anti-Soviet organizations from the United States, Canada and other Western countries" and said the CIA drew in "tens of other anti-Soviet organizations and services."

It said these countries have joined in a program to find Russian-speaking university students "skilled in

holding political debates" and recruit them for subversive duties during tourist trips to the Soviet Union.

The candidates selected were sent to two "anti-Olympic schools" in England, the newspaper said — one at a military base at Oldham, in Lancashire, another in Derbyshire.

Reiterating allegations about the use of young people as agents, the newspaper said "these are mainly students and postgraduate students from Harvard and Philadelphia universities."

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ON PAGE A-1

NEW YORK TIMES
13 JULY 1980

Moscow, Spruced Up and Wary, Braces for 'Olympic Saboteurs'

By ANTHONY AUSTIN

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, July 12 — Moscow is preparing for the Olympics as though it is unsure whether to dress up for a party or brace for an attack.

Miles of peeling buildings have been painted yellow and pink and miles of cracked roads have been repaved. Bare patches have blossomed into flower beds and stark streets have been lined with trees. Early in the morning, and again in the evening, convoys of troops rumble through the city, "storm workers" rushing to the few Olympic sites that remain to be finished before the Games open next Saturday.

Thousands of university students are behind the counters of the Olympic Village and the Olympic press centers, ready to answer questions from athletes or correspondents in English, French, German, Spanish, Arabic or Japanese. Thousands more have been mobilized to act as guides and translators for tourists.

Parks are ready to give band concerts, theaters to regale visitors with variety shows and plays, orchestras to fill the nights with classical music, pop groups to punctuate them with Soviet rock. From all over the country local troupes have been brought in for weeks of unremitting culture. "No other city hosting the Olympic Games has ever been in such a state of readiness as Moscow," exulted Tass, the official press agency.

Not all the readiness is festive; some of it is grim.

An emptiness, a hush, has fallen over the principal streets, the cumulative effect of weeks of an unavowed but obvious police campaign to thin out traffic during the Olympics by confiscating license plates for the slightest infraction. The police have also begun barring drivers with non-Moscow registration papers from entering the capital without special passes.

Pairs of policemen posted each hundred yards along streets stop drivers at every chance. Security men race about in cars, issuing loud, harsh orders through bullhorns. They also crowd the tree-lined sidewalks where people like to rest on park benches. They gather before the Rossiya and Kosmos Hotels, where 3,000 foreign journalists will be staying, giving the entrances an off-limits look and scaring off the Muscovites who usually hang about in front of tourist hotels.

Many of the policemen have been brought in from other cities, some from as far away as Central Asia. At the same time, Russians tell their foreign friends, many Moscow policemen have been put in plain clothes. If past experience is any guide, they can be expected to mingle with Olympic crowds and step forward as

"ordinary Soviet citizens" to administer a "fitting rebuff" to any unseemly "provocations" by Western visitors.

Some cities, among them Gorky, have stopped issuing train tickets to Moscow until Aug. 5 except for Moscow residents or people with a special need to go to the capital. Other cities have announced wholesale cancellations of train service to Moscow from July 18 to Aug. 8.

'Don't Want Any Incidents'

The precautions leave visitors to Moscow with the feeling that they are in one of the most heavily policed cities in the world, a city on the brink of something unnamed but vaguely dangerous. Soviet officials, asked why such extraordinary security precautions are considered necessary, say they "do not want any incidents."

A notice in the main Moscow post office says all packages addressed to Moscow as well as to Leningrad, Tallinn, Kiev and Minsk — the other Olympic sites — must be submitted open. The statute cited deals with the illegal use of explosives.

In view of the Munich Olympics, where 11 Israeli athletes were killed by Arab gunmen in 1972, it is hard to question the need for tight security. There is also ample evidence that the preventive measures in Moscow have been taken with more than terrorism in mind.

Almost all dissidents have been cleared out — arrested or banished or persuaded to go on vacation — during the cleanup that began months ago. Schoolchildren are away in summer camps — "as usual," say the authorities, although parents report a good deal more than the usual pressure to get the youngsters out of town.

300,000 Soviet Tourists

The 300,000 Soviet tourists expected in Moscow for the Olympics will be shepherded around in closely controlled groups. But there are still the people of Moscow to worry about.

Security officials are visiting all major places of work and study to lecture on the need for vigilance against foreign subversion. They tell their audiences what nasty political questions may be flung at them by "Olympic saboteurs" and how to put the troublemakers in their place. They instruct them on what else to expect — strips of cloth that sprout slogans when unrolled and held aloft, chewing gum for children spiced with poison or venereal disease, and other dirty tricks.

It is surprising to hear the accounts of the lectures that have been passed on by some of the people who have had to attend them. "My God!" exclaimed a Western diplomat, "I think the authorities are really afraid." When Moskovskaya Pravda, the newspaper of the Moscow Province Communist Party, said in April that the Central Intelligence Agency

planned to undermine the Olympics with teams of subversive agents trained by Zbigniew Brzezinski, the White House national security adviser, the story seemed too fanciful to be believed by the very authorities who planted it.

An hour-long television documentary preached the same message to millions of Soviet viewers last Sunday. Entitled "Lies and Hatred," the program showed how the clever minions of the C.I.A. conceal anti-Soviet books and pamphlets, including instructions for manufacturing explosives, in secret compartments of cars and specially tailored clothing. All this, said the commentator to ominous background music, is part of a plot to employ Zionist and fascist groups, including Russian émigré organizations, to conduct espionage and wage psychological warfare in Moscow during the Games.

Air of Border Checkpoint

The newly completed main Olympic press center in downtown Moscow — its six stories framing a plaza with a fountain — was designed as a pleasant, modern expanse. But the wire fence, the iron gates, the police huts and booths give its gray concrete the air of a border checkpoint. Western journalists checked through the electronic metal detectors and X-ray machines — the first time such security procedures have been imposed at an Olympic press center — must submit books and other written matter for inspection. The same checks are in force at the airport and in the hotels housing journalists.

At the Olympic Village on the city's outskirts, the security is even tighter. Tall wire mesh stretches along a new highway. A young soldier patrolling the fence, a Kalashnikov rifle slung across his back, orders a pair of hapless pedestrians to the other side of the road.

There is one gate for journalists with special Olympic accreditation cards. In the newly built Cultural Center the cards are exchanged for special passes and the journalists are allowed, one by one, to go through a door into a room with the security devices. A reporter with a small Japanese camera has to put that, too, through the X-ray machine. On the other side, he has to show how the camera works — pull back the lever and press the shutter button — as though the police want to make sure it does not fire bullets or poisoned darts.

CONTINUED

Past the security lines, hospitality reigns. An alert young man with passable English escorts the visitors around the complex — a fancy restaurant and a well-stocked bar, two movie theaters with 230 seats each, a well-equipped concert hall seating 1,200 where some of the best Soviet stage talent will be seen, an intimate discotheque and a spacious dance hall, consecrated chapels for Christians, Moslems and Jews, a practice track, a soccer field, an indoor swimming pool and three huge gyms for training purposes, all kinds of convenient arrangements for journalists to interview athletes and call their home offices long-distance, saunas with samovars, four sprawling cafeterias with gleaming modern kitchens and what must be the widest choice of meat, fish, fowl, vegetables, fruit and dairy products in any public eating place in Moscow.

An American veteran of the Moscow press corps mutters that this is much grander than the last Olympic Village he saw, when he covered the Rome Olympics in 1960. A young Russian overhears him. "You say this is better — yes?" he asks. "You think it's good? You like it here?" And his face lights up with pleasure.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 7U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
21 July 1980**Currents in the News****Moscow Olympics:
Not All Games**

MOSCOW

With the Olympic Games opening here on July 19, Moscow appears to be mobilizing as much for political conflict as for athletic competition.


Thousands of men in uniform are on watch almost everywhere. Highway junctions are guarded by groups of soldiers. In each block on main streets, sentries scan passing cars and pedestrians. Military trucks rumble by, ferrying soldiers to and from lookout duty at Olympic installations.

The Olympic Village is surrounded by wire and looks more heavily guarded than the Kremlin or Lubyanka Prison. Riflemen are posted every 100 yards. Electronic "seeing eyes" watch each gate, while plainclothes police with radios keep tabs on visitors inside.

Hotels and other buildings that foreigners are likely to visit are heavily guarded, too. Most are equipped with U.S.-made electronic scanners to detect concealed weapons. Entry to larger hotels requires an Olympic pass.

Since July 10, all highway routes into Moscow have been manned by militia, sealing off the city from the rest of the country. It is barred even to Soviet citizens, unless they can prove that they live or work in Moscow.

This vast police operation has these goals: To prevent terrorism such as that at Munich in 1972, guard against



Electronic sensing devices surround Soviet soldier at Olympic Village.

"subversive" literature or activities and hinder unauthorized meetings between Soviets and foreigners.

Barring nonresidents from Moscow has another aim: To prevent an embarrassing rush of outsiders from buying the food and goods being put in stores during the Olympics to impress foreigners.

To justify the tight security, Soviet officials tell the people that foreigners are plotting to use the Olympics as an opportunity to undermine socialism and damage Russia's international prestige.

Radio broadcasts say the foreigners want to spread "subversive booklets paid for from the funds of the U.S. Secret Service." A television program showed "foreigners" being caught with anti-Soviet pamphlets strapped to their waists. Rumors are being spread that "Zionists and the CIA" are planning ideological "contamination."

The precautions mean foreigners will get few chances for contacts with the Russian people. Known dissidents have been removed from Moscow. Many chil-

dren have been sent to the country. Adults will be more careful than usual in talking with visitors.

Soviet officials pretend not to be worried about the American-led boycott that is keeping 64 nations out of the Olympics as a protest against Russia's invasion of Afghanistan. Officials claim that the 79 competing nations will have a record number of 1,500 entrants in track and field.

Soviet television is expected to blot out scenes that would reveal that some nations are not allowing their flags to be flown or their anthems played. Nor will many Russians learn that most Western embassies have barred their staffs from attending the games.

But the Kremlin cannot hide the absence of such Olympic leaders as the U.S., West Germany and Japan.

Because of the boycott, NBC has canceled plans to televise 152½ hours of the Olympics. All that viewers will see on the U.S. networks will be a few minutes of highlights a day as part of regular sports and news programs. □

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SATELLITES IN THE NEWS

Approved For Release 2009/06/12 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000501400001-4

July 1980

US Needs More Rockets to Launch Vital National Security Satellites

by Benjamin F. Schemmer

AT THE VERY TIME when the Pentagon is becoming more dependent on satellites, it has been phasing out production of the rockets that used to launch them while waiting for the Space Shuttle to put even bigger ones in orbit.

Today, production lines of the giant Titan III booster (which launches the US' large spy satellites) and the Atlas-Centaur rocket (which launches many of the US' military and civil communications satellites) are close to shutting down. But the Space Shuttle's increasingly delayed initial operational capability and uncertainties over how big a payload it will really be able to carry, have planners in the Pentagon and Central Intelligence Agency worried that the US could soon end up short of the expendable launch vehicles it will need.

At the time the Fiscal Year 1981 budget was being prepared, for instance, the Space Shuttle's first operational launch was to take place late in December of 1981; now, just six months later, NASA says it will become operational in September of 1982. Fortunately, the US Air Force—which serves as "executive agent for all space operations related to national security"—has budgeted against some of the uncertainties inherent in transitioning to the Space Shuttle. Some of them, not all. But it is now looking at funding more.

Titan III Squeeze

The Air Force, for instance, will have to orbit between now and mid-1985 what Air Force Secretary Dr. Hans Mark calls "12 vital national security launches," a euphemism for large spy satellites like CIA's huge KH-11 "Keyhole." For those 12 launches, it had funded a total of 17 Titan III boosters, five of them as back-up in case the launch vehicles fail or the satellites malfunction once in orbit and have to be replaced. It has since asked Congress to fund two more of the specially-configured Titans, known as Titan 34Ds, providing a back-up of seven boosters.

USAF structured its budget request so the Titan III line could be kept open, but so that costs would be minimized if it turns out they will not be needed to compensate for further Space Shuttle delays or for Shuttle payload limitations.

One reason for the Air Force's frugality is that if they have to be carried to completion, the Titan IIIs would cost almost \$100-million per rocket. Even Mark agrees that "would probably make them the most expensive rockets in history." The reason for the high cost, of course, is that the rockets are now at the end of a production line and the Air Force is paying a very high cost for a low production rate.

What makes the high cost "affordable" is that there is no other launch vehicle to put those huge satellites in orbit until the Space Shuttle arrives.

What worries Pentagon and CIA planners even more is that they've made the satellites bigger than even the Titan 34D can handle (counting on the Space Shuttle to carry a bigger payload, both in

size and weight)—and it now looks as if "the Shuttle may not perform up to its completely full payload capability," according to Secretary Mark. "In other words," he recently told a Congressional closed hearing, "even though the Shuttle exists, we may not be able to use it to launch all of these spacecraft."

Atlas-Centaur Squeeze

US intelligence officials thank God that Air Force space launch planners have been figuring a hedge against *that* possibility as well. Ironically, to make good on their bet, they may have to go back into production with another booster that is also being phased out waiting for the Shuttle. By strapping the Atlas-Centaur's high performance upper stage onto the Titan III, they can get the bigger satellites up where the Space Shuttle was supposed to carry them. At the moment, however, there are only eight Atlas-Centaur flights scheduled, with the last one at the end of 1981. As a result, the Atlas-Centaur line will very soon be shut down. The only other free-world launch vehicle available to orbit the commercial satellites it has been putting up, should the Space Shuttle be further delayed, would be France's Ariane rocket. It has already been "retained" to launch three Intelsats and one Westar satellite in 1982. But it is a new and still unproven vehicle, having had only two launches; the last one recently ended in the ocean, not space. By comparison, the last 33 consecutive Atlas-Centaur shots have been complete successes.

While the Air Force and the spies and communicators it supports are wrestling with budget constraints and Shuttle uncertainties over whether or not, and how, to keep the Atlas-Centaur production line open, the civilian world may buy them some breathing time. Intelsat has been considering buying more Atlas-Centaurs for commercial satellite launches, and a decision is imminent as this issue comes off the press. That could keep the Atlas-Centaur line open just long enough so the Air Force would not have to pay for the high costs of re-starting a production line that otherwise would be

closed down at the time it is needed most.


More Dependent on Satellites the US Can't Get Into Orbit?

The first big military satellite which the Space Shuttle is supposed to launch would go up in mid-1983, too close to the Shuttle's presently scheduled September 1982 initial operational capability date to allow much margin for slippage or performance uncertainties.

All of this is happening at a time when the US "must anticipate and plan for more extensive operations in space," as Air Force Secretary Mark recently wrote Defense Secretary Harold Brown in a classified memo outlining his Service's dilemma in formulating its Fiscal Year 1982 budget. One reason, Mark noted, is that "areas to which the United States has routine access have been declining in recent years. Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan and Iran," he said, "are examples of regions where a few years ago we had complete access, and which today are no longer accessible by normal means. Thus," Mark emphasized, "surveillance of and communications with these regions will become more dependent on space operations than they have been in the past. We see this," he said, "as a continuing trend."

Thus, delays in the Space Shuttle may soon make the US' present booster inventory precariously inadequate—at the very time this nation is increasingly dependent on satellites for surveillance, warning, communications, and meteorological and navigational support. And it's happening at a time when the intelligence and defense communities may have designed more into their satellites than the Shuttle will be able to realistically handle.

Satellite designers have "historically been constrained by the size and weight limitations of expendable boosters," and thus their reliance on redundant systems to improve reliability and on hardening to hedge against Soviet anti-satellite capabilities (now operational against some US systems) has been restricted, as Air Force Lt. Gen. Kelly H. Burke, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Acquisition and Development recently explained USAF's high hopes for the Space Shuttle. If, they thought, would free them to increase satellite capabilities and survivability, and to add more attitude control propellant so they could stay in orbit longer. What the Shuttle may have done is encourage them to build satellites the US won't be able to orbit unless the US "booster gap" is bridged soon. ■☆☆

UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS
June 1980

When President Jimmy Carter quietly, but officially, opened the closet door on one of the nation's most covered intelligence collection systems in a Cape Canaveral speech on 1 October 1978, he publicly marked the beginning of the end of an era. His announcement was part of the preparation for the expected battle with the Senate over approval of the SALT II agreement. It was anticipated that the battle might eventually include the release of photographic satellite reconnaissance materials to establish both the verifiability of the provisions of the SALT II treaty and the reasonableness of some of the treaty's provisions. If this had occurred, the president may have had in mind a restricted use of these materials by the U. S. Senate. However, the House of Representatives probably would have insisted upon equal treatment, and once the process was started, the president may have been forced to go (or would have seen considerable advantage in going) to the general public with his supportive evidence:

The Iranian crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan froze the SALT approval process in the United States. The currently negotiated SALT II treaty is now more than likely a dead document. Whatever the timetable and in whatever manifestation arms control negotiations might resume, any administration of the future should anticipate a most difficult problem in gaining congressional approval of a SALT-type treaty. The pendulum swing away from accommodation toward confrontation strongly suggests that this will be the case. Another possibility is that any SALT approach is dead for many years to come, so that no administration will find it prudent to pursue this path. Instead, increasing tension and serious preparations for the use of force may cause the current or next administration to present, to the American public and the world, hard intelligence evidence that justifies the action being taken.

Whatever the basis, attempted accommodation or anticipated confrontation, if it happens, the taxpayer will have the opportunity to see examples of what has been one of the most valuable sources of strategic,

scientific, and technical intelligence for 19 years: U. S. satellite intelligence collection systems. The degree of success in controlling specific knowledge about these systems has been high. The conviction of a former CIA employee, William P. Kampiles, of espionage in November 1978, when the court found him guilty of selling a top secret manual of one of the country's operational photo satellite systems, represents an important exception to this success. According to news accounts which cited unnamed "U. S. officials," the Soviets first learned that the KH-11 spy satellite was photographing their territory

when they purchased a stolen copy of the satellite's manual. On 23 November 1978, *The Washington Post* reported, "The KH11 'was misclassified' by the Soviets as a nonphotographic satellite, . . . so they did not bother to try to hide sensitive weapons or operations from it when it passed overhead." News reports about the spy trial and the KH-11 revealed that KH was an abbreviation of the CIA code name. If correct, the selection of "Keyhole" to name a system that secretly and silently peeked down from space is apt. The code word was probably too suggestive to be openly used, so it was abbreviated. There is no way for anyone outside of the U. S. and Soviet intelligence communities to judge the claim that the Soviets did not recognize the KH-11 for what it actually was. The Soviets, however, with their large land-based optical and electronic systems, will probably be able to determine whether the manual they purchased for \$3,000 is authentic or a U. S. plant in an attempt at misinformation.

A more important point is that the court effectively ruled to keep the American public from knowing what the Soviets know. Reporters covering the trial petitioned U. S. District Court Judge Phil M. McNaghy to release all evidence submitted to the jury. A copy of the manual with certain parts censored was admitted into evidence, but Judge McNaghy refused to release it to the media. Apparently the United States may have decided that it is unavoidable or even worthwhile for the Soviets to know

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about our capability in this field, but that such knowledge is not to be shared with our other enemies and the American public. This does not reflect a desire to keep the American public in the dark. There is no practical way of sharing with Americans and not with the rest of the world.

The problem for the government during the trial of Kampiles was to be able to make its case well enough to get a conviction without being placed in a position of revealing intelligence information beyond that alleged in the charges against the accused. Press interest was high, and reporters pressed for details and explanation of testimony. Compromise of the system's technical photographic capability may not have been the government's most serious concern. It would be highly upsetting if the compromised document enabled the Soviets to enter the satellite's command and control links in order to insert false data, cause the satellite to dump data upon command, or to cause system malfunctions.

As for the material which did reach the press, it may have been slightly confusing for the general reader. On 23 August 1978, the headline in *The Washington Post* was "CIA 'Big Bird' Satellite Manual

Was Allegedly Sold to Soviets." The accompanying article described Big Bird as no more than five years old and reported that a dozen such satellites had been placed in orbit. Its photo capability was described as being so precise that it could pick out the makes of automobiles and even read their license plates. The article presented additional details, "Intelligence sources said yesterday that KH-11 was the CIA code name for Keyhole-11, which is the Big Bird photographic reconnaissance satellite . . . 'The Russians know this satellite has been in orbit taking pictures for some time,' the source said, 'Getting their hands on the manual doesn't stop the satellite and doesn't stop the pictures.'"

Clues that the U. S. Government may have initiated a misinformation effort appeared in a 23 November 1978 *Washington Post* article. It alleged that the KH-11 had looked down on Russia for more than a year without the Soviets realizing that it was a photo satellite. Compare the following quotation with that which appeared in the 23 August news item:

"The Soviets have known for years that the United States has been sending a number of different spy satellites over their territory, with those known as Samos and Big Bird among the ones it identified as picture-taking ones. But for some reason, the KH-11 was not picked out from the clutter of U. S. satellites as a new eye in the sky." Are KH-11 and Big Bird one and the same? One report, apparently heavily dependent upon "official

sources," said that they are. A second report clearly indicates that they are different. The point is not earth shaking, but it is instructive about the willingness of U. S. officials to plant seeds of doubt or perhaps deliberately to mislead.

What new information entered the public domain about U. S. photo satellites as the result of the Kampiles trial? On the matter of system identification, Samos had been in the news officially in the early 1960s until it was "disinvented" by security fiat around December 1961. At that time, the Department of Defense stopped identifying the name and mission of certain satellites when they were launched. Since all others were identified, the reasonable assumption was that those about which there was no publicity or "no comment" were launches for satellites with a national security mission. Big Bird was prominently in the news in January 1978 at the time of the crash in Canada of the Soviet Cosmos 954 satellite. In its issue of 6 February 1978, *Time* magazine carried a report of Big Bird's capability and a color sketch of the satellite. Much earlier, speculation on the system was published in Philip Klass's *Secret Sentries in Space* (New York: Random House, 1971, pages 170-171), the most definitive book available on U. S. photo satellite systems. It cannot be discounted that the 1978 news accounts to some degree were based upon Klass's 1971 research. In the Klass book Big Bird is identified as the first of the fourth-generation photo satellites. Klass identified the fifth-generation satellite by the code number 1010, indicating that the U. S. Air Force was going to call for industry proposals for the 1010 satellite during early 1971. The significant new capability of 1010, according to Klass, would have been the integration of a "real-time" reconnaissance capability. This would allow controllers to observe the satellite's view as it overflies the globe. Such a capability

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would have required institutional and bureaucratic adjustments not only to manage the system, but to exploit it fully. The existence of a bureaucracy for that role was indicated in a 1976 report by the Senate Select Intelligence Committee: "... the National Reconnaissance Office, an Air Force intelligence agency only recently disclosed to exist, ... reportedly operates satellite intelligence programs for the entire intelligence community. . . ."

A summary view of the system needed to support and exploit photographic intelligence from satellite sources mandates that it is not one of those compartments for which only a handful of people are cleared. Discounting the thousands of personnel who would have knowledge and responsibility about parts of the overall system, there remains the potential for thousands of others who would be actively involved in one phase or another of video production, negative handling, and printing of the photographic and other sensor material. In the first category are personnel of supporting industries—the builders of rockets, missiles, cameras, film, tape, and electronics. Few of these people need see the final product except to observe coverage of a calibrated U. S. target to determine sensor performance. It would be in the second category of photo analysts, technicians, and intelligence estimators, where the largest number of cleared people would be found. Alternatively, the largest group of clearances could be held by the legion of civilian and military planners and operators, the decision-makers, and their supporting staffs at the national level. The number can thus reasonably be expected to be large, and the potential over the years for specific leaks to the media is great. Security has been good, though, and Congress and the media appear to be playing active roles in this regard. This does not mean that knowledge about the systems—particularly specific knowledge gained from the systems—has not appeared in the public domain.

U. S. Presidents have been the most notable "leakers." An argument can be made that the president cannot be liable for any security leaks or violations, since the whole classification system is his. One of the most publicized references to photo satellite material came from President Lyndon Johnson. Speaking off the record to about 100 educators in Nashville on 15 March 1967, Johnson said that be-

cause of satellite reconnaissance, "I know how many missiles the enemy has." He claimed that this system alone had justified spending ten times what the nation had already spent on space, \$35-\$40 billion up to that time (*The New York Times*, 17 March 1967). President Dwight Eisenhower had also gone public on this intelligence capability. He and Premier Nikita Khrushchev had a short discussion about satellite reconnaissance in Paris in May 1960. The ill-fated summit conference foundered over the issue of the downed U-2 aircraft over Russia. Before the conference broke up, there was one meeting. Eisenhower wrote afterward that he ordered a stop to further U-2 flights over the Soviet Union. Two reasons were cited. The first was the belief that the Soviets could shoot down the high-flying U-2. "The second was that considerable progress was now being made in photography of the earth from satellites." (*Waging Peace: 1956-1961*, [Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1965, page 552.]) The president told Khrushchev that he had plans to submit to the United Nations a proposal for the creation of a U.N. aerial surveillance capability. He committed the United States not only to accept such aerial

NASA



This satellite view of the Middle East shows the easily recognizable shapes of the Sinai Peninsula, Gulf of Suez, and Gulf of Aqaba. At the upper left is the Mediterranean, and at the lower right is the northern end of the Red Sea.

surveillance, but to contribute to the establishment and operation of such international surveillance. Following Eisenhower's statement, French President Charles de Gaulle observed to the select gathering that within recent days a Soviet satellite had passed over France, and that reconnaissance photography might have been taken of the whole of France. Eisenhower wrote that "Khrushchev broke in to say he was talking about airplanes, not about satellites. He said any nation in the world who wanted to photograph the Soviet areas by satellite was completely free to do so."

This may suggest that the Soviets have held a casual attitude on the subject of intelligence satellites streaking over Mother Russia. The opposite is the case. Until they obtained a similar reliable capability, they bitterly opposed the successful U. S. programs. The turning point came in September 1963. To a large degree, Soviet sensitivities probably explain the U. S. refusal to acknowledge our own programs from 1961 until the present time. However, technical advances concerning space sensors not exclusively related to the Department of Defense have seriously eroded the security curtain. The vast amount of imagery available since 1972 from the Landsat system (before 1975, this program was called Earth Resources Technology Satellites, ERTS) available for commercial exploitation has served for most to dull the edge of curiosity about the capabilities of other satellite systems. It also served as a benchmark from which reasonable assumptions about still classified systems have been made.

Everyone who has written on the subject of intelligence satellites has addressed the area of capability. For the photographic satellite the area of greatest interest has been the degree of ground resolution possible. A news report cited earlier in this article claimed that products from Big Bird were so precise as to enable the identification of particular makes of automobiles. In addition, it was alleged that license plates could be read. Are we being informed or misinformed? It would take many pages to discuss the automobile claim in terms of feet and inches of resolution. Remember that there are hundreds of different car models and many of them are very close in size. The license plate claim would be easier to discuss in terms of inches of resolution if we could get by the fact that automobile plates are conventionally displayed so as to provide a top edge view to satellite cameras. The Director of Central Intelligence, Stansfield Turner, was reported in the 6 February 1978 *Newsweek* to have told White House aides that our photos were so good as to enable the CIA to dis-

tinguish between Guernseys and Herefords on the range. Why the CIA would want to identify these bovine cousins is a small mystery, but what can we learn from the statement? Guernseys are fawn and white and slightly larger than Herefords. The Hereford is red and frequently has a white blaze mark extending from the white face to across the withers. From a satellite view the Hereford would be more rectangular in form than the more triangular shaped Guernsey. They are rarely herded together. Perhaps Turner's statement meant that our color photography was good enough to have color separation for a target the size of a cow. To speculate beyond reason, he may have identified one of our photo satellite calibration areas, the precisely fenced holding areas of farms engaged in artificial insemination operations. Here one would find almost all breeds of cattle grazing expectantly side by side. More than likely, Turner was adding one more story to those that say something but tell nothing.

There is a good deal more unsubstantiated but clear information on the subject of resolution. On 8 December 1963, *The Washington Post* published a long feature article on the Samos program. Author Howard Simons claimed that one released photograph, taken by a U-2 in 1956, demonstrated 4-inch resolution of painted stripes in a parking lot. He surmised that technological improvements up to 1963 might permit similar resolution from a satellite 150 miles overhead. James A. Fusca, writing in *Space/Aeronautics* in June 1964, was quite positive in his statements concerning Samos: "Photographs obtained have a ground resolution of 16-20 in. at altitudes between 100-120 miles, sufficiently good to detect the dark shadow of a telegraph pole, and equivalent to the photographs taken by U-2s at extreme altitudes." It is the estimate of the previously mentioned Philip Klass that Samos-2, which was launched on 31 January 1961, had a ground resolution of 20 feet from its orbit of 300 miles. He further stated that the "unidentified" satellite launched on 22 December 1961 (possibly Samos-5), with half the altitude of the earlier Samos-2, perhaps had resolution as good as 5-10 feet. It is Klass's informed technical opinion that the second generation of U. S. satellites, those which sent their imagery to earth by radio transmission, could discern objects as small as 7 feet in diameter. The United States probably orbited 25 of this generation satellite during 1964 and 1965. Resolution in itself is not an objective. It is an expression of some ability to communicate intelligence via graphic form. It would be misleading to expect that each subsequent generation of reconnaissance satellite provided better ground reso-

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lution. In fact, even though some improvements were probably technically possible with advancements in camera designs and optics, film and film processing, and computer-supported interpretations, other objectives may have competed with the costs of obtaining such improvements. While the third-generation reconnaissance satellites may have had a higher resolution camera system, it had other significant new attributes. According to Klass the satellites of 1966-1967 were equipped with an infrared scanner that enabled them to take reconnaissance pictures during night passes. The number of satellites launched from this generation equipment was fewer than previous generations. The suggestion is that they carried a larger film supply and had an improved data transmission capability to ground stations.

The fourth-generation reconnaissance satellite has had more of a public character than any of its predecessors. This was the Big Bird, first launched in 1971, capable of both radio transmission of imagery and ejectable film packs. To handle its all-weather and nighttime role, Big Bird reportedly is equipped with side-looking radar that, from an orbit of 100 miles, would provide ground resolution of a few feet. At least some of the Big Bird satellites essentially have a "real-time" reconnaissance capability. By direct and communication satellite relay from Big Bird, ground personnel can see through the zoom-type telephoto lens as if they were on board the satellite. Big Bird's orbiting time has been around 220 days. Much of its payload weight is propellant used to maneuver both in altitude and in orbit. This maneuverability capability enables it to respond to the need for coverage of rapidly developing crisis situation. The trade-off cost is total time in orbit.

Application of "real-time" reconnaissance has been reported in the book *Satellite Spies* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1976) by Sandra Hockman with Sybil Wong. The following is attributed to a "highly classified person":

"We used satellite television to monitor the Yom Kippur war in October and November 1973. We were there day and night. We watched everything that was happening, especially over the Syrian front, and we gave the Israelis all the information we could. It helped them. . . . [W]e have given a few Israelis a general idea of what we have. The British and the West Germans know. The necessary personnel in NATO know. We are planning to build the system into the NATO command function. . . . [T]he Soviets learned about it in 1973. As soon as we started operations."

The difficulty with this statement is the suggestion

of continuous coverage. This could be accomplished by a synchronous satellite stationed over a geographical point, or by a stream of satellites maneuvered to make repeated passes over the same area. So far as is known, there is no photo reconnaissance synchronous satellite capability. The very high altitudes associated with synchronous orbit would appear to be beyond sensor capability to monitor battlefield action. The records do not show sudden increases in classified launches during this crisis. Three explanations suggest themselves: the report is in error, at least as far as the continuity of coverage is concerned; an unidentified satellite with a unique capability was at work; or the unidentified source defined "continuous" as repeated orbits over the same ground area, i.e., a maneuverable Big Bird-type satellite.

The term "photographic satellite" should not be taken in a literal sense. The point to be made is an important one and one that is abundantly documented in open literature. All regions of the electromagnetic spectrum, from ultraviolet through far infrared, have been carefully investigated for intelligence potential. We associate photography with cameras, negatives, prints, and slides. Radiometers are the instruments used to sense and capture data in the nonvisible (to the human eye) electromagnetic spectrum. What may be confusing is that, in fact, a visible presentation can be made of data received in what is labeled the nonvisible spectrum. For example, an infrared thermal image certainly communicates intelligence. The whole of Italy with scattered cloud coverage might be presented. The brain and eye are not confused by the presentation, and much can be interpreted, but not nearly as much as would be possible by a computer using digital techniques. We have gone through at least two generations of multispectral satellite sensor systems. Analysis and interpretation of these materials are principally by computers. Perhaps one measure of the potential of this intelligence is the commercial application already established. Commercial marketing of LandSat products is presently being done by a number of companies including General Electric, Bendix, Earth Satellite Corporation, and IBM, with others coming in the field.

Three years before the first LandSat satellite was orbited, the 22 June 1970 issue of *Aviation Week & Space Technology* presented a discussion of the hopeful future of such a venture. It was speculated that a functional earth resources observation satellite system would represent the greatest potential return on a dollar investment of any space project. Sixteen potential earth survey sensors were identified in a matrix

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
that associated each with objectives in the five categories of agriculture, geography, geology, hydrology, and oceanography. From the beginning of this project, the Department of Defense was a supporter and participant. It would not be surprising if a series of military intelligence collection efforts have been secretly associated with all of the publicly identified multispectral satellites and some that were classified launches. In conjunction with the best of our space and ground photographic capabilities, signature recognition criteria for all spaceborne sensors would have been well established long ago. The survey rate of various sensors differs greatly. If, for example, the signature for concrete was reasonably distinctive and detectable with a rapid rate sensor (a sensor capable of viewing large areas of the earth's surface at one pass), it could provide and maintain an index of man-made structures. New findings and enlargement of previous structures could then be targeted for photo reconnaissance and other types of coverage that would reveal adequate details for assessment.

The persuasive power of aerial and space photography must be rated high. The best public example concerned the use of U-2 photos to support the U. S. position during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Concerned about any possible irresolution on the part of our NATO allies, President Kennedy dispatched senior diplomatic personnel with photo interpreters and copies of U-2 photography. The purpose was to give foreign heads of state a briefing on the evidence before the president went to the American public and the world with our facedown of the Soviets over the missiles in Cuba.

Dean Acheson delivered to Charles de Gaulle a letter from Kennedy and offered to show the photographs. "A great government such as yours does not act without evidence," responded the French President. After he told Acheson, "You may tell your President that France will support him," he asked to see the photographs.

Roger Hillsman, who during the Cuban Missile Crisis was the Director of the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, writes that the intelligence community objected to the release of U-2 photography on the grounds that its high-quality resolution would reveal too much about our intelligence capability. The president decided that the photography had to be used and authorized its release to the general public. A similar argument for release is currently in full bloom. It has been reported that a White House panel started working in March 1977 to review the policy that governs what could be released in order to achieve more civilian benefits from

our photo intelligence satellites (*The Washington Post*, 13 November 1978). The argument is in progress again with the U. S. intelligence community, perhaps joined by counterparts in allied nations who may share at least in part the bounty from these collection systems. There is serious concern that if the decision is reached to release materials from our less capable older systems, it will lead to inevitably successful demands for the release of materials from the current and best systems.



U. S. AIR FORCE

Shots like this one, taken in 1962, gave President Kennedy the proof he needed of Soviet missiles on Cuban launch sites. They were enough to convince Charles de Gaulle, too.

There are and have been other proposals for releasing satellite intelligence. In "The International Control of Disarmament" (*Scientific American*, October 1974), Alva Myrdal outlined a detailed proposal for the creation of a new U.N. agency that would be charged with the collection and dissemination of intelligence regarding the compliance of nations with disarmament agreements. Mrs. Myrdal assumed that such a U.N. agency would have to depend at first upon the satellite photography from "national sources." At the time of writing, this would have to have been either or both the United States and the Soviet Union. This idea was officially updated during the 1978 Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament. France presented at this session a proposal for the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency. The proposal acknowledged that consent would be required from any nation before it could be monitored for com-

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pliance of a disarmament agreement. A possible exception was suggested if the Security Council invoked Article 34 of the U.N. Charter which authorizes the Council to investigate disputes or situations that might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute. Three technical stages were identified. The first capability the new agency was to establish would be a processing center where materials provided by nations having operational satellite systems would be interpreted. During the second stage, the agency would establish data-receiving stations that would be directly linked to national observation satellites. In the final stage, the agency would have its own satellites.

The attitude of the United States on this proposal may be inferred from a speech given at the 1978 U.N. Disarmament Session by delegation member Paul Newman. Mr. Newman gave details of the U.S. aerial photographic surveillance provided to Egypt and Israel in the Sinai. He made a general invitation:

"The United States is prepared to consider requests for similar monitoring services in situations where they might be applicable. To the extent possible U. S. assistance would be provided under the auspices of the United Nations or of regional organizations but, in any event, only upon the joint request of the affected states." (*Department of State Bulletin Reprint*, August 1978)

If, for whatever reason, the United States and the U.S.S.R. are unwilling to share their observation satellites with the United Nations, France may offer to develop and launch a satellite series in support of its own proposal. President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing told the disarmament delegates that France would have a photo satellite capability within five years. D'estang was too modest about his country's existing capability in this field. The report of a well-informed discussion group on problems of international security in outer space concluded that France uses satellites for reconnaissance, geodetic studies, and other activities necessary to the development of its land- and sea-based missile nuclear deterrent force.

One public Soviet response to opening dialogue on the possible U.N. use of observation satellite material appeared in an article by Yuri Kolosov in the November 1978 *New Times*:

"... if these photos have a sufficiently high resolution they can be used to obtain information about the defense potential of a country and its resources. That is why such photographs should be made available to all only with the consent of the countries whose territory is probed. Soviet scientists hold that photographs with a linear resolution of 50 metres or better can be used to obtain in-

formation the distribution of which could be detrimental to the national interests of states. This criterion was proposed for dividing photos taken from satellites into two categories: photos that can be distributed freely and photos that can be distributed only with the consent of the state concerned. Such an approach is vigorously supported by the socialist and developing countries and is opposed by the imperialist countries led by the United States."

Apparently the Soviet view is that ground resolution of around 160 feet is too poor to be of much value; hence it can be tolerated as "legal" for distribution. The Soviets do leave the door open for photos with better resolution, provided the involved country gives consent for release.

Recently, the United States has gone public on the general legal standing of satellite photographic reconnaissance. Major General Walter D. Reed, Air Force Judge Advocate General, said in a speech on 31 October 1978 that the U. S. position is that under current outer space treaty provisions, the term "peaceful" means "non-aggressive" and that space reconnaissance from a satellite is a non-aggressive, passive function of a satellite. Two different points are at issue here. The Soviets are not saying that satellite reconnaissance with excellent ground resolution is illegal. They are saying that the use of reconnaissance materials is not without some legal sanction and control. Their suggestion that 50 meters is the break point is obviously arbitrary, but one that may stand if it allows the use of the bulk of the U. S. LandSat material already collected. On the other hand, the United States may insist that this figure be reduced to whatever the average linear resolution is expected to be for our next generation LandSat system. The new LandSat system should generate many millions of dollars for companies commercially exploiting its materials, and an unpredictable amount for companies and countries that then successfully exploit the resources identified by LandSat. The Soviets are sure to label this as technological imperialism and tout themselves as the guardian of the resources of underdeveloped nations that would be taken advantage of by U. S. industry with superior knowledge of the location and extent of raw material resources.

The U. S. military also has adjusted to the new reality following Carter's October 1978 confirmation of photo satellite operations. The fiscal year 1980 Military Posture statement from the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff includes this comment on the subject:

"The purposes of the US reconnaissance and surveillance program are: to provide strategic early warning; to monitor enemy forces; to assess

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weapon systems characteristics; to develop and maintain a data base for operations planning; to conduct ocean surveillance; to monitor compliance with strategic arms limitation agreements; and to support crisis monitoring and decisionmaking. The US collection effort employs ground-based, airborne, shipboard, and satellite systems. . . . Space technology has contributed importantly to the reconnaissance and surveillance program."

This document provides some additional specific information on satellite reconnaissance systems. In the glossary two acronyms are identified: EORSAT (ELINT Ocean Reconnaissance Satellite) and RORSAT (Radar Ocean Reconnaissance Satellite). A RORSAT system was identified in Navy testimony released by the Senate Armed Services Committee. The Clipper Bow project was described as a satellite equipped with an active radar that was being designed to provide a tactical all-weather capability of detecting surface vessels. The Navy's White Cloud project uses clusters of EORSATs. When Clipper Bow is fully operational, the EORSATs will allow correlation of sig-

nal emissions with radar targets obtained from that system's radar satellites (see *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 10 May 1976, page 21; 12 February 1977, page 9; 19 December 1977, page 18; 10 July 1978, page 22; 28 August 1978, page 50).


In yet another use of satellites, the Navy gained favorable publicity during operation Stopgap for its radar ocean surveillance. In July 1978, a news report credited the use of information provided by Navy ocean surveillance satellites in the tracking and seizure of 40 oceangoing ships attempting to smuggle more than a million pounds of marijuana into the United States. For four and a half months, the Navy Ocean Surveillance Information Center (NOSIC) relayed its intelligence to the Drug Enforcement Agency which then passed it on to the Coast Guard for enforcement action.

The point of the real and potential political impact of high-altitude and satellite photography has been made in the case of the U-2 incident and the Cuban Missile Crisis. The impact that such material has already had in the SALT negotiations, and will have if there are future efforts to get a SALT treaty approved, is yet to be revealed. There may be another historical example of high political use of such material. A potential for such use would have been during the 1972 Nixon visit to China. The following scenario is, as far as the author knows, a complete fabrication. There is only one very thin reed upon which to base any speculation concerning the possibility of its real occurrence. This will be identified later. The action opens on 2 June 1971 in the Oval Office of the White House during the planning phase of Henry Kissinger's 9-11 July secret visit to Peking.

President Nixon: "Henry, we know from our Warsaw talks that the Chinese are ready for more public discussions, higher visibility, heads of state meeting. But I want you to make it perfectly clear that in no way is the United States going to China with apologies or humility. We are the premier power in the world, and I want you to be careful to point that out . . . in a diplomatic way, of course."

Kissinger: "I understand, Mr. President. It is a bold and imaginative move you are planning."

Although not used for intelligence, the earth resources observation satellite, Landsat, offers potential for information gathering in the areas of agriculture, geography, geology, hydrology, and oceanography.



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Scene 2, 13 July 1971. The Oval Office after Kissinger's visit.

Kissinger: "Mr President, the trip went exceedingly well. As you note in my report, I found the Chinese leadership to be aging but very pragmatic. There was an absolute minimum of rhetoric in our private conversations. They are vitally concerned about their security problem with the Soviet Union. It is an area in which we can gain great leverage, but we must not overplay our hand. I have a suggestion that will demonstrate our understanding of their problem, our power to monitor worldwide military events, and to place them in our debt for covertly assisting them vis-à-vis the Russians."

Scene 3: The National Photographic Interpretation Center.

Technician 1: "Why the hell does anyone want so many high-resolution graphics of sites along the Sino-Soviet border?"

Technician 2: "At least this gets us off the French medium-range ballistic missile cave search. I'm beginning to feel like the mushroom king of Southeast Washington. Let me have the first stack, and I'll start annotation of Soviet troop deployment and equipment identification."

Act II, Scene 1, 22 February 1972: Anteroom off the Great Hall of the People's Palace in Peking.

President Nixon: "As Mr. Lord has indicated during the last 40 minutes, the Soviet troop dispositions and equipment were, on the days of photo coverage, in defensive positions. Obviously, we have the capability to observe changes in their position and thereby infer some degree of Soviet intentions. I hope that this briefing has been helpful and that you accept these photos as a token in the quest for peace and stability in the world—a goal I am sure both of our great countries share."

Scene 2: The lakeside state guest house, 18N, Northeast edge of Peking.

President Nixon: "What do you think, Henry, how did it go?"

Kissinger: "It was an excellent beginning; we have the initiative."

Act III, Scene 1, 28 November 1975: Oval Office.

Chief of Staff Cheney: "There are several items on your upcoming China visit. The Agency reports frantic Chinese activity in their second attempt to get a photo satellite in successful orbit. Henry has annotated the report with a comment that for once the Agency is probably correct."

President Ford: "Henry is convinced that the Chinese will try to balance the account from the Nixon visit."

Act IV, Scene 1, evening of 3 December 1975: Lakeside

guest house, Number 18N, Peking.

Chinese Briefing Officer: "... one final item, as the People's satellite reveals, the Imperialist Socialists continue to test the "cold-launch" technique of the SS-18 from Tyuratam. We estimate that these missiles will be placed in the SS-9 complexes south of Novosibirsk and in other areas known to both our countries."

Deputy Premier Teng Hsiao-Ping: "The threat of hegemony to the world has never lacked visibility. These photographs merely confirm the specific reality of it and established how capable we are of detecting any danger. It is lamentable that some nations believe they gain security by planting ICBMs in the ground and, while watering them with the sweat of the oppressed worker and the tears of the misguided proletariat, are ever fearful of their sudden sprouting. We see no stability in such acts and prepare for the inevitable bitter fruits from such a harvest."

Chinese Briefing Officer (aside): "If we could have launched four days sooner, we could have shown him 105,543 people watching Ohio State beat Michigan 21 to 14 at Ann Arbor."

The facts that could support Act IV are that the People's Republic of China launched a photo satellite on 26 November 1975 and recovered it on 2 December, during President Ford's visit.

As previously noted, the United States has on occasion used the fruits of its reconnaissance programs for political purposes. There is no public evidence that Nixon did so in China during his February 1972 visit. It is speculated that the temptation to do so was present. Whether or not it was acted upon is not publicly known. What the public does know is that a smiling Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping artfully ducked a question on the number of Chinese troops committed to the Sino-Vietnamese border war in February 1979, by noting that "as regards the estimate of the size of forces involved, your satellites offer accurate information, and that's about the size of it." (*The Washington Post*, 28 February 1979.)

Whether or not we have shared any hard photo intelligence with the Chinese about the Soviets should remain in genuine secrecy. The possibility of this must be of serious concern to the Soviet Union, and it seems to be in our best interest to avoid relieving their tension one way or another. In the meantime, the Chinese are working to achieve their own independent capability in this field. The Soviets have orbited an impressive number of intelligence-related satellites, and we know that they have enjoyed at least one striking espionage success in finding out about the capability of the KH-11. This failure notwithstanding, the prodigious efforts of the United

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States to protect this technical intelligence system appear to have been a long-run success.

There certainly will be a secret future for Soviet, Chinese, U. S., and other countries' military intelligence satellites. Whether or not some of the U. S. materials are released for domestic political purposes, the world appears to be on the threshold of a burgeoning use of space-derived sensor material. The United Nations may get into the business of verification of treaty provisions. Equally important, the United Nations may have a paramount role to play in managing LandSat-type materials for the general benefit of all member nations, but for the specific protection of Third and Fourth World nations. The United States will have to make a decision on the type of role it will play. We have many years' worth of collection of worldwide graphics in our military archives and improving capabilities for more of the same. Additionally, we lead the world in experience and capability with earth resource materials gleaned from our LandSat systems. Plans have been announced for advanced LandSat systems, and the exploitation of these materials has high commercial interest. If it has not already been done, the development of an integrated optics data processor capable of satellite on-board comparison of sensor output with stored reference data should provide capability in our reconnaissance satellites to dually accomplish military missions and those missions dedicated to support the United Nations as well as some commercial enterprises.


The incredible capability of these technical intelligence collection systems has been vital to our national security. This view is also probably shared by the Soviet Union from its own security perspective. More than 17 years ago, Deputy Defense Secretary Roswell Gilpatric addressed the ironic consequences of Soviet secrecy and American openness, "The Soviets are forced to work very hard to keep up with what they know we are doing to keep up with what we think they are doing." In 1962, that was a reasonable statement. In 1980, the Soviet Union should be well over the shock of being on the wrong side of the "missile gap." Both countries for some time have had the technical capability of knowing with reasonable accuracy what each other's strategic offensive strength actually is. We concede that the Soviets know what we are doing, and we claim that we know what they are doing. Such statements appear to be adequate explanations for expected dampening of the strategic arms race. Something has not worked out. Some of our national security managers who have been supported by satellite intelligence systems that

have provided evidence that the Soviets have not been satisfied merely to close the gap of strategic weapon systems, are now nervous that in order to obtain a SALT treaty, these vital intelligence systems to some degree may be compromised.

I think that there is another equally important consideration. If any U. S. President uses satellite photographic materials to make his case on the verifiability of a SALT treaty, or to justify potential military action, he will be taking unpredictable risks in public response. The same proof that SALT can be verified may also be interpreted by a suspicious public that SALT II is many years too late, and that we now should not be limiting our strategic options in the face of graphic Soviet capabilities. In the case of justification of potential military action, what would the American public response be when presented with a larger portion of truth of graphic danger to the country? One would like to think that Americans can take the truth and would thereby be galvanized in support of whatever sacrifice is necessary to meet the peril. If this occurs, it will be a dangerous moment for the world. The Soviets will be placed at a critical point of decision. If war is avoided, the eclipse of their power someday may be measured from such a moment. In the United States, one response can be safely predicted. In this case, "One picture will provoke more than ten thousand words." There will be many, many words. More importantly, there should be a quickly developing vision of many additional applications of a technical system now primarily serving the national security community. That may be considered by a few as an unacceptable loss of monopoly over precious technical resources. There is, of course, the potential of strong counterweight arguments. But these can reasonably be made only when the closer door of satellite photographic system capability is further ajar.



Commander Jones was commissioned in 1950 following flight training in the Aviation Midshipman program. He made two combat tours in VF-191 flying the F9F-2 Panther from the USS *Princeton* (CV-37). He received his A.B. degree at George Washington University in 1961 and also has an M.A. from the University of Maryland (1963), and a Ph.D. from American University (1975). A variety of intelligence assignments rounded out the latter part of his career. These included intelligence officer, Carrier Division 14; assistant naval attaché, New Delhi, India; Navy Scientific and Technical Intelligence Center; and J-2, U. S. European Command. Since retirement he has taught at the University of Wyoming and Casper College. Currently he is research director with R. F. Cross Associates, Ltd., in Alexandria, Virginia.



*On a clear day from a U-2 you can see Washington, D. C.
... In the center of the picture, diagonal streets converge on
the Capitol; on the left bank of the Potomac River is the
Pentagon, and near the right side of the photo is the circular
Robert F. Kennedy Stadium.*

Approved For Release 2009/06/12 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000501400001-4

MISCELLANEOUS

Approved For Release 2009/06/12 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000501400001-4

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ON PAGE 9.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
17 July 1980

Horn of Africa beset by drought and internal conflicts

Ethiopia enlists Soviet arms to crush stubborn Eritreans

By Edward Girardet

Special correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Khartoum, Sudan

The strategic Horn of Africa today is being buffeted by a number of conflicts that show little sign of ending.

Ethiopia, for example, is faced with no fewer than four major rebellious upheavals within its frontiers. And neighboring Somalia, Sudan, and Djibouti are wrestling with the problems of more than two million refugees who see little hope of repatriation.

Ethiopia's strong man, Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam, appears to have decided (reluctantly, according to some diplomats) to use Soviet-backed military repression as the only viable means of bringing Eritrean, Somali, Oromo, and Tigrean secessionist groups to heel.

Any political concessions toward demands for self-determination, the Ethiopians fear, would only contribute toward the complete disintegration of their ethnically diverse and impoverished nation.

Over the past six months, the Ethiopians reportedly have been building up their forces inside Eritrea and have concentrated on bringing in more sophisticated weapons in preparation for another major offensive against the insurgents.

Intelligence reports indicate that Soviet ships have unloaded supplies at Massawa, the Red Sea port that replaced Russia's previous naval base at Berbera in Somalia. In addition, transport planes have been bringing Soviet weapons and equipment to Asmara, in Eritrea.

Western diplomatic sources say that these deliveries include armored MI-24 helicopter gunships, which have been used effectively against guerrilla forces in mountainous regions in Afghanistan, helicopter transports, and more than 200 tanks and armored cars.

Furthermore, the Soviet Union has flown in 200 more advisers and technicians to assist the Ethiopians. An estimated 14,000 Cubans and several hundred Soviet advisers already on hand are helping the Addis Ababa regime in its fight against the insurgents throughout the country.

Most distressing are reports from both rebel and diplomatic sources that the Ethiopians have brought up supplies of lethal GA nerve gas to the Eritrean front. Rebel sources maintain that the chemical gas equipment has been spotted by informers in the Eritrean region.

An estimated 100,000 civilians are said to be living in the Eritrean battle zones where this gas might be used. If gas were, indeed, used, it could cause many deaths, as there is no known antidote.



Past offensives against the Eritreans have ended ignominiously for the Ethiopians despite their superior military hardware. Eritrean resistance forces claim to have inflicted serious casualties on the government forces.

In July 1979, for example, an estimated 80,000 Ethiopian troops backed by Cuban advisers mounted a major offensive on two fronts, but were forced to retreat.

Similarly, in December 1979 the Ethiopians launched another attack against the Eritreans at Nakfa, the rebel stronghold, which included several aerial and land bombardments. Soviet warships had to evacuate Ethiopian forces that had suffered heavy casualties while trying to capture the town.

Observers believe that the new equipment and contingent of Russian advisers indicates that, as in the Ogaden, the Ethiopians are preparing for a massive offensive. But the rebels appear just as determined to continue fighting.

As far as the Ogaden is concerned, the Ethiopians appear to be stepping up the fighting against guerrillas in the area. Over the past few weeks, they have launched five air attacks against refugee camps and towns in Somalia which they claim serve as bases for insurgents in the Ogaden.

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Sudan is another African country whose relations with Ethiopia are delicate. President Jaafar Nimeiry has sought to bring about a peaceful solution to the Eritrean problem, and his nation is providing refuge for 360,000 Eritreans.

In an attempt to reduce border tensions, the Sudanese have pulled back their refugee camps. They also are trying to encourage Ethiopian rebel groups, which are free to operate politically inside Sudan, to be more discreet. An Eritrean-operated radio station, which until recently broadcast out of Sudan, has been moved to a rebel-held area in Ethiopia.

Mr. Nimeiry, a former president of the OAU, held initial talks with Colonel Mengistu in February 1979, but these failed to produce any positive results. In late May, Colonel Mengistu made a secret visit to Sudan for talks. Later, both leaders claimed to have discussed economic and cultural cooperation, but made no reference to the Eritrean question.

In a recent informal interview, Sudanese Vice-President Abel Alier told this reporter that no progress has as yet been made toward a peaceful settlement.

"Our role is to persuade the Ethiopians that a solution must be found," he said. But while emphasizing Sudan's predicament with having to provide food, jobs, and shelter for all its refugees, he added: "There must be more international involvement. There is a limit to what we can do."

The Mogadishu government maintains, however, that since its defeat inside Ethiopia in March 1978, it has not helped the guerrillas militarily.

Nevertheless, with their wives and children cared for in refugee camps in Somalia, an estimated 30,000 to 40,000 guerrillas are waging a war of attrition in the Ogaden. Recent refugee reports claim that the fighting has become much heavier over the past two months. Western diplomats believe that the Ethiopian air attacks could herald the beginning of a massive cleanup offensive against the Ogaden insurgents.

The Somali government in Mogadishu, which admits to supporting the Ogaden insurgents morally, has found it difficult to drum up support for pressuring the Ethiopians into granting its ethnic Somalis "self-determination."

The Organization of African Unity (OAU), which has twice formed committees to look into the matter, regards it as a sacred principle that no African state should violate the territorial integrity of another. Hence the lack of African sympathy for the Somali cause.

But the OAU finds it less easy to justify Ethiopia's brutal handling of the Eritrean situation. Eritrea was forcibly integrated into Ethiopia in 1961, so Eritrea's revolt is not merely a matter of border transgression, as is the case with Somalia.

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ON PAGE A-2.WASHINGTON POST
16 July '980

Hispanic U.S. Attorney Refuses Polygraph Test

By Charles R. Babcock
Washington Post Staff Writer

A leading Hispanic appointee in the Carter administration, under investigation for allegedly having taken a bribe six years ago, held an extraordinary news conference yesterday and all but dared the president to fire him.

Herman Sillas Jr., the U.S. attorney for Sacramento and the administration's choice last fall to become head of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, told reporters at the National Press Club that he was refusing a White House ultimatum to take a lie detector test administered by a CIA expert to clear up the bribe controversy. The Washington Post reported in January that the Justice Department recommended Sillas be fired after he flunked two lie detector tests about a charge that he took a \$7,500 bribe from a California car dealer in 1974 just before he became the state's director of motor vehicles.

Several Hispanic groups rallied to Sillas' side and made it clear his dismissal could have political repercussions for President Carter in the important Hispanic voting bloc. The six-month delay in the White House decision on the firing recommendation led some Justice officials to think the administration was looking for a way to keep Sillas in his job to avoid offending the Hispanic community.

White House counsel Lloyd N. Cutler denied that, and at his press conference yesterday Sillas said the delay was to allow his attorney to conduct his own inquiry.

Several representatives of Hispanic groups were at the press conference,

and Vilma Martinez, head of the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, issued a statement saying that Sillas had demonstrated his innocence by fully disclosing the facts.

In his meeting with reporters, which he cleared neither with the White House nor Justice Department superiors, Sillas released a detailed chronology of events in his case, including meetings with Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti and Cutler, and copies of correspondence with Cutler.

Cutler said in a brief phone interview yesterday that he could not comment on the unusual public airing of the matter because he still had to make a recommendation to the president.

In his last letter to Sillas' attorney, dated July 3, Cutler said he wanted the prosecutor to submit to another lie detector test by a government examiner. If he didn't agree, "we will reach our decision in this matter in the light of Mr. Sillas' refusal to take such a further examination," he said.

A statement issued by the White House press office yesterday said Cutler's primary concerns in his review have been to "protect the integrity and public reputation of the office of the U.S. attorney while at the same time affording Mr. Sillas and his legal counsel of a fair opportunity to present his side of the matter."

In a June 12 letter to Sillas' attorney, Warren L. Ettlinger of Los Angeles, Cutler expressed consternation that Sillas had taken a lie detector test administered by his own hired expert without telling the government.

In the press conference yesterday, Sillas released papers saying he passed his own private test with "flying colors" and criticizing the proce-

dures used by the FBI polygraph expert who administered the two tests he failed.

He thus was criticizing the lie detector test that is an important investigative tool of the department for which he works.

The use of the polygraph is becoming an increasingly controversial issue because of its use against Justice employees in another internal investigation of leaks about the FBI's undercover Abscam investigation. Federal courts have refused to allow the introduction of the polygraph test results in criminal trials because of its unreliability.

Sillas said yesterday that he was going public with his version of the case now because of the leaks. He said he merely wanted some say on who administered a fourth test. "What he or she finds could well have an impact on the rest of my life," he said.

16 JULY 1980

JACK ANDERSON

Top-Secret Correction—When the CIA discovers that it made a mistake in its top-secret Weekly Review, it informs its readers—in Congress and the White House—the way newspapers traditionally do. It runs a correction.

Thus a report in June 1975, that spent reactor fuel rods were removed illegally from an Argentine nuclear reactor site, proved to be wrong. So in August 1975, the Weekly Review ran a correction headed "Argentina: No Safeguards Failure." The red-faced CIA editors explained: "The report was in error; subsequent information indicates that the fuel had not left the site." It had just been stored.

Like many embarrassed editors, the CIA buried its correction story deep inside the weekly report.

EXCERPTED

CIA as victim — a fictionalized view

The Spike, by Arnaud de Borchgrave and Robert Moss. New York: Crown Publishers. \$12.95.

By Burke Wilkinson

This flimsy, underwritten, only spasmodically suspenseful novel of suspense may well turn out to be an important book.

The reason is simple. No book so far, fiction or nonfiction, has driven home its central point nearly as well: the Soviets, by skillfully spreading disinformation, via agents both witting and unwitting, have eroded and are still eroding America's intelligence-gathering capacity.

Because the authors are in a position to know what they are talking about, their book cannot just be written off as a run-of-the-mill thriller. Arnaud de Borchgrave has been far-roving foreign correspondent for Newsweek for the last 16 years. Robert Moss edits Foreign Report, a publication put out by The Economist of London.

Their plot caroms from Paris (1967) to Vietnam the following year, to Moscow, New York, Hamburg, and Rome in the 1970s and to Washington "in the near future." The central figure is crusading reporter Robert Hockney.

When the Jane Fonda-like woman he loves is brainwashed and ultimately destroyed, Hockney makes a sharp turn to the right, for she is the victim of the enemy he has in effect been aiding by his journalistic assaults on the CIA. Instead of exposing intelligence agency practices, he now turns to tracking down Soviet methods of infiltration, incurring the wrath of liberal think tanks and the do-good press, which once extolled him.

When Hockney induces a highly placed Soviet agent to defect, and the agent's revelations point to the US vice-president and many

others in authority as being in collusion with the enemy, Hockney's newspaper editor spikes the story — hence the title.

The characters are one-dimensional, or pale facsimiles of public figures. The President is called Billy Connors. He has a "papier-mâché smile," and he comes from Flats. Miss Serbian Milorad Yankovich, head of the National Security Council, is simply the Polish Brzezinski writ small.

No matter. As the story hurtles along, we learn a good deal about three kinds of Soviet spies: (a) the principal agents who maintain an intimate relationship with the KGB; (b) the wholehearted sympathizer, who while not formally recruited is totally to be trusted and often serves as a talent spotter for potential agents, and (c) the unconscious source who acts under KGB control without knowing it and is sometimes the most valuable of all.

The heart of the Soviet methodology is made vivid and believable: "The key to a successful disinformation operation is to start with a kernel . . . of truth. Around that you weave your fabric of falsehood. If you want to discredit true information, for example, the best way to do it is to circulate reports that are superficially similar, but can easily be shown to be false."

The words are Nick Flower's, and Nick is a double for James Angleton, the former chief of CIA counterintelligence. Nick understands why it is more popular and more stylish to attack his own intelligence apparatus than the enemy's — and is fired for doing so.

It is this central point, hammered home under its thin veneer of fiction, that makes "The Spike" more than just a slack spy yarn.

Burke Wilkinson, biographer and novelist, is also editor of "Cry Spy," an anthology of memoirs of agents from many countries.

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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
16 July 1980

Slight industrial gain for Soviets seen by CIA

Washington

Industrial growth in the Soviet Union will increase slightly this year from the record low in 1979, but energy supplies and other problems will still plague the economy, the Central Intelligence Agency said Tuesday. A CIA report said industrial growth this year would be barely above last year's record low of 2.2 percent.

The energy outlook is especially grim because oil and coal production in 1980 will fall short of the Kremlin's targets, the agency said.

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LOS ANGELES TIMES
16 JULY 1980

Sillas Rejects Demand by White House That He Take Another Lie Detector Test

By ELLEN HUME
Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—U.S. Attorney Herman Sillas Tuesday rejected a White House demand that he submit to a lie detector test by the chief CIA polygraph operator, saying a test he paid for himself had cleared him of a bribery charge.

White House officials said Sillas, by defying the ultimatum presented after an internal Justice Department investigation, had paved the way for President Carter to fire him.

Sillas, 46, is one of the highest-ranking Hispanics in the Carter Administration, and the top Justice Department official in the Sacramento area. He said at a press conference here Tuesday that he was innocent of the 1974 bribery allegation leveled by a convict, Richard Workman.

The allegation is untrue and the alleged transaction never happened, Sillas said of Workman's charge that he gave Sillas \$7,500 in the hope Sillas would help him obtain an auto dealer's license. At the

time, Sillas was a candidate for California secretary of state, and later was director of the California Department of Motor Vehicles.

"I walked into this office with a clean reputation. . . I'm not walking out of here with any cloud over my head," Sillas said. He said he already had refused two requests to resign tendered by acting deputy Atty. Gen. Charles Ruff.

Sillas handed out documents to reporters that indicated four polygraph operators had discredited two lie detector tests that Sillas had failed. The tests had been conducted by the FBI's chief polygrapher, Paul Minor.

Sillas also presented a statement by Lynn Marcy, director of the American Polygraph Assn., indicating that Sillas passed the crucial questions in a third test that Marcy privately administered to Sillas.

In June, Sillas proposed that the Marcy test be accepted in lieu of a test ordered by the White House, which was to be conducted by the CIA's top polygrapher.

White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler rejected Sillas' proposal, noting in a letter to Sillas' attorney that Marcy's conclusions were disputed after being reviewed by Minor, the original FBI polygrapher.

Cutler also emphasized that the Marcy test had been arranged privately by Sillas, without prior notice to the Justice Department, "under circumstances which would have permitted you not to disclose the results to us if you had deemed them unfavorable."

Cutler warned that if Sillas refused to take the test, "we will proceed promptly to complete our review of the matter, taking due account of Mr. Sillas' refusal."

Previously, in internal investigations in the Department of Justice, a negative inference was not permitted to be drawn from an employee's unwillingness to submit to the polygraph.

But partly as the outgrowth of a current investigation into "Abscam" leaks within the Justice Department, Atty. Gen. Benjamin R. Civiletti has adopted a tentative policy of permitting an adverse infer-

ence to be drawn from an employee's refusal to take the test.

Sillas, who said he has used a polygraph test only once as a prosecutor, dismissed the lie detector in general as "at best one factor and at best irrelevant, to the extent that it is not admissible in court."

Sen. Alan Cranston (D-Calif.), who recommended Sillas to President Carter for the U.S. attorney's job in 1977, issued a statement Tuesday supporting Sillas.

"I have become aware of no hard evidence to contradict Herman's assertion that he is innocent of taking the alleged bribe. I do not believe that his purported failure to pass the two lie detector tests is alone evidence of guilt. In the absence of any concrete evidence of guilt, Herman Sillas should not, I believe, be removed or pressured to resign as U.S. attorney," Cranston said.

Vilma Martinez, president and general counsel of the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund, issued a statement in San Francisco saying that Sillas "demonstrated that he is innocent by fully disclosing the facts in the case."

When the Workman allegations were disclosed six months ago, some Carter Administration critics charged that Sillas was being allowed to stay in office because he was a well-known Hispanic activist with ties to the Democratic Party.

White House officials have said that the charges took him out of the running last year for the position of commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Sillas and MALDEF denied Tuesday that the charges—or the White House treatment of him so far—had anything to do with his Hispanic background. "No one, including the White House, is playing ethnic politics," Martinez said.

16 JULY 1980

BLAME POL POT FOR BAD REPUTATION

Cambodia Communists Avoid Name

By KEYES BEECH

Times Staff Writer

PHNOM PENH, Cambodia—The Cambodian Communist Party, while it exists, is in no hurry to reveal itself because Pol Pot, the deposed premier, gave communism a bad name.

Education Minister Chan Ven, 43, a former high school physics teacher, said as much in a recent interview. Asked when the party was going to declare itself instead of hiding behind a front organization called the National Union for National Salvation, he replied:

"We don't use the party name yet because we need to be discreet."

He accused Pol Pot, who is now waging a guerrilla war against Vietnamese occupation forces, of betraying the Communist revolution. The Cambodian party was founded in 1951. Pol Pot took it over in 1960.

During his five-year rule, Pol Pot and his Khmer Rouge liquidated out 2 million Cambodians and abolished cities, schools, money and religion in a sweeping campaign to remake Cambodia.

Chan Ven said it did not matter what name the party used because "the people don't know anything about any party."

A self-described "provisional" Communist who hopes to get full party membership soon, Chan Ven disclosed that Defense Minister Pen Sovan, 44, is secretary general of the party and as such is the real strongman of the Phnom Penh government.

President Outranked

This explains why Sovan has taken precedence over President Heng Samrin in meetings with leaders of other Communist countries. The party secretary outranks the president in many Communist countries.

According to a Western aid official, it is obvious that Pen Sovan is Cambodia's real leader. "He's always on the go," the official said, "and we've noticed that when he shows up at a project, people work twice as hard. By contrast, Heng Samrin seldom leaves Phnom Penh."

Like a majority of the present Cambodian leaders, Pen Sovan says he worked closely with Pol Pot until he defected to Hanoi in 1974, while Heng Samrin did not defect until 1978.

Sovan speaks fluent Vietnamese and is said to have a Vietnamese wife. He also smokes Vietnamese cigarettes instead of Thai or Western cigarettes, as do most top Communist officials here.

Diplomats say the Vietnamese are sorry they made Samrin president because, as one put it, "He simply hasn't got the IQ for the job."

A tiny man with a receding hairline, Samrin is ill at ease with visitors to the point of being tongue-tied, according to those who have met him.

Chan Ven gave Western reporters a glimpse of the future when he announced that "our aim is to create a 'socialist man.'"

The speed with which the new Communist rulers have set about creating a "socialist man" in Cambodia, even before the country can feed itself, has startled some foreign observers.

Chan Ven said that children and adults alike will be educated within a "revolutionary system" based on Marxism-Leninism. He indicated his own knowledge on Marxism-Leninism was on the sketchy side when he said he was not yet ready to be a full-fledged Communist.

If this is true of the education minister, it would presumably take even longer for the largely illiterate Cambodian peasants to grasp the essentials of Communist dogma.

Foreign Education

Promising students, Chan Ven said, will be sent to friendly Communist countries—the Soviet Union, Vietnam, Cuba and East European nations—for higher education.

Destruction of the school system by Pol Pot has made things difficult, Chan Ven said, but there are nearly 1 million children in school, even though they attend classes sitting on the grass under palm trees.

Since Pol Pot apparently killed most of the teachers—educated people were enemies of the revolution—Cambodia has a severe short-

age of teachers. Of more than 20,000 teachers now at work, Chan Ven said, only 5,500 were teachers before Pol Pot came to power in 1975.

They survived by hiding their identity from the Khmer Rouge, as did other teachers who managed to escape Cambodia and are now in the United States or France.

"Pol Pot killed all the English-language teachers because they worked for the CIA," Chan Ven said.

All teachers, old as well as new, must undergo "political education," Chan Ven said, but for only a month. He added that non-Communist government officials of earlier days "must go the socialist way" or be discarded.

"Before, liberty was something that existed only on paper," he said. "But now we have liberty and equality in reality. We are happy with the socialist system."

Chan Ven also said he was happy with the Vietnamese for "liberating" Cambodia from Pol Pot. "The Vietnamese are not colonialists," he said. "They are here to protect us from Pol Pot. They will always help us to fight the reactionaries."

Chan Ven said the Vietnamese will withdraw from Cambodia if and when China stops supporting Pol Pot and if the "imperialist United States stops threatening Cambodia."

Seoul Picks Successor To Gen. Chon as Head Of Intelligence Agency

Special to The New York Times

SEOUL, South Korea, July 14 — A leading army general was named today to be the new director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, replacing Chon Too Hwan, the military strongman, who will, however, remain as head of the Defense Security Command, a military intelligence unit.

General Chon's yielding of one of his two concurrent posts is not expected to diminish his power. He will continue to guide the Standing Committee of National Security Measures, a junta-like organization that overshadows the civilian Government headed by President Choi Kyu Hah.

The new chief of the intelligence agency, Gen. Yu Hak Song, is one of 15 generals from the army, navy and air force who guide the country's political life during what they say will be a transition to a new civilian regime in 1981.

New Chief to Quit Active Service

A statement by President Choi's office said that General Yu, now the commander of South Korea's Third Field

Army, would take up his new post Friday, following his retirement from active service. The 53-year-old general has been responsible for the defense of strategically important northern corridors leading to Seoul. He will be the agency's ninth director since it was established in 1962.

General Yu previously served briefly as deputy chief of the Defense Security Command, now headed by General Chon. He first won prominence in 1967 when he led the South Korean logistical forces in Vietnam.

In a sweeping purge of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, General Chon recently ousted more than 300 agents accused of having been corrupt, high-handed or incompetent. He has said that the agency should be concerned only with national security and no longer be involved in political activities.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 30WALL STREET JOURNAL
15 July 1980

Soviet Economy Grew 0.7% Last Year And '80 Outlook Is Dim, Too, CIA Says

By a WALL STREET JOURNAL Staff Reporter

WASHINGTON—Soviet economic growth last year was a slow 0.7% and it isn't likely to accelerate much in 1980, according to the Central Intelligence Agency.

In a new study, the agency reports that Soviet economic performance in 1979 was the worst since World War II. Soviet output was so low, the agency added, that Kremlin leaders omitted the usual comparisons with the previous year in releasing year-end economic data.

Bad crops, stagnant oil production and declining productivity are largely responsible for the sharp fall in economic growth to 0.7% last year from 3.5% in 1978, the agency says.

But despite the sharp decline in the rate of economic growth, Soviet military spend-

ing continued to increase. In the past few years, military spending has outpaced the growth of the economy. As a result, the agency estimates defense spending absorbed 12% to 14% of Soviet gross national product last year, compared to 5% of GNP devoted to defense in the U.S.

At the heart of the agency's analysis is the conclusion that Soviet leaders are increasingly shortchanging consumers to maintain high levels of defense spending in an essentially stagnant economy. Per capita meat production, a key indicator of consumer welfare, declined 1% last year. The Soviets imported a record 31 million tons of grain in 1979, which allowed them to avoid wholesale slaughter of livestock. But despite the cushion of last year's grain imports, food shortages are expected to grow in 1980 partly because of the embargo of U.S. grain shipments this year, the agency says.

In local election speeches earlier this year, various regional leaders admitted shortages of meat, milk and bread and disclosed consumer discontent. The agency says that Kremlin leaders are telling consumers the shortages are produced by greater Soviet aid to less developed countries, but it adds that consumers remain skeptical.

"While consumer frustrations don't pose a threat to the stability of the regime, there are substantial economic and social costs at stake," the agency says. Among those costs: reduced productivity, alcoholism and absenteeism.

The Soviets face equally serious energy problems, according to the CIA. Soviet oil production in 1979 averaged 11.7 million barrels a day, the same as during the fourth

quarter of 1978. Although the Soviets have embarked on a major investment program to increase oil output, agency analysts predict Soviet oil production will continue to decline. That's partly because Soviet crews are paid bonuses on the basis of drilling, rather than on oil recovered, the agency says. As a result, crews often continue to drill in areas they should abandon.

The good news on the Soviet energy front was a sharp increase in natural gas production. Production in 1979 totaled 14.4 trillion cubic feet, up 1.2 trillion cubic feet from a year earlier. While the Soviets are trying to switch to gas, the move is slow because half the Soviets' oil is consumed in internal combustion engines.

Also, increases in the price of oil and gold allowed Moscow to increase hard currency imports while maintaining a healthy surplus in its current international payments account. Moscow earned \$9 billion from exports of one million barrels of oil a day last year, up from \$5.7 billion a year earlier on sales of 1.2 million barrels of oil a

15 JULY 1980

Cuba pins blame on Morocco, CIA for attack on ships

LAS PALMAS, Canary Islands [AP]—Cuba's consul on this Spanish-owned island Monday blamed Morocco's air force for a "brutal and cruel" strafing attack on two Cuban ships off the west African coast, in which one ship captain was killed and three crewmen were seriously injured.

The Moroccan government had no immediate comment on the charge.

Havana radio also blamed "Yankee imperialism, the CIA, and the lackey governments at their service."

On Sunday, Cuba's official news agency, Prensa Latina, reported that two warplanes without identification marks strafed two Cuban ships 30 miles off the coast of the former Spanish Sahara. It said the attack occurred Saturday when the ships were delivering fuel to a fleet of Cuban tuna boats.

Cuban consul Jesus Fernandez Ponce said that according to accounts from the crewmen, a small plane flew over their ships, apparently to identify them, and the attack came immediately afterward from two Moroccan fighters without a warning.

ACCORDING TO THEIR accounts, he said, the strafing was so intense that "the two fighters must have run out of ammunition" before they flew away.

The consul said the bodies of the captain and the three injured crewmen arrived here early Monday aboard a Spanish navy destroyer that was rushed to the scene, 140 miles east of here. The Cuban vessels, the Moroboro and Gilberto Pico, were to arrive in Las Palmas later Monday.

The crewmen, Narciso Scull and Jesus



Tribune Map

Medina of the Moroboro and Jose Quintero of the Gilberto Pico, were in grave condition in a local hospital, Fernandez Ponce said.

He said the body of Manuel Ventura, captain of the Moroboro, would be flown to Havana for burial.

THE HAVANA RADIO broadcast said: "What is the purpose of this imperialism? To impede our ships from continuing to take from the sea the food necessary for our people? What is the purpose of the CIA? To create panic and scare our fishermen? All right. We declare that they won't succeed. We will continue fighting, we will continue working, and we will be each day more internationalistic and communist."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A8THE WASHINGTON POST
13 July 1980

Documents Give X-Ray of Extreme Right's Plotting

By Katharine Koch
Special to The Washington Post

Documents seized from leaders of El Salvador's most prominent right-wing group following an unsuccessful coup attempt last May describe a well-armed, well-funded organization, with international connections and a firm belief that the United States is seeking to install a leftist government there.

The papers were taken during the May arrest of retired major Robert D'Abuissou, a Salvadoran former intelligence officer, and other members of the Broad National Front he heads. The documents have been circulating in Salvadoran government and diplomatic circles. U.S. intelligence officials vouched for their authenticity.

They provide a detailed example of the methods, means and thinking of the right in El Salvador's escalating political violence, where both right and left are seeking to overthrow the U.S.-backed civilian-military junta that took control last October.

Among the papers was the 1980 diary of Cpt. Alvaro Rafael Saravia, one of the men detained with D'Abuissou following the coup attempt. It logs the daily expenditures, arms purchases and the alleged composition of death squads with ties in Guatemala, Costa Rica and the United States.

Expenses totaling thousands of dollars are meticulously noted for haircuts, gasoline, car repairs, meals and the rental of safehouses. There are payments of \$700 to bodyguards, \$250 to the police and several \$1,000 pay-

ments to at least two active officers in El Salvador's police.

One memo says to "contract 20 men at \$280." Another authorizes \$80,000 "for the Nicaraguan," believed by intelligence analysts to be a hired killer.

Shopping lists of arms are scattered throughout the diary. One calls for 10 shotguns with 500 cartridges, two .45-caliber pistols with 100 cartridges, four 9mm submachineguns with 400 cartridges, six vests, three radios, a camera, two cars and one .22-caliber rifle with sight and silencer.

Several references are made to an M10 silencer usually associated with the Miami underworld and such unusual items as a Starlight night-sight scope and .257-caliber ammunition.

According to Bob Barnes of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, most of the material was non-military, but some items were "a dream list—the best equipment in certain areas. There are enough weapons there to arm a small army to fight a small war," Barnes said.

According to the documents, D'Abuissou and businessman Alfredo Mena Lagos planned to take over the country last May 5, when they would—with the backing of previously allied military units—announce they had saved El Salvador from a left-wing coup only days earlier. A state of emergency would be declared and supposedly moderate members of the junta would be implicated and replaced.

D'Abuissou would then reveal that the defeated Marxist-Leninist coup was perpetrated by the Trilateral

Commission, U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador Robert White, ousted members of the junta, leftist terrorists and, before his death, Roman Catholic archbishop Oscar A. Romero.

Romero was assassinated in March by unknown assailants alleged by the investigating judge to have been hired by D'Abuissou.

The Trilateral Commission, a select body of political and business leaders of the West's major industrialized countries, is often accused of trying to overthrow the left and install the right in power in the Third World. Its members have included President Carter and his national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski.

The rightists allegedly planned to claim the commission's intention to "install a revolutionary junta... mixing Christian Democrats,

socialists, communists, multinationals and guerrillas... (making) Central America a Cuban paradise."

Before the May coup attempt, as before a similar try last February, U.S. officials—who back the current government and its intended reforms—reportedly made it known that the United States would offer no support.

There is little doubt that U.S. influence with the Salvadoran military is waning, with rightists there seeing the United States as a longtime friend turned traitor.

D'Abuissou and his colleagues were freed 72 hours after their arrest for the attempted coup when military commanders overrode a decision of the junta to hold them for investigation. Two weeks ago, he was deported to Guatemala from the United States after entry in defiance of a State Department revocation of his U.S. visa.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 2THE WASHINGTON POST MAGAZINE
13 July 1980

RUDY MAXA'S

Front Page


CIA SLAMS DOOR IN THE FACE OF A VISITING CANADIAN SCRIBE

An editorial writer for the Winnipeg Free Press had a hard time believing Canada was an American ally after the chilly reception he received from the CIA while visiting Washington last month.

Journalist David MacDonald, 41, was one of a handful of reporters from North American newspapers who attended a four-day Washington Journalism Center seminar on America in the 1980s. Part of the program included a short, unclassified briefing at CIA headquarters in Langley for everyone... except MacDonald. No foreign nationals invited, said the CIA, because someone might spot an undercover agent walking around the compound.

"I called and asked why a Canadian was being treated like an East German," MacDonald says. "I mentioned the fact that we were part of the Olympic and grain boycotts. I didn't mention the Tehran embassy thing. They told me it was just a security rule."

By William Coulter



MacDonald also happened to mention the affair to his mother-in-law, Sarah McClendon, the sassy Texas reporter who thinks nothing of lecturing presidents during national press conferences. A CIA director is hardly an awesome figure to McClendon, who picked up the telephone to give CIA chief Stansfield Turner a piece of her mind. Turner missed a McClendon tongue-lashing only because a security man answering Turner's phone hung up on her.

"It was stupid and asinine, and I'm very embarrassed about the whole thing," says McClendon, referring to the exclusion of her son-in-law. "Canada loves the United States, and we treat it like a dog half the time."

Footnote: A CIA spokeswoman says foreign nationals are not permitted inside the Langley headquarters because background checks are too difficult to do quickly. But in the case of David MacDonald, intelligence officers might be interested in his next night's activities. Along with McClendon, MacDonald attended a soiree for congressional figures at the White House. McClendon and MacDonald chatted with Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti and ran into Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter. The president insisted the foursome pose for a picture.

ARTICLE APPEARED
OK PAGE A-5NEW YORK TIMES
12 JULY 1980

The Spies of Yesteryear Offer A Lesson in How Not to Do It

By MICHAEL KNIGHT

Special to The New York Times

CAMBRIDGE, Mass., July 10 — Things are not quite as bad in the international intelligence community now as they were in the early days of World War I, when the President of France learned of a shift in the location of his army's general staff headquarters only after his chauffeur dated a nurse who worked there.

But despite vast technological and organizational improvements, the problems of assessing and implementing military intelligence today are essentially the same as those that faced the major powers on the eve of both World Wars, experts meeting here have concluded.

Military historians and officials of the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency reached that conclusion in an atmosphere evocative not only of stories pre-World War I intelligence organizations that refused to believe their own spies or share their information with their own governments but also of a new tolerance for the intelligence community.

The three-day conference was only one of hundreds that are held in this city each summer among the academics who regularly flow in and out of government.

Untroubled Acceptance

But the untroubled acceptance by the university and student communities here of this conference and its aim of aiding intelligence-gathering agencies by studying the lessons of the past marked a subtle turning point in the atmosphere. Half a decade ago such a conference as this could not have been held without at least a measure of protest, but today there was not even one leaflet or picket sign.

"Harvard has always been intimately involved in the diplomatic and military spheres, at least since President Woodrow Wilson's time and the League of Nations, and the period of the late 60's and early 70's was only an interruption of that," explained Dr. Ernest R. May, a professor of history at Harvard who organized the conference.

"There are questions important to historians that are also important to the intelligence community today,"

he continued. "Questions about the flow and interpretation of information and how it is assessed in light of the social, cultural and political issues of the day."

That view was shared by a C.I.A. national intelligence officer. "Obviously we are in the business of assessing intelligence and anything that can be learned from the past is of interest to us," he said. "And the pre-World War I period was a period of intense failure in terms of intelligence."

The failures were repeatedly sketched by the panelists, who said their research showed that the Russian imperial intelligence organization had a yearly budget in current terms of only \$600 and was occupied most of the time with checking reports on the loyalty of army officers.

Another panelist told of the French intelligence organization, which had only five officers at its headquarters and five in the field and regularly underspent its meager budget, while reserving funds for an annual Bastille Day dinner.

Suffered from Divisions

Both Russia and France, the panelists said, suffered from divisions between a right-wing military establishment deeply suspicious of a liberal or left-leaning government. They also had experienced civil war and revolutions that led to almost as many internal cloak-and-dagger operations as foreign intelligence operations.

The two main intelligence failures in that period cited were the refusal of the French General Staff to believe evidence gathered as early as 1903 that the German Army was planning to attack France through northern Belgium, as it eventually did, and the disclosure by the French in the weeks before the beginning of World War I in July 1914 that they possessed the key to the German secret code.

That disclosure resulted, according to Dr. Christopher Andrew, a professor at Corpus Christi College in Cambridge, England, from an illicit love affair and the murder of one participant over a bundle of love letters.

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ON PAGE A-4

WASHINGTON STAR
12 JULY 1980

The Nation

■ Court Upholds CIA Secrecy

A federal appeals court yesterday upheld the right of Congress and the president to require secrecy for spending on foreign intelligence.

Ruling in a case involving a request to disclose CIA legal bills, the appeals court said certain expenditures for covert operations are protected from disclosure by statutes.

"The framers of (the Constitution) intended Congress and the executive to have discretion to decide whether, when, and in what detail intelligence expenditures should be disclosed to the public," wrote Judge Malcolm Wilkey for the court.

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ON PAGE C1

THE WASHINGTON POST
12 July 1980

Spy Didn't Come In From Anywhere

By Ronald D. White
Washington Post Staff Writer

For three months, more than 100 FBI agents staked out five sites in the Virginia countryside 60 miles south of Washington in a futile attempt to catch a Soviet spy.

But the espionage agent, suspected of buying military secrets from someone at a remote Navy base along the Potomac River east of Fredericksburg, never showed up at any of the "dead drop" zones that were watched around the clock by teams of government agents.

Details of the FBI operation became public yesterday after workers at the isolated Naval Surface Weapons Center at Dahlgren, Va., told reporters for a Fredericksburg newspaper that

FBI agents had warned them to be on the lookout for someone who might be helping the spy. The workers were said to be alerted to watch for people with ties to Iron Curtain countries, workers asking for classified data they didn't need or colleagues who appeared to have suddenly come into a lot of money.

Personnel at the Dahlgren Center work on the development of submarine-based nuclear missiles, satellite surveillance systems, electronic warfare gear and other Navy weapons. Spokesmen there said yesterday.

"It's normal procedure to try to alert [employees] to be aware of who might be the source of information leaks," said FBI spokesman Ed Gooderham yesterday.

The massive FBI effort began last March after Rudolph Albert Herrman, a former colonel in the Soviet KGB secret police, told U.S. authorities that one of his final assignments involved locating drop sites near Dahlgren.

Herrman, who posed as a New York-based free-lance photographer for 11 years, has provided "voluminous" details on KGB operating procedures, the FBI said.

The Dahlgren episode proved less fruitful, the FBI spokesman said yesterday.

But while the agents have been unable to locate either a Soviet agent or a contact inside the base, the FBI said the exercise could be helpful in plugging any leaks at the installation.

REUTER

DEATH-GERMS (REPEATING)

BY ARTHUR SPIEGELMAN

NEW YORK, July 11, REUTER - An eyewitness account of a mysterious epidemic which swept the Soviet city of Sverdlovsk in April 1979 alleges that more than 1,000 people died because of gases released by an explosion in a germ warfare plant.

The 1,200-word document, which was smuggled out of the Soviet Union and made available here today, was the first purported eyewitness account of the incident to reach the West.

It completely contradicted Soviet claims that the deaths in the Ural Mountains city of 1.2 million people were due to an outbreak of anthrax, a disease carried by animals, and said that in fact no livestock in the area had become ill from the fatal sickness which swept the city.

The document was made available by Freedom House, a non-profit U.S. organization which monitors civil liberties around the world, and a spokeswoman said its authenticity was vouched for by exiled Russian dissident Alexander Ginzburg.

Freedom House declined to say how the account reached the West and only described the author as a man who was in Sverdlovsk at the time of the accident.

The author said that an explosion took place at Military Compound 19 on the southern edge of the city between April 4 and April 6, 1979, emitting into the atmosphere a strain of I-21 gas.

Soon afterward, about 10 officers at a nearby ceramics factory died, the author said. Deaths were also reported in the village of Kashino, 18 miles south of the city.

Deaths began mounting to the middle of May with victims lasting only between two and four hours after being admitted to hospitals. The author said body temperatures of the dying reached 107.6 degrees (F) and higher before they expired.

He said the death toll in the course of a month hit between 30 and 40 people a day and that a minimum of 1,000 people died in that month. He added that a "few hundred" died during the first days after the explosion.

REUTER

THE AUTHOR SAID THAT MORE WOULD HAVE DIED EXCEPT THE DIRECTION OF THE WIND CHANGED AND THE CITY WAS HIT WITH A COLD SPELL FROM THE NORTH WHICH CARRIED THE CONTAMINATED CLOUD AWAY FROM DENSELY POPULATED AREAS OF THE CITY.²

AT FIRST OFFICIALS BLAMED THE DISEASE ON AN OUTBREAK OF ANTHRAX IN THE KASHINO VILLAGE; BUT NOT A SINGLE ANIMAL DIED THERE ALTHOUGH PEOPLE DID.

THE RESIDENTS OF ONE REGION OF SVERDLOVSK WERE FORCED TO UNDERGO VACCINATIONS AND THESE PROVED TO BE INEFFECTIVE OR TO CAUSE DEATHS THEMSELVES; THE AUTHOR SAID.

A SPECIAL UNIT AT HOSPITAL NUMBER 40 WAS SET UP AND MILITARY DOCTORS WERE SENT IN TO REPLACE CIVILIANS. THE MILITARY PHYSICIANS WORE DIVING SUITS BUT THESE WERE LATER REMOVED BECAUSE IT WAS FOUND THAT CONTACT WITH THE SICK WAS NOT DANGEROUS.

THE AUTHOR SAID THAT SOME PREGNANT WOMEN WHO LIVED THROUGH THE EPIDEMIC GAVE BIRTH TO CHILDREN WHO AT THE AGE OF TWO TO THREE MONTHS CAME DOWN WITH STOMACH DISORDERS AND CANCER-LIKE SWELLINGS. "CANCER AT THE AGE OF TWO TO THREE MONTHS" THE AUTHOR SAID.

TOPSOIL IN THE AREA WAS REMOVED BY WORK CREWS AND KASHINO BECAME ONE OF THE FEW VILLAGES IN THAT PART OF THE SOVIET UNION TO HAVE ITS STREETS COVERED WITH ASPHALT; THE AUTHOR CLAIMED.²

THE AUTHOR SAID THAT THE DISEASE COULD NOT HAVE BEEN ANTHRAX AS COMMUNICATED BY CONTAMINATED MEAT BECAUSE THE LUNGS OF THE VICTIMS WERE NOT DISEASED AND ANIMALS WERE NOT AFFECTED.

HE ADDED OTHER REASONS WHY IT HAD TO HAVE BEEN COMMUNICATED BY THE GAS WERE THAT IT WAS LIMITED TO A GEOGRAPHICAL AREA; VACCINES WERE INEFFECTIVE AND THAT OFFICIALS LATER HAD THE TOPSOIL OF THE AREA REMOVED.

REPORTS OF AN ANTHRAX EPIDEMIC IN SVERDLOVSK PROMPTED THE UNITED STATES TO QUESTION THE SOVIET UNION'S ADHERENCE TO THE 1975 BAN ON BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. THE STATE DEPARTMENT SAID ON MARCH 18 THAT IT HAD ASKED MOSCOW FOR AN OFFICIAL EXPLANATION.

REUTER

ACCORDING TO OTHER REPORTS REACHING THE WEST, AN ACCIDENT IN A MILITARY PLANT NEAR THE CITY RELEASED LETHAL ANTHRAX GERMS INTO THE AIR. IT WAS THOUGHT THAT SEVERAL HUNDRED PERSONS DIED.

CLUES TO THE EXISTENCE OF THE EPIDEMIC CAME FROM SOVIET FIGURES AND FROM ARTICLES IN A SVERDLOVSK NEWSPAPER WARNING PEOPLE TO TAKE PRECAUTIONS AGAINST ANTHRAX.

THE SOVIET UNION ON MARCH 20 ADMITTED THERE HAD BEEN AN ANTHRAX EPIDEMIC IN SVERDLOVSK BUT SAID THE EPIDEMIC WAS CA
REUTER 1505 RS

LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH
7 July 1980

Intelligence War KGB SUBVERSION IN PAKISTAN

By ROBERT MOSS

RUMOURS are rife in the diplomatic community in Islamabad that the Soviet Ambassador, Sarvar Alimyanovich Azimov may soon be recalled to Moscow to pre-empt possible Pakistani reprisals for his constant meddling in local politics.

These rumours have gained currency from recent major staffing changes within the Soviet Embassy and the KGB Rezidentura, whose chief is V. I. Gurgenev, an Urdu speaker.

Mr Azimov, born in Dijas, Uzbekistan, in 1923, is a writer and linguist of some repute, fluent in Arabic, Farsi, Armenian, and Turkish as well as several European languages.

Key to policy

His most important previous posting was as Soviet Ambassador in Beirut in 1969-74, when he successfully worked to expand Soviet influence over the Palestine Liberation Organisation.

Azimov laid the ground for the visit by Yasser Arafat to Moscow in July, 1974, that marked a watershed in relations between the Soviet leadership and the PLO.

For the first time the PLO chief was received in Moscow not only as a guest of the "unofficial" Soviet Afro-Asian Committee, but as the guest of the Soviet Government and Communist party.

His treatment reflected the acceptance by the Politburo of an argument propounded by Azimov and others that remains a key to Soviet Middle East policy today: that Russia, disappointed in its dealings with many Arab states, should seek to convert the PLO into its most important surrogate in the region.

Western diplomats who monitored Azimov's activities in Beirut say that he worked in intimate liaison with the KGB station, and himself a senior KGB officer.

While he was in Lebanon he had to cope with the scandal that resulted from the arrest of two Soviet spies who had tried to steal a Mirage jet fighter.

Threatening tone

Since his transfer to Islamabad in 1974, Azimov has adopted an increasingly threatening tone towards the Pakistanis.

After the first Communist coup in Afghanistan in April 1978, he held a Press conference in Lahore in which he declared, "Pakistan is the friend of our enemies, and her enemies are our friends."

He demanded that Pakistan withdraw from all alliances with the West, and even attacked the Pakistani Government for allowing local publication of President Sadat's memoirs.

In July, 1978, the Soviet Embassy in Islamabad started putting out a stream of false stories about Pakistani training of Afghan guerrillas.

Simultaneously, undercover KGB and GRU operatives began to increase their contacts with Opposition and separatist leaders and with anti-Zia officers in the Armed Forces.

There are currently about 340 Soviet officials serving in Pakistan, no fewer than 203 are stationed in Karachi, many of them employed as engineers and translators on Russian-financed steel projects.

A high proportion of these "technicians" are believed to be reporting to the KGB and GRU.

Old PLO friends

Mr Azimov's old friends in the PLO have provided him with useful auxiliaries for espionage and subversive operations in Pakistan. In recent years the Pakistanis have admitted Palestinian recruits to military training establishments.

But one Palestinian trainee, Zaydan Awni Mahmoud (a member of Yasser Arafat's Fatah organisation), was quietly deported earlier this

year shortly before he completed his pilot's training course.

The reason was that local security men caught him in possession of classified Pakistani Army documents.

Further investigation revealed that Mahmoud had been in close contact with officials of the Soviet Embassy in Islamabad. Though the episode was hushed-up, it revealed an intriguing dimension of Moscow's involvement with the Palestinian movement: the recruitment of proxy-agents for the KGB.

Since the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the Russians have been applying pressure to induce the Government of General Zia ul-Haq to deny support to the Afghan resistance.

PRAVDA's Islamabad correspondent, Vladilen Bayknov (who just happened to be in Afghanistan during the KGB engineered coup in April, 1978), gave warning in a recent article that Pakistan is on a "dangerous course" and that there is growing local opposition to giving support to the Afghan rebels.

His account of his conversations with Karachi dockers gave some insight into the deepening Soviet involvement with anti-Zia groups.

Most ominous of all perhaps, is the recent upsurge in KGB covert activity in Baluchistan. Intelligence sources in Washington maintain there are currently more than 300 Soviet agent work-

ing with Baluchi separatist groups, most of them based in Afghanistan.

According to a very recent intelligence report four Soviet-trained Baluchi leaders recently returned from Moscow to Kabul to take charge of a new campaign, the initial focus of which may be the Iranian rather than the Pakistani segment of Baluchistan.

The leading figure in this Moscow-trained team is said to be Abdul Samad.

CONTINUED

Arafat 'agrees to demands'

A NEW power-struggle appears to be brewing up within the leadership of the P.L.O., following an important meeting between Yasser Arafat and the Soviet Ambassador in Beirut, Alexander Soldatov, on June 11.

West European intelligence sources say that, at this meeting, Arafat agreed to a series of Soviet proposals that would regulate the relations between Moscow and a future Palestinian state, including the flow of Soviet aid and advisers.

According to these sources, Soviet Middle East experts have been devoting intense study in recent months to the implications of an independent state in the West Bank, and to the question of how Moscow could exercise a controlling influence over it via the P.L.O.

Three key working papers are said to have been drawn up on the orders of the Politburo.

The basic document, drawn up by Galina Nikitina, who is in

charge of the Israeli Desk at the Institute for Oriental Studies in Moscow, analyses how a Palestinian state could be used to destabilise conservative Arab regimes and to provide the Russians with a new strategic outpost in the Middle East.

Military ties

A second working paper, prepared by a team of military experts headed by Maj-Gen Shevlok, director of the foreign section of the Army's Main Political Department, is said to map out the military ties that Moscow would seek to establish with a P.L.O.-controlled state.

The third document, compiled by specialists in the International Department of the Soviet Communist party's Central Committee, outlines the possible treaty relationships between Moscow and a Palestinian state.

The Russians are evidently concerned to ensure that the P.L.O. will continue to accept their guiding reins if Israel is eventually compelled to withdraw from the West Bank.

In return for promises of increased Soviet aid, Arafat is said to have agreed to the substance of the Soviet demands.

There are unconfirmed reports that these include the creation of a Soviet military presence in a future Palestinian state as soon as political conditions would permit.

Leading rival

But Arafat may have been drawn into a closer relationship with the Russians than other P.L.O. leaders are ready to endorse.

While he consulted his deputy, Abu Johad, and the P.L.O.'s intelligence chief, Abu al-Hul, during the latest meetings with Soldatov, he is said to have avoided discussing the Soviet proposals with Abu Iyad, who now figures as his leading rival within the organisation.

The personal rivalry between Arafat and Abu Iyad (real name: Salah Khalaf) was one of the main sources of friction at the Fatah congress in Damascus in May.

Arafat's suspicions that Abu Iyad is seeking to displace him were no doubt intensified after he learned that his lieutenant had a secret meeting with the Libyan strong man, Col Gaddafi, on June 2. Arafat has consistently blocked Col Gaddafi's efforts to increase his influence over the P.L.O.

DEFENSE WEEK
30 June 1980

Aspin Reports On Sverdlovsk Blast

An outbreak of anthrax in Sverdlovsk in the Soviet Union last year was the result of an explosion at a biological warfare laboratory, a report released today by the oversight subcommittee of the House Intelligence Committee says. The report says that as many as 1,000 people may have died as a result of the explosion.

Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.), the subcommittee chairman, charges that the anthrax episode offers persuasive evidence that the Soviets "have cheated on the treaty dealing with biological weapons [the 1975 Biological Weapons Convention]." Aspin further charges that the Carter Administration, which knew about the Sverdlovsk incident, "played it for the galleries, regardless of the impact [of their actions] on the chances for diplomatic success."

However, both the report and Aspin's statement exonerate the Administration of charges of tampering with the intelligence process for political purposes. Such accusations were made because, although information about the incident was available to the intelligence community within a few weeks of the accident, the government did not move on the matter until almost a year later. This led to charges earlier this year that the Administration chose to suppress what it knew for fear it would damage Senate support for SALT II. The report says, however, that "the subcommittee found no persuasive evidence that anyone suppressed intelligence about Sverdlovsk, or that processing and action on this intelligence were delayed for fear of the impact on SALT II ratification."

Aspin makes a more subtle accusation: "The fact is that the United States first approached the Soviets privately through our embassy in Moscow on March 17. Then, one day later and before the Soviets had a chance to respond, we went public with the issue in a formal comment by the Department of State. We went public, moreover, in the middle of an international conference in Geneva, where all the

states party to the Convention had gathered to review its progress at the five-year mark, in keeping with a provision of the Convention itself. To say the least, this looks like we intended to embarrass the Soviets and make political capital out of the incident rather than to resolve it."

Officials at the State Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency deny the Aspin charge. They say that it was a wave of leaks of the story to the press that forced them to tip their hand. The press leaks, they say, came coincidentally at the time that the review conference under the 1975 treaty was about to begin. The public statement was necessary, if ill-timed, in order to avoid charges that the Administration was covering up something.

The official Soviet explanation of the Sverdlovsk incident is that tainted meat caused the anthrax outbreak. But the oversight subcommittee says that won't wash. "Information available to the U.S. government indicates that the symptoms displayed by victims in Sverdlovsk were those of inhalation anthrax," the report contends. If the anthrax were of the inhalation (or pulmonary) variety, it could not have been caused by tainted meat. Anthrax can be spread by eating contaminated meat, by skin contact with anthrax spores, or by inhaling the spores. In addition, inhalation anthrax is almost always fatal, while gastric anthrax is not. Inhalation anthrax, the Aspin subcommittee notes, "is the form this disease would take if stimulated by a biological warfare attack with aerosols. It is a form of the disease, moreover, which occurs in nature under only very unusual circumstances—and then not in epidemic proportions."

When the U.S. biological warfare program was in full-swing during the 1950s and 1960s at Ft. Detrick in Maryland, anthrax was one of the more promising weapons. According to sources who worked in the program, many biological agents such as bubonic and pneumonic plague proved difficult to culture and control. But anthrax in aerosol form was rather easy to grow and use.

Based on testimony from a Russian emigre, the Aspin subcommittee concludes that an explosion at

sent a cloud of anthrax spores into the night. Military Compound 19 is the Soviet equivalent of Ft. Detrick. The general Soviet biological warfare program is under the supervision of Col. Efim Ivanovich Smirnov, head of a military directorate charged with biological warfare research, some forms of which are still permitted under the 1975 convention.

"Winds blew the anthrax south, starting from the location of Compound 19 at the town's outskirts," the report goes on. "Although as many as 1,000 residents of the suburbs may have perished, the epidemic was less severe than if the winds had been blowing towards the center of town. Soviet authorities conducted repeated vaccinations of the populace, explaining at first that nothing was wrong, and later that a 'mistake' had occurred."

On the key question of whether the Sverdlovsk incident constitutes a violation of the convention, the Aspin report waffles. It points out that the section of the convention which exempts production of biological agents used for "prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes" offers a large loophole. In addition, there is nothing in the convention to determine how much of a substance would be more than required for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes.

"Thus," the report says, "the failure of the convention to set a specific standard for violation of its prohibition against acquisition or retention of biological agents leaves to the signatories of the convention the judgment as to whether the epidemic of inhalation anthrax in Sverdlovsk demonstrates a Soviet violation." But, the report concludes, "adequate intelligence is now available to enable political authorities to make a decision on Soviet compliance" with the convention. □

DEFENSE WEEK

16 June 1980

Defense Week Interview With Rep. Les Aspin**'We Have To Get A Lot More Scared Than We Are...'**

An easy informality, the kind of bookish disorderliness one would expect from an academic, surrounds Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.) in his Capitol Hill office. A shaggy grey and white dog named Junket greets visitors and lingers for a scratch behind the ears. Aspin used to say that she was his only Congressional junket. After taking a trip to China he abandoned the pun, although not the dog. In his office, Aspin leans back perilously in his chair causing visitors to fear for the large mirror that tilts, unhung, against the wall behind him.

The sense that this is the office of a genteel and somewhat rumpled professor is no accident. More so than most members of Congress, Aspin is acquainted with the world of ideas. After graduating with honors from Yale in 1960, he received a Master of Arts from Oxford in 1962 and, in 1965, a Ph.D. in economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Before his election to Congress in 1970, he was an economics professor at Marquette University in Milwaukee.

He was an aide to William Proxmire, the unorthodox senior Senator from Wisconsin, from 1960 to 1962 and a staff assistant to chairman Walter Heller of the President's Council of Economic Advisors in 1963. In 1964 he ran Proxmire's reelection campaign. During Army service from 1966 to 1968, Aspin served as an aide to Defense Secretary Robert McNamara. He won election to the House at age 31.

As a member of Congress, Aspin has gained influence in his chosen area of expertise—military affairs—out of proportion to his seniority. After obtaining a seat on the Armed Services Committee, he quickly moved to use the only weapons available to a junior member trying to buck the leadership—the press release and the floor of the House. Aspin quickly discovered that reporters have an endless appetite for stories about Pentagon mismanagement and waste, especially when, upon investigation, most of them turn out to be true. He quickly developed a reputation as an accurate and trenchant critic of bloated defense budgets at a time when defense spending was less popular than it may be today.

His releases, usually mailed out on Friday to catch the Monday morning editions, often present a well researched alternative to the standard line offered by Administration spokesmen. When the Carter Administration was overwhelmed by more than 100,000 Cuban refugees last month, Aspin revealed that Carter should not have been taken by sur-

prise. The CIA had predicted the exodus months in advance. In response to the cries of alarm about the Soviet gains in missile technology, which are used to bolster arguments for the \$50 billion MX missile system, Aspin's release (given significant play in last Monday morning's dailies) said that U.S. improvements in numbers and sophistication of missiles outweigh those of the Russians.

On the floor, Aspin has taken on the leadership and won. In 1973, he succeeded in cutting almost \$1 billion from the defense budget over the opposition of Armed Services Committee Chairman Edward Hebert. When the Watergate class of 1974 arrived on Capitol Hill and began to flex its muscles, Aspin was among those who plotted the ouster of the autocratic Hebert and his replacement by Rep. Melvin Price (D-Ill.)

As military spending has become more popular, Aspin's guerrilla attacks against the Pentagon have lost some of their sting. In addition, age and experience have changed Aspin. He is now a bit more conservative than during his early years in the House. Richard Barnard and Ken Maize of *Defense Week* talked with Aspin recently about his current views on defense policy.

Q. What do you hope to accomplish in your work in the intelligence field? Should there be a new charter for the CIA?

A. That is possible, but the main issue is: how good is your intelligence? Are there things you can do to make it better? I don't know the answers yet. I am in the midst of a whole set of hearings on these questions.

Q. Has the CIA been handcuffed and, if so, has this resulted in poor intelligence?

A. Intelligence has nothing to do with whether the agencies were handcuffed or not. The handcuffing applied to their covert operations and a few invasions of privacy in this country. But in terms of foreign intelligence—which is what you hope that the CIA and the intelligence community in general is going to provide for you—nothing was ever done about that. It wasn't even examined much. The Pike committee focused on constitutional abuses.

Q. How do you assess the quality of intelligence?

A. You need a benchmark in order to judge. An event is either predicted to happen or not happen, and it does or it doesn't. Other ways? We know, for example, at any one time, with a very high degree of accuracy, how many missiles the Soviets have. And we project that ten years into the future. After ten years, you can see how

Q. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's way of resolving his irritation with the CIA was to form the Defense Intelligence Agency. Is there any need for one intelligence agency in McLean and another in the Pentagon?

A. Ideally, you want to eliminate duplication in collection and promote duplication in analysis. DIA has had a lot of problems with this, but as a general proposition you want to encourage different ideas, promote competition, and reduce the probability of a mindset developing. You need somebody to question the assumptions.

Q. How good a job is Harold Brown doing?

A. He has been a very good secretary of defense. He is probably more technically competent than anybody else who has ever held that job, in terms of being able to understand the weapon systems and what they mean and their technical capabilities. It is hard to find a lot of real 'dogs' in the Pentagon budget in terms of weapon systems.

I wish he would talk out a little bit more about the philosophy of defense. He does not look on that as a major part of his job. It means there is a vacuum there because nobody in the Administration is conceptualizing about defense. Nobody is saying, 'Here's our philosophy of defense. Here is where we are going and here is what we are trying to accomplish. This is what the money is for.'

EXCERPTED

PROCEEDINGS
July 1980

"I'm Sorry, Monsieur, But We Cannot Trust the U. S. Government"

By Commander Edward P. Stafford, U. S. Navy (Retired)

It is early December 1979, in Kabul, Afghanistan. Two men meet in the dark back room of a riverside cafe. They order hot, heavily sugared Afghan tea. They speak in the local dialect. In complexion, dress, and manner, they appear no different from the cafe's other half dozen male customers. But they are different. One is an officer of American covert intelligence, the other a senior agent in the Surete Nationale, the intelligence service of the Republic of France. They lower their voices and speak in English. The American's tone is urgent.

"We know something is about to break at the top levels of this government, something that may involve overt action by the Russians, and we know you have sources in the inner circle who can tell us what that something may be. You have to identify those sources for us and put us in touch!"

The Frenchman sadly shakes his head.

"I am sorry, Monsieur. I know you are an honorable man and a patriot, but we cannot trust your government. You will report the identity of our sources to your agency, and according to your law, your agency can be forced to reveal their identities. To identify our sources is to risk their compromise, their loss—their deaths."

The American cannot deny the Frenchman's statement. He pleads, but the other man is regrettably adamant.

At dawn, on 24 December, the Soviets begin a massive airlift of troops into Kabul.

On the evening of the 27th, those troops support a coup which results in the murder of the Afghan prime minister and his family. He is replaced by a Russian puppet flown in from exile in Eastern Europe.

In the final days of the year, Russian armored and motorized rifle divisions cross the border to occupy the country.

The United States is surprised.

In all probability such a meeting never occurred. But it could well have, because similar conversations have taken place around the world with similar results: the refusal or reluctance of friendly intelligence services to cooperate with ours because of the very real risk of compromise.

Incredibly, under the Freedom of Information Act, U. S. intelligence activities, including the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Administration, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation are required to provide information on request, not only to Americans but to foreign citizens and organizations as well. The Director of the CIA has testified, for example, that in one case his agency was required by law to release sensitive information requested by the Polish Embassy. There is good reason to believe that some Freedom of Information requests for similar information have originated with the Soviet internal security and intelligence agency, the KGB.

But use of the Freedom of Information Act is not the only risk taken by friendly intelligence services which cooperate with us. They also face the danger, inherent in a free society, of exposure by former U. S. intelligence officials who out of greed or reasons of mistaken personal conscience publish books or articles naming names and exposing "covers." And they are similarly endangered by crusading radical periodicals which obtain sensitive information by underhanded methods and spread it across their pages in righteous protest.

Again, incredibly, there are no criminal penalties on the books against such activities, even though they can and do result in the death of American citizens engaged in protecting the very freedom whose abuse has killed them.

The intelligence services of our allies are further concerned that CIA and FBI activities are currently overseen by no less than eight congressional panels with a total of some 200 members and hundreds of staffers who also have access to sensitive information. Given the law of averages and the fact that Members of Congress are cleared automatically, with no investigation, for the most secret information solely by the fact of their election, the potential for dangerous leaks is obvious.

In an ideal world, there would be no need for covert intelligence activities, but we do not live in such a world. For a great nation, whose affluence is the envy of all, to cripple its clandestine operations on idealistic or moral grounds is to become a floundering myopic giant in the jungle of international rivalry and intrigue.

Nor can the job be left to the clean technology of orbiting observations and sensors, however miraculous their capabilities. Satellites cannot determine the plans or intent of an antagonist or ferret out foreign-directed plots against friendly regimes; they cannot tell what a missile canister contains or count the warheads under the streamlined nose cone of a ballistic missile. They can be thwarted by weather or camouflage, blinded, or even destroyed; and our antagonists in the international arena have developed and are improving their abilities to use all these and other means of concealment and deception.

There is, in short, no valid substitute for the trained and skilled human intelligence operative on the ground at the scene of action. And let there be no doubt, along with the members of our armed forces and taking equal or greater risks, such operatives man essential posts on the perimeter of protection behind which we Americans are able to exercise our precious freedoms. We must allow them to do their jobs with a minimum of impediment and hindrance, requiring accountability and responsibility but recognizing the special circumstances of their operations. We do not, after all, install governors on our tanks or restrict the altitude or range of our fighter planes and the depth at which our submarines may operate.

Our intelligence sources have a big job to do. The Soviet Union, feeling the oats of the growing military superiority it has achieved as the result of the most massive buildup of armaments since the resurgence of Nazi Germany in the 1930s, is stepping up its program of expansion, subversion, and intimidation in pursuit of its announced goal of a Communist world dominated by the U.S.S.R. Afghanistan is only the most recent and overt

example of rising Russian arrogance based on their new military muscle and the reluctance of the United States and its allies to invest in security.

The more dangerous the world becomes, the greater the need for accurate intelligence for survival. With our strength stretched thin in the effort to protect our vital interests around the world, we have to know where, when, and how to apply it to best advantage. What are Russian intentions after Afghanistan? Will they take advantage of the chaos and impotence in Iran to gain access to the oil for which they foresee a need and for which their inefficient economy cannot pay, and simultaneously to achieve their century-old goal of a warm-water seaport?

If that is their intent, will the means be disruption, subversion, and an eventual power grab by subsidized activists, or will it be by direct assault southward to the Gulf of Oman?

What do the Soviets have in mind for Pakistan? Subversion of the country's unpopular and narrowly based military dictatorship and a resultant Iranian-style incapacitation? Or, on

the pretext of hot pursuit, occupation of the area bordering on Afghanistan and elimination of Moslem rebel and refugee encampments there?

Neither satellites nor U-2s can provide such answers, and even tactical communications intercepts can only give us clues. If we are to have answers on which to base our own counter actions, they will be provided by human intelligence sources, and they must be unfettered and supported by the people they serve—you and me.

But the need for answers and effective counters is not limited to distant lands. The KGB has expanded and accelerated its operations in the United States in recent years. The number of full-time KGB agents in the United States has doubled since 1966 to an estimated 760. Another 800 or so officials from Warsaw Pact countries work part-time for the KGB. In addition, some 20,000 Soviet seamen come ashore in this country each year, and about 30,000 Soviet-bloc citizens visit as tourists. The FBI cannot even estimate the number of intelligence operatives in these groups. Another unknown quantity is the number of

agents posing as refugees who enter illegally and melt into the huge, unsuspecting community of legitimate Cuban refugees from the threadbare tyranny of Castro.

The objective of all this activity is to obtain information in such advanced fields as computers, lasers, space technology, microelectronics, nuclear engineering, and, of course, new weapon systems. A second, related objective is to discredit and thus weaken and hobble our own intelligence services, especially the CIA and the FBI.

There are some specific actions we can take to defend ourselves and our institutions against such a massive assault:

- ▶ We can reduce the number of intelligence "oversight" committees in the Congress to one each in the House and Senate and require normal security clearances for all members and all staffers handling sensitive and classified information.

- ▶ We can exempt our intelligence services from the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act, except for requests from American citizens for information on their own involvement

with those agencies.

- ▶ We can legislate criminal penalties, including long jail terms and heavy fines, for former intelligence employees who violate their pledges and reveal information damaging to the United States after leaving government service.

But even more importantly, we can recognize the indispensable contribution that our intelligence services make, every day and often at considerable risk, to our personal freedom and security. We can stop categorizing all intelligence operatives with unthinking opprobrium as "spies" and accord them the same honor, respect, and support we instinctively give to those who march in uniform in full sunlight under the Stars and Stripes.



Commander Stafford, author of *The Big E* (Random House, 1962), *The Far and the Deep* (Putnam, 1967), and numerous articles, served tours as CinCPacFlt's historian and SecNav's speech writer. He is now a speech writer at NASA.

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REAGAN -- INTELLIGENCE

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

Campaign Report

6 G.O.P. Senators to Offer Own Intelligence Charter

WASHINGTON, June 29 (AP) — Six Republican Senators allied with Ronald Reagan have drafted a charter that would restructure United States intelligence agencies and remove restrictions on domestic spying.

Senator Malcolm Wallop of Wyoming and five other Republican Senators, all serving as advisers in Mr. Reagan's Presidential campaign, drafted the charter. They plan to introduce it later this summer in conjunction with another charter for the Federal Bureau of Investigation. That charter also removes restrictions imposed after a Senate committee found abuses of civil liberties by the bureau and the Central Intelligence Agency in the 1960's and 1970's.

"The worst abuse by these agencies has not been in civil liberties but in incompetence and bad intelligence," said a Senate staff aide who helped draft the charter and who asked not to be named. "The point of this charter is to get the job done, not to safeguard the people of the United States. How that is done is a practical question which is difficult to define in advance in a charter."



ASSOCIATED PRESS

ADOP SENATORS WANT TO REMOVE SPYING RESTRICTIONS
BY MICHAEL J. SNIFFEN

ASSOCIATED PRESS WRITER

WASHINGTON (AP) - REPUBLICAN SENATORS ALLIED WITH RONALD REAGAN HAVE DRAFTED A CHARTER THAT WOULD RESTRUCTURE U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AND REMOVE RESTRICTIONS ON SPYING ON AMERICANS IN AN EFFORT TO MAKE THE AGENCIES MORE EFFECTIVE.

SEN. MALCOLM WALLOP OF WYOMING AND FIVE OTHER REPUBLICAN SENATORS, ALL SERVING AS ADVISERS IN REAGAN'S PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN, DRAFTED THE CHARTER. THEY PLAN TO INTRODUCE IT LATER THIS SUMMER IN CONJUNCTION WITH A REPUBLICAN FBI CHARTER, WHICH ALSO REMOVES RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED AFTER A SENATE COMMITTEE TURNED UP ABUSES OF CIVIL LIBERTIES BY THE CIA AND FBI DURING THE 1960s AND 1970s.

THE ASSOCIATED PRESS OBTAINED A COPY OF THE WALLOP DRAFT.

"THE WORST ABUSE BY THESE AGENCIES HAS NOT BEEN IN CIVIL LIBERTIES BUT IN INCOMPETENCE AND BAD INTELLIGENCE," SAID A SENATE STAFF AIDE, WHO HELPED DRAFT THE CHARTER BUT ASKED NOT TO BE NAMED. "THE POINT OF THIS CHARTER IS TO GET THE JOB DONE TO SAFEGUARD THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES. HOW THAT IS DONE IS A PRACTICAL QUESTION WHICH IS DIFFICULT TO DEFINE IN ADVANCE IN A CHARTER."

BUT A TOP CIA OFFICIAL, WHO ASKED ANONYMITY, SAID: "THIS GIVES US POWERS WE'VE NEVER ASKED FOR AND DON'T WANT." AND A JUSTICE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL, WHO ALSO DID NOT WANT TO BE NAMED, SAID: "THIS WOULD WEAKEN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY BY CASTING ITS PRACTICES INTO FURTHER LEGAL DOUBT."

THE WALLOP CHARTER WOULD:

- SPLIT THE CIA INTO AN INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING AGENCY AND AN ANALYTICAL AGENCY, WHICH THE CHARTER WOULD PUT IN COMPETITION WITH THE PENTAGON'S DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IN PREPARING ANALYSES.
- ESTABLISH A NEW NATIONAL OFFICE OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE WITH THE POWER TO HAVE ANY INTELLIGENCE AGENCY INVESTIGATE ANY AMERICAN WHO MAY BE ENGAGED IN CLANDESTINE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY, TERRORISM, DRUG TRAFFICKING OR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME.

ASSOCIATED PRESS

- ALLOW INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES TO WRITE THEIR OWN GUIDELINES; IN CONSULTATION WITH CONGRESS; FOR USING MAIL-OPENING; BURGLARY AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AGAINST AMERICAN AND FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE TARGETS WITHOUT COURT WARRANTS.

- CREATE A DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE WHO WOULD BE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT SENATE CONFIRMATION TO OVERSEE THE AGENCIES; WHICH WOULD BE HEADED BY DIRECTORS WHO ARE CONFIRMED BY THE SENATE FOR 10-YEAR TERMS AND REMOVABLE ONLY FOR CAUSE.

CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON THE GOP CHARTER IS UNLIKELY THIS YEAR. THE CONGRESS HAS DEFERRED DISCUSSION UNTIL NEXT YEAR OF A DETAILED INTELLIGENCE CHARTER THAT HAS QUALIFIED CARTER ADMINISTRATION SUPPORT.

THAT CHARTER CONTAINED STRICT DEFINITIONS AND GUIDELINES DESIGNED TO PREVENT THE ABUSES OF THE PAST. INSTEAD, CONGRESS IS NEARING PASSAGE OF A BILL WHICH SIMPLY CLARIFIES AND STRENGTHENS CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO OVERSEE THE CIA, FBI, DIA AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES.

CIA SPOKESMAN HERB HETU DECLINED COMMENT ON THE PROPOSAL "BECAUSE IT'S GETTING POLITICAL AND WE'RE NOT GOING TO TAKE SIDES."

THE SENATE AIDE SAID CO-SPONSORS INCLUDE SENS. PAUL LAXALT OF NEVADA; RICHARD LUGAR OF INDIANA; ALAN SIMPSON OF WYOMING; RICHARD SCHWEIKER OF PENNSYLVANIA AND S.I. HAYAKAWA OF CALIFORNIA. LAXALT, WHO WILL INTRODUCE THE GOP FBI CHARTER, IS CHAIRMAN OF THE REAGAN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN AND, LIKE LUGAR, A CONTENDER TO BE REAGAN'S RUNNING MATE.

THIS AIDE SAID THE INTELLIGENCE CHARTER IS CLOSE BUT NOT IDENTICAL TO A REPUBLICAN POLICY PAPER PREPARED LAST AUGUST BY RICHARD V. ALLEN, REAGAN'S CHIEF NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. ALTHOUGH REAGAN HAS NOT ENDORSED THE CHARTER, THE AIDE SAID THE REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM MIGHT ADOPT SOME OF ITS PRINCIPLES.

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UNLEASH SENATE'S SPOOK CHAMPIONS

DISTRIBUTION II (c) 1980 CHICAGO SUN-TIMES (FIELD NEWS SERVICE)

SIX SENATORIAL ADVISERS IN RONALD REAGAN'S CAMPAIGN HAVE DRAFTED LEGISLATION THEY PLAN TO INTRODUCE THIS SUMMER TO UNLEASH THE CIA, FBI AND THE REST OF THE FEDERAL INTELLIGENCE NETWORK TO SPY ON AMERICANS.

SEN. MALCOLM WALLOP (R-WYO.) IS POINT MAN IN THIS ASSAULT ON THE FREEDOMS GUARANTEED BY THE BILL OF RIGHTS.

REAGAN CAN'T BE DIRECTLY TARRER FOR THE REPREHENSIBLE EFFORT; BUT HIS ASSOCIATION WITH THE WALLOP CABAL DEMANDS HIS PUBLIC DISASSOCIATION FROM ITS MEMBERS ON THIS ISSUE AT LEAST.

THEY PROPOSE; FOR ONE THING; TO ALLOW FEDERAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES TO WRITE THEIR OWN RULEBOOK-ONLY IN CONSULTATION WITH CONGRESS-ON OPENING THE MAIL OF; ELECTRONICALLY SURVEILLING AND BURGLARIZING AMERICANS AS WELL AS FOREIGNERS THEY JUDGE TO BE APPROPRIATE TARGETS; ALL WITHOUT COURT WARRANT.

IT IS ASTONISHING THAT THE MOTIVATIONS REPRESENTED IN THIS PROPOSED LEGISLATION STILL SURVIVE IN A CONGRESS WHOSE OWN INVESTIGATORS SO RECENTLY EXPOSED THE "ROGUE ELEPHANTS" IN OUR SPY AGENCIES WHO TRAMPLED THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS IN CIVIC, CHURCH AND COMMUNITY GROUPS INNOCENT OF ANY CRIME BEYOND EXERCISING THEIR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION.

THE DOCUMENTED LIST OF VICTIMS IS LONG; LITERALLY IN THE HUNDREDS; BUT THINK ONLY OF THE FBI'S CRUEL SCANDAL-MONGERING AGAINST THE REV. MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. AND ACTRESS JEAN SEBERG.

THE CIA SAYS IT NEITHER SEEKS NOR WANTS THE PROPOSED NEW POWERS. THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT; MOTHER AGENCY OF THE FBI; SAYS SUCH A LEGISLATED CHARTER "WOULD WEAKEN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY BY CASTING ITS PRACTICES INTO FURTHER LEGAL DOUBT."

WALLOP AND HIS COHORTS AIM TO PROTECT THE COUNTRY FROM TOTALITARIANISM WITH TOTALITARIANISM'S OWN TOOLS; AND FOR THAT THEY DESERVE ONLY SCORN.

NY-0702 0747EDT

COMMENT: The above is an excerpt from a special roundup of editorials from the Field News Services source publications released on the NEW YORK TIMES Wire.

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ON PAGE 10

HUMAN EVENTS
28 JUNE 1980

Who Might Staff a Reagan Administration?

By PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

What would a Reagan Administration look like? Columnist Buchanan wrote this overview after a series of interviews with the people around the presidential candidate. Buchanan takes a look at people who would most likely be Reagan's top economics and defense advisers and the people who may well staff a Reagan White House.

For the CIA, Dr. Richard Pipes, the Harvard Kremlinologist, who headed up the "B" team that disputed official CIA conclusions regarding Soviet military power, is a name that regularly occurs in conversation.

For the National Security post, the inside track is given to Richard V. Allen, chief foreign policy researcher-writer in the Nixon campaign of 1968 and the Reagan campaigns of 1976 and 1980.

Allen is strongly pressing the view (shared by Dean Rusk) that the NSC should be diminished in size, and reduced in visibility; and the NSC chief should become a coordinator and traffic control officer for policy recommendations from State, Defense and CIA, not a regular visitor on "Meet the Press," nor a globe-traveling luminary sighting AK-47s down the Khyber Pass.

If named to the NSC, Allen would push for re-establishment of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and creation of an NSC Advisory Council, which would meet monthly and include foreign and defense policy specialists from the Kennedy and Johnson as well as the Nixon and Ford administrations.

There is here, incidentally, a delicious irony. In 1968, Allen was named Kissinger's first deputy at the

NSC, and Kissinger promptly did for his subordinate what Khrushchev did for Malenkov—exiled him to the bureaucratic counterpart of a power station in Kazakhstan.

With the exponential growth in conservative and neo-conservative think tanks, with Republicans having held executive power for eight of the last 11 years, Reagan—unlike Nixon who took over, after eight years of Democratic rule—would have a vast pool of seasoned talents on which to draw.

Persons likely to appear at sub-Cabinet, service secretary and assistant secretary levels include former Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Fred Ikle, and his deputy, John Lehman Jr.; Roger Fontaine, the Latin American specialist who was a Reagan second during the latter's debate with William Buckley on the Panama Canal treaties; Dr. Glenn Campbell of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace; Laurence Silberman, former acting attorney general and ex-ambassador to Yugoslavia; William R. Van Cleave, another member of Pipes' "B" team who heads the Institute for International Studies at the University of Southern California; Professors Richard Tucker of Johns Hopkins and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.

From the ranks of recently retired military, two names are commonly mentioned: those of former Army Gen. Daniel O. Graham, former director Defense Intelligence Agency, and Edward Rowny who resigned as the Joint Chiefs' man at the SALT talks rather than endorse the treaty that emerged.

If there is a common characteristic of all the above, it is that they are hard-headed realists about ultimate Soviet ambitions and the present ominous power equation, and if there will be an operative rule in selecting Reagan's national security team, it will be that Jackson Democrats are welcome as advisers and appointees—but no McGovernites need apply.

If Reagan is sworn in, in January 1981, one is given to understand that the housecleaning at the NSC, State, Defense and the CIA would be instant, and almost total.

Expansive titles aside, there are five slots on the White House chart whose occupants enjoy a special opportunity to exert influence and wield power: the national security adviser, the domestic council chief, the press secretary, the chief of staff and the assistant to the President for congressional liaison.

What provides the occupants of these offices their opportunity is that each becomes a "line officer," with a larger personally chosen staff, whose position requires constant communication and contact with the Oval Office. In the White House, proximity is power.

Right now it is difficult to project a President Reagan's staff, since the practice in most presidential campaigns is a shakedown, after the primaries, and a beefing up of the "issues side" for the fall election.

But if Ronald Reagan were pressed to put together his top White House staff, as of today, it would probably look like this:

National Security Adviser: As mentioned above, while this office would be scaled down from the Kissingerian heights of 1972, it would likely belong to Richard V. Allen, former Kissinger deputy, who has assembled and is coordinating the work on an imposing list of scores of Reagan foreign and defense policy advisers.

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WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
26 JUNE 1980

Aides Shape Defense, Foreign Affairs Plans

By Henry S. Bradsher
Washington Star Staff Writer

Ronald Reagan's advisers on foreign and defense policy, who believe in building up U.S. military strength against a growing Soviet threat, are talking about reducing the role of the National Security Council in a Republican administration.

The advisers are also considering ways to change the national intelligence system so that a wider range of assessments would reach the president than in today's tightly centralized arrangements.

And they are beginning to study U.S. military requirements for the next decade, although redirecting the massive military machine would be far harder than making bureaucratic changes.

Sixty-two persons are now listed as foreign policy advisers to the Republican presidential candidate, and 37 defense policy advisers are listed. Many of them are associated with institutions that are widely considered right-wing or have personal reputations as hawks.

A sampling of their statements and writings, and talks with some of them, show a strong desire to strengthen the armed forces. An apparent majority of them worry that this country has in the past two decades fallen behind the Soviet Union in military power.

But Richard V. Allen denies that the advisers' thinking is limited to the simple idea of building more weapons. He says the outlook in the Reagan camp goes deeper than that.

Allen is Reagan's principal coordinator in the fields of foreign and defense affairs. He plays a key role in the selection of advisers and thus the shaping of the counsel they give to the former California governor.

"The governor feels it would be nothing but irresponsible to wait until November to think about" the long-term policy problems that would confront him if he won the election, Allen said in an interview.

So, under Allen's supervision from his 16th Street office next to the Sheraton-Carlton, a number of advisers are working on studies. Some might become campaign speeches. Others could be used to answer questions — not only here but also from concerned Europeans.

Reagan Advisers Eye Reduced Role for NSC

The studies range from such subjects as the relations that a President Reagan might have with the 97th Congress, to questions like whether the United States really needs an ability to defend the Persian Gulf region.

Some conclusions already seem firm in Allen's mind. One is the need to reduce what he sees as the domination of the administration's security apparatus by the NSC and its chief, the president's national security adviser.

The well advertised clashes between Zbigniew Brzezinski's NSC and former Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance's State Department "seem utterly pointless," Allen said, and the system should be revised to avoid such collisions in the future.

"The governor favors the strong secretary of state concept," according to Allen. Reagan would reduce the role of the NSC to an office that assigns jobs to other parts of the government, "but not try to sabotage or ride herd on the bureaucracy," Allen said, in an implied judgment on the way the system works now.

"You don't need to humiliate the national security adviser by removing his authority," Allen added. "He has a job to do as an honest broker" handling material from various executive departments. "But his job has to be one of managing the flow of information, not of policy formulation."

Allen says that what he now advocates was the original concept of the NSC and its chief, but it got distorted by presidential desires for a strong adviser close at hand and by strong personalities in the security adviser's job. How would Reagan check that tendency?

"I would imagine, on the basis of his experience as governor of California, that Reagan will govern through his Cabinet officers," Allen said. And, more pointedly, he added that Reagan would not do what Richard Nixon did in 1969.

Allen defines that experience as "going into the White House, locking the gate and assuming that the bureaucracy is of no practical value, so that all policy is made inside the White House." That is what made Henry A. Kissinger such a dominant figure as President Nixon's security adviser, Allen said.

Kissinger is also held responsible by several Reagan advisers for chalking off alternative intelligence views. Some even accuse him of forcing intelligence to fit policy on such things as supporting detente in the early 1970s instead of paying enough attention to the Soviet military buildup.

"We need competing centers for national intelligence estimates, so there's a richer variety of views, rather than submerging points of view that should be heard," Allen said.

He suggested the resurrection of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board to evaluate what the intelligence professionals produce. It was abolished at the beginning of the Carter administration because, one hawkish observer commented, liberals regarded it as "a nest of Cold Warriors."

Allen's views on such questions come from two decades of academic and political experience in foreign and defense policy. He speaks from personal experience inside the White House at the beginning of the Nixon administration.

During the 1968 presidential campaign, Allen played the same role for Nixon that he is now playing for Reagan, and he followed the boss into office. But Nixon went outside his campaign circle to enlist Kissinger as his security adviser. Allen was named deputy adviser. Within a short time, he was out.

Sources who had a close view of that period say Kissinger could not tolerate Allen's direct access to Nixon. Some of them also suggest that Allen was more an operator than an analyst, and Kissinger wanted analysts to produce option papers for him.

Allen now says that it has been a mistake to put "a bunch of 35-year-olds in the White House" in control of experienced bureaucrats. He adds with a grin that in 1968 he was just 32 years old. By now he has matured to look older than his 44 years.

A Reagan administration would not replace people just for the sake of having new faces, Allen insisted. He mentioned — off the record — the names of some technocrats now in the Carter administration who should be kept as "national assets."

But a Reagan victory in November would bring into office "people you know and who share your point of view," Allen said, in order to "try to

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RADIO BROADCASTS INTO IRAN

Approved For Release 2009/06/12 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000501400001-4

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ON PAGE 24

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
30 June 1980

A CIA boomerang

Counterproductive is a word we try not to use often — because it's so counterproductive. But no word describes quite so well the US-backed clandestine radio broadcasts seeking to undermine the Khomeini government in Iran — broadcasts that were reported yesterday to have been acknowledged by American officials.

The "Free Voice of Iran" broadcasts are believed to have been begun by the CIA in the middle of May from transmitters in Egypt. They described the Ayatollah as "racist and fascist," supported exiled opponent Shahpur Bakhtiar, called for the "liberation" of Iran, and even appealed to Iranians to prepare for armed action.

This provides as clear a case as any that spies should stick to secret gathering of information and not try to undermine or topple governments, whether or not there is added the boomeranging embarrassment of being caught.

In Belgrade last week President Carter joined his hosts in a statement affirming Iran's right to internal development without outside interference. This presumably meant that any US-backed broadcasts inciting Iranians are ended. Mr. Carter would do well to confirm this officially, not least for the sake of the American hostages in Iran. For news of the broadcasts can only backfire, providing ammunition for the Khomeini revolution not against it.

And it can feed what many close observers

describe as Iranians' genuine fears that the US wants to control events in Iran again as in the days of returning the Shah to power. President Bani-Sadr may be exaggerating somewhat for internal political reasons, but he is serious in expressing this fear in a speech to his nation just this past weekend.

"In my opinion, American policy has not been changed, and the United States feels she is Iran's absolute ruler, and if she cannot get hold of Iran today she can have it tomorrow."

This is a fear that Mr. Carter should do everything in his power to dispel. The American people do not want to take over Iran.

Nor, for all their vocal criticism of Ayatollah Khomeini, do they want their country's intelligence agencies trying to interfere in the Iranians' business of solving their own political problems in the wake of revolution, any upheaval.

No one wants to tie the hands of the CIA in obtaining information. But, when it comes to covertly spreading what sounds like incitement to violence or otherwise interfering in sovereign states, current legislative efforts to improve and control the intelligence agencies should be stronger than a bill that was recently passed by the Senate. There are certain things the intelligence agencies of a free democracy cannot do without harm to their integrity and effectiveness. One of them is to corrupt the communications process by using deception to try to turn people against their leaders.

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ON PAGE A10

THE WASHINGTON POST
30 June 1980

U.S. Denies Role In Anti-Khomeini Radio Broadcasts

State Department officials yesterday denied that the United States had anything to do with radio broadcasts into Iran attacking the government of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

Officials acknowledged the existence of an anti-Khomeini broadcast called "The Free Voice of Iran," but rejected a published report yesterday that the programs were sponsored by the Central Intelligence Agency. They speculated that the broadcasts might have come from Iraq, Saudi Arabia or Egypt, under sponsorship from groups in those countries.

The report in The New York Times said the radio programs were supportive of ousted Iranian Prime Minister, Shahpour Bakhtiar, now living in exile in Paris, who is trying to organize opposition to Khomeini.

In a brief statement, the State Department said yesterday, "We have repeatedly made our position clear on interference in internal affairs of Iran. We do not endorse or support the activities of any group of Iranians outside of Iran who may be advocating a change of government in Iran. Any allegations to the contrary are irresponsible and misleading, and may jeopardize the safety of the hostages in Iran."

The published story said the covert broadcasts to Iran emanated from two sites in Egypt, with the personal authorization of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat.

A number of government officials recently have expressed concern that the usual, publicly acknowledged American radio programming into the Persian Gulf is inadequate. The Voice of America is now beaming its news broadcasts into Afghanistan in a language that many Afghans have trouble understanding, and programming into Iran has a weak signal.

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AM-BROADCAST 6-29

WASHINGTON (UPI) -- THE CIA, WITH THE HELP OF EGYPT, HAS BEEN AIRING RADIO BROADCASTS INTO THE MUSLEM WORLD SINCE MAY WITH THE AIM OF UNDERMINING THE REGIME OF AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH KHOMEINI, IT WAS REPORTED SUNDAY.

CIA OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON DECLINED TO COMMENT ON THE NEW YORK TIMES REPORT, WHICH SAID THE BROADCASTS BEGAN TO TAKE FORM LAST DECEMBER DURING A WHITE HOUSE MEETING OF THE SPECIAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE CONDUCTED BY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI.

ACCORDING TO THE NEWSPAPER, THE BROADCASTS APPEAR TO HAVE ORIGINATED FROM TRANSMITTERS IN EGYPT -- ONE BELIEVED LOCATED IN ALEXANDRIA AND THE OTHER NEAR THE SUEZ CANAL.

THE TIMES SAID THE PROGRAMS WERE THE IDEA OF THE CIA'S "UNCONVENTIONAL BROADCAST" SECTION AND NON-ENTERTAINMENT PORTIONS OF THE PROGRAMS WERE IDENTIFIED AS COMING FROM "THE FREE VOICE OF IRAN."

CORRESPONDENTS IN IRAN DURING MID-MAY SAID THE NIGHTLY BROADCASTS FEATURED MUSIC BY A POPULAR IRANIAN FEMALE VOCALIST, ACCORDING TO THE TIMES, BUT IT SAID OTHER PARTS OF THE PROGRAMMING CALLED UPON MEMBERS OF THE IRANIAN ARMY TO REFUSE COMBAT WITH KURDISH REBELS.

THE BROADCASTS ALSO INDICATED SUPPORT FOR EXILED IRANIAN PRIME MINISTER SHAHPUK BAKHTIAR, CALLED FOR THE "LIBERATION OF IRAN," IDENTIFIED KHOMEINI AS A "RACIST AND FACIST" AND APPEALED TO IRANISMS TO "TAKE GUNS INTO YOUR HANDS" IN PREPARATION FOR AN OVERTHROW OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT, THE NEWSPAPER SAID.

THE SPECIAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE WAS APPOINTED BY PRESIDENT CARTER TWO YEARS AGO TO OVERSEE COVERT INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS BY THE UNITED STATES.

UPI 06-29 09:34 PED

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ON PAGE A-3

NEW YORK TIMES
29 JUNE 1980

U.S. Concedes It Is Behind Anti-Khomeini Broadcasts

By DAVID BINDER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 27 — American officials acknowledged today that the United States was responsible for clandestine radio broadcasts aimed at undermining the Iranian rule of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

The programs, broadcast in Persian from transmitters in Egypt, one believed to be near Alexandria and the other near the Suez Canal, appear to have begun in the middle of May, the officials said, and were set up by the Central Intelligence Agency.

Spokesmen for the C.I.A. and other intelligence agencies, asked about the broadcasts, said they could not help in terms of denials or confirmations.

The idea for the project, one of a number conducted by the C.I.A.'s "unconventional broadcasting" section, was described by the officials as having come up during the winter. President Anwar el-Sadat, who inherited a large radio-transmitting capacity from his predecessor, Gamel Abdel Nasser, is said to have given personal authorization for the use of free time for the broadcasts.

Broadcasts Heard in Teheran

American correspondents who were in Teheran in mid-May said that the nightly broadcasts featured music by Gagoosh, a popular female singer from Iran, and news broadcasts aimed at undermining Ayatollah Khomeini's Government.

The nonentertainment portions of the broadcast, which were identified as coming from "The Free Voice of Iran," contained appeals to the Iranian Army not to engage in combat with Kurdish rebels. Some of the broadcasts indicated support for the exiled former Iranian Prime Minister, Shahpur Bakhtiar, who has been attempting to mobilize anti-Khomeini forces from his base in Paris.

The broadcasts included a call for "liberation of Iran," a description of Ayatollah Khomeini as "racist and fascist" and an appeal to Iranians to "take guns into your hands" in preparation for action.

The C.I.A. connection in Egypt was developed late last year after a White House meeting of the Special Coordinating Committee on Dec. 11 conducted by Zbigniew Brzezinski, the President's national security adviser. The focus of the meeting, about five weeks after 53 Americans were taken hostage, was ways to expand American broadcasts to the Moslem world, including Iran and the 50 million Moslems in the Soviet Union.

Facilities Thought Inadequate

The Special Coordination Committee was appointed by President Carter two years ago to authorize and oversee covert operations by the C.I.A. and other intelligence agencies.

Mr. Brzezinski and his adviser on Moslem affairs and radio broadcast matters, Paul B. Henze, who is a former C.I.A. officer, were described after the meeting as being dissatisfied with the capacity of the Voice of America, which was then broadcasting two hours a day in Persian, and with the American-sponsored Radio Liberty, which was broadcasting a rather weak signal in some of the languages of Soviet Moslems.


It was decided after the meeting, the officials said, to explore the possibility of acquiring air time on the Egyptian transmitters for broadcasts to Iran and Soviet Central Asia.

President Sadat, who was a target of

Iranian attacks long before he provided exile in Egypt for the deposed Shah of Iran, agreed to the White House request, the American officials said. American officials said they believed Egypt had been promised additional transmitter facilities by the United States through the Agency for International Development to compensate for the Egyptian facilities used by the C.I.A. But a spokesman for the aid agency said the only equipment of which he was aware was a set of radar and radio control centers designed to improve communications for users of the Suez Canal at a cost of \$17.7 million. The equipment for that project arrived in Egypt only last month, the spokesman added.

We don't comment on a story of this kind. We have repeatedly made our position clear on interference in internal affairs in Iran. We do not endorse or support the activities of any group of Iranians outside of Iran who may be advocating a change of government inside Iran. Any allegations to the contrary are irresponsible and misleading and may jeopardize the safety of the hostages in Iran.

*This is the Statement
State Dept released*



STAT

Mrs. Timm Fails an Attempt to Visit Iran Again

Associated Press

Barbara Timm, the mother of an American hostage in Iran, returned to the United States yesterday evening after an unsuccessful attempt to make a second trip to Tehran. Her attorney blamed the State Department.

Timm, 41, of Oak Creek, Wis., returned to Dulles Airport accompanied by her lawyer, Carl McAfee.

At a brief meeting with reporters, she declined to comment. McAfee said, "She very frankly has been under tremendous stress and strain."

Last April, Timm visited her 20-year-old son, Marine Sgt. Kevin Hermening, the youngest of the Americans taken captive in Tehran on Nov. 4, 1979.

She left for Paris last Thursday night after the Carter administration granted her a waiver from its two-month-old ban on travel to Iran.

Department officials said permission for the trip was granted on humanitarian grounds. A State Department spokesman declined to comment last night on the latest developments involving Timm.

But McAfee blamed the State Department for the failure to get to Iran.

He said the department travel permit contained "restrictions and restraints we feel would hamper and destroy their ability to work toward a release of the hostages."

"We had hoped to make a plea for the release of all of the hostages and to promote an interparliamentary meeting between leaders of the U.S.



Associated Press

Barbara Timm, mother of an American hostage in Iran, at news conference at Dulles International Airport.

and Iranian congresses] to resolve the situation," McAfee said.

He stressed that Iranian officials had given them clearance to come to Iran but their decision to return home was based solely on the State Department restrictions. He did not elaborate on the exact nature of the restrictions.

U.S. Denies Role In Anti-Khomeini Radio Broadcasts

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The report in The New York Times said the radio programs were supportive of ousted Iranian Prime Minister Shahpour Bakhtiar, now living in exile in Paris, who is trying to organize opposition to Khomeini.

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
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
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LEGISLATION/CHARTERS

Approved For Release 2009/06/12 : CIA-RDP05T00644R000501400001-4

DES MOINES REGISTER
9 June 1980

Giving in on CIA

Since early November, 53 Americans have been held captive in Iran by fanatics who believe that the hostages are occupants of a "nest of spies."

In other countries, especially Third World countries, the Central Intelligence Agency is held responsible for nearly every ill imaginable, and people suspected of being CIA agents are sometimes put in danger of their lives. In 1975, Richard Welch, the CIA's station chief in Athens, was shot to death after he was identified as a former CIA chief in Peru.

The same fate could befall a journalist, cleric or academic thought to be in the employ of the U.S. intelligence service. There are few ways to immunize oneself against such suspicion. But it would help if an accused newspaper reporter could point to a U.S. law prohibiting the use of journalists as spies.

A month ago, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (Dem., N.Y.) promised to seek such a prohibition when the Senate took up the proposed (and ill-named) Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980.

On Tuesday, the bill came up, and Moynihan offered his promised amendment. Then he

withdrew it because the leadership of the Senate Intelligence Committee sent an open letter to the Senate asserting that the committee opposed all revisions, including Moynihan's rider. The measure passed, unrevised. Differences must be worked out with the House, which passed a foreign-aid bill containing similar provisions on intelligence oversight.

The only senator to vote "no" was William Proxmire (Dem., Wis.), who realized that the measure would give the president the authority to withhold secrets from the Congress almost at will. Far from being a bona fide oversight bill, the measure codifies the perpetuation of secrecy.

The Moynihan rider probably would have been defeated, given the congressional zeal to "unleash the CIA," but Moynihan shouldn't have given up so quickly. He shouldn't have taken his colleagues off the hook. If the Senate is going to compromise the independence, effectiveness (and possibly even the safety) of reporters, academics and clerics, it should have been required to do the deed openly.

ASSOCIATED PRESS

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ARM-CIA-CONGRESS:280

COMMITTEE APPROVES BILL ON CIA

BY ROBERT FURLOW

ASSOCIATED PRESS WRITER

WASHINGTON (AP) - A BILL ORDERING THE CIA TO SHARE ITS SECRETS WITH CONGRESS - AND TO GIVE ADVANCE NOTICE OF UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS - WON NARROW 8-6 APPROVAL THURSDAY BY THE HOUSE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE.

THE COMMITTEE'S FIVE REPUBLICANS, WHO WANTED TO INCLUDE WIDE-RANGING OTHER PROVISIONS SOUGHT BY THE CIA, JOINED DEMOCRATIC REP. CLEMENT ZABLOCKI IN OPPOSING THE BILL.

"WE WANT TO DO SOMETHING TO HELP THE AGENCY," REP. JOHN ASHBROOK, R-OHIO, SAID AFTER THE VOTE, COMPLAINING THAT THE DEMOCRATS "JUST WANT TO INCREASE CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT."

ACTUALLY, THE CIA ALSO HAS FAVORED THE IDEA OF REVISING THE CONGRESSIONAL-NOTIFICATION LAW, HOPING TO REDUCE FROM EIGHT TO TWO THE NUMBER OF HOUSE AND SENATE COMMITTEES THE AGENCY MUST REPORT TO.

THE INTELLIGENCE BILL, LIKE A VERSION PASSED 89-1 BY THE SENATE EARLIER THIS MONTH, WOULD DO JUST THAT, ORDERING THE CIA TO REPORT TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES OF BOTH HOUSES.

HOWEVER, IT ALSO DEMANDS PRIOR NOTICE OF "SPECIAL ACTIVITIES" - UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS IN WHICH SECRET AGENTS TRY TO INFLUENCE EVENTS OVERSEAS. CIA DIRECTOR STANFIELD TURNER, SPEAKING FOR THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION, HAS SAID THE CIA IS GLAD TO GIVE PRIOR NOTICE MOST OF THE TIME BUT THAT A FLAT DEMAND FOR IT IS AN INFRINGEMENT ON EXECUTIVE BRANCH AUTHORITY.

THE BILL APPROVED THURSDAY IS ALL THAT REMAINS OF THE ONCE-LENGTHY CIA CHARTER, WHICH INCLUDED CIA-BACKED PROVISIONS TO JAIL PEOPLE WHO PUBLICLY IDENTIFY SECRET AGENTS AND TO EXEMPT THE AGENCY FROM MOST OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT.

THE SENATE, AND NOW THE HOUSE COMMITTEE, DELETED THOSE SECTIONS AFTER FAILING TO WIN WIDE AGREEMENT ON A BILL THAT WOULD BALANCE SUCH PROVISIONS WITH NEW RESTRICTIONS ON CIA ACTIVITIES.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
27 June 1980

Bill Would Require Notification Of CIA Undercover Operations

Associated Press

A bill ordering the CIA to share its secrets with Congress—and to give advance notice of undercover operations—won narrow 8 to 6 approval yesterday by the House Intelligence Committee.

The committee's five Republicans, who wanted to include wide-ranging other provisions sought by the CIA, joined Democratic Rep. Clement Zablocki (Wis.) in opposing the bill.

"We want to do something to help the agency," Rep. John Ashbrook (R-Ilk) said after the vote, complaining that the Democrats "just want to increase congressional oversight."

Actually, the CIA also has favored the idea of revising the congressional notification law, hoping to reduce from eight to two the number of House and Senate committees the agency must report to.

The intelligence bill, like a version passed 89 to 1 by the Senate earlier this month, would do just that, ordering the CIA to report to the intelligence committees of both houses.

However, it also demands prior notice of "special activities"—undercover operations in which secret agents try to influence events overseas. CIA Director Stansfield Turner, speaking for the Carter administra-

tion, has said the CIA is glad to give prior notice most of the time but that a flat demand for it is an infringement on executive branch authority.

The bill, approved yesterday is all that remains of the once-lengthy CIA charter, which included CIA-backed provisions to jail people who publicly identify secret agents and to exempt the agency from most of the Freedom of Information Act.

The Senate, and now the House committee, deleted those sections after failing to win wide agreement on a bill that would balance such provisions with new restrictions on CIA activities.

Another complication for the future of the remaining congressional notification bill is the existence of still another version, this one attached to foreign aid legislation by Zablocki's House Foreign Affairs Committee.

That provision, rejected so far by the Senate, would allow a president to forgo prior notice if he decided such a move "was essential to meet extraordinary circumstances" or to save lives.

After yesterday's vote on the intelligence bill, Zablocki asked that the legislation be sent to his committee for further consideration—and possibly amendment—before being sent on to the House floor.

NEW YORK TIMES

NYN.TIMES (FIELD NEWS SERVICE)

WASHINGTON-FOR MONTHS NOW, THERE HAS BEEN A CLANGING OF BELLS AND SHOUTING FROM CAPITAL ROOFS ABOUT THE NEED FOR CONGRESS TO PASS SOME SORT OF COMPREHENSIVE LAW TO SPECIFY-FOR THE FIRST TIME-WHAT AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES CAN AND CANNOT DO.

IT IS NOW STRIKINGLY CLEAR THAT THE AMBITIOUS EFFORT IS GOING NOWHERE IN THIS ELECTION YEAR.

DISPUTES ON THE BROAD RANGE OF ISSUES THAT MUST BE CONFRONTED IN A COMPREHENSIVE INTELLIGENCE CHARTER, ALL HAVE ULTIMATELY AGREED, ARE TOO HUGE. PARTISAN CONSIDERATIONS IN A HOT POLITICAL YEAR RUN TOO DEEP. THE LARGER EFFORT TO CREATE AN INTELLIGENCE CHARTER HAS BEEN SHELVED.

WHAT SURFACED IS THE SENATE-PASSED INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT ACT OF 1986, A DOCUMENT REMARKABLE NOT ONLY FOR ITS BREVITY (A LITTLE OVER A COLUMN IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RECORD) BUT ALSO BECAUSE IT WAS ENDORSED BY REPUBLICANS AND DEMOCRATS, FRIENDS AND FOES OF INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES.

THE OVERSIGHT BILL SAILED THROUGH THE SENATE BY A VOTE OF 89-1 EARLIER THIS MONTH, IN PART BECAUSE SOME OF THE POINTS THAT KILLED THE COMPREHENSIVE CHARTER LEGISLATION WERE LEFT OUT.

SEN. BIRCH BAYH (D-IND.) CALLED THE PASSAGE "A GOOD EXAMPLE OF A SITUATION WHERE A 'QUARTER-LOAF' IS BETTER THAN NO LOAF AT ALL."

THIS "QUARTER-LOAF" MAKES NO MENTION OF PENALTIES FOR THOSE WHO REVEAL THE NAMES OF CIA AGENTS ABROAD AND FBI COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AGENTS IN THE UNITED STATES. THERE HAVE BEEN CALLS FOR LEGISLATION ON THIS ISSUE FROM CIA OFFICIALS AND OTHERS.

THIS "QUARTER-LOAF" CALLS FOR NO EXEMPTIONS FOR INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES FROM MOST OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT, ANOTHER DEMAND OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY VIOLENTLY OPPOSED BY AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS, AMONG OTHERS.

CRITICS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAVE CALLED FOR PASSAGE OF STANDARDS LIMITING SURVEILLANCE OF AMERICAN CITIZENS. THERE IS NO MENTION OF SUCH STANDARDS IN THE SENATE BILL.

ONE OTHER AREA UNTOUCHED BY THE LEGISLATION IS A PROHIBITION OF THE USE OF ACADEMICIANS, JOURNALISTS AND CLERICS AS SPIES.

THAT SAID, THE OVERSIGHT BILL DOES GIVE CONGRESS SIGNIFICANT NEW AUTHORITY TO MONITOR AND, TO A CERTAIN EXTENT, CONTROL ALL INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES.

NEW YORK TIMES

The CIA, created by Congress in 1947, operated largely unfettered by Congress until 1974 when legislators, responding to concern about the agency's unbridled covert operations abroad, enacted the Hughes-Ryan amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act that required the CIA to report covert actions (such as propping up friendly governments, trying to overthrow unfriendly ones) to Congress.

For friends of the intelligence agencies, the Senate oversight bill provides that the number of committees to be informed about covert activities would be reduced from eight to two.

Critics of intelligence agencies, such as Morton H. Halperin, director of the Center for National Security Studies, hailed the Senate measure as "a good bill" and "a victory," on the notion that it achieves more stringent congressional control.

The bill would require reporting to Congress of not just CIA covert actions but "all intelligence activities" of intelligence agencies, including the FBI and the National Security Agency.

The Senate oversight bill makes clear that Congress' permission is not required before intelligence activities can be undertaken but, rather, that the Senate and House intelligence committees must be kept "fully and currently informed" instead of learning of the operations after the fact—"in a timely fashion" as Hughes-Ryan vaguely required.

The new Senate bill would require the president to inform at least a few key members of Congress of planned covert action no matter how sensitive it might be.

Everyone could live with the Senate legislation, with one key exception: the House of Representatives.

Recently, behind closed doors, Republicans on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence served notice that they would not go along with a proposal by committee Democrats similar to the Senate version, though slightly tougher.

Republicans, joined by Democratic member Clement J. Zablocki, favored a measure easier on the CIA that would allow the president, without prior notification of anyone, to order operations he deemed "essential to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting the vital interest of the United States or ... (were) essential to avoid unreasonable risk to the safety or security of the personnel or methods employed."

That measure is a Zablocki amendment to the House-passed fiscal 1981 foreign aid authorization.

NEW YORK TIMES

ULTIMATELY, LAST THURSDAY, THE HOUSE COMMITTEE NARROWLY APPROVED ITS VERSION OF THE SENATE OVERSIGHT BILL. VOTING 8-5, WITH REPUBLICANS AND ZABLOCKI VOTING NO, THE HOUSE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE ENDORSED A BILL THAT WOULD GIVE THE PRESIDENT EVEN LESS LEEWAY IN WITHHOLDING INFORMATION FROM CONGRESS.

(MORE)

NY-0629 0013EDT

REQUIRES THE PRESIDENT TO DISCLOSE TO HOUSE AND SENATE COMMITTEES ANY "IMPROPER" OR ILLEGAL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES BY ANY AGENCY. THE SENATE VERSION REQUIRES REPORTING ONLY OF "ILLEGAL" ACTIVITIES.

THE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THE TWO BILLS COULD BE ACADEMIC.

REPUBLICANS, SAID HOUSE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE MEMBER ROBERT MCCLORY (R-ILL.) WILL PRESS FOR ADOPTION OF THE ZABLOCKI FOREIGN AID AMENDMENT.

MCCLORY CANDIDLY ADMITTED THAT GOP REASONING HAS AT LEAST A PARTISAN TINGE. "(SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN SEN. FRANK) CHURCH IS BLOCKING THE ZABLOCKI AMENDMENT AND CHURCH IS UP FOR RE-ELECTION. IN A SENSE WE'RE TRYING TO HOLD FRANK CHURCH'S FEET TO THE FIRE. HE'S TRYING TO BE A LIBERAL AND A HARD-LINER AT THE SAME TIME."

IF THE ZABLOCKI AMENDMENT PLOY FAILS, MCCLORY ANTICIPATED THAT HOUSE REPUBLICANS WILL ATTEMPT TO AMEND THE HOUSE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE BILL TO INCLUDE, AT THE LEAST, A PROVISION MAKING IT A CRIME TO REVEAL AGENTS' NAMES.

IF SUCCESSFUL, THAT COULD MAKE A HOUSE-SENATE COMPROMISE IMPOSSIBLE THIS YEAR AND EVEN THE "QUARTER-LOAF" WILL HAVE ELUDED THE LEGISLATORS.

AS FOR THE HOPE OF COMPREHENSIVE LEGISLATION TO CONTROL THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, THE FOREGOING DISPUTES SHOW HOW DIFFICULT IT WILL BE NEXT YEAR AND PERHAPS FOR MANY YEARS TO COME.

ENDIT WARREN

NY-0629 0016EDT

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ON PAGE 1

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
27 June 1980

Washington Wire

REPUBLICANS STALL on some legislation, hoping for a Reagan takeover. They talk of killing the modest CIA-control bill passed by the Senate—and enacting instead an openly pro-CIA measure next year. Some hope to block Carter-backed legislation to limit development of Alaska lands; they figure a Reagan administration would reverse Carter's conservationist policies.

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AFGHANISTAN

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DURHAM MORNING HERALD (N.C.)
12 June 1980

If The CIA's Helping Afghans, Then Bravo

A report in *The Philadelphia Inquirer* has it that the American Central Intelligence Agency has been buying up arms for clandestine shipment to the Afghans who are fighting to overthrow their Soviet masters.

If it is true, then bravo for the CIA. This country should be giving the Afghans all the help it can. This is just the sort of operation the *Herald* had in mind in a recent editorial that discussed the justification for intervention against other regimes.

And it is just the sort of operation that keeps many Americans divided in their feelings about the CIA. On the one hand, a secret organization, operating with few restraints, is by definition antithetical to many American ideals; it can be—and too often has been—a threat to constitutional rights. On the other hand, in a world that is harsh to the weak and unprepared, there is often a need for a spy agency that can do more than act as a passive gatherer of data. There is a need for an agency that can take action to shape events.

You could hardly ask for a better example than Afghanistan. We should be helping the Afghan rebels both because it is in our interest to thwart the Russians and because it is a just cause. The Soviet Union, in an act of naked imperialism, is seeking to enslave the Afghan people. But many Afghans, fiercely independent, are refusing to be enslaved.

They are fighting back with a pathetic array of inadequate weapons, obsolete rifles that date

to the two world wars, some homemade. The sight of those ragtag warriors, riding their shaggy ponies down a mountain defile, ought to evoke the sympathy of any people who care about freedom, any nation that has ever felt the heel of a tyrant. These Afghans are riding to war against what may now be the finest military machine in existence, directed by men who are utterly ruthless. With their ponies and outmoded shoulder arms, the Afghans are pitted against a force of overwhelmingly superior numbers, a force equipped with modern weapons, flame throwers, bombers, helicopter gunships and the most diabolical of chemical weapons. And, if it comes to that, who can doubt that the Russians would long hesitate to use theater nuclear warheads?

Yet, given the ferocity of the Afghan fighters, the desperation that is natural to those who defend home and hearth, and the forbidding terrain that is their home, it is conceivable that they could make the Russian takeover too costly to sustain. They have done it before. They might do it again, unless the Russians simply level those mountains and incinerate the country or saturate it with poison.

The spectacle of Afghanistan ought to be a sobering lesson to the world and to those in our own country who yammer about disarmament. Such talk is cheap, until the bayonet is thrust toward the belly. Then, as in Afghanistan now, the only choice is to fight. ■

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ON PAGE **26-27**

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
7 July 1980

Should the U.S. Arm Afghan Rebels?



NO—"We've had our share" of military involvement abroad

Lester L. Wolff
Member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee

Q. Representative Wolff, why are you opposed to the U.S. providing weapons for the Afghan insurgents?

A. First of all, I think it would create a very dangerous precedent. We've had our share of getting involved in the affairs of other nations through military action. Furthermore, no amount of arms that we could give to these rebels will have a significant military effect against the weight of what is a major Soviet intrusion into Afghanistan. By providing weapons, we would lend credibility to the Soviet allegation that their Army is in Afghanistan merely to help the government deal with outside intervention.

Q. Wouldn't our failure to aid the Afghans reinforce doubts about American credibility?

A. I don't believe that would be true. Helping an established government is one thing; helping an insurgency is something else again. The United States has never had a formal treaty arrangement with Afghanistan that commits us to support resistance against a Soviet intrusion.

Besides, I am struck by how little enthusiasm there is among the Europeans, the Chinese and even other Islamic

nations for helping the Afghans. There are a great many people who rhetorically want to defend Afghanistan with our materiel and our blood—and yet are unwilling to do anything themselves. I don't think the United States should be placed in the position to hold up the entire world.

Q. Do we have a moral obligation to arm the Afghans?

A. We have a moral obligation to do whatever we possibly can to resist—through sanctions and economic pressures—the Soviet invasion, but I don't think that this requires American military involvement. After all, we don't supply guns to the people in Northern Ireland who are engaged in an insurgency against British rule. It would create a double standard if we started giving weapons to the rebels in Afghanistan and didn't give them to the rebels in the north of Ireland who are trying to shake off the yoke of Britain.

Q. Do you think the Soviet move is a threat to Persian Gulf oil?

A. I certainly see it as a threat. But that threat has not materialized in further Soviet movement out of Afghanistan.

Q. Where would you draw the line?

A. I believe that we have drawn that line. We have already put the Soviets on notice that we would consider an intrusion into Iran, Saudi Arabia or the other Persian Gulf and Trucial States [United Arab Emirates] as a serious threat to us, and we would respond militarily.

Q. Without U.S. weapons, what do you see as the outcome?

A. I don't expect either side to win. Just as the United States had difficulty in defeating a ragtag army in Vietnam, I think that the Soviets, with all of their modern equipment, will face continuing guerrilla action. I don't think the Soviets will be able to install a government that will be favorable to them and that will be very stable in the face of the fierce antagonism of the Afghans.

Opposing Views



YES—Refusal "would demonstrate we are all talk and no action"

Robert K. Neumann
Former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, 1966-73

Q. Ambassador Neumann, why should we arm Afghan rebels?

A. We have vital interests in that area. Therefore, the more difficult and costly the Soviets' invasion of Afghanistan is made, the less likely they are to embark on similar operations elsewhere. If we refuse to help the Afghans, we would give a clear indication to the Soviet Union that, even in such a low-risk situation, we are unwilling to intervene. That would demonstrate that we are all talk and no action.

Furthermore, all the nations of the Persian Gulf without exception interpret the Russian foray into Afghanistan as directed primarily at them politically—and possibly militarily in the future. They're watching what we do very carefully. Our failure to act would give a signal to Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states that we are simply not to be counted upon. They want us to take much larger risks, if necessary, in their defense than we are now asked to take with regard to Afghanistan, and if we do nothing for Afghanistan, they will draw their own conclusion. They will then have to consider how to respond to Russian pressure to cut a deal with Moscow.

Finally, let me emphasize that the Afghan people will continue to fight whether we help them or not. One of the several Afghan leaders made that point recently on a television program in very simple terms: "It is not up to Washington," he said, "whether we will fight or not; it is up to Washington whether we will fight with reasonably good weapons or with stones."

Q. Should the U.S. help the insurgents openly or secretly?

A. Nobody is talking about huge arms deliveries. What the Afghans need are shoulder-carried rockets—a few hundred or, at most, a few thousand—to knock down or keep at a distance the Soviet gunships. That is all. And these can be provided with a clandestine operation. By that, I don't mean that nobody would know about it. "Clandestine" really means that you don't take official responsibility.

The weapons, of course, would have to be delivered through nominal Pakistan territory. I say "nominal" because the 14-to-16-mile-wide belt around the Afghan border is not really controlled by the Pakistani government, any more than it was controlled by the British government in colonial times. It is tribal territory. So the Pakistanis, if they chose to do so, could credibly claim that they know nothing about the arms deliveries.

Q. Could aid to the rebels force the Soviets to withdraw?

A. There is no possibility of driving the Russians out. Nobody is thinking about that. The question is one of cost—the cost the Russians are forced to incur. By doing what I propose, we would enable the Afghans to very effectively keep the Russians constantly losing ground and losing people. The Afghans already are doing that with the small means that they have—mainly self-fabricated or captured Russian weapons.

I do not expect the continuing Soviet losses to have any dramatic effects in the Soviet Union. But there will be a growing discomfort, and that will make the Russians think ☐ elsewhere.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 18NEWSWEEK
7 July 1980

Afghan Stalemate

Soviet television newscasts showed happy Russian tank crews saying goodbye to friendly Afghan peasants. Communist newsmen reported that 10,000 troops and 108 tanks were going home to the Soviet Union. But even as the armored column rumbled north along the mountainous roads, huge Ilyushin military transports and Aeroflot jets—their silver fuselages bearing the message “Official Olympic Carrier”—were landing at Kabul airport with fresh replacements and more weapons. And at strategic locations encircling Afghanistan’s tense and sullen capital, the Soviets continued building barracks—and digging in for a long stay.

Token Gestures: In the West, Moscow’s partial withdrawal from Afghanistan was largely seen as a cosmetic operation. There was some token applause: French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, for example, called it “a gesture in the right direction.” But the pullout, such as it was, appeared to be limited to equipment too heavy or too sophisticated to be suitable for guerrilla warfare—such as FROG surface-to-surface missiles, SAM anti-aircraft batteries and T-72 tanks. No combat forces at all were withdrawn. U.S. officials estimated that the Soviets still had 85,000 troops in Afghanistan, and they pointed out that more than 30,000 Soviet troops are bivouacked just across the border in Soviet Turkistan—within easy striking distance.

For the most part, intelligence experts were unconvinced by Moscow’s contention that its limited pullout was possible because “life in Afghanistan is gradually returning to normal.” Six months after their invasion, the Russians have yet to establish themselves as anything approaching the masters of all they survey. Soviet troops supported by heavy weapons do control the major cities. But the countryside and the highways are controlled by Afghanistan’s anti-Soviet Muslim tribesmen. The capital of Kabul is regularly racked by low-level purges and executions, the Afghan Army has been weakened by desertions, and there is constant factional fighting between rival wings of Afghanistan’s Marxist movement.

If anything, Soviet military activity in Afghanistan is more visible now than ever before. Kabul’s once sleepy airport has been turned into a round-the-clock MiG fighter base and logistics center. Fighter jets roar off regularly on bombing missions. Droop-winged military transports unload new, canvas-covered helicopters, armored vehicles and wooden ammunition

crates, while commercial jets arrive daily with replacement troops—and leave with dozens of wooden coffins.

Despite all this, the guerrillas remain surprisingly strong. They are still able to stage hit-and-run attacks on outlying police posts and army units, ambush convoys moving along the lifeline from the Soviet border and infiltrate Kabul at night. Abdul Rasool Saiyaf, leader of an umbrella group of the Pakistan-based rebel factions, recently told NEWSWEEK’s Ron Moreau: “We are sending a message to all our people that the Russians can’t stop us and that the *mujahedin* [rebels] are nearby, defending our land and religion.”

Some intelligence sources are convinced that as many as 150,000 to 200,000 Soviet troops would be needed in Afghanistan simply to maintain control over the present low-level guerrilla war; it would take perhaps twice that many, they say, to achieve a complete victory. “If the Soviets really want to control Afghanistan,” says one Western diplomat, “they will simply have to bring in more troops and kill more Afghans.”

Jimmy Carter has repeatedly called for a complete Soviet pullout from Afghanistan, and the offer he made in Belgrade last week was designed as a face-saving formula for the Russians to do so. In Washington, the fact that Moscow did not completely reject Carter’s proposal was seen as a faintly encouraging sign. But Administration officials conceded that much depended upon the Kremlin’s ultimate objectives in Afghanistan. “If they want a springboard in the Persian Gulf,” said a senior White House aide, “they’re not going to pull out and we’re in for a decade of long, protracted struggle. But if what they really want is a secure country on their border, the President is saying that we can work that out.”

Fig Leaf: The Soviets may prefer to work it out in their own fashion—by maintaining a sizable military presence in Afghanistan. Other Western diplomats believe, however, that the Soviets are genuinely seeking a pretext to cover a retreat from an unwinnable war. “Moscow’s pullout is a gesture,” said a European diplomat in the Soviet capital, “but it is a gesture that should be explored.” The Russians insisted that the puppet regime of President Babrak Karmal had to be preserved in any settlement and that the withdrawal of all Soviet troops could take place only after the foreign-supported Islamic rebellion ceases. Given those unbending conditions, the worry was that exploring the Russian gesture might be tantamount to accepting its invasion.

ANGUS DEMING with RON MOREAU in Peshawar and FRED COLEMAN in Washington

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ON PAGE 11-A

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
27 JUNE 1980

Behind the smokescreen on Afghanistan

by James McCartney
Inquirer Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — While talking tough in public, the United States is searching for a negotiated solution to the Afghanistan situation.

President Carter is not yet ready to sit down with the Soviets, but he is at least ready to explore in public some of the ways in which a peaceful solution might be put together.

According to well-informed sources here, this is the meaning of a subtly refurbished peace initiative for Afghanistan that the President floated earlier this week in Belgrade.

Without advance warning, he used a toast at a state dinner to drop a new phrasing of the U.S. position for handling the crisis.

He said the United States was "prepared to explore a transitional arrangement" in Afghanistan in combination with the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from that country.

This meant that the United States is prepared to support the establishment of some kind of interim regime in Afghanistan to run the country while arrangements are negotiated for a permanently neutral government.

The reception in Moscow, however, hardly has been one to raise hopes. Yesterday, Tass, whose first reaction was that Carter's statements were "deliberately vague," intensified its assessment and accused the President of spreading "deliberately slanderous provocations," and accused him of continuing "undeclared war" on Afghanistan.

NATO yesterday demanded an immediate withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Afghanistan and pledged to continue delaying detente until Moscow agrees to a political settlement. U.S. Secretary of State Edmund S. Muskie, one of the 15 NATO foreign ministers who ended a two-day conference, said, "The emphasis was on total withdrawal." The ministers rejected the view that the Soviet

announcement last weekend of a planned partial withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan was evidence of conciliation.

The President first mentioned the proposal of an interim stage in Afghanistan at a news conference in February, but it received virtually no attention and never truly became a matter for serious discussion.

Tensions then were high in the wake of the December invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet forces, and the United States still was seeking to persuade its European allies to invoke tough economic sanctions against the Soviets.

The new effort to reintroduce the idea, and elaborate upon it, comes in a changed political environment.

First, President Carter in Belgrade was speaking — from a prepared text — only a few days after the Soviets announced plans to withdraw some troops from Afghanistan. It was his reply to that announcement.

Second, Carter was putting forth a framework for a possible negotiated solution to the Afghan crisis on the eve of a visit to Moscow by West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt.

Schmidt, who met privately with Carter in Venice this week, goes to Moscow next week. State Department officials are going out of their way to point out that he will have an opportunity to discuss possible solutions to the Afghanistan crisis with Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev.

This newly devised role for Schmidt explains why Carter turned around overnight in his attitude toward the Schmidt visit. Ten days ago, U.S. officials were privately criticizing Schmidt for his decision to meet with Brezhnev.

But after Carter's meeting with Schmidt in Venice, the President reversed field. He said that contacts between European and Soviet leaders were coming at a good time, and could be beneficial in explaining

allied views on the Afghanistan crisis to Moscow.

None of this means that the Afghan crisis is anywhere near solution or that any kind of a breakthrough is at hand.

The Soviets, however, may be willing to look for ways out, too. U.S. officials have noted with interest Brezhnev's declaration earlier this week that, for all practical purposes, the Soviet Union has won the Afghan war and thus can begin to withdraw troops.

U.S. intelligence officials believe the Soviets still are taking a beating from Afghan rebels, and couldn't possibly "win" in Afghanistan without increasing troop levels.

But the situation suggests that the Soviets may have decided to follow the formula for ending the Vietnam War made famous by former U.S. Sen. George Aiken — "declare victory, and get out" — though that hope is probably premature.

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ON PAGE 2

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
27 June 1980

The news—briefly

NATO backs US on key issues

Washington

The 15 NATO states endorsed strong US stands on the Afghanistan and Iran issues, but did not announce any agreed action to secure Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan or freedom for the 53 US hostages in Iran, Monitor correspondent John K. Cooley reports.

NATO's semiannual ministerial council meeting in Ankara, Turkey, did not discuss sending aid to "Afghan liberation fighters," Secretary of State Edmund Muskie said after the meeting.

Intelligence sources here say that whatever troop units the Soviets may finally withdraw in their much-publicized plan to ease the Afghan situation, they are already pulling out short-range (20- to 30-mile) frog missiles, antiaircraft guns, and some fighter planes.

Lack of any serious air or heavy-weapons opposition on the ground enables them to dispense with these weapons, not needed in fighting with the Afghan guerrillas, US experts say.

In Ankara, Mr. Muskie said there had been no discussion of a "transitional withdrawal" plan President Carter mentioned during his recent European tour.

NATO Secretary-General Joseph M. A. H. Luns said NATO concern that West Germany might delay deployment of new medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe was "allayed." The first deployment moves could take place before Chancellor Helmut Schmidt meets Soviet President Brezhnev in Moscow June 30, Mr. Luns said.

The NATO communiqué said it was important for the United States and the USSR to continue arms-control talks and called for "continuing dialogue with the Soviet Union to preserve détente on a global scale."

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NEW YORK TIMES
27 JUNE 1980

NATO, Favoring Soviet Dialogue, Demands a Pullout in Afghanistan

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

ANKARA, Turkey, June 26 — The North Atlantic military alliance concluded its annual meeting today with a renewed demand for total Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan, but it also stressed willingness to maintain a dialogue with the Soviet Union.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's foreign ministers stressed the need for "immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan" and urged the Soviet Government "to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of that country and the rights of the Afghan people freely to determine their future."

In their final communiqué, the ministers noted that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan "had done serious damage to détente" but restated their wish "to keep open the channels of communication between the countries of East and West."

In effect, the communiqué represented a consensus position that was foreshadowed by the statement on Afghanistan issued in Venice by seven non-Communist industrialized nations.

Both here and in Venice, the United States claimed strong backing for its policy of firm confrontations over Afghanistan, while French officials said the combination of toughness and continued dialogue with the Russians was an affirmation of the position they share with the West Germans.

Muskie Cites 'Basic Solidarity'

Secretary of State Edmund S. Muskie said at a news conference at the end of the session that the allied views on Afghanistan "reflected the basic solidarity" of the alliance. He said that the wording of the communiqué showed that the allies

had "failed to be seduced" by the Soviet announcement last weekend that some of its units were being withdrawn.

In fact, Mr. Muskie said that American intelligence now believed that there had been an increase in Soviet forces in Afghanistan in recent weeks, bringing the total above 85,000, while the planned withdrawal would involve 5,000 to 8,000 troops.

The recent announcement that some Soviet troops are being withdrawn from Afghanistan would be of interest if it were the beginning of a total withdrawal," the communiqué said, repeating the demand for "the total and immediate withdrawal" of the Soviet forces.

The only issue that apparently produced some discord, according to the spokesmen of various delegations, was the drafting of communiqué language on the Middle East. Several European countries, including Britain and France, wanted it to reflect the recent statement issued by the Common Market, which includes a call for "self-determination" for the Palestinians.

Because the phrase "self-determination" is usually regarded in the code of Middle East diplomacy as the right of the Palestinians to an independent state on Israel's borders, Mr. Muskie objected. The United States has maintained that the Palestinians should have a voice in the determination of their future, meaning they should negotiate with Israel and other parties in the region about their eventual status.

Mr. Muskie appeared irritated when asked about the dispute, saying that it was "interesting how quickly a closed session becomes open."

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SOVIETS

GERMS -- LASERS -- KGB

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THE WASHINGTON POST
2 July 1980

A Soviet Treaty Violation?

THE HOUSE Committee on Intelligence has now released its report on the outbreak of anthrax poisoning in the Soviet city of Sverdlovsk. Based in part on secret hearings, it reveals nothing startlingly new about this possible major violation of an arms control treaty. But it does give much added weight and even a new dimension to what was already known.

The report concludes that the Soviet Union's explanation of the anthrax outbreak—that it resulted from eating tainted meat—is flatly not “consistent with information available to the United States.” This information indicates that approximately 1,000 people died within a matter of hours. Such rapid and widespread death could only have been due to “inhalation anthrax” caused by the release of a large cloud of anthrax spores. No natural cause could reasonably account for such a phenomenon. The report notes that the military facility where the outbreak is thought to have occurred has been “long suspected of housing biological warfare activities.”

Nothing more has apparently been heard since the Soviet Union's first prompt reply to the U.S. request for an explanation of the incident. No reply has been forthcoming to the U.S. response that it found the tainted meat story inadequate. Under the Biological Warfare Convention—which bans the development and use of biological weapons—all parties have an obligation to “consult one another and to cooperate in solving any problems which may arise.” A good case can be made that the Soviet Union is in violation of at least this provision of the agreement.

As Rep. Aspin, principal author of the report, points

out, the importance of finding out whether or not the Soviet Union is systematically violating the convention goes way beyond the importance of biological warfare itself—although, if the U.S.S.R. is cheating, the United States and the other hundred-odd parties to the treaty should certainly know about it.

The larger issue is how the Soviet government views its arms control commitments, and how it weighs the risks and benefits of cheating. If the Kremlin is prepared to run the political risk of being caught violating a fundamental arms control agreement, and if it is willing to accept substantial dangers to its own citizens—perfectly illustrated by the accident at Sverdlovsk—all for the sake of a weapon of minimal military utility, then the domestic debate over how much confidence the United States must have in its ability to verify arms control agreements could be fundamentally altered.

At this point, the State Department will say only that it is pursuing the Sverdlovsk matter through diplomatic channels. These channels have apparently been quiet for three months, and there is no expectation that answers to the U.S. questions will soon be forthcoming. But the government does have another course of action available to it. The Biological Warfare Convention provides that any nation that finds that another is violating its obligations under the agreement may bring a complaint before the U.N. Security Council. Hasn't the United States been patient enough on this? Do we really want—via our “quiet diplomacy”—to strengthen the argument of those in the Kremlin who say there are only small political risks in violating arms control agreements?

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THE WASHINGTON POST
30 June 1980

Soviets Accused Of Cover-Up on Anthrax Epidemic

By George C. Willson
Washington Post Staff Writer

The House Intelligence oversight subcommittee accused the Soviet Union yesterday of covering up the facts about an anthrax epidemic at Sverdlovsk in April 1979.

On the basis of secret and open hearings, the subcommittee concluded that the Soviet explanation that people died in Sverdlovsk from eating meat poisoned with anthrax is "incomplete at best and at worst a fabrication."

What really happened, according to the subcommittee report and interviews with U.S. intelligence officials, is that an explosion at Military Compound 19 at Sverdlovsk blew a cloud of anthrax spores into the open air. That compound has long been suspected of germ warfare activity by U.S. intelligence.

A south wind took the deadly anthrax spores to the outskirts of Sverdlovsk, a city of 1.2 million 875 miles east of Moscow. U.S. officials estimate that as many as 1,000 people may have died from breathing in the spores.

Subcommittee Chairman Les Aspin (D-Wis.) said "all arms control conventions" are threatened by the Sverdlovsk cover-up.

Rep. John Ashbrook of Ohio, ranking Republican on the subcommittee, said that Sverdlovsk proves that the United States should not sign any treaties with the Soviet Union "unless they are self-enforcing or if we have the capability to fully monitor them."

On the basis of reports from persons inside the Soviet Union at the time of the epidemic and other evidence, U.S. intelligence officials have concluded that the symptoms displayed by the afflicted Russians at Sverdlovsk could have come only from breathing in anthrax germs, not from eating them in diseased meat, as Moscow said was the case.

By calculating how many anthrax

spores it would take to kill the 40 to 1,000 Russians who are believed to have died at Sverdlovsk from the anthrax, U.S. intelligence officials believe the quantity far exceeded the amount needed for the laboratory experiments allowed under the 1975 biological warfare treaty.

One U.S. intelligence estimate is that 5,000 to 20,000 anthrax spores were released into the open air at Sverdlovsk. However, as the subcommittee noted in its report yesterday, no U.S. intelligence agency has made the corporate judgment that the Soviets definitely violated the treaty.

The 1975 treaty, signed by the United States, the Soviet Union and 111 other countries, prohibits the production of anthrax or any other biological agent for germ warfare. However, laboratory quantities of such germs can be produced to enable a nation to develop defensive measures or conduct peaceful experiments.

The subcommittee in its report noted that the 1975 treaty did not set a specific limit on how much anthrax or other biological agents could be produced before the quantity would amount to a violation. Therefore, said the subcommittee, it would be difficult to prove on the basis of current information whether the Soviets violated the treaty or not.

This leaves it to the nations that signed the treaty to judge "whether the epidemic in Sverdlovsk demonstrates a Soviet violation," the subcommittee said.

It said it had looked into reports that the Carter administration had suppressed evidence and hampered probes by U.S. intelligence agencies of the Sverdlovsk epidemic for fear the findings would keep the strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT II) from being approved by the Senate.

Concluded the subcommittee: "There is no persuasive evidence to support allegations that the U.S. government suppressed intelligence about the outbreak of anthrax in Sverdlovsk, or that it delayed acting on this matter out of concern for SALT II or any other political motive."

Speaking for himself, Aspin said, "The evidence is fairly good that the Soviets have cheated on the treaty dealing with biological weapons. That combined with the lousy way this has been handled by the administration threatens not only this treaty but all arms control conventions."

The State Department insists that it is pressing the Soviet Union to disclose the full story on Sverdlovsk but is trying to do it within diplomatic channels rather than publicly. However, the department concedes that it has not yet received satisfactory replies to its questions about the epidemic.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A19THE WASHINGTON POST
29 June 1980

Soviets May Have Violated 1975 Germ Warfare Pact

By George C. Wilson

Washington Post Staff Writer

The future of U.S.-Soviet arms control agreements is being further clouded by deepening suspicions that the Soviets have violated an existing treaty banning the production of germs for warfare.

The suspicions were aroused and subsequently confirmed to varying degrees by the outbreak of deadly anthrax in Sverdlovsk, Russia, in April.

The U.S. intelligence community has concluded after sifting through the evidence that between 40 and 1,000 Russians were killed at Sverdlovsk by breathing in anthrax, rejecting the Soviet claim that the people who died ate meat poisoned with anthrax.

Several germ warfare experts within the Defense Intelligence Agency have concluded that so much anthrax was being produced at Sverdlovsk that it could only be intended for "offensive" use, not for laboratory research on how to defend the country against the deadly germs.

Neither the DIA nor any other U.S. intelligence agency is willing to make a corporate judgment to that effect yet, sources said. But Pentagon officials conceded that the unanswered questions about Sverdlovsk threaten future arms control agreements and impel military reappraisal of U.S. defenses against germ warfare.

Politicians who have supported U.S.-Soviet arms control agreements in the past are warning that new ones will be hard to sell to Congress unless the Carter administration finds a way to force the Soviet Union to tell the whole story of Sverdlovsk.

Sen. William Proxmire (D-Wis.), in the forefront of this group, is demanding that the administration make an international issue out of Sverdlovsk by bringing it before the United Nations.

But President Carter is reluctant to do that, as evidenced by a letter Deputy Secretary of State Warren M. Christopher sent last week to Proxmire.

After telling Proxmire that the administration had "raised the issue twice" with the Soviets about Sverdlovsk and "made clear to them that we are dissatisfied with their responses to date," Christopher wrote:

"Because of the gravity with which we view this issue, we are making special efforts to insure that it is dealt with in the most serious fashion and not treated as a political ploy with which to embarrass the Soviets. This is crucial if we are to persuade both the Soviets and the international community that our concern is genuine."

In discussing Christopher's letter, Proxmire said he was "disappointed" that the State Department was not being more aggressive with the Soviets on the issue.

"We should be insisting on unequivocal answers from the Soviets to all our questions," he said. "They owe us that under the biological warfare convention of 1975."

"Nothing is quite as horrible as germ warfare," the senator continued, "and the world should be told of Soviet perfidy. If the Soviets have cheated on an important international treaty, we need to know it now rather than later when it might be too late."

The treaty is the 1975 Biological Weapons Convention, signed by the United States, the Soviet Union and 111 nations. It bans the production or storage of biological agents beyond what is needed "for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes."

Since April, U.S. intelligence agencies have been trying to figure out how many spores of anthrax it would have taken to kill the Russians who died at Sverdlovsk.

"Clearly if the fatalities were at the upper end of the estimate," said one defense official in discussing the significance of the estimated 40 to 1,000 deaths, "there would have been more anthrax produced than needed for any laboratory purposes."

If it is proved that the Soviets are indeed stockpiling anthrax in preparation for wartime use, should the Pentagon follow suit and develop this germ warfare capability it abandoned?

The view at the policy level is "no" because anthrax and germs like it are too difficult to manage on the battlefield. The better response to Soviet stockpiling would be to develop defenses, including clothing and injections.

Since the 1975 treaty does not specify how much anthrax constitutes a violation, it would be difficult, given Soviet secrecy and scant U.S. intelligence on the accident, to prove Moscow went beyond developing agents for peaceful purposes at Sverdlovsk, administration officials said.

But if the congressional preception continues to grow that the Soviets are cheating on germ warfare treaties, these officials conceded, it will be harder than ever to assure already skeptical lawmakers that the Soviets would live up to SALT II or any other treaty.

The Federation of American Scientists, in its newsletter this month, called upon Soviet scientists to "provide the world with more information" on Sverdlovsk.

"The matter is taking on ever-greater importance for the future of arms control," the federation warned.

"The circumstantial evidence for such a violation arises from the fact that the epidemic in question took place in a part of the surroundings of Sverdlovsk in which there is a long suspected laboratory for biological warfare."

Moreover, anthrax is an obvious candidate for biological warfare activities. It was one of the half dozen biological agents thought most promising in the now-terminated U.S. biological warfare program.

"Not contagious, and thus running no risks of spreading to one's own troops," the scientists group wrote, "its spore form is highly stable against sunlight, changes in temperature or shocks and hence lends itself to a long shelf life."

"It cannot be filtered out by the nose. And a massive dose is very lethal. It is not, however, an especially desirable weapon, both because the spores persist for years after use and because the persons may not die immediately."

"This suggests," continued the federation, "that Soviet motivation for violating the treaty could not, or should not, have been very high."

Soviet scientists should strive to get out the facts, said the federation, to lessen the risk that the 113 nations who foreswore biological warfare by signing the treaty will pursue the

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ON PAGE 9.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
30 June 1980

More evidence surfaces of Soviet germ-warfare accident

By John K. Cooley
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor
Washington

The USSR is concealing the truth about an anthrax epidemic at Sverdlovsk last year that probably involved Soviet violation of a 1975 treaty against manufacturing biological weapons, according to intelligence reports released by a congressional committee June 30.

Critics of the Carter administration, led by US Rep. Les Aspin (D) of Wisconsin, are charging that the administration's awkward handling of news about a reported explosion in a Sverdlovsk germ-warfare research laboratory that allegedly led to hundreds of Soviet casualties has made it more difficult to get at the truth.

In comments prepared for delivery on the House floor June 30, Congressman Aspin agreed with findings of the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Permanent Select

Committee on Intelligence that there is strong evidence "the Soviets have cheated" on the biological weapons treaty.

However, Mr. Aspin agrees with the subcommittee's majority report that absolves the Carter administration from allegations that it played politics with the Sverdlovsk germ-warfare information. Some critics have charged that the administration withheld the information from the US public until all hope for the ratification of the SALT II treaty by the Senate had been lost in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

The committee's ranking Republican member, Rep. John M. Ashbrook of Ohio, and Rep. C. W. Bill Young (R) of Florida, added the opinion that the US should sign no arms-control treaties with the Soviets "unless they are self-enforcing or if we have the capability to fully monitor them through our intelligence agencies or with on-site inspection.

The committee document and a related,

earlier account of the Sverdlovsk affair by the Public Interest Report of the Federation of American Scientists, disclose the following sequence of events:

- In 1972, the US and the Soviets signed the biological weapons convention. Signers are bound "never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire or retain" germ-warfare agents "of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes."

- The US intelligence community began collecting information on suspected Soviet germ-warfare facilities, including one called Laboratory No. 19 near Sverdlovsk. Travelers from the USSR and one Soviet defector, identified as "Mr. Popovsky," reported that in April 1979 an explosion there released clouds of anthrax bacteria spores, and that hundreds of fatalities resulted from inhaling the spores.

- On Feb. 19, 1980, the Soviet news agency Tass denied anything had happened in Sverdlovsk, calling published reports about the anthrax epidemic "malicious inventions." But on March 19 Tass conceded there had been a natural epidemic. It said diseased meat had brought on the epidemic. The Soviet government formally told the US the same thing March 20.

- Meanwhile, on March 17, as Mr. Aspin points out, the US had approached the Soviets privately, reminding them of the obligation to consult on such matters under the 1975 treaty.

Before the Soviets had a chance to respond privately, the US then went public in a State Department comment, during a conference in Geneva to review progress on the treaty. The result of this was the indignant Soviet response of March 19. This looks to some administration critics, including Mr. Aspin, as though "we intended to embarrass the Soviets and to make political capital out of the incident rather than to resolve it."

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 8THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE
30 June 1980

Fear Russ girding for germ war

By James Coates

Chicago Tribune Press Service

WASHINGTON — Soviet installation of military facilities at several pharmaceutical factories has caused United States intelligence analysts to suspect that Kremlin leaders are stockpiling germ-warfare weapons in violation of treaties, a House study has concluded.

The report, by the House Intelligence Oversight Subcommittee, disclosed the troubling evidence of Soviet germ war preparations in Siberia and elsewhere while investigating whether the Carter administration disclosed details of an anthrax epidemic in Siberia for political purposes.

As many as 1,000 persons died last year of the animal-borne disease when they inhaled anthrax germs that escaped from a laboratory in Sverdlovsk after a small explosion, U.S. officials disclosed recently.

DRAWING ON TOP-secret CIA reports and other classified data, the House subcommittee found that Sverdlovsk is only one of several sites where army units are now in place at pharmaceutical plants "known from open literature to have biological facilities."

The Biological Weapons Treaty of 1975 prohibits both the U.S. and Soviet military from stockpiling germwar weapons. The report pointed out that the U.S. has removed military units from its old germwar plants "in keeping with the letter and spirit" of the treaty.

Thus, "it is disturbing that the U.S.S.R. may have built military facilities at microbiological plants since the negotiation and signing of the convention," the committee report said.

THE DOCUMENT was released by Rep. Les Aspin [D., Wis.], who initiated the investigation to determine whether administration officials leaked intelligence reports about Sverdlovsk to punish the Soviets for invading Afghanistan. Making such political use of CIA data could reduce the agency's effectiveness, Aspin warned at the time.

Instead, the subcommittee found not only that the administration acted properly but also that the Russians' behavior over the Sverdlovsk incident raises questions about whether they would cheat on a nuclear arms treaty.

After the U.S. disclosed the accident, Soviet spokesmen insisted that the anthrax epidemic was caused by tainted meat in Sverdlovsk. But, Aspin's report indicated that the CIA found that the fatal anthrax was a rare form usually created in laboratories.

THE SVERDLOVSK victims inhaled the anthrax spores, whereas nearly all naturally occurring anthrax cases are caused by eating tainted food or touching the germs, the report said.

The only naturally occurring anthrax cases traced to inhaling the germs involve workers who shear infected sheep. "So," said Aspin, "when you have information that confirms numerous deaths in an urban area from inhalation anthrax, you know that somewhere along the line there was a man-made concentration of the spores that got into the air — or else the Soviets have a well-camouflaged sheep-shearing operation."

Aspin also questioned why the Soviets lied about the tainted meat when they could have simply said there was an accident involving germs being kept for peaceful research, which the treaty permits.

ASPIN, A LEADING congressional liberal, pointed out that the now-stalled Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty contains restrictions that could be difficult to verify for compliance, such as range of missiles and size of rockets.

"It may be that in the future only those arms-control agreements that are verifiable in the narrowest terms can be seriously considered," Aspin said. "The consequences of this would be grave."

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ON PAGE 61

AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY
16 June 1980

Soviet Union Developing Laser Antisatellite Weapon

Washington—Soviet Union is conducting research and development on a multishot high-energy laser weapon designed to engage U. S. spacecraft operating at altitudes above 5,000 km., according to U. S. laser weapons experts. The Russian weapon is expected to be available by 1985.

The USSR already has operational a high-energy laser weapon capable of destroying U. S. satellites in low earth orbit. That laser has been in development for several years, as first reported by AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY (Nov. 13, 1978, p. 14). The development effort is at the facility at Troitsk, formerly known as Krasnaya Palka, 30 mi. south of Moscow.

U. S. intelligence analysts believe the Soviet high-energy laser weapon is capable of damaging or degrading subsystems and sensors on U. S. satellites at 100 km. The analysts added that the Soviets are developing far more powerful laser weapons that will have the capability to damage optical sensors such as those on U. S. early warning and reconnaissance satellites at altitudes up to 40,000 km.

The U. S. analysts believe the next step in the Soviet high-energy laser program is a space-based antisatellite system, and that research and development already is in progress for such a system. Power sources for such a weapon already have been tested, one U. S. official said.

The Soviet Union has the technology to deploy a high-energy laser weapon onboard a large transport or bomber aircraft in the

mid to late 1980s with an effective killing range of 200 km., one analyst said. The Soviet program roughly parallels the USAF airborne laser laboratory effort in progress at the Air Force Weapons Laboratory, Kirtland AFB, N. M.

U. S. intelligence officials estimate the Soviets will have in operation a non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse system operational by 1985, with space basing likely.

The Soviet antisatellite program is continuing with flyby tests in space against dedicated targets to simulate sending hot metal fragments into hostile spacecraft. The early killer satellite tests on Cosmos spacecraft using a radar sensor have proved successful on a number of occasions.

The highest altitude involved in the Soviet killer satellite test was with Cosmos 918 at 1,590 km., and the lowest altitude test with Cosmos 961 at 164 km.

The last four Soviet antisatellite tests have been with a new optical sensor for the Cosmos to home on the target. The first test with the new acquisition sensor was with Cosmos 886. All four of the tests with the new sensor have failed to maneuver the Cosmos spacecraft close enough for detonation against its intended target.

The Soviet antisatellite effort is continuing and U. S. officials expect to see additional testing against dedicated spacecraft targets with improvements to the new optical sensor.

"They'll keep trying until they get it right," one analyst said.

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ON PAGE 2

WASHINGTON WEEKLY
1 JULY 1980

Accuracy in Media

— Reed Irvine

WASHINGTON—Andrei Sakharov, the brilliant Soviet physicist and Nobel prize winner, has sent a powerful warning to the West that we face "cruel cataclysms" if we don't stand firm before the totalitarian challenge.

Sakharov's warning, published in The New York Times Magazine on June 8, 1980, included a remarkable statement about the danger posed by Soviet influence over the media in the Free World. Reading this, one might wonder whether someone had succeeded in smuggling a copy of *The Spike* to Sakharov, who is under virtual house-arrest in the closed city of Gorky. *The Spike* is the new bestseller by Arnaud de Borchgrave and Robert Moss, two outstanding journalists, which tells through the medium of fiction just how deep and serious KGB manipulation of our media has become.

Sakharov probably hasn't even heard of *The Spike*. But he does have considerable knowledge of the Soviet system and the KGB. He is now its most famous victim, undergoing persecution for having dared to campaign for greater freedom and human rights in the Soviet Union. The New York Times has so far ignored *The Spike*, failing to review it even as it soared in the bestseller lists across the country. But it has done a service in bringing Sakharov's warning to public attention. Here is what this great Soviet scientist and human rights activist has written in The Times about Soviet manipulation of Western thinking.

"A totalitarian system conducts its policy through control from a single center—diplomacy, information and disinformation services inside and outside the country . . . foreign policy of satellite countries and all kinds of clandestine activities—all these are coordinated from a single center.

"Special attention must be paid here to clandestine activities, since a person is inclined to forget something if it is not waved in front of his eyes. The West and developing countries are filled with citizens who by reason of their positions are able to promote Soviet influence and expansionist goals.

"Some of them are motivated by ideas that at least merit discussion. After all, in the Soviet Union, the ideological epicenter, and in China as well, communist ideology is not a complete fraud, not a total delusion.

Sakharov Warns of KGB Manipulation of Western Media

"There are others among such people who conduct themselves in a 'progressive' manner because they consider it profitable, pretigious or fashionable.

"A third category consists of naive, poorly informed or indifferent people who close their eyes and ears to the bitter truth and eagerly swallow any sweet lie.

"Finally, there is the fourth group—people who have been 'bought' in the most direct sense of the word, not always with money. These include some political figures, businessmen, a great many writers and journalists, government advisers, and heads of the press and television. Over all, they make up quite a group of influential people."

Sakharov goes on to point out that the unity of all its forces gives the totalitarian state an advantage over the pluralist West. He says that we face "very difficult times and cruel cataclysms if the West and the developing countries do not now show the required firmness, unity and consistency in resisting the totalitarian challenge. This relates to governments, to the intelligentsia, businessmen, and to all people. It is important that the common danger be fully understood—everything else will then fall in place."

One of the important factors that keeps the West from showing the required firmness and unity is the manipulation of our media and the mesmerizing of many of our opinion molders by the Soviets. This is beautifully illustrated by programs attacking the CIA, aired in rapid succession over public broadcasting, ABC and CBS in May and June. They pictured the CIA as our enemy. They ignored the KGB.

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ON PAGE 1-9

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
1 July 1980

En garde for Olympics

Moscow brings in troops to man tight security system

By David K. Willis
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Moscow Metal detectors and X-ray machines (made in the United States), khaki-clad soldiers armed with Kalashnikov AK-47 automatic rifles, electronic trip-beams guarding no man's land outside tall wire fences, tens of thousands of police patrolling in pairs beneath huge posters of smiling "Misha" bears.

All are part of an unprecedented security screen clamped down around Olympic sites and hotels on the eve of the 1980 games.

Veteran Western residents say they have never seen anything like it in peacetime in Moscow or other Soviet cities.

It reflects several facets of the Soviet character: determination to avoid any Munich-style terrorism or incidents as Moscow becomes the first communist city ever to host an Olympics Games; traditional suspicion of outsiders; KGB certainty that the CIA and other Western agencies are using the tourist influx to conceal spies; and a vigorous effort to break as much contact as possible between ordinary Soviet citizens and tourists at the gleaming, ultramodern Olympic Village, which is light-years ahead of the comfort enjoyed by the average citizen here.

Police pay particular attention to reading matter and notebooks of correspondents and tourists. Already some items have been confiscated.

Here's the airport-type procedure I have to go through to enter the huge Olympic press center building, which has just been opened:

Outside one of the three main entrances, two policemen studiously compare my face with the picture on my accreditation card.

Inside a curtained entryway, I put my briefcase on a moving belt and see it disappear into the depths of an X-ray machine made by a company in Cambridge, Mass. I take out my keys and pens and other metal objects and put them in a plastic tray.

I step through the archway of the metal detector (called "Friskem" and made by a Delaware firm), wait for the all-clear, pick up my briefcase, and step into the interior courtyard.

Police patrol in pairs both around the courtyard and in the corridors of the press center itself, which is vast and well equipped. Correspondents who were in Munich in 1972 and Montreal in 1976 say no such security surrounded press centers there.

When I visited the Olympic Village with the Newsweek correspondent here, we first saw a Soviet infantryman armed with a Kalashnikov stationed every 100 yards or so along the head-high wire fence enclosing the entire area.

Behind the soldiers were wooden barriers, and between the barriers and the fence sets of electronic-beam relay points enclosed in small towers made of green plastic. Presumably the beams are activated at night.

Inside a small wooden hut, we surrendered our precious accreditation cards. In return we received special passes for the village only and walked through a narrow corridor of wire fences, watched by a dozen soldiers and officers, to the cultural center.

From there we were permitted through another checkpoint into the shopping and cafeteria area. With its gleaming stores, repair shops, displays of brightly colored sports equipment, and giant cafeteria, it is a piece of the Western world set down in green fields in a Moscow suburb.

A young blond plainclothes man began following us, a walkie-talkie set under his coat. Every step we took was watched by dozens of soldiers with communications gear in hand, police, and plainclothes agents.

When visiting correspondents check into their hotels, they go through metal detectors and X-ray machines, and then their bags are searched again, with particular attention to reading material.

At the press center, one British journalist had his notebook leafed through. A communist correspondent had his notebook taken away, colleagues report.

Tens of thousands of militiamen (police) have been brought into Moscow from outlying areas. Auxiliary police with red armbands, mainly young people, patrol Moscow's gleaming, modern subway system. For each day they patrol, an extra day is added to their annual vacations from their regular jobs — a bonus apparently causing many to volunteer with alacrity.

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ON PAGE A12

THE WASHINGTON POST
1 July 1980

High-Level Soviet Diplomat Expelled From Iran on Charges of Espionage

By Jay Ross

Washington Post Foreign Service

TEHRAN, June 30 — The Iranian government today announced the expulsion of a high-ranking Soviet diplomat on charges of spying in a move that emphasized the worsening relations between the two countries since the Soviet invasion of neighboring Afghanistan last December.

The Iranian Foreign Ministry said First Secretary Vladimir Golvanov "was arrested last week while contacting and exchanging espionage documents against the interests of the Islamic republic with a foreign national in Tehran."

It added that Golvanov was declared persona non grata and asked to "leave Iranian soil within 24 hours." It was understood that he had already left the country.

A Soviet Embassy official denied any knowledge of the incident and the Iranian government declined to provide any further information.

Among the questions that could not be answered were the identity, nationality and fate of the other foreigner, the nature of the information passed and whether Golvanov was actually imprisoned since last week, which would be a violation of diplomatic immunity.

Golvanov, who had served here for three years, is the first Soviet diplomat to be expelled since the ouster of the regime of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and the assumption of power by the Islamic republic under the leadership of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Two Iraqi diplomats were expelled earlier this year during the flareup of border fighting of Iran and Iraq.

Despite harsh Iranian criticism of the Soviets over Afghanistan, Moscow has sought to take advantage of Iran's even worse relations with the United States because of Tehran's continued holding of the 53 American diplomatic hostages.

Moscow has offered the possibility of increased trade across the border along the Caspian Sea to ease the effect of Western economic sanctions, but there is little evidence of greater traffic in the sparsely populated area.

Last week the Soviets refused to allow Iranian ships to traverse the rivers and canals connecting the Caspian and Black seas.

In addition the countries have been unable to reach agreement on a price for Iran's natural gas, which has been piped to the Soviet Union for years under an agreement reached during the shah's government.

Khomeini has taken the line that Iran is "neither Western nor Eastern." The United States has been termed "the great Satan" but to many Iranians the Soviet Union is "the lesser Satan."

The seized American Embassy has become known to Iranians as the "nest of spies" because of longtime CIA activity, but many have also long accused the Soviets of espionage activity. The shah evicted several Soviet diplomats.

One test of the Soviet determination to continue trying to take advantage of hostile U.S.-Iranian relations will come in Moscow's decision whether to follow normal Soviet practice and expel an Iranian diplomat in Moscow of similar rank.

Although Golvanov was the first Soviet diplomat expelled since Khomeini took power, there was an incident last year in which a Soviet military attaché, Col. Vladimir Lugovskan, was hastily withdrawn after a leftist Iranian politician was arrested on charges of spying for the Soviets. The politician, Mohammed Reza Saddati, is a member of the Mujaheddin guerrilla group and is still in prison awaiting trial.

CONEIN ALSO acknowledged to investigators that he established a "safehouse" in a downtown apartment here and then used the apartment for a private showing of a line of surveillance and assassination equipment sold by the firm of B. R. Fox.

It was disclosed in 1975 that Conein had visited B. R. Fox. News accounts at the time indicated that government spokesmen said that it was an ordinary transaction and only a "few hundred dollars worth" of surveillance equipment was purchased.

But Defeo reported: "Conein, on behalf of DEA, has purchased a total of \$760.80 worth of surveillance equipment from B. R. Fox Laboratories of Alexandria, Va. Conein indicated that sanitized equipment is the kind that cannot be traced to manufacturer or purchaser, and that this is necessary because the government must have deniability."

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ON PAGE A-8

NEW YORK TIMES
1 JULY 1980

Iran Expelling Soviet Envoy as Spy As Relations Continue to Decline

TEHERAN, Iran, June 30 (Reuters) — Iran ordered the expulsion of a Soviet diplomat today for spying.

The diplomat, First Secretary Vladimir Golovanov, who has served in the Soviet Embassy here since September 1977, was declared persona non grata and given 24 hours to leave the country.

A statement issued by the Foreign Ministry said he was picked up last week while handling "espionage documents against the interest of the Islamic Republic of Iran."

The state radio said Mr. Golovanov had been caught handing documents to a foreign resident of Iran. No details were given on the second person or what happened to him.

The Soviet Embassy had no immediate comment on the incident, which marked a further deterioration in relations between the two countries, which have grown increasingly strained in recent months, particularly over the issue of the Soviet intervention in neighboring Afghanistan.

In other developments today, a Justice Ministry investigator insisted that the rape trial of one of the 53 American captives, Michael Moeller, a Marine sergeant, would proceed unless the victim's family could be persuaded to drop the charges.

Trial Under 'International Laws'

The investigator, Ali Akbar Paveneh, said that prosecution, "according to international laws," would probably proceed even if the Iranian Parliament agreed to free the other hostages. The rape victim, identified only as Azem A., was found strangled March 27 near the American Embassy compound. Her brother, Abolnasser, told the authorities he had killed her to protect the family's honor because he believed that she was pregnant by Sergeant Moeller.

[In Loup City, Neb., the accused American's mother, Doris Moeller, told

The Associated Press that she and her husband may consider traveling to Iran if there was a way they could help.

[Meanwhile, President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr said he feared the American hostage crisis might not ever end, United Press International reported. Mr. Bani-Sadr, who was quoted in an interview with the newspaper Bamdad, said that economic sanctions imposed on Iran for refusing to free the hostages had severely hurt the country and that he was now concentrating on developing self-sufficiency programs because "we decided that this problem will never be solved."]

Iranian Government leaders have long stressed that, while they opposed the policies of the United States, the country would not slide into the Soviet camp.

The most recent example of Iranian-Soviet friction over the Afghan intervention was disclosed in a speech two days ago by Mr. Bani-Sadr.

The President said he told the Soviet Ambassador, Vladimir M. Vinogradov, that the spiritual power of Islam, which was victorious in Iran, "will force you to leave Afghanistan."

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ON PAGE A9

THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
2 July 1980

The World

Islamic Clerics Assail Soviets For Spying

Iran's powerful clerical hardliners warned the Soviet Union yesterday that its diplomats may be treated the same way as the 53 captive Americans unless they stop "spying" on Iran.

The warning was contained in the official party newspaper of the Islamic Republican Party. The fundamentalists were responding to Monday's expulsion of a Soviet diplomat accused of spying by warning Moscow that its "spies" would be treated the same way as American agents.

"We were hoping that the fall of the United States Embassy as the largest spy base of America in Iran would be a warning to other oppressors and exploiters."

In Washington, former Attorney General Ramsey Clark asked Congress yesterday to investigate past American actions in Iran, try to lift the sanctions President Carter imposed on Tehran and meet with Iranian legislators.

At a luncheon hosted by Rep. John Conyers, D-Mich., and the Fund for New Priorities, a liberal political group, Clark, who recently traveled to Iran without a State Department okay, told House members that such conciliatory moves might not free the hostages who have been held since Nov. 4. But at least, he said, such moves would help quell the anti-American mood in Iran.

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BOOKS AND AUTHORS

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ON PAGE 17

PUBLISHER'S WEEKLY
27 JUNE 1980

Snepp Delivers First Novel, With a Challenge, to CIA

Frank Snepp, reluctantly complying with Supreme Court orders, has turned over to the CIA the manuscript of his first novel, "Convergence of Interest," for prepublication review. But in doing so, Snepp challenged the CIA's right to review fiction, urged the CIA not to censor or make changes in the manuscript and threatened to take the agency to court if it does so.

"I as a private citizen, caught up in an extraordinary circumstance, will be obliged to resist you again," Snepp said in a letter he hand-delivered to the CIA along with the manuscript. "Any deletions you might press for in my novel, any demands for amended language, any insistence on a showing of sources, will be met head-on and, if necessary, in court."

He added in an interview with *PW*: "My inclination is to refuse to do any kind of compromising whatsoever and to go directly to court. It's a matter of principle. I am the first American to be forced under threat of criminal penalty to submit a novel for censorship or to even make a gesture in that direction," Snepp said.

He said he and his lawyer don't believe court rulings, upheld by the Supreme Court last February, require him to comply with any changes demanded by the CIA.

"Convergence of Interest" presumably is of interest to the CIA because the plot has the CIA involved in the assassination of President Kennedy. "My novel is particularly provocative because it does deal with a CIA oper-

ative," but not with a CIA intelligence operation, Snepp said. It also reflects his own cynicism with CIA operations, he added.

Snepp, a former CIA agent, has no contract for the book, but has given the option to Random House, publisher of his first book, "Decent Interval," about the last days of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. It was that book that led to the landmark Supreme Court ruling upholding the CIA's right to review manuscripts by current and former employees.

In his cover letter to the CIA, Snepp told the agency that if it persisted in reviewing the novel, "You will be setting a terrible precedent, opening the way to a regime of censorship and government manipulation of the individual that can know no limits." He urged the return of his manuscript "Forthwith."

Snepp told *PW* that his action in submitting the manuscript puts the onus on the CIA. Apparently the agency has not yet determined how it will deal with Snepp's novel. Spokesmen refused to say definitely what would be done with the manuscript. Snepp said he had learned after he submitted the book that meetings were held in the CIA to discuss the agency's right to review fiction. He didn't know the outcome. The CIA has 30 days to complete its review.

HOWARD FIELDS



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ON PAGE C-1

WASHINGTON STAR
29 JUNE 1980

washington life

Snepp Takes On the CIA Again

By Randy Sue Coburn
Washington Star Staff Writer

Tacked on the bulletin board over Frank Snepp's desk are a dozen Magic-Marked sheets of paper listing useful phrases like "without a glimmer of compassion" and "he attempted a feeble smile." They served as cue cards of sorts during the former CIA officer's writing of his recently completed novel, "Convergence of Interest."

The story of a CIA official who becomes involved in an assassination plot against President Kennedy, the novel has not yet been shipped off to the writer's publisher. First it must be cleared by the CIA.

"Convergence of Interest" is Frank Snepp's first novel. It is not, of course, his first book. That was "Decent Interval," a detailed, non-fiction account of American conduct during the Vietnam withdrawal. And it was "Decent Interval" — published in 1977 without CIA authorization — that got Snepp into the business of clearing his fiction with the agency.

Snepp was an intelligence analyst at the American embassy in Saigon throughout the ceasefire period. In "Decent Interval," he contended that the American evacuation from Vietnam was both dishonorable and damaging, but he emphasized that he built his case without utilizing classified material or endangering the covers of operating agents.

Snepp insisted his book did not violate his secrecy agreement with the agency. The agency insisted it did. In court, the agency won.

As a result of his case, Snepp owes

the government all personal profits from "Decent Interval," a figure that currently stands at \$140,000 — including his \$22,000 advance plus expense money, all of which he says is long gone. These days, he's consulting with accountants to determine how he's going to pay taxes on his relinquished profits.

The court also ordered Snepp to obtain CIA clearance for the novel he just finished, an order Snepp wanted to defy.

"But I complied," he said, "because I've just come through massive litigation that throws my patriotism, morals and integrity into question. If I were to engage in an outright violation of these orders, my critics would go on the rampage, the issue would be lost in the hoopla and I'd be thrown in jail."

So he settled for accompanying his manuscript with an impassioned letter urging the CIA's general counsel to agree with him that novels are not — and should not be — subject to the agency's clearance process, through its Publications Review Board.

If the agency didn't understand the dangers of censoring fiction, he wrote, "you would already have hauled the Buckleys, the McCarrys, the Hunts and various other spook-turned novelists into the dock... the available evidence clearly points to a double standard at work."

In a lighter tone, he suggested the only damage his novel might inflict is "boredom on a reader who has the right to expect better for the tariff."

In return, Snepp received a terse acknowledgment of his manuscript's arrival on June 10.

"If they try to change one thing," Snepp said, "we'll end up in court again. And believe me, I'm not looking forward to it."

According to Frank Snepp's vision of how life should proceed, he would not pass his 37th year without making a lot of money on his novel. "Despite these august surroundings," Snepp said, referring to his sparsely furnished, \$373-a-month Arlington apartment, "I don't know where next month's rent is coming from. And I can hardly afford to eat, let alone to move."

He still has his credit cards, though. Depressed after submitting his novel to the CIA, he decided to dine grandly on plastic money at Germaine's. In that pricey Asian restaurant, Snepp feels at home, possibly because most of the waiters and the proprietress herself have read "Decent Interval." That he was not presented with a bill at the end of his meal indicates not only their opinion of his book, but unspoken sympathy for his money problems.

Before Snepp's case went to the Supreme Court, his publisher — Random House — had loaned Snepp about \$12,000 in the mistaken belief that he was a good risk. "We were always aware of the possibility of litigation," said Snepp's editor, Robert Loomis, "but this went way beyond what anybody expected."

The first dollop of advance money for Snepp's next two unwritten books — a survey of his case, called "Irreparable Harm," which is what Snepp stood accused of doing to the government, plus another novel — already has been deposited in an escrow account, which currently holds \$106,000.

Snepp said he's received loans from "very prominent people I can't name," and every now and then he receives some money in the mail. His girlfriend in France, the bikini-clad blonde memorialized on his living room wall in several photographs, sent \$200 the other day.

"That's how I'm eating now," he said. When asked if other good friends are helping, Snepp attempted, as his cue cards say, a feeble smile.

After a lengthy pause, he could name only two people who come under that heading "good friend" — his editor and his lawyer. In the course of several hours, during which Snepp calmly and meticulously analyzed the forces that have isolated him, his phone rang once. Although he had set his recording machine to intercept calls, he jumped up to answer. It was a wrong number.

Last February, on the day of Supreme Court decision, Snepp heard only from his mother. She couldn't understand why her son was so depressed. "But you're famous," she insisted.

CONTINUED

Snepp sees his "faithless" label as terminating friendships with fellow agents who had supported his determination to write "Decent Interval." He says he learned in the course of his case that Pat and Bill Johnson, two of his best friends and heroes in his book, unsuccessfully conspired with the agency to incriminate him by offering classified documents. His fingers fly through stacks of Xeroxed memos before pulling the one about Daphne Miller, a former girlfriend and CIA employee who, after they broke up, reported to superiors all she knew about the book he was writing.

Having a namesake who's been so severely reprimanded by the Supreme Court is no boon to the career of Snepp's father, a North Carolina Superior Court judge. So Snepp now avoids Charlotte, especially since his mother, who's divorced from his father, likes to notify the local press when he visits.

Worst of all to Snepp, the 10 Vietnamese families he helped evacuate have severed connections with him.

"They don't understand American law," he said. "They think they'll get into trouble."

Because he considers himself a political moderate — he does not condemn covert operations and does not endorse the dismantling of the CIA — Snepp feels his University audiences don't quite know what to make of him. Similarly, Snepp's American Civil Liberties Union lawyer, Mark Lynch, tells of colleagues who theorize that Snepp willingly set himself up for litigation to give the Agency a legal weapon to use against other, more vociferous dissident agents, like Phillip Agee and John Stockwell.

While Snepp promises he'd be insulted to be defended by anyone who supports Agee, the man is obviously no darling of the right, either. But even some conservative pundits who cheer his punishment are uneasy that the Snepp ruling might be broadly interpreted to censor any public servant who's ever dealt with confidential material.

"I'm like someone with a terminal disease," Snepp said. "Nobody knows how to behave toward me. The point is, there's no maneuvering room for a political moderate."

Snepp holds such constricted space responsible for radicalizing former colleagues like Stockwell ("In Search of Enemies"), Agee and Victor Marchetti ("The CIA and The Cult of Intelligence"). It seems to be an interesting puzzle to him, just barely a personal matter.

"They had invested a kind of blind faith in the agency," Snepp said, "and when it was undermined, they reached out for another. The exposures stunned me, but not so much that I felt I had to embrace something new."

After he finishes the book about his case, which unquestionably will have to be cleared with the agency, Snepp doesn't plan to deal with Vietnam again: "It's like staring at the sun too long — it blinds you to everything else."

Still, the injunction prevents him from writing without clearance about anything he learned as a result of his employment with the agency, and it's likely his next projected novel — a romance set in Saigon about an agent and a French woman — will be seen in that light.

"I'd have to have a frontal lobotomy," Snepp said, "to wipe out everything I've learned as a result of my time with the agency. Even in writing my novel, I really couldn't say that, for instance, my cynicism about certain characters didn't derive from my experience."

Seeing no profession besides novelist open to him, Snepp still follows the regimen begun with "Decent Interval." He writes five hours every day and then, as he says in his formal way, "I indulge in rigorous exercise."

That means running seven to 10 miles and swimming for 45 minutes at the Fun and Fitness Health Club on Lee Highway. While the activity obviously enhances his tan and his sturdy good looks, Snepp calls it therapy; he has to wear himself out before he can fall into anything approximating a sound sleep.

As his bulletin board testifies, Snepp did not exactly find writing fiction a remarkably harmonious meeting of mind and mode. Following the advice of another intrigue writer, Grahame Greene, he's learned that wine at night improves the ear for dialogue produced during the day. And since his world view is hardly lighthearted, he's obviously come some distance from when he considered his editor's idea that he write fiction "a joke."

Once the CIA is done with "Convergence of Interest," Snepp believes that the book will, in a parlance that probably will never leave him, "float." As Snepp's editor said, "I don't think they'd cut it up to where we couldn't publish it."

On his last visit to the bank, Snepp remembered, he ran into former CIA director William Colby, who came forth with a publishing prediction of his own.

"He told me," said Snepp, "that I should be able to make a lot of money on the novel because of all the publicity. I said that's a hell of a way to make a literary name."

But angry and fearful as he is about further censorship, Snepp still can't discount the possibility that his mother and William Colby are probably right about that.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE **F-8**

WASHINGTON STAR
29 JUNE 1980

PUBLISHING By Hilary Mills CIA review on Hunt befuddling

E. Howard Hunt says he would "never fall into the problems" that now plague former CIA agent Frank Snepp — who has just been forced to submit the manuscript of his novel *Convergence of Interest* to the agency for censorship — because Hunt has "never violated" his agreement with the agency to submit his books, whether fiction or non-fiction, for pre-publication review.

In a recent interview, Hunt said his new novel (and 54th book), *The Hargrave Deception*, was cleared by the agency. His publisher, Stein & Day, confirms this, citing a release letter to Hunt dated Aug. 29, 1979, from John Greaney, associate general counsel of the CIA (now resigned).

Despite this official letter, the agency seems to be wallowing in a cloud of misinformation about which of Hunt's manuscripts have been cleared and which haven't.

On March 6, 1980, eight months after Hunt's novel had apparently been cleared, two members of the CIA's Public Affairs Office (which now oversees the CIA's formal review board, set up in 1977) testified before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. They were Herbert Hetu, director of public affairs, and Charles Wilson, executive secretary of public affairs.

As a transcript of that hearing reveals, Wilson was asked by Rep. Les Aspin, "Does Howard Hunt submit his spy novels?" Wilson's reply: "No." Aspin then asked Hetu, "But has Mr. Hunt never submitted his spy novels?" Mr. Hetu answered, "No."

Sources also indicate that back in May 1978, Ernest Mayerfeld, deputy general counsel of the CIA, wrote a letter to Frank Snepp's lawyers which stated that a 1973 novel of Hunt's, *Give Us This Day*, had only been "informally" cleared and had not been subjected to official review.

In trying to clear up this discrepancy with the agency, I learned quite a lot about the CIA's befuddled review process. Unable at first to get through to Hetu or Mayerfeld, a CIA spokesperson got on the phone and, after checking, said the transcript of the congressional hearing was being "corrected." (It's worth noting that the transcript had already been screened by the agency at least once before it was released to the public without this correction.)

Apparently after the hearing and after the initial screening process, Hetu and Wilson decided to research the accuracy of their statement about Hunt's submissions and discovered that they were wrong, that *The Hargrave Deception* (the only one mentioned) had, in fact, been cleared. Now remember, this was sworn testimony before Congress by two top-ranking members of the CIA responsible for reviewing manuscripts; even they didn't know that Hunt's manuscript had been cleared six months previously. No one, by the way, could find a copy of that newly-corrected transcript.

Mayerfeld then apparently told this spokesperson that "he really couldn't remember" what he said in his letter to Snepp's lawyers and that the only way to get that information was by obtaining the letter through the Freedom of Information Act. Exasperated, I finally asked the spokesperson if she would check to see if all of Hunt's spy novels had been cleared by the agency. She said she would.

Phoning her the following afternoon, however, Herbert Hetu got on the phone and said it would take "50" researchers to check the files on Hunt's submissions since prior to 1977 there was only an informal and badly organized review process. Hetu did admit, however, that William F. Buckley Jr., another ex-agent, has never submitted his spy novels.

Snepp, meanwhile, has submitted his novel only because he is under a court injunction to do so and because the agency has taken all of his earnings (including typing and traveling fees) from his unauthorized book, *Decent Interval*. Since he is \$40,000 in debt he is acquiescing to the agency although he asked the agency for speedy action to exempt a work of fiction from the clearance process. He's just received a reply from John F. Payton, assistant general counsel, however, saying the manuscript has been forwarded to the official review board.

PETERSBURG PROGRESS INDEX (VA)
5 June 1980

And On The Credit Side

There may be nothing unusual about the fact the Central Intelligence Agency continues to show up in the news in various ways more often than not as an object of criticism. For several years we have had open season on the agency. A continuing effort seeks to achieve agreement on a charter specifying what it and other intelligence agencies should be allowed to do and should not be allowed to do.

Of comparable importance may be the need to have the executive branch and the White House to which it reports pay more attention to what it reports.

On the critical side is a new book, *Wilderness of Warriors*, by David C. Martin, detailing alleged CIA blunders over a period of 30 years and giving special attention to two officials identified as the former chief counterspy and former leading covert operator.

According to the author, the CIA did only what a series of administrations instructed it to do; that it was "asked to do things nobody should have been asked to do, had been given secret powers no one should have been given."

In the current news is a story of a different kind. A Wisconsin congressman, a Democrat, who is chairman of the oversight subcommittee of the House intelligence committee, says the administration in the case of Cuban refugees is guilty of converting "a great intelligence success into a great national disaster."

He says that if the administration had believed the CIA, it could have done a better job of holding back the floodgates of the vast influx and "could have made good propaganda out of these people leaving." Instead, a "floundering" administration declared a closed-door policy, then an open-door policy, then a closed-door policy again. The foregoing seems to accord only too well with the facts.

On January 30 the CIA's Cuba Analytic Center reported the Castro regime might again resort to large-scale emigration to reduce discontent resulting from the country's economic deterioration.

State Department sources do not deny that warnings were received. The nearest thing to a defense is that the CIA reports did not predict the extent or the timing of the flood of refugees, that they only suggested the possibility of a huge exodus.

We may wonder whether the attitude toward the reports was attributable to the criticism and disfavor visited upon the CIA. Also in the field of information and warnings, it has been criticized for failure to issue warnings of the approaching upheaval in Iran. However, in the case of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, there have been reports the CIA was on its toes and was supplying advance warnings but that they were ignored by the State Department and the White House.

Admittedly a great deal depends upon whether a government suspected of launching an invasion, a mass exodus, or whatever, carries through on its intention. Whether or not the executive branch should jump into a state of high preparedness every time it receives warnings, it should give them serious study depending upon the gravity of the subject. It looks as if in this case the CIA has been performing well and has not been taken seriously enough.

The credit side of its record deserves notice.

This week the Senate by vote of 89 to 1 approved a measure which, instead of being the restrictive charter greatly favored four years ago, would leave the CIA more or less alone. That is, it would be required to report to the intelligence committees of the Senate and House, not to as many as eight committees. The House had passed a similar bill.

From all of which it may be inferred Senator Moynihan's description of the CIA as a "seriously injured institution" evokes large agreement. Perhaps the lessons of the past have been learned. In light of recent reports pertaining to Cuba and Afghanistan, it might be a good idea to attach a provision requiring someone in the White House to spend at least 30 minutes studying each warning which is received from the CIA.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 37VILLAGE VOICE
1 JULY 1980**BOOKS****Dallas Again:
The Plot Sickens**

By Eliot Fremont-Smith

CONSPIRACY. By Anthony Summers.
McGraw-Hill. \$17.95.

That the Warren Commission investigation of the JFK assassination was inadequate has been known for a very long time. That it was under great psychological pressure to find no conspiracy has also been long known. (President Johnson believed Castro ordered the assassination, but didn't want such a verdict because that could mean war.) More recently, it has become a fact of record that the commission was deliberately lied to on crucial matters by both the FBI and the CIA. Beyond this, a hundred loose ends have been dangling in the wind for over 16 years, hardly a single aspect of the event—from the extraordinarily unprofessional and bungled autopsy on—has failed to raise disturbing questions.

Yet, until very recently, I, for one, have resisted conspiracy interpretations. The reasons are many—Anthony Summers has a good compendium of them at the beginning of his book—and they certainly include wish. Once in a while, at least, things are as they seem; not everything is the result of some complex, calculated, hidden plot. My resistance to conspiracy theory in general is based on evidence of my own experience: convenience, coincidence, and ignorance are usually the true conspirators in what looks to some like planned design—as well as on a self-defensive refusal to accept paranoia as a way of life.

In the Oswald matter, until recently, it has not been a great strain to prefer, despite all the loose ends and oddities, the Oswald-did-it-and-did-it-alone interpretation to all others. In the first place, it was the simplest theory (and had, and still has, an abundance of circumstantial and psychological support); rival theories seemed (and still seem) overburdened with complexity. I think (want to think, of course, but still do think) that very few secrets are kept, and hardly any that in-

volve more than two people. It's been 16 years since Dallas and every conspiracy theory of the assassination involves large numbers of people as well as amazing timing, prescience, and luck. To believe Ruby was mandated to murder Oswald (for crucial instance) is to believe Dallas police officials were also part of an overall assassination plot and kept Ruby informed as to when the actual prison transfer would take place—for Ruby was late, and had the transfer taken place as scheduled, Oswald might be alive today.

Then, too, the evidence of the conspiracy theorists was usually suspect and presented with irresponsible assertion. Enormous fuss was made over photos ("doctored" and/or of "doubles") without any hint that photos can fool. Photographic evidence must always be suspect; Summers thinks that an analysis of a blob in an old and damaged snap of the grassy knoll will reveal a head, presumably of a second gunman. Well, it certainly should be analyzed, but I can tell you now that a "head" will not be definitively distinguishable from an accident of light or a chemical fault. Technology still has its limits, and they are far more humbling than technologists willingly admit.

Likewise, Summers is too certain (as is Andrew Hacker in the current *New York Review of Books*) that the recently discovered acoustical tape of the assassination, recorded accidentally by a motorcycle police escort in Dealy Plaza, proves that there were four shots (and therefore a second gunman, and therefore a conspiracy). The best acoustical analysis suggests four shots, but the best is not exact enough to prove anything; one is talking here of experts' estimates of likelihoods of what's on a very messy tape, above the motorcycle's noise and, apparently, noise from other sources (the tape is a police headquarters dictabelt, with various messages coming in). So, technology, I maintain, can only raise possibilities and likelihoods, not establish irrefutable truth

of what was going down on November 22, 1963.

Which leaves circumstantial evidence. And it is this, I believe, that has shifted the balance—or anyway now does shift it in Summers's huge, exhaustive, deeply unsettling book. I haven't gone over to the other side, but I am persuaded that the Oswald-alone theory no longer outweighs conspiracy.

What Summers (a BBC reporter) has done is assemble all the latest information, much of it from the huge (though truncated) findings of the House Select Committee on Assassinations, and present it, with apparent scrupulousness, in the form of a detailed inquiry of the coincidences, questions, and loose ends. And there are simply too many of them, and they cut too deeply, for easy dismissal. What they point to is a conspiracy of Oswald, the CIA, the mafia, and possibly certain anti-Castro exile groups, to murder the president and cover up the murder in order (1) to prevent a diplomatic rapprochement with Cuba that Kennedy was exploring (a fact, and only recently revealed—though it does not follow that rapprochement was settled policy or would have been successful), and (2) to put a halt on the administration's (specifically Attorney General Robert Kennedy's) war on organized crime in America.

Beyond all the loose ends and discrepancies (e.g., if Oswald was such a good shot, and he may have been; now come he missed General Walker?—indeed, why Walker at all?), the scenario rests on two interrelated series of facts that have come to light in recent years. The first is that the CIA has lied over and over again on matters connected with the assassination—from its awareness of Oswald to its plots with mafia figures to kill or disable Castro, plots that we now know were carried on without Kennedy's knowledge (in 1963) and in subversion of whatever diplomatic normalization he had directed be explored.

At which point one must distinguish between the monolith CIA and the CIA as composed of elements that, by system as well as paranoia, operate independently. It is Summers's supposition that the Cuba element was out of control (again, we know this to be true to some degree, both in the Bay of Pigs and Watergate phenomena), and that the CIA as monolith was not fully cognizant of its activities—though both Allen Dulles and Richard Helms knew something and committed perjury.

CONTINUED

In a nutshell: insofar as Cuba was concerned, this element in the CIA, operating on its own but protected at the top (it shouldn't get around, *whatever the stakes*), that the CIA was wholly disorganized), was bent on its own foreign policy, even if it meant treason and assassination of the president. (About the same thing when you come right down to it; one is the expression of the other. Read Gordon Liddy: to the mundane mind, clandestine commitment is absolute—it means *no limits*.)

The Oswald connection? It is both foggy and definite. The foginess, which is all over, could be dismissed except for the definite part—which is that the CIA lied and spread “disinformation” about its connections with Oswald (who appears to have been a low-level agent, possibly a double-agent with CIA knowledge), and appears to have deliberately hidden and destroyed evidence pertinent to the assassination inquiry. The FBI, which has also destroyed evidence (as has the Pentagon), seems to have played a lesser role, and also more definable: J. Edgar Hoover protecting his incompetency, contacts with the underworld, and perceived mission for the FBI, to subvert the liberal-left at home (the FBI program to destroy Martin Luther King was just starting).

The second, really dovetailing part of the scenario, involves the mafia—beginning with the CIA's recruitment of top figures in organized crime to participate in disabling Castro, and ending (?) with the extraordinary connections of nearly everyone involved in the assassination and its aftermath with the mafia. (Only Michael and Ruth Paine, who befriended Oswald in Dallas and introduced him to the ACLU, seem exempt; and even this detail has peculiarities, with Oswald calling the ACLU for info on how to start a chapter just after the Paines had taken him to one.)

Moreover, the mafia connections lead either to Cuba or to the Dallas police, with small-time hood Ruby extremely and inexplicably busy at both ends, and police (who, in amazing numbers, knew Ruby, and may have kept him abreast of the transfer and let him in a side-door, not mentioned in any official report but there all the same) who are not interrogated, or refuse to answer questions, or demand lie-detector tests they then fail. It is most peculiar; Summers's book is, at the least, profoundly disorienting.

Style can count for too much. Summers's style seems responsible; what hyperboles there are are tamed in a wealth of meticulousness. Summers is a fussbudget, but keeps his claims in check. His hypothesis is labeled as that and is open-ended. He doesn't have the answers, and is honest about the extravagant implications of any Oswald-plus thesis. The central implication is that if there was a conspiracy, it wasn't narrow or two-bit; it reached into very high spheres of our government and very high officials knowingly covered up treason. It does boggle.

As I say, I'm not ready to buy outright Summers's conspiracy theory—the network he suggests is too extensive and too complicated, and too many people (both mundane and frenzied “patriots”) are included who won't talk even though their basic loyalty and personal integrity is on the line. But the force of his compilation is such that I can no longer say that the Oswald-alone theory makes better sense, or even has satisfactory coherence. The suspension of disbelief seems now commanded in regard to the most painful scenario possible—the stuff of fiction, in point of fact the stuff of John Ehrlichman's most arresting Nixon fiction—and likewise the suspension of belief in Oswald as the lone and lucky assassin. I say “suspension,” and I mean just that—Summers's book does not make conspiracy easy or easily assimilable; but it raises so many specific questions that some of them must be answered before anyone can say again that Oswald-alone makes better sense than some horrendous alternative.

Summers ends his book with a startling find and plea. The find is that, even during and after the House Committee report, the major press did and has done nothing to investigate seriously (on a par, say, with Watergate) the JFK assassination. He documents this with wishes like my own, plus an assumption that dissent is a job for kooks (he doesn't say this, but it's also true—that the major media does not wish to prove kooks right), plus understandable tiredness. *Oswald again? That's 16 years ago.* Also patriotism: We clearly need some kind of functioning CIA (it was right about the hostages), so don't rock the boat. And it is possible that the full truth about the assassination would destroy the CIA as we know it—an almost inevitable, if temporary, consequence of a finding of official and calculated treason.

Yet what is the job of the press if not to follow leads of national interest and consciousness? Summers offers many leads (many still alive) in his book. It is important that we know if a major instrument of government has worked by extreme means for extreme ends to destroy an elected (for good or ill) government policy. If it has happened, it must not happen again; and the only safeguard for this is, truly, the truth. And then, finally, there is justice, and the rule of law. On murder, there is no statute of limitations.

I worry for my country, myself, those dear to me. There are many problems, and solutions are not in sight. For a long time I thought the JFK assassination was, whatever the regrets and “only ifs” and remembered trauma and mourning, not a problem. At least we had the most sensible answer to that: Lee Harvey Oswald, misfit, shot and killed the president by happenstance and alone; it could happen anywhere, any time, one of those things. And I fought the good fight to maintain that belief—that most likely of possibilities.

No more. I now think it is possible that the Kennedy assassination was the most far reaching state crime ever committed in this country. If so, the culprits are undetected, and some are still alive, and a criminal government still exists. If not so, we need to know that too. For the press, it should be the biggest story ever. So why doesn't it move? I know why. I've told why in this review. The excuses are understandable in hindsight; they don't suffice now.

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MISCELLANEOUS

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 2

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
2 July 1980

CIA complains to CBS on covert-action report

New York

Frank C. Carlucci, deputy director of US central intelligence, has formally objected to a recent CBS Report titled "Return of the CIA" which accused the CIA of reviving the use of covert actions.

In a letter addressed to the new CBS president, Thomas H. Wyman

(with a copy sent to The Christian Science Monitor), Mr. Carlucci accused the documentary of "selectively combining 25-year-old facts and footage with current interviews and innuendo to convince the audience that covert action is virtually our only activity. [CBS] Correspondent [Ed] Bradley says the return of covert action and the return of the CIA are synonymous. This is a distortion which underestimates the intelligence of your audience and does a disservice to our many dedicated people who work in the collection and analysis area."

Monitor TV critic Arthur Unger points out, however, that Mr. Carlucci does not deny that the CIA is involved in covert actions.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE B15THE WASHINGTON POST
1 July 1980**JACK ANDERSON**

The Real Culprits in Security Foul-Ups

Intelligence officials are prowling the halls of Congress, trying to convince lawmakers that the laws governing intelligence activities should be tightened. Congressional access to this information, the spooks argue, must be strictly limited.

But the pathetic truth is that it's not loose-lipped members of Congress who are the worst violators of security. It's the intelligence agencies themselves. I've documented this in the past; now I have two examples that would be funny if they didn't involve serious security foul-ups.

The first case concerns the super-secret National Security Agency at Fort Meade, Md. Of all the nation's intelligence agencies, this is — or should be — the most sensitive. Its specialty is satellite spying and intercepting coded foreign communications.

To protect its secrets, the NSA had Marine guards posted throughout its headquarters building to keep employees from going into areas they didn't have clearance for. Then, in October 1978, the NSA brass adopted a nifty new system. It replaced the Marines with civilian guards and gave each security-cleared employee a battery-operated, electronically coded badge. This touched off an alarm if the employee wandered into an area not authorized by his or her clearance.

There was one awkward flaw in the super-duper badge system: If someone walked past a checkpoint with no badge at all, the alarm didn't go off. The security geniuses at NSA discovered this after a couple of months when a woman — fortunately not a Soviet spy — got lost looking for a bank office and wandered into the

agency's most sensitive area.

The second example involves the Central Intelligence Agency. About 15 years ago, sources told my associate Dale Van Atta, a technician with a mechanical knack discovered a weakness in the combination locks the agency used on its file cabinets here and abroad. Without any tools, he could open any file cabinet in five or 10 minutes.

The technician — again, fortunately, a patriotic American and not a potential traitor — devised a simple way of solving the problem. His suggestion was ignored.

Exasperated after several years of official shrugging, the employee finally made a challenge to the CIA. Stripped to his underwear and locked in a roomful of file cabinets, he would open them all. Taken up on his challenge, he proceeded to do precisely that.

Instead of congratulations or an award, the technician got nothing but grief from his bosses, who condemned him for meddling in affairs that were none of his business.

The CIA later adopted the employee's suggestion, but let it fall into disuse. As a result, "anyone with equal mechanical ability can discover how to open filing cabinets here and abroad, and any disaffected former employee can use this method against the agency," a CIA source said.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-11

WASHINGTON STAR
28 JUNE 1980

Cord Meyer

Testimony from a Soviet defector

In spite of modern communications, the Atlantic Ocean sometimes seems like an impassable moat as in the failure of the American press to cover the recent defection to the British of the most interesting KGB officer to change sides in a long time.

In a healthy break with previous practice, the Thatcher government made Ilya Dzhirkvelov available to *The Times* of London as soon as he had been determined to be an authentic defector and not a double agent. Instead of being kept under wraps to protect the fragile structure of detente, he was given the chance to tell his story last month in a series of five fascinating interviews run prominently in *The Times* but given no coverage here.

This defector lacks the towering indignation of a Solzhenitsyn or the moral lucidity of a Sakharov. But his testimony, coming from a middle-level official, is probably more representative of how a great many Russians feel and carries a message both of warning and hope to worried Westerners.

In this mid-50s, Ilya Dzhirkvelov was of Georgian birth like Stalin and he still has an ambivalent respect for the dead dictator. As a true-believing Marxist, he joined the secret police at an early age and rose through the ranks of the

KGB's first directorate until he was assigned, under Tass cover, to serve as a Soviet agent in Africa. His last post was press officer for the World Health Organization in Geneva, where his KGB assignment was to orchestrate covert Soviet propaganda throughout the specialized agencies of the U.N. Exposed over the years to the realities of life in the West in contrast to the distorted version fed by the regime to the Russian people, he became completely disillusioned with the Communist Party elite. He came to see them as a self-appointed and self-serving "aristo-bureaucracy" living behind a wall of special privilege and self-deception.

Finally, with his career at a dead end as the result of what he claims is pervasive favoritism, the invasion of Afghanistan was for him the last straw. By ingenious advance planning, he managed to escape safely, with his wife and child, to England and was given political asylum. Having left no hostages behind, there were no threats the regime could use against him; and he leaped at the chance to tell his story to *The Times*.

Regarding Soviet policy in Africa which he saw at first hand, Dzhirkvelov is devastating in his criticism. Although he is convinced there are very few true-believing Marxists left in the Soviet bureaucracy, the men in the Politburo demanded a

rigid application of ideological doctrine that had no relevance to complex African tribal problems. As a result, they sank huge sums in a series of abortive communist coups from Tanzania to the Sudan.

He sees the Soviet military intervention with Cuban troops in Angola and Ethiopia as a gambler's throw to turn the tide, which at least temporarily succeeded because of Western failure to meet the challenge.

More frightening for the future is his description of the extent to which the Politburo is continuously and deliberately misled by ambitious party careerists down the line who report to the Kremlin what they think it wants to hear about the increasing strength of communist movements. This is a species of dangerous self-deception that many thought went out of fashion with the death of Stalin but Dzhirkvelov gives numerous recent examples.

In fact, he thinks that the Soviet lunge into the quagmire of Afghanistan was prompted by just such a combination of ideological preconceptions at the top and careerist-motivated disinformation from below. He reports a consensus among his KGB colleagues in Geneva that the Afghan invasion was "a senseless and irrational step. We thought it was complete

madness."

Dzhirkvelov is even more critical of the regime's over-centralized attempt to control every aspect of economic and cultural life. For everyone except the ruling elite with its privileged access to special stores, economic conditions are described as "catastrophic." He sees a direct connection between the permanent scarcity of consumer goods and the ruinous increase of alcoholism and widespread bribery.

As *The Times* editorializes, this loss of faith in the official ideology and this disastrous failure of the system to meet consumer needs may further tempt Brezhnev and his heirs to seek justification for their privileged rule in foreign military triumphs that can appeal to Russian chauvinism. Military power is, after all, the one solid achievement of this aristo-bureaucracy, and they have demonstrated the will to use it.

If the U.S. and its Western allies can summon up in time the strength to contain Russian expansionism, there is eventual hope for a more open society in the accumulating dissatisfactions that Dzhirkvelov so vividly describes. He sees a portent of changes to come in "the immense growth" of the Russian audience that listens to Western radio broadcasts.

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SPY SLANDER

(ALEXANDRIA) -- THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WILL BE THE FOCUS OF A TRIAL BEGINNING WEDNESDAY IN ALEXANDRIA FEDERAL COURT -- WITH ONE OF ITS FORMER AGENTS CHARGING HIS FORMER AGENCY BOSS WITH SLANDER.

39-YEAR-OLD CHRISTIAN PHILIP LIECHTY WAS A C-I-A OPERATIONS OFFICER IN SOUTH KOREA FROM 1969 TO 1974, AND WAS FIRED TWO YEARS AGO.

BUT LIECHTY'S TWO (N)MILLION DOLLAR LAWSUIT STEMS MORE DIRECTLY FROM HIS FIGHT FOR CUSTODY OF HIS EIGHT-YEAR-OLD DAUGHTER. DURING THAT BATTLE, LIECHTY'S WIFE HAD HIS FORMER SUPERVISOR AT THE SPY AGENCY, ROBERT BODROGHY, TESTIFY AGAINST HIM.

LIECHTY WAS CALLED A VIOLENT MAN, WHO ONCE THREATENED TO KILL A COLLEAGUE OVER A WORK DISAGREEMENT. LIECHTY LOST THE CUSTODY FIGHT AND FILED THE SUIT AGAINST BODROGHY.

BUT LIECHTY CLAIMS BODROGHY TESTIFIED AGAINST HIM BECAUSE OF HATRED DATING BACK TO THEIR DISAGREEMENTS IN KOREA.

TO PROVE THAT POINT, HIS LAWYERS HAVE ASKED FOR REAMS OF DOCUMENTS DETAILING THAT OPERATION. THOSE DOCUMENTS INCLUDE BODROGHY'S ACCUSATIONS THAT THE AGENCY COVERED UP HIS DISCOVERY OF BRIBES TO U-S CONGRESSMEN FROM KOREAN OFFICIALS.

THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT HAS STEPPED IN AND MARKED MUCH OF THE MATERIAL "CLASSIFIED" BECAUSE OF NATIONAL SECURITY.

BUT LIECHTY'S LAWYER, THOMAS FAY, SAYS -- QUOTING NOW -- "THE ONLY SECURITY ISSUES ARE ABOUT THE SECURITY OF A FEW CONGRESSMEN WHO WERE NEVER PROSECUTED FOR TAKING BRIBES."

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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE B3THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
1 July 1980

Deal to Start on Slander Suit of Ex-CIA Agent

By Jane Mayer
Washington Star Staff Writer

A case that one Justice Department official privately calls "the weirdest damn thing I've ever seen" will go on trial tomorrow in Alexandria's federal court.

The case began as a child-custody fight between a Bethesda man and his wife. But it has since become "the strangest way to bring a grievance against the CIA," the Justice official said.

In the middle of it all will be a tall, thin, embittered man — proper, even stiff, with a habit of colorless suits and strained smiles.

The man is Christian Philip Liechty, a 39-year-old spy who looks perfect for the part — but apparently wasn't.

Liechty was a CIA operations officer in South Korea between 1969 and 1974, and was fired two years ago by the agency.

He claims he lost his job for trying to blow the whistle on corruption and skulduggery within the CIA ranks in South Korea.

In a soft voice filled with irony, Liechty depicts himself as a martyr.

But others have mocked that notion, painting a picture of Liechty as an unstable, obsessed man, lost in a crusade against the CIA.

In either case, for more than six months, he has been preparing to place the CIA on trial this week.

His case does not follow the pattern of other CIA dissidents, like Frank Snepp and John Stockwell, who went to court over their rights to publish works critical of the agency.

Instead, Liechty's case began as a simple child-custody battle in Montgomery County over his 8-year-old daughter.

In her attempt to gain custody, according to court depositions, Liechty's wife brought in his former supervisor in the CIA, Robert F. Bodroghy, to testify against him.

Bodroghy, according to court records, depicted Liechty as a violent man who had allegedly threatened to shoot a colleague for interfering with his work.

Liechty, who denies the tale, lost custody of the child, but turned around to sue Bodroghy for slander.

This \$2 million slander suit is the basis for tomorrow's trial — but doesn't explain why the Justice Department entered the suit, marking most of the case's reams of papers "classified."

National security issues entered the case with Liechty's contention that Bodroghy was motivated by malice stemming from their disagreements in South Korea.

To this day, Liechty swears the CIA actively covered up its knowledge of bribery by Korean officials of American congressmen, and in doing so, obstructed justice.

While the Justice Department has investigated his allegations, it has never substantiated his testimony or acted on it.

Liechty claims that Bodroghy, and other CIA officials including Director Stansfield Turner, tried to silence him from divulging alleged CIA wrongdoing there.

He maintains that the CIA gave "hundreds of thousands of dollars" to Korean CIA officers for bogus operations, and that the CIA systematically misreported events to please the preconceptions of the Nixon administration.

"I didn't want to do it this way," Liechty said recently. "I wanted to reform the agency from the inside, but it just didn't work. When I complained to my superiors, they began to discredit me. Senior officials lied like hell, and then they took away my job."

Liechty, who joined the CIA after four years in a midwestern college, claims, "It was a tremendous shock getting booted out, because when you leave the agency, you leave your whole life."

But in looking back, he says it was-

n't a very good life anyway. He claims suspicion and jealousy were so all-pervasive in the CIA, he never made a good friend in the eight years he worked there.

The other agents were "the best of the worst — adult Boy Scouts shuffling papers and wearing Rollex watches, pretending to be James Bond."

The agency was "a madcap dream" according to Liechty, who complains that the operations were "filled with tremendous financial waste, totally unmonitored by Congress."

Liechty says he began sending oral complaints about "manipulation of intelligence" to his superiors in 1969, and later, written manifestos.

But he met with "a litany about President Park, and how necessary it was to keep a 'firm' government in the country."

President Park Chung Hee, the authoritarian ruler of South Korea for 18 years, was assassinated last October.

By 1977, Liechty said, "I knew I was being eased out. It was fascinating to watch, and sad."

Thomas Fortune Fay, Liechty's attorney, described the CIA as "asinine" for claiming national security issues are at stake in the case.

"The only security issues are about the security of a few congressmen who were never prosecuted for taking bribes," Fay concluded.

A CIA spokesman refused to discuss the case while it is under litigation, as did defendant Bodroghy.

Justice Department lawyer Stanley D. Wright, who will represent the government's interests at the trial, also declined comment.

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ON PAGE 12

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
7 July 1980

Washington Whispers

U.S. intelligence officials who in the past have discounted reports of unrest inside the Soviet Union now say that economic stagnation is so severe and the outlook so bleak they would not be surprised to see an epidemic of strikes of the kind that beset Russia in early May—and perhaps even more dangerous signs of discontent.

★ ★ ★

A major reason Western intelligence officials doubt that Russia will take any steps that endanger its grip on Afghanistan: Any move that leads to loss of Kremlin control might stimulate more restiveness in Eastern Europe, where only Soviet might keeps Communist regimes in power.

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ON PAGE D-3

WASHINGTON STAR
28 JUNE 1980

Appellate Court Orders Agee's Passport Restored

By Kenneth R. Walker
Washington Star Staff Writer

The U.S. Court of Appeals yesterday restored former CIA agent Philip Agee's passport, which the federal government revoked last year to prevent the intelligence critic from cooperating with Iranian militants holding American hostages.

However, the court delayed the effect of its action for five days following an emergency request by Justice Department attorneys last night.

The appellate panel split 2 to 1, in affirming a lower court decision that the State Department lacked legal authority to revoke Agee's passport.

The government moved to revoke Agee's passport last December after the former spy announced his intention, when the hostages have been freed, to assist the Iranians in analyzing CIA documents discovered in the American Embassy in Tehran.

Since resigning from the CIA in 1968 after 12 years service, Agee has been a vociferous critic of agency activities around the world. He has authored several reports purporting to name CIA operatives in various countries. He now lives in Hamburg, West Germany.

The appellate court's majority opinion by Judge Roger Robb concluded that the government could revoke the passport, "if (Agee) were indicted or otherwise charged with an offense."

"Under the (Supreme Court) decisions it is not enough, absent a formal allegation of criminal activity, that Agee's conduct may be considered by some to border on treason," Robb added. "We are bound by the law as we find it."

In a strongly worded dissent, Judge George E. MacKinnon contended there was ample justification for the passport revocation.

In addition to voting to uphold the State Department regulation used to revoke the passport, MacKinnon also concluded that Agee's "criminal conduct" also justified the revocation.

Although Agee has not been indicted for any criminal violations, MacKinnon said he could conclude that Agee was guilty of four criminal violations, including treason, and aiding and abetting the kidnapping of the U.S. hostages in Iran.

As to the treason charge, MacKinnon wrote: "It is plain that by (his) conduct, Agee indicated his adherence to the enemies of the United States, giving them aid and comfort."

The judge said Agee was criminally liable in the Iranian detention of the hostages by virtue of his offer to participate in a "tribunal" of American crimes against Iran. MacKinnon also noted Agee's "advice" to the Iranian militants to offer to exchange the hostages for all of the CIA files on Iran.

"Agee thus became a principal in kidnapping when he counseled the terrorists in their kidnapping violations to demand U.S. property..." the judge wrote.

In addition to taking the unusual step of concluding that an undicted citizen was guilty of serious criminal violations, MacKinnon went even further by writing "draft indictments" for each of the four alleged violations. The draft indictments have no legal effect.

The appeals court granted the government attorneys' request for a stay for five days to provide Agee's lawyers an opportunity to respond.

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ON PAGE A6

THE WASHINGTON POST
28 June 1980

Appeals Court Rules for Agee In Passport Case

By Laura A. Kiernan

Washington Post Staff Writer

The U.S. Court of Appeals here said yesterday that the State Department had no legal authority to revoke former CIA agent Philip Agee's passport.

The court's 2-to-1 decision included a blistering, 68-page dissent with five draft indictments of Agee and seven lines of verse from Sir Walter Scott.

The majority agreed with U.S. District Court Judge Gerhard A. Gesell that Congress had not authorized a federal regulation that the State Department contended authorized it to revoke Agee's passport on national security grounds.

The Justice Department went back to the appeals court last night and asked it to delay reinstatement of Agee's passport—which Gesell had ordered—until the government decides whether to go to the Supreme Court.

The appeals court agreed to a five-day postponement to give Agee's lawyers time to respond to the government's request.

The State Department notified Agee, who now lives in West Germany, in December that it was immediately revoking his passport. The action came shortly after a New York newspaper reported that Agee, an outspoken critic of U.S. intelligence practices, had been invited to participate in trials of the American hostages in Iran. Agee has denied receiving such an invitation.

Yesterday, Judge Roger Robb, writing for himself and Judge Patricia M. Wald, said Agee's right to travel is constitutionally protected and cannot be regulated or stopped by revocation of his passport—unless Congress specifically authorizes such an action.

Under prior Supreme Court decisions, Agee's passport could have been revoked if he had been charged with a crime, Robb wrote. Gesell repeatedly raised this point with State Department lawyers during hearings in his court.

Even though some may feel that Agee's conduct—including allegations that he has publicly identified CIA agents—may "border on treason," Robb said, that is not enough to support revocation of his passport. "We are bound by the law as we find it," he said.

In an emotional dissent, Judge George E. MacKinnon said the Constitution and laws were never intended to assist someone whose conduct "adheres to our enemies, causes serious damage to our national security and endangers the lives of our citizens."

The State Department was "well-advised to 'mark him well,'" MacKinnon said, quoting from Sir Walter Scott's "The Lay of the Last Minstrel."

MacKinnon said that revocation of Agee's passport was authorized under a federal law giving the president authority to act in hostage situations. National security concerns also justified the U.S. action, he said.

MacKinnon relied on affidavits filed by the government and by Agee to suggest that the ex-agent could be charged with five criminal violations, including treason, kidnaping and conspiracy to commit extortion.

"There are relatively few . . . citizens who have the same capability and vicious intent to damage our national security as has Mr. Agee," the judge wrote.

GAINESVILLE SUN (FLA.)
10 June 1980

Mocking the Tyrants

When the Rev. and Mrs. Paulding James were Episcopal missionaries in Uganda for five years, they were among those accused as "Zionist spies, CIA agents and paratroopers."

The matter was serious, because the charge was hurled by Idi Amin — the African nation's chief, now deposed, who instigated the murder of one Episcopal bishop and was prone to spearing small children in the gut.

Their innocence, of course, was the Rev. and Mrs. James' thin cloak of security against the madman. Had there been one iota of proof, Mrs. James said, "both we and the church would have been in mortal danger." And she added Amin was not particular and, if the charge was proven against one church, all would have been in jeopardy.

This is pertinent because of an abbreviated charter for the Central Intelligence Agency which is making its way through Congress. It effectively nullifies a current guideline which prohibits the CIA from establishing a "secret, paid or unpaid, contractual relationship with any American clergyman or missionary..."

Getting rid of that clause, says general secretary Claire Randall of the National Council of Churches, will endanger "the free and effective exercise of the church's mission around the world."

The CIA should not jeopardize any American's life or livelihood, short of treason or similar crime. But it does precisely that with its penchant for co-opting both people and various vocations as a "cover" for intelligence gathering or dirty tricks.

And the spooks go to great lengths. During the Vietnam War, the CIA or some similar outfit established a fake news service and infiltrated the American news corps in Vietnam, apparently for the exclusive purpose of spying on Americans or spreading "disinformation." The plot was discovered only when one of the secret agents was killed and concerned newsmen ended up with a body whose home and business addresses were fake. The other spooks had slap disappeared, and the operation was so hush-hush that the responsible agency never was identified. The CIA is the prime suspect.

So along with churches, the American news industry is concerned about that abbreviated CIA charter. American correspondents abroad also must get along with foreign governments — even those as kooky as

Idi Amin. If foreign governments know American newsmen are legalized as secret agents or informers, all newsmen are suspect.

So the American Society of Newspaper Editors, like the National Council of Churches, takes offense at the abbreviated charter which unleashes the CIA. It has protested the Carter Administration's obvious intent to use newsmen as intelligence covers. One member, editor A.M. Rosenthal of The New York Times, phrased the problem in these terms:

"We send correspondents abroad as correspondents, not as agents. They ask their host countries to trust them, to give them special access, to allow them to travel about, and to enjoy the privileges of a correspondent whose only job is to gather the news.

"If it's the policy of the U.S. government to decide that it can on occasion use a foreign correspondent (as a CIA agent), every American correspondent abroad immediately becomes suspect... It is so obvious that it is almost painful that this CIA policy puts into jeopardy the physical safety and ethical position of every American correspondent abroad."

The CIA does not have a charter. It is operating under some hasty restraints enacted after its power was sorely abused by the Nixon Administration. In contriving something better, the U.S. Senate has thrown in the towel and decided it cannot produce a comprehensive charter, at least this year. The original version of 172 pages is snarled because nobody has figured out how Congress can oversee CIA operations and still provide a margin of security for secret operations.

So the bill has been trimmed to a stopgap of four pages. In this version, the exploitation of clergy, journalists and educators is permitted.

In that form, it passed the U.S. Senate almost unanimously a few days ago. If clergy and journalists are to be protected, it's now up to Rep. Don Fuqua of the Second District and his colleagues in the House.

The revolting fact is that President Carter wants the CIA to have its way. Since Carter is in the saddle, that is clear intent to subvert the American church and press overseas, thereby jeopardizing the lives and livelihood of clergymen and journalists.

Foreign travelers of a tyranny, like the Soviet Union, are automatically assumed to be subverted. Where did we get the quaint idea that the United States is different?

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE C1-4THE WASHINGTON POST
29 June 1980

The Unresolved Questions in the Letelier Case

Why were warnings of Chile's plot unheeded?

Why was U.S. evidence withheld?

By John Dinges and Saul Landau

COOPERATION with "friendly" intelligence agencies was the established practice of U.S. embassies and the CIA abroad, and that included granting visas to known agents to conduct intelligence missions in the United States. But something about the request Ambassador George W. Landau received in late July 1976 from a Paraguayan government official in Asuncion aroused his suspicions.

The official, a top aide to Paraguayan President Alfredo Stroessner, assured Landau that Chilean President Augusto Pinochet himself was asking for a favor. The official said he needed visas immediately for two Chilean Army officers using Paraguayan passports to travel from Asuncion to Washington on an intelligence mission. The mission, he said, had been cleared with the CIA station in Santiago and the two men would be in touch with CIA Deputy Director Vernon Walters in Washington.

Ambassador Landau, according to his later testimony, issued the visas for the two men the next morning. But his suspicions led him to take two precautions: He had the agents' false Paraguayan passports photographed, and he sent the photographs to CIA headquarters with a full account of the affair — just in case the Chilean agents were lying about why they were going to Washington.

Landau's action was the first brush by a U.S. official with Chile's secret operations leading up to the assassination of Orlando Letelier six weeks later. In the weeks preceding the assassination of the leftist former ambassador and foreign minister, a flurry of cables and official communications went back and forth between the U.S. Embassy in Asuncion, the State Department, the CIA and the Immigration and Naturalization Service concerning the two Chilean agents, whose real identities — not learned until almost two years later — were Michael Townley and Armando Fernandez, the Chilean secret police agents who led the operation to kill Letelier.

CIA Director George Bush and his deputy, Gen.

Walters, were among those who personally received and acted on Landau's warning. The ambassador's cable, sent via a top secret State Department "back channel," went first to the office of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.

All that raises a series of disturbing questions. U.S. officials at the highest levels knew in advance about Chile's undercover mission in Washington and possessed photos and passport information. Was that information sufficient foreknowledge to have prevented the murders? Once the assassination occurred, was the information turned over immediately to the FBI by the persons and agencies possessing it?

The pictures and the advance information obtained by Landau and others ultimately provided the keys to solving the case. But, unlike fictional spy mysteries, all the pieces of the puzzle did not fall into place with the identification of the guilty. Instead, the U.S. agencies involved in the case imposed an extraordinary mantle of secrecy over the actions of U.S. officials before and after the assassination and over the records and files relating to those actions. Given the secrecy about the extent of U.S. government foreknowledge, the questions we raise can only be partially answered.

According to our reconstruction of events, the Letelier assassination was set in motion in late June 1976. Pinochet's intelligence service had received reports of Letelier's recent visit to Holland to lobby against a \$64 million investment by a Dutch company in Chile and of confidential meetings in New York between Letelier and a prominent leader of Chile's centrist Christian Democratic Party. Congress had just cut off Chile's military aid because of human rights violations.

Over the next three months, Col. Manuel Contreras, chief of DINA, the Chilean secret police, dispatched five of his agents on four separate but interrelated missions to Washington to carry out the order to kill Letelier. Of the four missions that made up the Letelier assassination operation, at least two were detected by U.S. authorities.

CONTINUED

The first operation got only as far as Asuncion. DINA agents Townley and Fernandez went there to obtain false Paraguayan passports from the Paraguayan intelligence service and proceed on to Washington. After days of delay, they received the passports under the false names of "Juan Williams" (Townley) and "Alejandro Romeral" (Fernandez).

According to Paraguayan intelligence chief Col. Benito Guanes, they said they needed the passports for a trip to the United States to buy weapons and intelligence equipment "for which [they said] they could count on cooperation from the CIA/USA."

Ambassador Landau was told the CIA was aware of the mission, but that it involved surveillance of Chilean Marxists who had infiltrated the U.S. offices of the Chilean copper corporation.

After issuing the visas and photographing the "Williams" and "Romeral" passports, Landau wrote a long top secret cable to CIA Deputy Director Walters, who he had been told would be meeting the two Chileans in Washington. That cable remains secret, but we learned some of its contents. In it Landau asked Walters to confirm that the Chilean intelligence mission had been worked out with the CIA. He also sent copies of the passports to the CIA via diplomatic pouch.

Meanwhile, Townley and Fernandez, unaware their pictures were now in the hands of the CIA but suspicious of the long delays in obtaining their false documents, returned to Santiago instead of flying to Washington as originally planned.

Landau's cable, sent July 28 via the State Department's "Roger Channel" to bypass regular distribution routes, reached the desk of CIA Director George Bush. Bush handled the matter because Walters, who was about to retire from the agency, was on vacation in Florida. At State, the cable was routed from Kissinger's office to that of Harry Schlaudeman, assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs.

Landau expected Walters, who had visited Paraguay on agency business only a month before, to take quick action. "I sent a message to Gen. Walters outlining the whole matter and suggesting that I presumed that this matter fell within the scope of his agency and that he was aware of all this. I said that if he did not, I suggested he deny them [Williams and Romeral] entry at the port of arrival," Landau said in a later deposition.

The CIA reaction was peculiar. A week passed during which Townley and Fernandez, had they followed their original plan, could well have had time to arrive in Washington and kill Letelier. Walters and Bush conferred about the matter, and finally on Aug. 4 Walters called Landau in Paraguay to tell him that the CIA was "not aware" of the Chilean mission, and wanted nothing to do with it. But Walters, as far as is known, ordered no CIA action to stop the Chilean mission or control it in any way.

Judging from his actions, Ambassador Landau was alarmed. He immediately informed the State Department that the visas issued to "Juan Williams" and "Alejandro Romeral" were revoked. He demanded that the Paraguayan official who had requested the visas retrieve the passports from the Chileans and return them so that he could physically cancel the visas.

Landau considered the matter so serious that he ordered lookouts posted at all U.S. consulates and ports of entry to arrest "Williams" and "Romeral" if they tried to enter the United States and to prevent them from applying for visas in any other country. Landau also made 10 telephone calls to a high Paraguayan official over the following weeks to insist that the Paraguayans return the passports.

In Santiago, preparations began for the second and third DINA missions. Four false Chilean official passports were sent to the U.S. consulate in Santiago with government requests for visas to the United States. On Aug. 17 the visas were issued for passports in the names of "Juan Williams," "Alejandro Romeral," "Armando Faundez" and "Liliana Walker."

Although two of the names were the same as those used in Paraguay, the DINA agents using the identities of Williams and Romeral were not Townley and Fernandez. They were Capt. Rene Riveros ("Williams") and Rolando Mosqueira ("Romeral"), who arrived in Miami Aug. 22, apparently on a mission to "clear" the use of the names in Paraguay by acting as decoys to test whether U.S. authorities would react to their entering the country.

Although the two men were not stopped at Miami Airport, their arrival was detected and reported to Washington. The circumstances and records of that detection, presumably made by INS officials as a result of Landau's lookout notice, remain unclear even within the FBI.

The agents, clearly intending to call attention to their presence, informed Vernon Walters' CIA office by phone that they, "Juan Williams" and "Alejandro Romeral," were in Washington. On Sept. 1, the two men arrived back in Santiago.

What did the CIA do, if anything? We don't know. It would have been logical for those who knew of Chile's ongoing covert operation in Washington to try to find out what Chile was up to, especially in light of the "Romeral-Williams" team's claim in Paraguay that their mission had CIA clearance. It is beyond belief that the CIA would simply have ignored a clandestine operation by a foreign intelligence service in Washington, or anywhere in the United States.

DINA and the CIA were in constant touch with each other through normal liaison channels. Walters' duties as deputy director included liaison with foreign intelligence services and he knew DINA chief Contreras personally. Did he or director Bush order their representative in Chile to tell his liaison counterpart in Chilean intelligence, "Hey, we know you're up to something in Washington, so either tell us what it is or stop it?"

Moreover, it was well known in intelligence circles that DINA had carried out assassination of exile leaders in foreign countries. Given DINA's macabre reputation and Letelier's prominence in Washington, it would not be difficult to speculate that if DINA were planning an assassination in Washington, the target would be Letelier.

One thing is clear: DINA chief Contreras would almost certainly have canceled the remaining operations to kill Letelier if the CIA or State Department had raised alarms about the "Romeral" and "Williams" missions and expressed their displeasure to the Chilean government. An intelligence officer familiar with the case said that any warning would have been sufficient to cause the assassination to be scuttled.

It wasn't. On Aug. 26, Lt. Fernandez, traveling as "Armando Faundez," arrived in Washington with DINA agent "Liliana Walker" (whose real identity has never been established). They conducted "preoperational" surveillance on Letelier.

CONTINUED

On Sept. 9, Townley, traveling on an official Chilean passport in the name "Hans Peterson Silva," arrived to head the fourth and final stage of the assassination operation. He received Fernandez' surveillance report, then arranged with four members of a Cuban exile group in Union City, N.J., to help him build and plant the bomb. On Sept. 21 it exploded under Letelier's legs, killing him and Ronni Moffitt, who happened to be riding to work that day with Letelier and her husband Michael, who survived.

Immediately, the assassination was put in the context of prior attacks on prominent Chilean exiles opposing the Pinochet government. Two years earlier, in a hauntingly similar car bombing in Buenos Aires, Argentina, the former chief of the Chilean armed forces, Gen. Carlos Prats, and his wife were murdered. One year before, exiled Christian Democratic leader Bernardo Leighton, an advocate of a leftist centrist front against Pinochet, was shot down with his wife on a Rome street. Both survived. DINA was widely believed to have been responsible. It would seem to go without saying that those who had detected DINA's covert operation in Washington prior to Letelier's assassination would immediately tell the FBI all they knew. The passport photos of "Romeral" and "Williams," the Paraguay incident and the actual entry into the United States of Chilean intelligence agents were obviously important leads worthy of highest priority in the investigation.

Moreover, the FBI's man in South America, Special Agent Robert Scherrer, made a major intelligence breakthrough one week after the assassination. He reported that Chile had organized a six-nation intelligence network called Operation Condor, whose functions included interchanging passports for use on missions to assassinate exiled leftist leaders. Paraguay was one of the members, with Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Bolivia and Chile. Scherrer, even without knowing about the "Romeral" and "Williams" affair in Paraguay, concluded in his Sept. 28 cable to Washington that the Letelier assassination "may have been carried out as a phase of Operation Condor." Scherrer's cable was distributed to the CIA and State Department.

What then did Bush, Walters, Landau and others in State and the CIA do with the "Romeral" and "Williams" photographs and information after the assassination?

been assigned to Assistant U.S. Attorney Eugene Propper and Special Agent L. Carter Cornick of the FBI's Washington field office. Propper, realizing that the investigation could not go far without cooperation from the CIA, met Bush two weeks after the assassination. According to one of those present in that meeting, Bush talked about the importance of Operation Condor to the Letelier case, but did not say a word about the "Romeral" and "Williams" pictures and the Paraguay incident. Nor did Bush, Walters or anyone else from the CIA subsequently volunteer their information about Chile's covert missions to Washington.

Instead, the CIA seems to have done just the opposite. Stories appeared in Newsweek, The Washington Post, The Washington Star and The New York Times saying the CIA had concluded that DINA had nothing to do with the Letelier assassination. In one of the stories, Bush was reported to have personally informed Kissinger of his conclusions about DINA's innocence. The sources cited in the articles suggested a "martyr theory" for the assassination, according to which leftists may have killed Letelier in order to create a martyr and discredit the Chilean government at a time Pinochet was improving his human rights image.

At the State Department, some but not all of the pertinent information about Chile's secret missions was turned over to the FBI on Oct. 22, one month after the assassination. The information included copies of the photographs of "Romeral" and "Williams" and the fact that two men using those names and official Chilean passports had entered Miami on Aug. 22 (but not that they had also come to Washington).

But the "Romeral-Williams" information and photographs played no active role for the first 10 months of the FBI investigation. When, in July 1977, the photographs were finally put to use, the "Williams" picture was identified and the case was on the way to being solved. The man in the picture, Michael Townley, was turned over to the FBI the following March in accord with a secret agreement signed by Chile under heavy U.S. diplomatic pressure. Townley confessed and became the prosecution's chief witness.

In the course of the investigation, there were at least five cases of withholding, destruction or concealment of key evidentiary documents. These incidents raise the possibility that an attempt was made from within the U.S. government to sabotage the FBI investigation and divert its focus away from Chile's military government.

1. For more than a year after the assassination, Assistant U.S. Attorney Propper and the FBI did not receive Ambassador Landau's cable to Vernon Walters fully explaining the Paraguay incident.

2. State Department Chile desk officer Robert Driscoll, who told a superior in a memo that "Romeral" and "Williams" were in Washington around the time of the assassination, ignored instructions to inform the FBI. The memo was given to the FBI from Chile desk files more than a year after the assassination.

3. Immigration and Naturalization Service information — based on I-94 forms filled out by all foreigners entering the United States — on three of the five members of DINA's assassination missions were removed from INS computers. The missing listings were "Romeral," "Williams" (the Aug. 22 Miami entry with Chilean passports) and "Hans Petersen" (the name used by Townley to enter New York Sept. 9, 1976). Moreover, INS officials conducted a file search in 1979 and discovered the disappearance of all paperwork that normally would accompany lookout notices such as those the State Department ordered posted for "Romeral" and "Williams."

4. Someone with access to U.S. citizen registration files in the U.S. consulate in Santiago removed the photograph of Townley on file there.

5. Other evidence in the consulate files was destroyed as well. After Townley's expulsion, FBI agent Scherrer discovered that U.S. Consul Josiah Brownell had ordered the shredding of consular files that would have included the letters from the Chilean Foreign Ministry requesting visas for agents "Hans Petersen," "Armando Faundez" and "Liliana Walker." In mid-1977, Scherrer had warned Brownell that the files might contain evidence in the Letelier case and should not be destroyed.

CONTINUED

The unanswered questions do not diminish the achievement of the U. S. investigators who solved the assassination and whose evidence stood the test of a jury trial in which three Cuban exile accomplices were convicted. But the actions taken willfully to divert the investigation from its course and delay it for at least a year are also crimes. Those actions should be subject to the same scrutiny as the assassination itself. If there are innocent explanations, they should be made public along with all relevant documentation in the case. Only then will the prosecution of the Letelier-Moffitt murders stand as untainted examples of the triumph of American justice.

John Dinges is a Washington journalist and formerly was this newspaper's special correspondent in Chile. Saul Landau is a Washington writer and filmmaker, and a fellow of the Institute for Policy Studies here. This article is adapted from their book, "Assassination on Embassy Row," just published by Pantheon.

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NEW YORK TIMES
27 JUNE 1980

'They're C.I.A.,' People Mutter

By Earl S. Martin and Pat Hostetter Martin

MALAYBALAY, Philippines — One might have thought we would be immune to it by now. We got it regularly during our years of refugee-assistance work in Vietnam — before and after the Communist takeover. Now here in the Philippines it is common fare. Yet when our next-door neighborhood confided to our student helper that she had decided we must be Central Intelligence Agency agents, the suspicion left us unsettled again. Such charges no longer sting; they've come too often for that. Now they just trouble.

The cause of the suspicion is understood easily enough. We are Americans, and, rightly or wrongly, many third-world people ascribe a certain omnipotence to the United States Government.

Furthermore, seeking identification with the people here, we are serious about learning the local language well. We spend much time listening to the concerns of peasant farmers and the urban poor — those most inclined to complain against their Government.

Once the label of covert agent is applied, there is virtually no way to shake it. Everything you do or don't do can deepen the suspicion. Anything unexplainable, like living a sacrificial life, or anything contradictory, can be attributed to "part of the cover."

In this light, it was especially disturbing to read recently that the Director of Central Intelligence, Admiral Stanfield Turner, was seeking authorization to use missionary and journalistic "covers" for C.I.A. agents around the world. If that was granted, the trust-building so essential to our service would become even more difficult.

So why all the concern? When the "C.I.A." tag gets pinned on us, why don't we just shrug it off?

Well, we're training ourselves to do just that. But we're still disturbed because, frankly, we perceive our goals and our methods to be markedly differed from those of the C.I.A.

Does that make us anti-American?

Not necessarily. It is our ultimate loyalty of the C.I.A. is to serve the United States Government. Ours is to serve God and "to bring sight to the blind . . . to release the oppressed," as the Book of Luke enjoins. Sometimes these two sets of goals may seem compatible. Other times our priorities are clearly different, perhaps even in conflict.

— As are our methods. While the C.I.A. sponsors much open, helpful research that is accessible in the public domain, a significant aspect of the C.I.A. involves covert operations, secret intelligence gathering, using paid undercover agents, deception, false pretense, falsehoods.

We are not arguing that governments should abolish such covert agencies, although we believe the world would be a kinder place without them.

We are saying that these covert methods of the C.I.A. stand in direct conflict with those of the church-service worker. The latter seeks to live in a spirit of openness and honesty. Genuine human and spiritual development must be predicated upon trust. Employing covert means is the surest way to destroy that spirit of trust.

So what should be our response? We hope that United States citizens and legislators will register concern about the Central Intelligence Agency's proposed crippling of missionaries and journalists by further entangling them in webs of suspicion.

The overall good will of other nations toward the United States, and even the ability to discern what is happening in other countries, may be increased if church workers and journalists are free to work without suspicion. Further, using them may encourage some to take subtle or overt anti-American postures to "prove" they are not Government agents.

But these are not in our opinion, the primary reasons to oppose the Central Intelligence Agency's use of such "covers." It is rather that the ability of church workers and news reporters to serve the cause of truth and human development can be severely jeopardized if they are wrongly suspected of covert operations. In the meantime, those of us in the field take solace where we can, knowing we'll never

fully shake the sticky suspicion.

There is some comfort. Here in the Philippines, for example, history records numerous occasions when foreign powers took unfair advantage of the uncunning openness of the Filipino people. So it is perhaps encouraging to see some signs of wariness and caution.

It is tricky business for a small country to survive amid the competing interests of the superpowers. Thus, while suspicions of us as United States intelligence agents are troubling on a personal level, we are also heartened that people here are being careful as they make their way in a world that still has too many covert agents.

Earl S. Martin and Pat Hostetter Martin are community-development representatives of the Mennonite Central Committee.

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BOMB EXPLODES KILLING ONE; GOVERNMENT BLAMES CIA
BY LESLIE SEDN

ASSOCIATED PRESS WRITER

ST. GEORGE'S GRENADA (AP) - A BOMB EXPLODED NEAR A MAJOR BRIDGE OUTSIDE ST. GEORGE'S THURSDAY, KILLING AT LEAST ONE MAN WHOSE SEVERED HEAD WAS FOUND NEARBY; AUTHORITIES REPORTED. THE MARXIST GOVERNMENT IMPOSED A STATE OF EMERGENCY AND BLAMED THE BLAST ON "A CIA IMPERIALIST AGENT."

THE EXPLOSION CAME A WEEK AFTER AN ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT AGAINST PRIME MINISTER MAURICE BISHOP AT A POLITICAL RALLY. THAT BOMB EXPLOSION KILLED THREE PEOPLE AND INJURED MORE THAN 20 OTHERS. BISHOP ESCAPED THE BLAST AND SAID "IMPERIALISTS" WERE RESPONSIBLE BUT STAYED CLEAR OF IMPLICATING THE UNITED STATES.

AUTHORITIES SAID THURSDAY'S EXPLOSION OCCURED SHORTLY AFTER MIDNIGHT BUT APPARENTLY DID NOT DAMAGE THE BRIDGE, LOCATED ABOUT 20 MILES NORTHWEST OF THIS EAST CARIBBEAN ISLAND NATION'S CAPITAL OF ST. GEORGE'S. BISHOP SEIZED POWER IN A BLOODLESS COUP LAST YEAR, OUSTING FORMER PRIME MINISTER ERIC GAIRY WHILE HE WAS IN NEW YORK ON GOVERNMENT BUSINESS.

THE ISLAND'S ONLY RADIO STATION, WHICH IS GOVERNMENT-OWNED, SAID THE BLAST HAD SET A "PATTERN OF ATTEMPTED POLITICAL DESTABILIZATION". IT SAID "A BOMB WAS FERRIED TO GRENADA BY A CIA IMPERIALIST AGENT" AND WAS TO BE USED "TO BLOW UP A MAJOR BRIDGE." IT OFFERED NO FURTHER DETAILS.

BISHOP ANNOUNCED THE STATE OF EMERGENCY SHORTLY AFTER KNOWLEDGE OF THE BLAST WAS MADE PUBLIC AND SAID IT WOULD REMAIN IN EFFECT INDEFINITELY. ROADBLOCKS WERE ENFORCED AND POLICE CHECKED AUTOMOBILES FOR POSSIBLE WEAPONS. ONE SOURCE SAID HE HAD BEEN CHECKED SEVEN TIMES.

A FEAR OF A POSSIBLE CIA PRESENCE IN GRENADA APPARENTLY LED TO A SEARCH BY POLICE OF HUNDREDS OF TOURISTS, THE MAJORITY OF THEM U.S. CITIZENS, WHEN THEY WENT ASHORE FROM A BRITISH CRUISE SHIP ON TUESDAY. AUTHORITIES SAID THEY WERE "LOOKING FOR CIA AGENTS."

ONE REPORT SAID THE OWNERS OF THE BRITISH CUNARD LINE STRONGLY PROTESTED GOVERNMENT ACTION AND THREATENED NOT TO RETURN TO GRENADA. THE SHIP'S OWNERS WERE NOT IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE TO CONFIRM THE REPORT.

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NEW YORK TIMES
27 JUNE 1980

Giscard Says Bombs Could Be Made in 3 Years — Work Started in '76

By RICHARD EDER

Special to The New York Times

PARIS, June 26 — President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing announced today that France had developed and tested a prototype of a neutron bomb warhead and would be ready in two or three years to make a decision about putting it into production.

Mr. Giscard d'Estaing's announcement, made at a rare formal news conference at Elysée Palace, marked a milestone in France's intensive review of its defense policy. French military leaders have urged adoption of the neutron weapon.

The United States has done development work on a neutron weapon but shelved it in 1978 before reaching the testing stage. The Soviet leader, Leonid I. Brezhnev, said in 1978 that the Russians had tested such a weapon "many years ago." Neutron devices destroy living beings with powerful radiation emissions, but avoid major structural damage from blast and heat.

The United States was aware that France tested a nuclear weapon earlier this week, according to American intelligence officials, but did not know it was a neutron bomb because the test was conducted underground at an atoll in the South Pacific.

Research Began in 1976

The French President said that research on the weapon had begun in 1976. He gave few details about the nature of the tests, and did not say where or when they had been conducted. Last month the Defense Ministry denied reports that a series of nuclear tests had been carried out at Mururoa atoll in the South Pacific.

Regarding production of the weapon, the President's stress was not so much on whether it would be produced in 1982 or 1983 as on whether it might be delayed a further two years to permit the development of a new vehicle for it. No details were given.

The announcement contained both political and strategic implications. The neutron bomb's nature as an antipersonnel weapon and its relatively short-lived contamination make it attractive to military planners because its use seems less onerous in war than other nuclear weapons.

The French are interested in the neutron bomb for the same reasons that other Western military men have favored it. Traditional French military doctrine, developed under President de Gaulle, called for massive nuclear retaliation in the event of a Soviet attack on its territory.

NEUTRON WARHEAD TESTED BY FRANCE; NO PRODUCTION SET

ry. French planners subsequently shifted to the view that it was not enough to wait for an attack upon French territory, but that even a Soviet move in West Germany would require a response.

The neutron bomb, less destructive of property than standard nuclear weapons, was one possible answer. Another was the development of missile delivery systems that would reach substantially beyond France's borders. The French have been developing a missile system called Hades that is mounted on moving trucks; the missile has a range of some 150 miles, and would supersede its present Pluto missile, whose range is only 75 miles.

Soviet Objected to Bomb

When the United States was debating whether to manufacture and deploy a neutron weapon in Europe, the Soviet Union objected vigorously. It remains to be seen whether Mr. Giscard d'Estaing's announcement today will elicit a similar reaction. The French President recently returned from a meeting in Warsaw with the Soviet leader, Mr. Brezhnev, and has repeatedly stressed the need to maintain détente and keep talking with the Soviet Union.

At today's news conference, Mr. Giscard d'Estaing urged that the recent Soviet announcement of a partial troop withdrawal from Afghanistan should be taken seriously. In Washington, and at the recent summit meeting in Venice, the tendency has been to regard the Soviet move as a propaganda gesture.

Mr. Giscard d'Estaing said the Soviet action should be seen as a sign that the Russians were looking for a political solution to the Afghan situation. "However limited in number, even though the numbers are significant, this withdrawal is a gesture in the right direction," the President said, and added that it was a response to the points he had made to Mr. Brezhnev in Warsaw. He added that "it showed Soviet recognition that it was in Afghanistan that the deterioration in international relations must be met."

The announcement about the prospect of a neutron weapon seems likely to stir up considerably less domestic opposition in France than it did two years ago in the

United States. The French Communist Party is expected to oppose the weapon vigorously. On the other hand, the Socialists, who have previously been against it, issued a statement yesterday that although the manufacture of such a weapon was not advisable "under present circumstances," research on it should be continued.

U.S. Said to Be Aware of Test

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 28 — The United States was aware that France tested a nuclear weapon earlier this week, but did not know that it was a neutron bomb because the test was conducted underground at an atoll in the South Pacific, according to American intelligence officials.

Seismic instruments detected the explosion, officials said. They said it had taken place at the South Pacific island used by the French for previous underground tests. Several such tests have taken place at Mururoa Atoll.

Recent American intelligence estimates of France's capacity to explode a neutron bomb were said to indicate that development on such a device was progressing, but officials did not anticipate this week's test.

Bonn Declines Comment

Special to The New York Times

BONN, June 28 — A Government spokesman here said today that West Germany had no official reaction to the French announcement that it had tested a neutron device and did not know whether Paris had informed Bonn of the test before today's announcement.

He said the question would likely be discussed when Chancellor Helmut Schmidt meets President Giscard d'Estaing during the French leader's state visit to West Germany from July 7 to 11.

Bonn has been irritated in the past by French failure to consult West Germany on questions of mutual interest and importance.

The French announcement comes just over a year after the question of stationing American neutron bombs in West Germany strained Bonn's relations with Washington. After Mr. Schmidt made a strenuous effort to win support for a decision to station the American warheads on West German soil, President Carter decided in April 1978 to postpone a decision to produce the weapon.